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**Proceedings of the conference "Memory, History and Identity in Bessarabia and Beyond",
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ON MEMORY, HISTORY, AND IDENTITY IN BESSARABIA AND BEYOND

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All but one of the four articles in this forum, were first presented at a con-ference entitled, "Memory, History, and Identity in Bessarabia and Beyond" held at the University of Pittsburgh on October 21-22, 2005. Charles King, the Ion Rațiu Chair of Romanian Studies at Georgetown University, gave the keynote address. Other speakers included Elizabeth Anderson, Maria Bucur, Rebecca Chamberlain-Creangă, Ludmila Cojocari, Hulya Demirdirek, Cătălina Gura-gata, Andreea Deciu Ritivoi, Katherine Sorrels, Dmitry Tartakovsky, Alexander Vari, and Mihnea Vasilescu. Monica Heintz, unable to attend, sent a copy of her documentary film *This Country, and That Other Country*. Christian Gerlach, Robert Hayden, Kirk Savage, and Gregor Thum served as discussants. Although only three of the original twenty-one papers presented in Pittsburgh appear here, we use this introduction to describe the origin of the 2005 conference and its main themes. We hope this strategy will encourage interested readers to lo-cate the other articles, or contact their authors, because, as we found out during the heated debates at the conference, they yield a rich inter-dialogue between them.

The last few years have been a fruitful period for the study of memory and identity in historic Bessarabia and the contemporary Republic of Moldova. In fall 2005 an unusually high concentration of specialists in this area found them-selves temporarily together at the University of Pittsburgh: Irina Livezeanu in the Department of History, Jennifer Cash in Anthropology, and Ludmila Co-jocari as a Fulbright Scholar with the Center for Russian and East European Studies and the Department of History.[1]

We initially decided to organize this conference with a focus on Bessarabia and contemporary Moldova to capitalize on our own interests and strengths in

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[1] In March 2005, Monica Heintz and Deema Kaneff organized a conference on the theme "Emerging Citizenship and Contested Identities between the Dniester, Prut, and Danube Rivers" at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle, Germany. That con-ference together with ours has since generated subsequent panels at major area studies conferences in the United States such as the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS) and Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN).

twentieth-century Romania, Soviet Moldova, and the contemporary Republic of Moldova. We intended to build on the synergy of ideas and research that we had been fortunate to gain in Bessarabian studies for the year, by bringing additional scholars working in the region to join us for a two-day exchange. Yet we also wanted to foreground the importance of exploring this tiny region"s connections to wider geographic, political, social, and cultural areas. We were convinced that important comparisons between Bessarabia/Moldova and its neighbors could - and should - be made with regard to nationalism, ethnic politics, cultural politics, war and its memorialization, and other related topics. Hence in drafting the program, we added "and Beyond" to our agenda, and took advantage of additional local talent at the University of Pittsburgh in choosing the commentators: Robert Hayden"s work on the legal and institutional bases of ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, Christian Gerlach"s expertise in the Holocaust, Gregor Thum"s work on European cultural history, and Kirk Savage"s investigation of the memorialization of the American Civil War were all perspectives that we wanted to bring into deliberate dialogue with ongoing work on Moldova and Bessarabia.

The four papers appearing here were volunteered by their authors, yet also form a natural set, as we will suggest below, in their common focus on the "making" of history, memory, and identity. The three papers which were first delivered at our conference, are, by coincidence, written by scholars hailing from the Republic of Moldova. This group of articles is joined by a fourth, written by the Romanian-born Irina Livezeanu in 1990, at a time when both the Soviet Union and communist rule throughout Eastern Europe were visibly decomposing.[2] We have chosen to republish her article here because it was originally published in a special issue of the American journal Armenian Review, and has remained relatively unknown among scholars of Moldova, Bessarabia and Romania. We also considered Livezeanu"s comparison of national movements in Moldova/Bessarabia at the very beginning and at the very end of the Soviet experiment and of the twentieth century, to provide a useful framing for many of the questions of identity and memory broached at the conference.

In particular, these four pieces focus on the history of "making" memory and identity in Bessarabia and the Republic of Moldova. One of the key themes of the conference was on the ways in which national identity has changed over time. This general approach is in keeping with the constructivist approach that has dominated studies of nation building for over twenty-five years. Yet, bringing together scholars from art history, literary studies, sociology, anthropology, education, and history also served to focus attention on the expressive, experiential, and active dimensions of identity formation. Thus Alexander Vari spoke of bull fights and urban planning in the crafting of Romanian and Hungarian identities at the turn of the twentieth century, while Andreea Deciu Ritivoi described the recent debates over the building of an Orthodox National Cathedral in a pre-war

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[2] "Moldavia, 1917-1990: Nationalism and Internationalism Then and Now," *Armenian Review,* vol. 43, no. 2-3, Summer/Autumn 1990, Special Issue on the Problems of Nationalism in the Soviet Union.

Bucharest park (Parcul Carol) that also houses a Soviet-era monument. Changing architectural, social and political landscapes correspond with the ways in which people experience and express collectivity. Our participants, however, engaged in a discussion about both the changing landscapes and people"s engagement with the new "terrain." Maria Bucur, for example, detailed how women"s engagement with the experience of war, through their initiation of various memorializing activities, has played an important role in "gendering" the Romanian nation. In their efforts to remember and memorialize war victims, women enter into the discourse on "war" and the "nation," and change what the "nation" can mean by infusing their identities as women, mothers, and wives into the discussion of "war." Rebecca Chamberlain-Creangă and Hulya Demirdirek explored other faces of memory and identification on – or just within – Moldova"s borders, for two "nations" that exist despite the political and theoretical odds. Demirdirek, for example, discussed the problem of Gagauz identity which is strong, despite lacking clear historical "memories" or even identity specialists interested in crafting them. For her part, Chamberlain-Creangă detailed the many everyday experiences – particularly encounters with the Transnistrian "state" – that lend collective life in Transnistria a particular "national" cohesiveness. In other words, conference participants acknowledged the shifting terrain of national identity in Bessarabia and nearby regions, refused to gloss over or explain away the theoretical or political "surprises," and sought instead to elucidate the mechanisms behind the shifts and sometimes sudden materializations of new (and old) identities. Thus the past-oriented focus of the conference"s theme also became a platform for a future-oriented discussion of the making of memory, history, and identity.

The four papers collected here thus reflect the broader discussions of the conference, while narrowing the focus to a more specific consideration of the history of social agency in making national identities in Bessarabia and Moldova. Taken together, they ask important questions about the role of intellectuals in identity creation. The difficulties involved with defining the "intellectual" are well known, as the term can be stretched or shrunk to include varying categories of individuals – the educated, professional scholars and educators, writers and artists, and even bureaucrats. Each of these four articles offers its own perspective on the intellectual involvement in identity creation.

Livezeanu"s article compares the national movement that emerged in the Soviet Republic of Moldova during the 1980s with nationalist activity in Bessarabia in 1917. When it was originally published in 1990, the question to which this article was ultimately directed concerned the likelihood that post-Soviet Moldova would unify with Romania. Indeed, political rhetoric at the time suggested this possibility, but Livezeanu doubted it. On the one hand, her careful investigation of the events of 1917 suggested that national sentiment alone had not driven Bessarabia"s unification with Romania. Rather, while early patriots in Bessarabia agreed on the importance of cultural work to raise Romanian-Moldovan consciousness, most of them did not seek geo-political change, and political debates focused primarily on questions related to agrarian reform. Thus, politi-

cally active "nationalists" hardly seemed to be executing a national agenda in their individual decisions in 1917, so much as responding to a series of emergencies brought about by war and revolution in Russia, Romania, and the broader European region. Livezeanu"s presentation of the 1917 unification as the result of a series of unanticipated conjunctures that can be analytically distinguished from national sentiment and rhetoric cautions against telescoping the presence of pro-Romanian cultural sentiments into an expression of a political agenda for unification. At a secondary level, Livezeanu also describes the development of a Moldovan national identity that was forged in the complexity of the Russian Empire and Soviet experience, and is therefore not merely "Romanian." This too, she saw in 1990 as a probable sign that Moldovan/Romanian nationalism in the Republic of Moldova would not necessarily yield unification.

Ionas Aurelian Rus"s article also presents an overview of Moldovan and Romanian nationalism in the Russian Imperial province of Bessarabia between 1900 and 1917, when both Moldovan and Romanian identities were present among the "Romanian" speaking population. In contrast to Livezeanu"s detailed analysis of historical events that reveals the contingency of political developments, Rus interrogates the historical material, attempting to refine some of the classic theoretical approaches to nationalism through the Bessarabian perspective. In this respect, the dual presence of Romanian and Moldovan identities among the educated population in early twentieth century Bessarabia, is significant both theoretically and historically. The two forms of national identity – one which imagines Romania as a parent-nation, and one which does not, has persisted for over a century. "Indeed, on both sides of the Moldovan/Romanian identity divide, participants in early national movements in Bessarabia were overwhelmingly from the same demographic: they came from the educated classes, and many "felt a nearer loyalty to Bucharest than to Petrograd."3 Thus, the nature of national identity in Bessarabia presents itself as a puzzle that cannot be unraveled by theory even before the intense nation-building projects of inter-war Romanian rule, and subsequent Soviet rule.

Other conference panelists stressed the role of education, and the responsibility of intellectual elites, yet more explicitly. In addition to Vladimir Solonari"s paper, which appears here, two other panelists – Elizabeth Anderson and Dmitry Tartakovsky – also addressed the responsibilities that intellectuals hold as professional identity specialists. They addressed – in particular – the field of professional history writing, and its translation to school curricula and the general public. Anderson"s piece especially made clear the extent to which the social category of "the educated" has changed in the past century. Whereas Rus and Livezeanu testify to a broad category of intellectuals that included in the early part of the century elementary school teachers, as well as priests, writers, and many others who cooperated in social and political activities, Anderson reveals distinct differences in the post-Soviet period between "elite" academic historians

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3 Rus cites Louis Guy Michael"s assessment of local sentiment for Romania as recorded in, *More Corn For Bessarabia: Russian Experience 1910-1917* (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1983), 113.

who write textbooks and the history teachers who use these. She argues that the appearance of a "pro-Romanian" orientation that spans both groups has much to do with patterns of power and structural subordination within the profession, and far less to do with a more diverse range of individual professional and personal identities among – at the very least – school teachers. Although Anderson"s piece does not appear here[4], we have described it at some length because it forms a natural part of the broader dialogue with the other four articles.

Vladimir Solonari"s article interrogates the moral responsibilities of professional historians in Moldova concerning the treatment of the Holocaust. But in this article, which is part of an ongoing review of recent Moldovan historiography, Solonari addresses not only with the work of professional historians such as Serghei Nazaria, but also the essays of émigré novelist Paul Goma, an influential voice among Romanian nationalists in contemporary Moldova. Goma"s indictment of the Jews as traitors to the Romanian fatherland in 1940 serves to justify their subsequent destruction by the Antonescu-led forces. Goma"s views may well contribute to the continued obfuscation of a difficult and painful past. Both the Goma episode and Solonari"s discussion of the Nazaria publication and scandal—point to the continued politicization of the history of Jews particularly during World War II in contemporary Moldova. Moreover, Solonari finds that the politicization is neither disappearing nor being positively transformed by the emergence of histories of the Holocaust (prior to the 1990s, it was simply absent from local history). Rather, Moldovan history-writing continues to be overdetermined, specifically in reference to the Holocaust, by competing Romanian and Soviet narratives of Jewish history in Bessarabia. For Solonari, recovering a memory of the Jewish experience in Bessarabia that is independent of other national interests is a moral imperative for professional historians "beyond" the scope of their own national identities.

We anticipate that historians and other intellectuals in Moldova might well rather not have their motives and professional activities subjected to the kind or degree of critical scrutiny present in the four articles gathered here. Memories of the Soviet experience, and the national struggles of the 1980s, are still central to collective identities in Moldova. Themes such as those highlighted here – the contingency of national political developments, as well as of nations more generally, the dual presence of Romanian and Moldovan national identities in Bessarabia prior to Soviet rule, the incongruence at times between languages and national identities, and the possible moral imperative of intellectuals to recover memories "beyond" or "below" those of the nation – may therefore seem less pressingly relevant to the local scholarly community than they did to us in Pittsburgh.

We would argue, however, that turning the analytical spotlight on intellectual activities also helps to elucidate patterns of collective social action. Skeptics of the constructivist approach that these articles share, are right to note that a

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[4] Elizabeth A. Anderson, ""They Are the Priests": The Role of the Moldovan Historian and Its Implications for Civic Education," *Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education,* June 2007, Vol. 37 (3).

danger of discussing the "constructed" nature of identity, particularly with reference to national identity, is that we can forget the tremendous importance of identities in individual and group life. Indeed, ethnic and national identities are not "false," but they are contingent and might have developed otherwise – or not at all – in particular places and times, and among particular groups.

The fourth and final article presented in this forum shifts the focus from the role of intellectuals and elites in "making history," to that of other social actors, including the state, families, and youth. Ludmila Cojocari"s study of the commemoration of May 9 (Victory Day) celebrations during the past six years of Communist rule (2001-2007) also shifts our attention definitively to the problem of emergent forms of memory and identity. Earlier versions of Cojocari"s article focused specifically on the celebration of Victory Day in 2005, when May 9 fell – coincidentally – on the first Sunday after Easter, Paştele Blajinilor, traditionally a day for families to gather in cemeteries to commemorate their deceased relatives. Thus, individuals with friends and relatives who died during World War II, had on that day, an option to participate in a traditional form of remembering the dead, or in state-sanctioned activities to mark the memory of World War II, and Cojocari"s investigations suggested that the choice to participate in one form or the other could be linked to an individual"s ethnic identity.

In the more developed version of her study presented here, Cojocari deepens her attention to the state"s efforts to reconfigure May 9 as a celebration of the beginning (and continuity) of Moldovan statehood. Thus the official celebrations incorporate a variety of seemingly contradictory political messages such as Ştefan cel Mare"s role as progenitor of the current republic, the Soviet liberation of Moldova during World War II, and the current state"s membership in a democratic "Europe," while maintaining celebratory forms that are highly reminiscent of the Soviet-era celebrations. In contrast to the state"s interest in creating new memories, however, she finds that participants and veterans are still deeply engaged with making meaning out of the war in terms of the historic Soviet-Romanian conflict. Indeed, for veterans, their families, and neighbors – remembering war, and particularly war-dead, continues throughout the year, most especially at Paştele Blajinilor. In contrast to her earlier expectation that ethnic identities might correlate with individual preferences for official versus traditional forms of commemoration, Cojocari"s expanded study reveals a rich social dialogue about the immateriality of national borders and armies in the commemoration of war-dead.

Like the other papers described above, Cojocari"s research demonstrates the co-existence of several historical narratives among Moldova"s general population. The post-1991 period has seen rapid shifts in the public portrayal of memory as political power shifts between different segments of the population and different political parties. Each succeeding party hopes to control memory and provide a convincing and lasting interpretation of the "unmasterable past," but singularity is elusive, as different memories persist among different sectors of society. Indeed, Cojocari finds it difficult to align distinct memory-types with particular social groups in contemporary Moldova, much as Rus found it diffi-

cult to do so for early twentieth century Bessarabia. Neither class, professional, nor ethnic memories seem to be consistent, but there may be other forms of memory – such as family memory – that are important, yet still under-studied sites for understanding how national and other collective identities are formed and re-formed in the land between the Prut and Dniester Rivers.

Taken together, the four articles here – like the others with which they originally dialogued – reveal new directions for the study of memory, history, and identity in Bessarabia and Moldova. They push "beyond" the previous attention that scholars of the region gave to the Romanian/Moldovan question – to a closer examination of local identities, histories, and memories, particularly related to those of ethnic minorities, and to less readily identified social groups. They also push "beyond" the accepted knowledge of a natural alignment between intellectuals and nationalism, and ask about divisions among intellectuals, the connections between ideology and political process, and the moral responsibilities involved in history-writing and memory-making. Finally, in maintaining a close local focus on Bessarabia and Moldova, they question and enrich existing theoretical understandings of memory, history, and identity.

Yet, although these claims can be made for the collected articles, it must also be remembered that Moldova (Bessarabia) has had no monopoly either historically or at the present moment on troubled nationhood, political instability, imperial domination, or on ethnic, religious, or linguistic diversity. Within Central and Eastern Europe we can think of many other areas - among these Czechoslovakia, Bosnia, Transylvania, Bukovina, and Ukraine - with similar pasts and shared current problems. Of course, each group or place has its unique development, and a particular mix of ethnic and linguistic factors with which to contend. Collective memory and identity are constructed out of these particular raw materials but are also shaped by politicians, intellectuals - often historians and writers—and institutions. As Rogers Brubaker, Margit Feschmidt, Jon Fox, and Liana Grancea have recently shown in an in-depth study of the city of Cluj-Napoca, "everyday ethnicity" is experiential and fuzzy, and shifting according to need and context, unlike the discourses of nationalist politicians. These authors successfully avoid a common "pitfall of work on ethnicity: that of reproducing the over-ethnicized view of the social world that is characteristic of many intellectuals and of ethnic and nationalist activists."[5] The papers presented at the Pittsburgh conference on Memory, History, and Identity are part of a similar project, which is – like its object of study – a work in progress, which can benefit from sustained dialogue with other cases.

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[5] Rogers Brubaker, Margit Feschmidt, Jon Fox, and Liana Grancea, *Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 206

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM IN MOLDOVA, 1917-1990[1]

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Rezumat

Articolul, redactat inițial în 1990, chiar în timp ce regimurile comuniste din estul Europei cădeau unul după altul, face o analiză comparată a mişcării naționale din Basarabia /Moldova în perioada revoluției ruse din 1917, şi în perioada anilor 80, deci cea a prăbuşirii comunismului. În ciuda sentimentului de recuperare istorică a Frontului Popular din Moldova, autoarea arată că au existat diferențe profunde nu numai între cele două conjuncturi, dar şi în gradul de dezvoltare a conştiinței naționale printre moldovenii de la începutul şi sfârşitul perioadei comuniste. Deceniile de modernizare, şcolarizare şi urbanizare sub egida regimului sovietic au avut efectul neintenționat de a promova identitatea națională printre moldoveni, în timp ce în 1917 mulți dintre cei mobilizați politic fuseseră mai mult orientați către reforme sociale şi internaționalism decât spre un veritabil naționalism.

Prologue

Historians most often write about the *past perfect* examining events and actions that took place long ago and that have been put to rest by the passage of copious time. We generally do our thinking, searching and writing from a safe distance measured in decades if not centuries. But in 1989 and in the early 1990s Eastern Europe in rebelling against communist rule seemed to be regurgitating its prewar past, or at least striving to bring it back. Like many of my East Europeanist colleagues, I watched the retreat and then sudden demise of communist regimes on television with bated breath. On the edge of our seats we witnessed national movements in the non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union reconnecting with the language of popular ethnic patriotism silenced four, five or six decades earlier.

Some Western Sovietologists had visions of liberalism"s second coming, and others diagnosed the return of repressed nationalism as if the Soviet system had frozen "natural" historical processes and ideologies in their tracks. As the communist glacier succumbed, they seemed to say, nature would take its, well … natural course. On the other hand, in the United States Francis Fukuyama proclaimed—in Hegelian tones hinting at the final evolutionary stage of human society—the end of history within sight, as a consequence of the triumph of the West in the Cold War.[2] He did not portend the end of time, but he imagined the possibility of many fewer conflicts, and, on the negative side, of "centuries of boredom." Historical events would keep occurring, but all within an endless age of liberal democracy since Marxism-Leninism was dead "as a living ideology of world historical significance."[3]

As Fukuyama"s prose suggests, 1989 was a time of hope and promise of almost apocalyptic proportions. People in Eastern Europe yearned to see the best of the past (a past from which they had been forcibly alienated by decades of totalitarian dictatorship) revived, although as a consequence of censorship and propaganda few Moldovan citizens alive in the late 1980s were well informed about the pre-communist era.

My own goals were more modest: to compare the perestroika-era Moldovan national movement, which had asserted itself during the Gorbachev years, and had taken me by surprise, with a superficially similar movement at the start of the 20th century to which 1980s Popular Front Moldovan nationalists were tracing their ancestry. As a student of Greater Romania and of Soviet Moldova I felt that I could understand the Popular Front of Moldova"s agitation and aspirations from a useful perspective. I embarked on an extended comparison of the two political movements and of their respective moments—one marked by Bolshevik dreams, the other by intense anti-Bolshevism. These "bookends" provided the contexts for two different stages of the national movement in Bessarabia/Moldova. But different sets of demographic and social profiles also separated the two national movements already set apart by the seventy intervening years.

[2] Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).
[3] Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest* (Summer 1989). Accessed at http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm, May 17, 2008.

Republishing this essay almost twenty years after I wrote it, seems appropriate in this issue of *Interstitio. East European Review of Historical Anthropology* where I join a group of authors who are grappling with "memory, history and identity in Bessarabia." They are some of the new generation of scholars of Moldovan nationalism, historiography and memory. They are also themselves in some ways the offspring of *glasnost* and of the Popular Front of Moldova"s triumph at the end of the Gorbachev era. The Front"s successes in 1989-1990 in unifying different opposition groups in Moldova in order to obtain the recognition of the identity of the Moldovan and Romanian languages, to elevate the status of this single language, and to bring back the Latin alphabet provided the social and cultural foundation for the Republic"s political independence. While the Front no longer exists as such, it evolved into a Christian Democratic political party and advocated for the unification of Moldova with Romania. Its glory days are certainly over as it has been marginalized by almost two decades of post-communist and neo-communist politics, but its chief achievement—an independent country in which Moldovans are sovereign—is fundamental particularly as Moldova"s international security seems solid. Moreover, without the Front"s early cultural and political broad based work, none of the intellectual activity represented here, nor much of what these authors analyze in terms of historiographic debates and a variety of commemorative options, would have been possible.

For the most part, this new generation of scholars has not yet felt the need to examine its own genealogy forged in the struggles of the 1980s - a time considered too close to be history proper, but not recent enough to merit politological attention. Thus my article focuses attention on an important but somewhat obscure corner of the recent past, a place from which a range of current perspectives and options stem.

I stand by the analysis that follows even if the issue of unification with Romania has faded in importance. But the language I used then was clearly dated: had I written on Moldova more recently, I would not have described "Moldavia," and I would have examined the Moldovan (not Moldavian) national movement. In Romanian, "Republica Moldova" represents the changed circumstances - political independence - of the country since 1990 by the simple abandonment of the Soviet and Socialist adjectives of the "MSSR." In addition, here as elsewhere, the Cyrillic alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet long in use in neighboring Romania. In English, however, the momentous political changes that established the sovereignty of this former Soviet Republic has been marked by a spelling shift from Moldavia(n) to Moldova(n). The latter orthography follows the original Romanian name for the province that was partitioned in 1812, *Moldova*, over the Russian *Moldaviya*, thus symbolically liberating the toponym, which is itself a symbol, from the imprint of Russian imperialism. I have brought the language up to date, and I have made other revisions—including in the title, the original version of which reflected the immediacy of the political changes I was witnessing.

Introduction

Somewhat to the surprise of Western observers, a sophisticated and powerful national movement asserted itself in the late 1980s among the Moldovans living in the Soviet Union. In an article published earlier I myself had concluded—in retrospect correctly, but much too cautiously—that the growing influence in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic of the Russian language and other factors such as mixed marriages did not necessarily "signal the demise of Moldavian language and nationality. . . . A constantly growing share of Moldavians," I explained, "will be living in urban environments where more effective communications may enhance their impact on the republic's ethnic profile."[4] That, of course, turned out to be the case with a vengeance.

The Moldovan movement flourished in the 1980s in the climate created by Mikhail Gorbachev's revolutionary policies. It was organized in part by a local support group for *perestroika*, and in its vanguard were the Moldovan intelligentsia, students, and above all, the Moldovan literati. The headquarters of the Popular Front of Moldova, founded in 1989, were at first in the Moldovan Writers' Union in Chişinău. With this leadership, the movement focused first on obtaining expanded linguistic rights for Moldovans - whose language had long lacked prestige in their own republic. This cultural focus, however, was only the first stepping stone to openly political demands. This is not surprising since language and cultural issues in the Soviet Union and elsewhere have often served as the first step on a ladder toward full-fledged national independence, and, where appropriate, irredentism. Moldova's nationalists achieved many of their cultural and linguistic goals, and they made some gains toward their longer-range political objectives which included not only independence but also, it seemed, possible, unification with neighboring Romania.

Activists in the Popular Front of Moldova (PFM) and other Moldovan nationalist groups in the 1980s traced their roots back to the Moldovan independence movement of the early part of the twentieth century, and particularly to the patriots active in the 1917-18 events that had led to the union of Bessarabia with Romania. Linguistically as well, their program drew on the achievements of the interwar years when, as part of Greater Romania, the province was largely Romanized, and when the Latin alphabet was adopted.

But the Moldovan activists of the Gorbachev years succeeded in some ways where their interwar predecessors had not. Their success consisted mainly of the fact that they built their movement from the "ones and twos" of the 1960s to mass proportions in the late 1980s, and did so *by themselves* in a well-paced, organic process. An expanded native Moldovan intelligentsia, recently urbanized, but with still powerful ties to the rural population struggled for—and won—the recognition and enhanced status of the Moldovan language, and for the correction of the official historical record on the identity of the Moldovans and their language. As in the case of the Baltic republics, Moldova's incorporation into the Soviet Union following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact became questionable when

[4] See Irina Livezeanu, "Urbanization in a Low Key and Linguistic Change in Soviet Moldavia;" Part 2, *Soviet Studies* 33, no. 4 (October 1981), p. 588.

the Pact was condemned by the Gorbachev regime.

In contrast to these 1980s successes, the record was less clear in the interwar period. Even though the territory of present-day Moldova had a hospitable home within Greater Romania"s boundaries from 1918 to 1940, Bessarabia, as this area was then known, was considered Greater Romania's most backward province. In 1917, when the Russian Revolution offered the opportunity for a Moldovan national revolution, the Moldovan intelligentsia was tiny, quite Russified, not very political, and not initially irrendentist in orientation. During the revolutionary period of 1917-1918, when Bessarabian autonomy, independence, and unification with Romania rapidly came to pass, national consciousness among Moldovans was still largely inchoate, and the social issues thrown up by the Russian Revolution seriously clouded the nationalism of many Moldovan activists. The Moldovan National Party was organized in 1917 with the indispensable help of Romanians from Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Old Kingdom, and unification with Romania was achieved ultimately under some pressure from and with the military assistance of Romanian troops. While many aspects of Russification were reversed during the Greater Romanian period, the policies of Romanization were often applied by "outsiders" - that is, Romanians from outside Bessarabia - and they elicited from some Bessarabian Moldovans not always gratitude, but also regionalist sentiments in reaction to what they perceived at first as a rush toward unification, and to the centralization "by pitchfork" applied by Bucharest after that.

It was thus only in the Gorbachev period of gradual democratization affecting all of the Soviet Union, that the Moldovan national movement ripened indigenously into a phenomenon worthy of the name. This maturation was achieved both because of the political conditions offered by the democratic reform program launched by Mikhail Gorbachev, and because of long-term processes of national formation that were a byproduct of Soviet-sponsored modernization policies since World War II. Massive industrialization and urbanization which was full-heartedly backed by Soviet policies—to the point of ecological irresponsibility—worked to further the formation of Moldovan national consciousness— by educating and bringing overwhelmingly rural Moldovans to more politically charged urban centers—and at the same time increased the Moldovans' frustration with the subordinate place their nation continued to hold within their own republic in institutions of higher education, in the party and state bureaucracy, and in the Russified cities.

In addition, despite the ultimate Soviet goal of merging the nationalities, an objective only abandoned in 1989, Soviet nationality policies until Gorbachev were oppressive, but also nurturing—if reluctantly—of Moldovan identity, language, and cultural institutions even during the period of stagnation.[5] By not proclaiming itself a nation-state, but existing perfidiously as a "unitary state in a federal shell," the Soviet Union, that sham structure of federal republics within which the non-Russian titular national languages were institutionally tolerated, has at least paid lip service to Lenin's original generous promises to the em-

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[5] Bohdan Nahaylo, "Gorbachev Disavows Merging of Nations," *Report on the USSR,* 3 February 1989.

pire's nationalities.[6] Despite the Moldovans' well-justified claims that they were the victims of Russification policies, the admittedly nominal respect accorded in the Soviet Union to national cultural institutions nevertheless allowed the non-Russian nationalities to conserve something of their identity and vitality even if in a deeply repressed and distorted form. To the extent that the respect Moldovans commanded was only nominal, and that they recognized themselves to be in danger of denationalization at the hands of their elder Russian communist brothers, this provided the Moldovans, like other Soviet nationalities, with the impetus for organizing to demand real recognition of their nationhood, and compensation for their victimization during the Stalin and Brezhnev periods.

Deconstructing the Past

The Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (M.S.S.R.) corresponds roughly to the territory of the tsarist province of Bessarabia (*Bessarabskaia guberniia*). In 1812 the Principality of Moldova was partitioned in negotiations between the Ottomans and Russia at the Treaty of Bucharest.[7] Moldova being a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, the latter disposed of the better half of the Moldovan Principality without consulting the Moldovan population, or even its elite.[8] Following the Crimean War, in 1856, the three southern districts of Bessarabia were returned to the Moldovan Principality. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 alloted southern Bessarabia back to Russia but in 1918 Bessarabia was united with Romania. In 1924 the Soviet Union created the Moldovan Autonomous Republic (M.A.S.S.R.) on the left bank of the Dniester. In 1940, following the Soviet Nazi Pact of 1939, the Soviet Union re-annexed Bessarabia. While Romania occupied the area during World War II, Stalin took it back after the War. The postwar boundaries of the M.S.S.R. excluded several districts of historic Bessarabia (incorporated into the Ukrainian Republic), and they included several districts of historic Ukraine and the 1924 M.A.S.S.R.[9]

The Moldovans who participated in the national revival movement in Soviet Moldova looked back fondly on the interwar period of their history, and on the period before the Russian annexation of Bessarabia in 1812. Their historical nostalgia focused particularly on 1917-18 when Bessarabia broke away from Russia and united with Romania. In fact, the unification of Bessarabia with

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[6] From Klara Hallik"s speech delivered June 6, 1989 at the First Congress of People"s Deputies, in Oleg Glebov and John Crowfoot, eds., *The Soviet Empire: Its Nations Speak Out* (Chur, Switzerland and New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1989), p. 37.

[7] George Jewsbury, *The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia 1774-1828: A Study of Imperial Expansion* (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1976), p. 34.

[8] Andrei Popovici, *The Political* Status *of Bessarabia,* (Washington, D.C.: Ransdell Inc., 1931), p. 66.

[9] Ibid., pp. 69-70; George F. Jewsbury, "An Overview of the History of Bessarabia," in Maria Manoliu-Manea, *The Tragic Plight of a Border Area: Bassarabia and Bucovina* (Los Angeles: Humboldt State University Press, 1983), passim; and George Cioranescu, *Bessarabia: Disputed Land Between East and West* (Munich: Jon Dumitru Verlag, 1985), p. 199.

Romania in 1918 was itself problematic. Nor were the two decades that followed politically cloudless, because of Soviet agitation for the return of the area to the U.S.S.R., because of the internal "family" problems between Moldovans and Romanians, and because a weak Moldovan national movement on the eve of the unification provided a fragile foundation for national integration.

While Soviet apologists for the reannexation of Bessarabia in 1940 distorted the interwar history of Romanian Bessarabia, it was nevertheless true that the unification of the province with Romania was a process, like such unifications in general, fraught with tensions. These derived partly from the fact that Russification policies in Bessarabia *had* succeeded to a significant degree, alienating the native intelligentsia from the peasant masses. Tsarist policies did not deprive the Moldovans of their mother tongue altogether, but they gradually suppressed Moldovan as a fully recognized institutional, educated, or "civilized" language. Thus, Romanian disappeared gradually from the schools and the churches, stopped developing as a literary language, and did not go through the fundamental transformation that it experienced in the Principalities, through the adoption of the Latin alphabet in the 1860s, and the further Latinization of the vocabulary.[10]

The Russification policies of the regime did not greatly affect the identity of the majority of the Moldovans, since in overwhelming numbers these were illiterate peasants.[11] The peasants "had remained almost untouched by Russian culture," and "they continued to speak their beautiful and enchanting ancestral language," even in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when Bessarabia was more effectively integrated into the Empire by modernizing institutions such as army, school, and railroad.[12] Imperial assimilationist measures, however, deeply influenced the small but influential elite of Moldovan society. As a result of successful Russification, by the last decades of the nineteenth century, Russian authorities could suppress Romanian language courses without eliciting much protest.[13] In the nineteenth century, many well-to-do young Moldovans left Bessarabia to be educated in Odessa or elsewhere in the western parts of the Empire.[14] To be cultured in Bessarabia, even if Moldovan, meant increasingly to be Russian or Russified. Imperial policies in the nineteenth century did

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[10] Earlier attempts at ridding Romanian of the Cyrillic alphabet, which had been used in the Principalities for writing Romanian since the 15th century, were made by Romanian émigrés in Paris after the 1848 Revolution. The Latin alphabet was adopted in 1860 in Wallachia and in 1863 in Moldavia. See G. Ivanescu, *Istoria limbii romăne* (Iasi: Editura Junimea, 1980), pp. 517, 664-65, 678-82. In the 19th century, Romanian adopted many borrowings from French, in addition to the earlier Latin.

[11] In 1897 the population of Bessarabia was 84.4 percent illiterate. In the rural areas where the Moldavians were concentrated, the proportion was even higher. Livezeanu, "Urbanization in a Low Key," Part 1, p. 330.

[12] Ministerul Instrucțiunii, *Lege pentru Invățământul primar al statului* (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1925), p. 19, and Ion Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei*, 3rd ed. (Czemowitz: Glasul Bucovinei, 1923), p. 374.

[13] See Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei*, pp. 376.

[14] Ibid., pp. 375-377.

not Russify Bessarabia through and through, but they relegated the Moldovan language to the rural, less educated, native population, and they stunted the normal growth of a literary Moldovan/Romanian language. Ştefan Ciobanu remarked:

The Romanian language of Bessarabia, the beautiful Moldovan language, survived intact only in the villages; [on the other hand] it degenerated in the mouths of the intellectuals who had gone through Russian culture. The books put together by the intellectuals bear this same stamp of Russian culture, being printed in Russian letters.[15]

It was hard for Moldovan nationalists in the twentieth century to remember that the Cyrillic alphabet was not imposed initially on Romanians by an alien cultural imperialism. The Cyrillic script was used in Romanian until the middle of the nineteenth century. While linguistically it might make more sense to write Romanian with Latin letters, the logic of Latinity did not make itself felt until the 1840s.[16] The first language of the Orthodox church, the princely courts, and high culture in the two principalities had been Old Church Slavonic since the tenth century. For its historic value the Cyrillic alphabet even had supporters among some Moldovan nationalists.[17] In spite of the importance of the Latin alphabet in modern Moldova, historically there was no necessary contradiction between patriotism and acceptance of the Slavonic and Cyrillic influence on Romanian/Moldovan. While the Latin alphabet may fit better the Latin structure of Romanian, and allow for an easier penetration of French, Italian, and Latin cognates into the evolving language, the use of Cyrillic had other advantages. It reflected the history of the early written language influenced as it was by the Church Slavonic used in the Principalities in the church and at court. The Moldovan language extolled by early Moldovan nationalists was a conservative, archaic idiom preserved best by the Moldovan peasants, in stark contrast to modern Bucharest Romanian, a tongue much changed by terms and phrasing imported from Latinate Western Europe, especially France.

Given the linguistic and cultural Russification of most of the Moldovan intelligentsia, the high level of political repression, and the large proportion of peasants in the Moldovan population, nationalism was not a mighty force in Bessarabia before the twentieth century. The revolution of 1905 witnessed the embryonic but fleeting emergence of a tiny national movement in Moldovan intelligentsia and landlord circles. More than anyone else, Moldovan students at

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[15] Ştefan Ciobanu, *Cultura românească în Basarabia sub stăpânirea rusă* (Chişinău, Editura Asociaţiei Uniunea Culturală Bisericească din Chişinău, 1923), p. 134.

[16] Ivănescu, *Istoria limbii române,* pp. 517, 678-79.

[17] No less a proponent of Cyrillic was the poet and priest Alex Mateevici. It is ironic that Mateevici was made the "patron saint" of Moldovan cultural nationalism in the 1980s. By 1917 Mateevici had joined those wishing to introduce the Latin script in Bessarabia, but earlier, Mateevici reportedly argued that Slavonic had been a good influence on the Romanian language, as had been the Cyrillic alphabet, which allowed the Moldovans to keep alive the ancestral tongue. By contrast, he thought, in the Romanian Kingdom the introduction of the Latin alphabet and of neologisms had spoiled the purity of the language. See Ciobanu, *Cultura românească*, pp. 326 -27.

Russian universities in the western parts of the Russian Empire were in the vanguard of the Moldovan movement.[18] But the flurry of open political and publicistic activity that began in 1905 was short-lived. It was followed by a reaction against the liberation movement which left only a few brave veterans to carry the torch to 1917. In the years before World War I national activity in Bessarabia was again very restricted, its most important focus being the periodical *Cuvânt Moldovenesc* (Moldovan word) started in 1913 under the direction of Pantelimon Halippa.[19]

Thus, 1917 did not find a well-organized and committed group of Moldovan nationalist revolutionaries. Certainly, many Moldovans were caught up in the insurgent fever of March 1917, but their concerns tended either to fall short of political nationalism, being culturally oriented, or to overshoot the goals of national liberation in joining the ever-louder chorus of socialist demands. Judging by the diaries and memoirs of the Transylvanian Romanian nationalist Onisifor Ghibu, in 1917 nationalism was not an ideology Moldovans embraced spontaneously.[20] Political nationalism in Bessarabia was slow to emerge because of the long years of repression and inexperience. Even culturally Moldovans lacked Moldovan and certainly "Romanian skills," that is, many educated Moldovans were ignorant of the Moldovan language, they lacked confidence in Moldovan as a language of public discourse, and they failed to recognize the identity between Moldovan and Romanian. Second, socialist ideology, spreading with the revolution to the Eastern front, was capturing the hearts and minds of many Moldovan soldiers and intellectuals. Ghibu, who found himself in Bessarabia at that time and participated enthusiastically in nationalist organizing efforts exclaimed frustratedly in his diary, "What people, lord, these Moldovans! Soaked up to their necks in internationalist socialist ideas and hesitant like rafts blown by the wind, they have no strong guiding principle!"[21]

For Ghibu, who had struggled for Romanian rights under Hungarian rule in his native province of Transylvania where the national movement had strong roots, the "guiding principle" too often missing among the Moldovans was the

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[18] Ion Pelivan, *The Union of Bessarabua with her Mother-Country Roumania* (Paris: Imp. des Arts et des Sports. 1920), p. 7.

[19] Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei*, pp. 394-403. One other short-lived Moldovan publication saw the light: *Glasul Basarabiei* (Bessarabia's voice).

20 While one should be careful of Ghibu's self-congratulatory tone in his rendition of events in 1917, his observations about the embryonic national movement in Bessarabia in 1917-1918 seem accurate, inasmuch as they derive from a detailed diary he kept in 1917. See Onisifor Ghibu, "In vâltoarea revoluției rusești: Insemnări 'zilnice' ale unui ardelean martor ocular—și mai mult decît atîta—al revoluției rusești în anii 1917-1918, începînd cu ziua de 12 martie și pînă în ziua de 6 august 1917," ms.; and his memoirs *Pe baricadele vieții IV: In Basarabia revolulionara (1917-1918) Amintiri*, ms., both in the Archive O. Ghibu, Bucharest. His memoirs are based on his 1917 diary and his rich library and archive. Moreover, and more importantly, Ghibu's observations ring true because they contain so much that runs counter to Ghibu's own nationalist aspirations. Having gone to Bessarabia to organize an irredentist movement, Ghibu was nevertheless honestly recording his frustrations.

[21] Ghibu, "In vâltoarea revoluției rusești", 28 April 1917.

national, pan-Romanian one. The first national Moldovan group to emerge in March 1917, the National Committee, was hesitant to engage in openly political work. The Committee's members thought of reviving the defunct Moldovan cultural society from 1905, whose statutes, Ghibu was outraged to note, were written in Russian. Like the moderates of 1905, they preferred sticking to a cultural program of establishing choirs and schools and distributing Moldovan books.[22] The idea, suggested by Ghibu, of founding a Moldovan National Party (MNP) that would send delegates to the projected Constituent Assembly was greeted as mad by Moldovan patriots, who had learned to live without political representation under Russian rule.[23]

Some patriots favored cultural work even after the founding of the MNP because they claimed to be repelled by politics, but perhaps also because they had so little political experience.[24] Others, like the educated boyar Pavel Gore, were reluctant to join the MNP because they felt that the Moldovans' needs could be satisfied within the framework of the Provisional Government and the zemstva, just as later, in 1918, many Moldovans preferred a less radical solution than union with Romania.[25] Gore argued that Bessarabia could not have full autonomy as easily as Poland since "we don't have deeply-rooted political traditions, we don't have people, we don't have the means. From the historical point of view Bessarabia doesn't have the right to be an independent state."[26] From Ghibu's nationalist perspective, there were other heresies afloat among the Moldovans, such as the idea of an autonomist, instead of a National Moldovan Party, that would unite all Bessarabians, regardless of nationality, in the struggle for the province's autonomy.[27]

Given such doubts and the plurality of political opinions among Moldovans in 1917, the MNP's success in establishing itself as the party of most politically-conscious Moldovans stands out.[28] Ghibu, who was at the center of the national movement in Moldova, felt that at the end of April, after six weeks of intense debates and propaganda, "the national idea had spread to cooperative members, the clergy, some of the teachers, and the countryside."[29] Nevertheless, he continued to be frustrated with abundant signs of abiding Russification, such as correspondence in Russian from new MNP adherents, Moldovans signing their names in Russian, meetings conducted in Russian, etc. Such evidence of Russification reinforced his belief that the Moldovans could not do the national work on their own, and that the Romanians from across the Prut were indispensable to the Moldovan movement: "Were it not for us being around here, it would have been 'good bye party, good bye language.' These locals [the Moldovans] would not

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[22] *Pe baricadele vieții*, p. 51.

[23] Ibid. pp. 52-53.

[24] Ibid., pp. 80-81.

[25] Ibid. p. 23.

[26] As reported in Ghibu, "In vâltoarea revoluției rusești", 4 April 1917.

[27] Ibid., 24 April 1917.

[28] Pe baricadele vieții, pp. 93, 111-113.

[29] "In vâltoarea revoluției rusești", 28 April 1917.

have spoken Romanian hardly at all. And most of all, they wouldn't have worked the Romanian way."[30]

Once established, however, the MNP's heated debates over priorities reflected the deep ambivalence of the Moldovan intelligentsia toward nationalism. Some Moldovans were interested primarily in social revolution or in a national revolution for the Moldovan peasantry. These radicals had formed their political identity in 1905 in the struggle against the imperial government, but also in opposition to moderate national reformists, priests, and landowners interested mostly in cultural freedoms to avoid rocking their own comfortable economic boat. In 1917, social radicals were unwilling to collaborate in the National Party with class enemies such as priests and landowners. For example, Pantelimon Halippa did not want to make "common cause with the priests and boyars, whom he called 'disgusting excrements' and a 'shame to our time"." Halippa cursed the boyars and defended the class interests of the peasantry, maintaining also that "only the peasant was truly Moldovan."[31] His polemics captured fairly accurately the process of uneven Russification described above (although there certainly were some Moldovan landlords). But they also reflected the populist ideology of the "Russian" Revolution in which the Moldovans were participating.

The dilemma between "social" or "national" revolution was clearest in debates of the Party's agrarian program. In the beginning this conflict was buried and a nationalist program won out briefly with prominent demands for national autonomy at different levels. It was drafted by Ghibu, but only passed after long and bitter debate on April 4, 1917. In summary, the program committed the MNP to struggle to strengthen the freedoms achieved during the February Revolution, to establish a new form of government reflecting these ideals and to struggle for broad autonomy for Bessarabia in all areas, while remaining tied to Russia and while protecting the national rights of all inhabitants. It called for all domestic legislation to be drafted by a provincial diet called Sfatul Țării. It further stipulated that local persons "from the people" take charge of administration, which was to be conducted in the people's language, reserving the Russian language for relations with the central government; that in schools instruction take place in the people's national language, with Russian offered as a course of study; that Moldovans no longer be drafted outside of Bessarabia, and that local recruits receive military instruction in Moldovan; an end to the colonization of foreigners on Bessarabian land, and the allotment of land to needy peasants; and that the economic life of Bessarabia be redressed and its income used strictly for local needs. Finally, the program called for the same national rights granted to non-Moldovans in Bessarabia to be extended to the Moldovans living across the Dniester.[32]

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., 24 April, 1917.

[32] See Ibid., 4 April 1917, and *Pe baricadele vieții*, pp. 62-65. According to Ştefan Ciobanu, the program was not Ghibu's, but Vasile Stroescu's, the man who briefly became the symbolic president of the party. See Ştefan Ciobanu, *La Bessarabie: Sa Population, Son Passé, Sa Culture* (Bucharest: Impr. Nationale, 1941), pp. 69-70. I am inclined to believe that the

This original MNP program gave barely a nod to the agrarian question. The point on land was paired tellingly with a stipulation against foreign colonization, as if to suggest that any shortage was an outgrowth of the national question. Although initially reconciled to this program, Halippa and other Moldovans with socialist leanings still favored a broad redistribution of land without payment by the peasants, especially after hearing the demands of Moldovan soldiers in Odessa in mid-May. The socialists considered national autonomy for Moldova as secondary to social justice—meaning a strong promise of land to the peasants. The soldiers had little respect for private property as such, since by their sacrifices in the war they had earned the right to the land, while the landlords had lost theirs by keeping themselves safe from the fighting.[33]

At a large street demonstration held on May Day in Odessa, 30,000 to 40,000 Moldovan soldiers accepted the MNP program, but they insisted on changing radically the point about land, demanding "all land to the people without pay."[34] Thus, the MNP's erstwhile clear priorities—first the national, then the social—drafted by a Transylvanian were muddled up and even reversed by Moldovan soldiers, and the momentum towards autonomy was momentarily lost. Ghibu had counted on the May Day soldiers' meeting serving as the occasion for a declaration of Moldovan autonomy. Instead there had been a radical change in the party program, which Ghibu explained away as "not an emanation of the Moldovan soul, but an excrescence of the extremist revolutionary theoreticians from Petrograd."[35] Regardless of his interpretation, the Moldovan soldiers were themselves voicing the demands of the radical Soviets. Later at a peasant congress on May 21-24, Halippa called on the peasants of all nationalities to unite. By not speaking of the Moldovans' right in particular, he too in effect went against the original MNP program, replacing the national with the social idea. The congress as a whole voted for a federated parliamentary republic, rather than an autonomous Bessarabia.[36]

The socialist ideology sweeping through Moldovan ranks was inimical to wealthy landowning Moldovans - some of whom were part of the national movement too - as well as to many Romanians from outside the province. Ghibu feared "a fratricidal war for the land," a war that would divide the nation rather

program was drafted by Ghibu and that Stroescu was only then chosen president with Ghibu's support. In fact, Ghibu and Halippa together went to Odessa to enlist Stroescu at the head of their party. They found Stroescu playing solitaire and speaking out against politics and for cultural work, though in the end they managed to persuade him to take on the job. See Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieţii*, pp. 65-66, 79-81, 91-93. One reason why Ciobanu might have chosen to attribute the program to Stroescu in 1941 when he published his study, was that Bessarabia had by then been lost by Romania to the Soviets. An account of 1917 that portrayed political activity as completely "native" as opposed to directed by a Transylvanian was more favorable.

[33] "In vâltoarea revoluţiei ruseşti"*,* 21 April, 1917.

[34] *Pe baricadele vieţii*, p. 179.

[35] Ibid., pp. 180-183.

[36] Ibid., pp. 193-198.

than integrate it.[37] "Today," he wrote in his diary, "there cannot be a question of classes, but only of Romanians."[38] Ghibu planned to explain to the peasants: "We are altogether the state . . . therefore justice to all of us! Speaking to him thus, honestly and sincerely, the peasant will understand and will accept the more moderate point of view."[39] Others agreed. At an Odessa meeting a Transylvanian officer vented his frustration:

> Gentlemen, Romania is under the German heel, Transylvania under the Hungarian one, and the Bukovinians are even worse off. The only Romanian region which is free and untouched by the ravages of war is Bessarabia. And you, who have until now had neither school, nor church, nor anything national, now you want to know nothing other than land, and only land.[40]

The agrarian question and the Moldovan soldiers' social radicalization threw the MNP into crisis, bringing it to the brink of a split, one faction following the original Chişinău program, another advocating the more radical "Odessa program." Some in the Party proposed dropping "National" from the Party's name, others favored changing its orientation to a Bessarabian rather than a Moldovan party.[41] As the socially radical view was gaining strength in the Party, two landowners, Herța and Gore, had to withdraw from the leadership, and on May 31 the Party drew up plans for the redistribution of land.[42] The Party's publication, *Cuvânt moldovenesc*, changed its tone, emphasizing democracy and social justice over national autonomy.[43] Indicative of this crisis was the fact that for the fall elections of Bessarabian delegates to the Constituent Assembly, the Moldovan candidates ran on several lists, including a *zemstvo* list of mixed national composition, an MNP list, and a Moldovan Socialist Revolutionary list composed of Moldovan soldiers.[44]

As the propaganda efforts of the Moldovan nationalist vanguard broadened in the spring and summer of 1917, not only did the conflict between different ideologies come into view, but also abundant evidence of the distance separating the Moldovans from a Romanian identity. Thus, for instance, teachers who agreed to join a Moldovan teachers' association and even to pay dues to the organization signed the statutes in Russian; they approached Romanian books with awe and read slowly and haltingly; and most of them said that they did "not know Romanian, only Moldovan."[45] Although differences between Moldovan dialects (especially in speech)—on both sides of the Prut—and literary Romanian certainly exist, and were undoubtedly deepened by the political separation imposed on Bessarabia in the century since 1812, from a strictly linguistic point

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[37] "In vâltoarea revoluției rusești", 24 April, 1917.

[38] Ibid., 19 March, 1917.

[39] Ibid., 26 April, 1917.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., See also Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții,* pp. 268-269.

[42] Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții,* p.276.

[43] Ibid., p. 305.

[44] Ibid., pp. 550-552.

[45] "In vâltoarea revoluției rusești", 30 April, 1917.

of view the idiom of Bessarabian Moldovans is not a language apart.[46] But the problem encountered by Ghibu and others in 1917 and the interwar years was only partly linguistic. Ghibu had to "translate" his draft of the MNP program, and presumably other articles and speeches, into the "popular" Moldovan form, *"limba prostească"* before publishing it in the local press.[47] The problem was largely psychological: educated Moldovans, who could understand and speak Moldovan, but who generally used Russian in public, did not consider their native language appropriate for elevated discourse.[48] Although Moldovans granted that Romanian was a proper language, they felt that they did not know Romanian.

Ghibu addressed this issue in his diary, as he observed it at a zemstvo meeting of Moldovan teachers. One teacher told Ghibu that she had become completely Russian and wanted to stay that way Ghibu reproduced their exchange:

> I say [to her]: these were the circumstances under the old regime, but now things are going to change. [She answered:] "Yes, but I don't want to make myself Moldovan any more; I'm staying Russian. There is nothing greater or more beautiful than Russia! The Moldovans have no literature." I tell her that they do, and even a very beautiful one, but she says that that [literature] is Romanian. I tell her that there is only one people, one language, etc. . . . All these female teachers are resistant to Moldovan tendencies, in which they see separatism. They say that if they think in Russian, then they are Russian.49

A related question was that of the Cyrillic vs. the Latin alphabet, which had replaced the Cyrillic script in Romania but never in Bessarabia. In 1917 (as in the 1980s) the "alphabet question" provoked heated debates. The Moldovan School Commission had to decide on the publication of new school texts, and thus on the alphabet in which to print these. Initially most of the commission members, and all of the clergymen on it, favored the "Russian" alphabet. The faction that militated for the Latin script in the end won unanimously.[50] The same battle was fought again and very heatedly at the Teachers' Congress of May 26. After much argument the Latin script won out, though the clergy remained opposed to it even after it became official.[51] The Latin-letters printing press was

46 See Kenneth Rogers, "Moldavian, Romanian, and the Question of a National Language," in Manoliu-Manea, ed. *The Tragic Plight, passim.*

47 Ghibu's entry of 5 April in his diary, *"In vâltoarea revoluției rusești,"* gives a clue as to the meaning of prost or *prostesc* in Moldovan. In Romanian these adjectives mean dumb or simple-minded, but in Moldovan they seem to convey rather the sense of "popular" or "folkish;" as in "the simple language of the people."

48 Moldovan teachers who were retooling themselves in the educational uses of Moldovan also argued that Moldovan was "limba prostimei, "the language of the popular masses. See report by Petru Bogdan, Archivele Statului, București, Fond Ministerul Instrucțiunii și Cultelor, 1918/193/12-15.

49 "În vâltoarea revoluției rusești," 30 April, 1917.

50 Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții*, pp.237, 516.

51 Ibid., p. 266, and Emmanuel de Martonne, *What 1 Have Seen in Bessarabia* (Paris: Imp. des arts et des sports, 1919), pp. 34-35.

inaugurated in Moldova on September 8, 1917.[52]

The language question was one telling aspect of the national identity of the Moldovans. While nationalists claimed that there was no difference between Moldovans and Romanians, the identity of the two was not universally accepted by Moldovans in 1917. At a teachers' congress in May 1917 the keynote speaker, Pavel Gore, addressed the audience as "Romanian brothers" but he elicited shouts of "We are not Romanian, we are Moldovan!"[53] The audience also corrected Gore when he read patriotic verses about the Romanian language. The language was Moldovan, the audience yelled out.[54] While this opinion dominated, it was not unanimous. For example, Ioan Codreanu, a peasant from Soroca district, was eloquently pro-Romanian:

> Well brothers, I have read all kinds of books and I searched to see who we are. And I found out that in truth we are Romanians (long applause) ... Say it without fear and wherever you go: we are Romanians, Romanians we are called! (long applause).[55]

Codreanu's speech suggests that one reason for some Moldovans' sense of a separate identity may have been long-inculcated fear: a pan-Romanian identity represented a defiant stance vis-à-vis imperial arrangements, while a separate Moldovan one did not. In May 1917 some Moldovans were becoming defiantly Romanian. But most continued to identify themselves as Moldovans. The priest Alexe Mateevici who spoke later at the Teachers' Congress attests to this:

> With sorrow we saw today that among yourselves not everyone is united over certain just ideas. Some consider themselves Moldovans, others—*fewer in number*[56] —[consider themselves] Romanians . . . . Yes, we are Moldovan sons of old Moldova, but we are part of the great body of *Românism* settled throughout Romania, Bukovina, and Transylvania (applause). Our brothers from Bukovina, Transylvania, and Macedonia don't call themselves after the places where they live, they call themselves Romanians. This is what we must do also.[57]

Mateevici's advice was probably followed increasingly as Moldovans grew into a Romanian identity made safer day by day by the growing national movement and the concrete steps taken to institutionalize Moldovan. By September of 1917, when the Congress of Nationalities of the Russian Empire opened in Kiev, the MNP president, Teofil Iancu, had more trenchant comments on being Moldovan. He saluted the Congress in the name of the Romanians from Bessarabia and then elaborated:

> Many of you have heard of Moldovans, but few of you know that a Moldovan nation does not exist. There exists, however, a *Romanian nation*. The term

[52] Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții,* pp. 511-513, 524.

[53] Ibid. p. 251.

[54] Ibid. pp. 251-252.

[55] Ibid. p. 257.

[56] Emphasis added.

[57] Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții*, p. 258.

"Moldova/Moldovan" is only territorial, not national, and if we call our committees and organizations "Moldovan," we do so for purely tactical reasons, because the word "Romanian" sounds too harsh to the ears of our enemies who are many, as are yours, and it [the word "Romanian"] would justify their accusing us of separatism.[58]

These examples of the political, linguistic, and cultural upheaval among Moldovans in 1917 illustrate the fact that the Moldovan national movement did not emerge full-grown in 1917 claiming autonomy, independence, and unification with Romania. Rather, the infant movement toddled painfully to its feet hampered by the daunting dowry of tsarist Russification policies and by the competition between national and class ideologies brought to the fore by the social revolution unfolding in Russia's borderlands simultaneously with the national one. Moreover, Moldovan nationalism was helped along by nationalists from across the Prut, like Onisifor Ghibu, from whose testimony I cite. Further progress toward political independence and unification with Romania may also have been unlikely without Romania's military and political involvement.

An institution fondly recalled by the Moldovan national movement in the 1980s was Sfatul Ţării, the "State Council" or "Supreme Soviet" formed in Bessarabia in 1917.[59] Suggestions were made in 1989 that the Moldovan Supreme Soviet should be renamed Sfatul Ţării in memory of the first Sfat, but the proposal was defeated on April 26, 1990.[60] Sfatul Ţării's votes in favor of unification allowed Bessarabia"s union with Romania in 1918. It is thus important to understand its creation and functioning in 1917-18.

Calls for the formation of Sfatul Ţării came first in the MNP program, which still envisaged Bessarabia as part of the de-monarchized Russian federation. But other revolutionary developments also affected the steps Bessarabia took toward independence and unification with Romania. First, the anarchic conditions brought about by the retreat of mutinying troops from the front may have prompted Bessarabians to try to insulate themselves from the revolutionary chaos. In May 1917 sixteen detachments of Moldovan soldiers, comprising a total of 1600 men, were formed in an attempt to end the contagion of indiscipline and to defend Bessarabian communities.[61] Later these native units proved insufficient to maintain order in the province, which led to the invitation of outside military aid.

Second, the internal discussion about Bessarabia's status and the role Sfatul Ţării should play may have been accelerated by the independence process in neighboring Ukraine. In July 1917, the newly formed Ukrainian Rada called for provincial delegates, including one from Bessarabia, to convene in Kiev.[62] In July

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[58] Ibid. p. 419.

[59] ATEM report, "Moldavia People's Front Rally,"15 August 1989, translated in *Foreign Broad-cast Information Service: Daily Report Soviet Union (FBIS-SOV)*, 12 September 1989.

[60] *Sovetsakaya Rossiya*, 27 April 1990, translated in FBIS-SOV, 9 May 1990.

[61] Pelivan, *The Union,* p. 22.

[62] Ciobanu, *La Bessarabie*, p. 72.

and August, politically active Moldovans became determined to prevent annexation by Ukraine, but to call their own "Rada."[63] Ukrainian claims to Bessarabia were temporarily settled with a voluntary disclaimer of territorial ambitions to Bessarabia.[64] But these claims were renewed the following winter when Ukraine tried to get German cooperation in occupying southern and northern areas of Bessarabia.[65]

In the fall of 1917 the demand for instituting Sfatul Țării was taken up by the large congress scheduled for October 20-24 in Chișinău.[66] It convened over 500 delegates representing 250,000 Moldovan soldiers. Ostensibly intended to organize a Moldovan regiment to defend Bessarabia against the anarchy of deserting soldiers from the Romanian front, the congress met right before the Bolshevik insurrection in Petrograd and its decisions practically coincided with the historic Bolshevik coup.[67] In fact, the congress's agenda went well beyond the task of military reorganization, and the participants were both civilians and military. Present were young officers, soldiers, students, teachers, peasants, and nationalist politicians.[68]

The congress voted unanimously for the territorial and political autonomy of Bessarabia to be governed by Sfatul Țării and made up of Moldovan and non-Moldovan delegates in the proportion of approximately two-thirds to one-third.[69] The congress also resolved to nationalize the army and raise the number of Moldovan units from 16 to 100; to nationalize the schools and the bureaucracy; to take over and redistribute all the land; and to transform Russia into a democratic federative republic.[70] While not trying to detract from the legitimacy of Sfatul Țării, which he considered "a genuine governing organ," Charles Upson Clark observed that "the Diet was mainly appointive, and would not be considered a duly representative body in normal times in any western country."[71]

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[63] Pelivan, *The Union*, p. 22, and de Martonne, *What I Have Seen*, p. 40.

[64] Ciobanu, *La Bessarabie*, p. 72.

[65] Charles Upson Clark, *Bessarabia: Russia and Roumania on the Black Sea* (New York : Dodd, Mead & Company, 1927),, p. 170.

[66] See Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții,* p.609. He contends that the congress did not adjourn on time but stayed in session for another three days when news of the Petrograd revolution arrived.

[67] Ibid., pp. 593, 597, and Ion Pelivan, The Union, p. 23.

[68] Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții*, p. 616.

[69] The Congress decided that Sfatul Țării would have 120 delegates, 84 Moldavians, and 36 representing other nationalities. The soldiers' delegates elected 44 representatives for Sfatul Țării Later the number of delegates was increased to 150, of which 105 represented Moldovans and 45 represented the minorities. In addition to the military congress itself, the zemstva, the peasant soviet, and many other Moldovan, revolutionary, and minority organizations chose delegates. Ten seats were reserved for Moldovans on the left bank of the Dniester. Clark, *Bessarabia,* pp. 145-146; Ciobanu, La Bessarabie, pp. 74-75; and Ghibu, Pe baricadele vietii, pp. 617-18.

[70] I. Zaborovschi, "Istoria" in Ștefan Ciobanu, ed., *Basarabia: Monografie* (Chișinău: Imp. Statului, 1925), p. 150, Clark, Bessarabia, p. 145, and Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții*, pp. 580, 600, 605, 607-608.

[71] Clark, *Bessarabia,* pp. 147-148.

Given the upheaval produced by the October revolution, the convocation of Sfatul Țării remained suspended in anticipation. Most newspapers in Chişinău did not want to publicize its opening when the general situation was so uncertain. Only *Ardealul*, edited by Onisifor Ghibu, announced on November 19 the local parliament's first session. On the night before Sfatul Țării's inauguration, the Moldovans informally chose Ion Pelivan as their leader. Pelivan was contested by the non-Moldovan bloc, and Ion Inculeț, considered less of a Moldovan nationalist, became the successful compromise candidate for Sfatul Țării President.[72] In his inaugural address, Inculeț tried to calm non-Moldovans:

> It is absolutely evident that rumors of a so-called "Roumanian orientation" are misleading and without any foundation in fact. . . . Separatism in Bessarabia is non-existent, particularly separatism toward Roumania. Here there is only a handful of men who turn their looks across the Pruth. The paths of Bessarabia merge into the paths of Russia, for Russia is a country much freer than Roumania.[73]

Sfatul Țării opened amid the troubled atmosphere created by the dissolving and retreating Russian army. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers were in Chişinău and had taken possession of the telegraph, telephone, and railroads. Nor were Moldovan units completely immune to "Bolshevization." Some fell under the influence of the "internationalists."[74] In part because of the belief that Sfatul Țării could organize the region to resist Bolshevization, it received initial support from many Bessarabian peasants victimized by pillaging, and from anti-Bolshevik Moldovans and non-Moldovans.[75] Sfatul Țării seemed useful as a non-Bolshevik local government representing a substantial consensus in support of law and order. Its potential effectiveness seemed especially great due to the Sfat's popularity among soldiers. Because they were heavily represented in Sfatul Țării, it was hoped that they would be less likely to desert and seek revolutionary but disruptive peace, land, and justice. It is well to remember, however, that Sfatul Țării was itself a popular council or soviet.[76] It was empowered by direct democratic and appointive means rather than elected by secret ballot. Unlike the soviets in Russia proper, it had a national agenda as well as a social one.

On December 2, Sfatul Țării proclaimed the Moldovan Democratic Republic as a part of the federation of Russian republics.[77] Sfatul Țării considered itself a transitional institution and it intended to call "in the shortest possible time a Popular Assembly of the Moldovan Republic, chosen by universal, direct, equal

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[72] Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții*, pp. 646, 649, 652.

[73] Clark, p. 149.

[74] P.N. Halippa, cited in Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții*, p. 647.

[75] Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieții,* pp. 654-658, 663.

[76] See [A. N. Krupensky], *L"Occupation roumaine en Bessarabie: Documents* (Paris: Lahure, n.d.), p. 5, and A. N. Krupensky and A. C. Schmidt, *Summary of Events in Bessarabia*, 1917-1918 (Paris: Lahure, 1919), p. 21.

[77] Ibid., p. 76, and Zaborovschi, *"Istoria,"* p. 151.

and secret vote, according to the system of proportional representation."[78]

In the following months Bessarabia's history was shaped increasingly by the persistence of the terrifying social conditions caused by the haphazard retreat from the collapsing Russian front, by Bolshevik strongholds forming in Bessarabia, and by Ukraine again voicing claims to Bessarabian territories. These threats, the Bolshevik gains in Chişinău, and widespread popular violence in the countryside engendered middle- and upper-class fears and an exodus of refugees fleeing to Romania.[79] An upper-class woman described the disorders as she experienced them:

It was at the time of the Brest-Litovsk peace. Bands of Russian soldiers were passing along. Often they would come in, asking for something to eat and drink, took what they liked and went away. Then they would return to the village, keep on drinking and excite the peasants. The next day, they would come back with the most quarrelsome of them. And very soon the whole village was with them. Then plundering and burning down began.... My brother and my sister-in-law were killed. . . . Yet our peasants are not bad men. Two weeks afterwards they were ashamed of themselves. A fit of madness, as they put it![80]

This alarming situation determined Sfatul Ţării to ask for outside help. The Russian Commander-in-Chief at Iaşi, not having enough reliable troops available, turned over the request to the Romanian army, which agreed to send troops to reestablish order and to guarantee the safe transport of supplies to the Romanian and Russian armies.[81]

The "invitation to the Romanians" was highly controversial. Not only did the Bolshevik Soviet in Chişinău object, Ion Inculeţ, President of Sfatul Ţării, and Pantelimon Erhan, President of the Council of Directors, also took issue. Inculeţ and Erhan sent a telegram to the Romanian Government in Iaşi:

We protest the introduction of Romanian armies into the territory of the Moldovan Republic. We demand categorically the immediate cessation of shipments of troops, and the prompt recall of those troops already over the border. The introduction of Romanian troops into Bessarabia threatens us with the horrors of civil war, which has already begun.[82]

Trying to calm their fears, General Broşteanu vowed that his troops would protect Moldova's independence rather than interfere in its internal affairs. Romania itself was "in too difficult a situation to have any thoughts of conflict or conquest."[83] While violence increased in the short run, the arrival of Romanian troops in mid-January sent the Bolshevized soldiers over the Dniester and reestablished order. The stance of non-interference seemed confirmed by the ability

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[78] Clark, *Bessarabia*, p. 159.

[79] Ibid. pp. 169-170, I. Zaborovschi, "Istoria," p. 151, and Ciobanu, *La Bessarabie*, p. 76.

[80] de Martonne, *What 1 Have Seen*, pp. 32-33.

[81] Pelivan, *The Union*, pp. 28-30; Appendix 4 in *L"Occupation roumaine*, p. 49, and Clark, *Bessarabia*, pp. 169-171.

[82] Cited in Clark, *Bessarabia*, p. 172.

[83] Ibid., pp. 173-175. See also General Prezanu"s statement in *L"Occupation roumaine*, Appendix 4, p. 50.

of Sfatul Țării to pass Bolshevik-inspired agrarian legislation during the Romanian occupation.[84]

But soon after the arrival of the Romanian troops, and after the declaration of Ukrainian independence, Sfatul Țării proclaimed on January 24, 1918, the independence of the Moldovan Republic. The break-away Ukrainian Republic physically separated Moldova from Russia, and thus encouraged Moldovan independence.[85] Having lost its geographic connection to Russia, and being both separated and threatened by the newly independent Ukraine, Sfatul Țării, on March 27, voted to unite with Romania.[86]

Although the March unification displeased the Russians and Russophiles of the province, the union was limited by conditions, and Sfatul Țării remained a semi-autonomous ruling body responsible for local government and for implementing the locally hewn agrarian reform. Bessarabia's special interests were represented in Bucharest by its own delegates.[87] But these arrangements did not last long either. The conditions of semi-autonomy were first abused and then officially eliminated. On November 20, 1918, forty Sfatul Țării delegates, including many ethnic Moldovans, wrote a memorandum to the Romanian government expressing distress with its centralizing and overbearing tendencies in Bessarabia, and invoking respect for the conditions agreed upon in March.[88] While the forty signatories stated that they expected a reply by December 5, the unmistakable answer came on November 27 following pressures by a delegation of Bucharest leaders. General Văitoianu, born in Bessarabia but serving in the Romanian army and as Romania's Minister of Interior, was the one to apply the pressure. He told Sfatul Țării delegates at a pre-session meeting:

> Presently the point is to complete that which has been started; one should not stop at half measures. The Act of March 27 provides for provincial autonomy. Now is the moment to give up that autonomy so as to make from now on one body with the Romanian people. What would be the benefit of maintaining autonomy? Are Romanian laws bad? I really do not understand what this autonomy is. You ought to give it up, even if only for the sole reason that you don't have in Bessarabia any good clerks—that is, any good Romanian nationalists.[89]

Văitoianu indicated that Bessarabia's unconditional unification with the other Romanian lands would help Romania's case at the Peace Conference,

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[84] Ciobanu, *La Bessarabie*, p. 77.

[85] See "Déclaration du 24 janvier 1918, du Conseil suprème de la République modave (Sfatul-Tzerii)," in *L"Occupation roumaine*, Appendix 11, p. 64.

[86] Zaborovschi, "Istoria," pp. 151-152, and Dr. P. Cazaco, *Notes sur la Bessarabie* (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1920), pp. 79-80.

[87] Zaborovschi, "Istoria," p. 153, and Clark, *Bessarabia*, pp. 198-199.

[88] Clark, *Bessarabia*, pp. 208-214.

[89] "Compte rendu par le député V. Tziganko, chef du part paysan, d"une entrevue qu"il eut en compagnie d"autres députés avec le Commisaire général de la Béssarabie, général Vaitoiano, le vendredi 23 novembre 1918," in *L"Occupation roumaine*, Appendix 26, pp. 100-101

where the Romanian delegation would be able to make the case that "Bessarabia is happy in the arms of Romania—she has even renounced her autonomy and asks only to be one with the Romanian people."[90]

During its next session, Sfatul Țării first voted for agrarian reform, which was a point of great importance to many of the delegates. Then on November 27, it dissolved itself, having approved a new act of unconditional union between Bessarabia and the mother country which left little room for regional autonomy.[91] Sfatul Țării delegates who opposed the unconditional union claimed that the Diet's last session was not well publicized, probably on purpose, and that the vote took place in the middle of the night and without a quorum.[92] These allegations convinced some members of the Romanian Territorial Commission at the Peace Conference. Indeed, while the unconditional union of Bessarabia may have helped Romanian arguments in Paris, the legitimacy of the Sfatul Țării vote was in doubt, and the Romanian premier was questioned about it. Sherman Spector, the diplomatic historian of Romania's success at the Peace Conference, writes:

> The Commission awarded Bessarabia to Rumania on the basis of historical, economic, and ethnic considerations *despite* the suspicions of American, British, and Italian experts regarding the Sfat vote. [Sir Eyre] Crowe, Britain's Assistant Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, convinced the others to disregard it.[93]

The union of Bessarabia with Romania in 1918 may have embodied less the aspirations of Bessarabian Moldovans than those of nationalist Romania. The different stages of autonomy, independence, conditional and unconditional union traversed in 1917-18 represented a logical, if rapidly telescoped, succession of steps that restored to modern Romania a territory that had been taken in 1812 from the Moldovan Principality—one of the building blocks of modem Romania. Thus, by revolutionary means, the historic wrong of Russian imperialism was righted. National justice—from Romania's standpoint—was wrought with the help of circumstances that included the collapse of the Russian army, the presence of Romanian troops, German collusion, Ukrainian independence, and the interests of the Great Powers.

Sfatul Țării either initiated or approved the steps toward independence and union, but its own legitimacy was nationalist and revolutionary rather than purely democratic. Moreover, since the union was achieved in several steps, each of which appeared in its time to be self-contained, proponents of Bessarabia's sovereignty or independence—without unification—were each time taken una-

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[90] Ibid., p. 101. The Bessarabia Ion Pelivan and representatives from the other newly annexed provinces did in fact accompany Ion Bratianu to the Paris Peace Conference in a show of unity. See Sherman D. Spector, *Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), p. 73.

[91] Clark, *Bessarabia*, p. 225.

[92] Protestation d"un groupe de députés du Sfatul-Tserii, 30 novembre 1918," in *L"Occupation*, Appendix 23, pp. 94-98.

[93] Emphasis added. Spector, *Rumania,* p. 101.

wares. They were fragmented among themselves, and they failed to foresee the possibility of eventual unconditional union, which was the ultimate outcome of this process. At one point, for instance, Moldovan independence and Romanian armed intervention received the backing of Bessarabia's anti-Bolshevik Russians. But they would most probably have withheld their support, had they realized that the presence of Romanian troops in Bessarabia might lead to the final integration of Bessarabia into a centralist Romanian state. Many Moldovans from Bessarabia also preferred autonomy over union with Romania. George Jewsbury's view of this question seems accurate:

> The controversy over the unification of Bessarabia has spawned a large number of conflicting legal opinions. But it is not to be doubted that initially the local leaders wanted their autonomous position within the new Russian state as envisioned by the Provisional Government leaders, that is a pluralistic, democratic society. The Moldavian National Party, the peasants, and the Soldiers' Congress in October were fairly united on this issue. The *Sfatul Țării* until the upheaval became too great in January 1918 retained its desires to stay within a Russian framework, within the parameters of a Moldavian Federated Republic.[94]

The Bessarabians' reserve toward the hurried union with Romania was not completely resolved in the interwar period. Romanization alienated many—mostly Russians, but also some Romanians. Emmanuel de Martonne, a French geographer known for his pro-Romanian views, observed in 1919 the resistance of Romanian and non-Romanian inhabitants to the Romanization of Russian schools:

> The Russian officials and the non-Roumanians withdrew. The boys themselves refused at first to attend classes conducted in Roumanian. The notion that Russian alone could be a learned and literary language had sunk deep in those young minds. Roumanian, a peasants' tongue, could lead to nothing. All over Bessarabia the same incidents took place.[95]

The landlords, more than anyone else, were nostalgic for the pre-revolutionary days. De Martonne commented that instead of being grateful that the land reform had saved them from revolution and total expropriation, they "raise captious objections as to the amount of compensation that is due them. Many regret the good old Russian days."[96] Russian and Russified bureaucratic elites also shared this nostalgia, since they felt "bound to the old regime by all their material interests."[97] This may explain why many "minor officials refused to swear the oath of allegiance to the king of Roumania."[98]

These were, of course, normal problems given the abrupt shift from Russian to Romanian rule, and the small if enthusiastic pro-Romanian elites. De Mar-

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[94] Jewsbury, "An Overview," pp. 14-15.

[95] De Martonne, *What I Have Seen*, p. 12.

[96] Ibid., p. 13. See also p. 33.

[97] Ibid., p. 39.

[98] Ibid.

tonne was optimistic that the worst was over in 1919. In the matter of schools, at least, parents, once used to the idea of Romanian schools, were "asking for an extension of the study of Roumanian, so far limited to the lower grades in the schools."[99] Moreover, the Bulgarian and German communities in Bessarabia were not deemed hostile to Romanian rule, the Germans seeming even "sincerely and loyally attached to Greater Roumania."[100]

Years later, when Romanian rule was no longer as new, less positive estimates of Romania's success in integrating Bessarabia emerged. Following the Tatar Bunar uprising, engineered by the Soviet Union and repressed by Romanian forces in 1924, the French military attaché in Bucharest reported to the French Minister of War on the situation in Bessarabia. Lieutenant Colonel d'Humières held the Soviet Union responsible for the attempted insurrection. But he also judged the Romanian regime harshly for allowing favorable conditions for the Soviet agitation to persist. Not only was Bessarabia burdened with a Bulgarian population that was, in his opinion, completely Russified and thus an easy target for Soviet propaganda and espionage efforts, but the Moldovan peasant population had also lost its Romanian character under the previous Russian domination, and was now "closer to the Russian than to the Romanian." Moreover, little progress had been made in reversing the process:

> The Romanian administration until now has demonstrated a notorious inability for the Romanization of the country. By lack of method and political know-how, and of total lack of honesty it has alienated the sympathies of the population. It is indispensable that the Romanian government take steps to modify its administration, lest it allow the communist agitation to progress and new incidents to occur.[101]

In a follow-up report written later, d'Humières restated his analysis that the Soviet strategy in Bessarabia consisted of a double appeal to Russian and Russified elements, but also to the Moldovan peasantry who were "already dissatisfied with the venal and oppressive Romanian administration." He warned that Romania was in real danger "if the Government does not move to improve the conditions in which this region is administered and to win the hearts of the Moldovan population."[102]

In 1931, a new French military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Palasse, voiced similar opinions about Bessarabia under less threatening circumstances. While noting more rural prosperity than he had been made to expect, Palasse also heard complaints that echoed those of 1924:

> Generally, whether one addresses a peasant or a once large landowner, ... one notices dissatisfaction with regard to the Romanian administration. One must realize that these areas have not regained their prosperity after

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[99] Ibid., p. 12.

[100] Ibid., pp. 19, 22.

[101] France, Ministère de la Guerre, Diréction de l'Armée de Terre, Vincennes (V) 7N 3045, 9 October 1924.

[102] Ibid., 22 November 1924.

the war, and that in the wake of acquiring these provinces, Romania has done nothing to keep them. The country has been carved by taxes and exploited by mediocre and unscrupulous clerks.[103]

In 1931, with Stalinist collectivization underway in the Soviet Union, rumors from across the Dniester did less harm than good to the Romanian cause. Thus Palasse could hope that "an able policy and good administration of the region would be likely to bring around these populations, which, while regretting the past, would not wish to return to today's Russia."[104]

While the evidence suggests that the Romanian government was not very popular or effective in Bessarabia in the interwar period, the loss of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union in 1940 had nothing to do with the mood of the people. It came ultimately not because of disaffection with the corrupt and inefficient Romanian government, but as a result of corrupt great power politics in the form of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Pact and the Stalinist and stagnationist policies that followed it for the next half-century were effectively criticized by the Moldovan movement activists of the late 1980s. That movement took on mass proportions, it learned to work politically in highly effective ways, and—more than its predecessor in 1917-1918—it developed into a potent national consciousness-raising force for Moldovans of all classes.

Reclaiming the Past

Unlike other major Soviet nationalities, the Moldovans seemed for a long time to be "trouble-free"; Moldova was described as "the USSR's. . . . sleepy republic."[105] Occasional outbursts occurred, and a few brave dissidents suffered for their nationalist activity.[106] But to most students of the Soviet Union looking at the big picture, Moldovans were too tranquil to notice. Ludmilla Alexeyeva's comprehensive book on Soviet dissent contains nineteen chapters on human rights, religious, and nationalist dissidents of many stripes, including Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Georgians, Armenians, Crimean Tatars, Meshkhetians, Jews, Germans, and Russians but no chapter, and not even an index entry, on the Moldovans.[107]

While Moldovans demonstrated a cultural thirst for Romanian films, performers, literature, and periodicals, that seemingly harmless apolitical appetite was indulged in the Khrushchev and early Brezhnev periods with selective imports of Romanian books, subscriptions to Romanian publications, and tours

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[103] V 7N 3047, 4 November 1931.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Jonathan Eyal, "Nationalism—Now Moldavia," *Soviet Analyst* 18, no. 2, 25 January 1989.

[106] Nicholas Dima, *Bessarabia and Bukovina: The Soviet-Romanian Terrtorial Dispute* (Boulder: East European Quarterly), p. 5; *Micromagazin*, November 1982; and Grigore Singurel, "Moldavia on the Barricades of *Perestroika*," *Report on the USSR,* 24 February 1989.

[107] Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1985), passim.

by visiting Romanian musicians. In the late 1960s and 70s, however, Soviet authorities suppressed even these cultural outlets, hoping probably not only to eliminate Moldovans' interest in Romanian culture, but also their potential nationalism. This shift from limited cultural permissiveness to interdiction may well have come in response to the increasingly frequent indirect allusions to Romania's right to Bessarabia emitted from Bucharest.[108]

The first signs that the Moldovans were not so easily either appeased or repressed, but were striving to bring their cultural aspirations to meaningful political results, came in 1987. An alternating series of concessions and ideological criticisms from Moldova's old-style leadership was directed at an increasingly vocal Moldovan intelligentsia, and signaled the rising tide of tensions and change in the republic.

In February 1987, Semion Grossu, since 1980 the first secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party (MCP), warned a Komsomol congress that certain young Moldovans were unable "to understand the laws governing the development of nations," and that national relations were "succumbing to hostile propaganda and slipping into a position of nationalism."[109] He was referring to incidents that began in 1986 in which Moldovan students had made nationalist propaganda and tried to correct the fallacious official version of Moldovan history which denied the republic's historical ties to Romania. In May, Grossu's deputy, Viktor Smirnov, used a Komsomol meeting to address the gravity of the problem of youth contaminated by nationalism, and criticized the Moldovan intelligentsia for harping on the "Bessarabian theme," i.e., that of Moldova's Romanian past and its illegitimate incorporation by the Soviet Union. Nationalist tensions had reached such a high level that they resulted in brawls and violent attacks against national symbols. Grossu and Smirnov rejected accusations of carrying out a policy of Russification and tried to revive the spirit of internationalism.[110]

But the MCP also made minor concessions to Moldovan nationalism. A campaign was launched to improve the study of Moldovan language and literature in the republic, and to make Moldovan courses more accessible to the population. Twin articles in *Sovetsakaya Moldaviya* on May 30, 1987, concerning the improvement in the study of Moldovan and Russian, outlined decrees passed to correct problems in the teaching of both languages. The Moldovan decree seemed designed to persuade a dissatisfied Moldovan public that the leadership was taking effective steps to rectify long-standing problems: the fact that Moldovans were losing knowledge of their native tongue, the difficulty of studying in Moldovan at a full range of higher-level educational institutions, and the scarcity of qualified Moldovan-language teachers. The "companion" decree regarding the improvement in the study of the Russian language seemed de-

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[108] Charles King, *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), pp. 95-112.

[109] Bohdan Nahaylo, "National Ferment in Moldavia," *Radio Liberty Research* (RL) 32/88, 24 January 1988.

[110] Ibid.

signed to prove that the republic leadership was not simply caving in to criticism from the Moldovan community, but rather showing equanimity in linguistic and nationality problems.[111] This was probably also an attempt to continue with the old goal of bilingualism, that is, of having non-Russians become proficient in Russian. Clearly the old Moldovan party leadership was hoping to use the decrees to make minor reforms, and to appease both the Moldovan rebels and Moldova"s Russian public, whose potential as a backlash force may already have been apparent. This calculation, however, failed miserably.

Rather than being mollified by these concessions, the Moldovan intelligentsia escalated its demands during the coming months. While the organizational structure of the movement in its early stages is still obscure, the strategy that emerges in retrospect, and may have been consciously designed already by 1987, was a three-fold one: (1) to pursue the issues of linguistic reform and cultural autonomy and development further, past any merely formal concessions from above, and to gain mass Moldovan support in the process; (2) to challenge the stagnationist communist leadership in Moldova politically on grounds of its dissent from Gorbachev's reform spirit, thus gaining high-ranking union-level support from Moscovite leaders who would begin to see in the Moldovan nationalists valuable allies for *perestroika*; and (3) to include non-Moldovans in the growing movement by organizing around issues that cut across ethnic lines such as the economy and the environment, or that addressed the specific national needs of non-Moldovans like the Gagauzi and Ukrainians.

In July 1987, the leadership of the Moldovan Writers' Union, a group that was from the beginning in the vanguard of the national movement, asked the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting to eliminate censorship over the ideological content of programs, and to allow all local broadcasts to be made in Moldovan.[112] This demand and other nationalist activity elicited a strong response from the party leadership. In September a meeting of Moldovan Communist Party activists was devoted mainly to the national question in the Republic. On that occasion Grossu criticized the unsatisfactory level of "internationalist and patriotic education" in the republic, citing conflicts between different nationalities in villages, work-places, and between students in many institutions of higher education. He also upbraided recently formed informal organizations, precursors of the Popular Front of Moldova, and the Moldovan literary weekly *Literatura şi arta*, the organ of the Moldovan Writers' Union, for publishing historical and literary materials contrary to official views.[113]

In the struggle between the old-style communist leadership under Grossu, and the insurgent Moldovan nationalists, *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* lined up on the former side, while Literatura şi arta became the outspoken mouthpiece of the rebels. Nevertheless, as these gained ground, even *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* became a more reliable barometer of the popular mood. For example, it reported on January 15, 1988, a round-table discussion among cultural professionals,

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[111] *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, 30 May 1987.

[112] Nahaylo, "National Ferment."

[113] Ibid.

including editors from *Sovetskaya Moldaviya, Moldova socialistă*, and *Literatura şi arta*. Although, as reported, the discussion was civil in tone, and mentioned Moldova's cultural accomplishments in the Soviet period, it focused primarily on the "many years of shortcomings and mistakes," and on Moldova's still daunting cultural deficiencies."[114] In October 1989, *Sovetsakaya Moldaviya* began printing weekly Moldovan lessons in its Thursday edition.

In April of 1988 an incident at the Pedagogical Institute in Chişinău was reported in *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*: The previous October, Moldovan students there had assembled a *stengazeta*, a "wall gazette," that included documents printed in the Latin alphabet prior to 1941. The historical documents and the allusions to Moldova's pre-Cyrillic and pre-Soviet Romanian past outraged some of the faculty at the Institute.[115] The chairman of the History Department denied that Moldovan had ever used the Latin alphabet, and tore down the exhibit. Significantly, the Moldovan students registered their complaint in a collective letter to the editor of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, and received a sympathetic hearing.[116] By appealing to higher authorities in Moscow, the students successfully bypassed the entrenched republican leadership.

A much grander gesture in the same vein followed shortly with the publication in *Literatura şi arta* of the "Appeal to the All-Union Party Conference" addressed to Gorbachev. The document, voted unanimously by the Moldovan Writers' Union and published on June 9, 1988, talked about Moldova's "renewed stagnation," the lack of restructuring there, and the persistence of "Bodiulism" in the current leadership, a reference to Grossu's predecessor, Ivan Bodiul, the corrupt Brezhnevite leader of the republic until 1980. It also brought up the issue of full cultural autonomy and of the right to use and be educated in the titular language of each republic. While the "Appeal" was not discussed at the All-Union Party Conference in any detail, it galvanized a mass protest movement in Moldova, the centerpiece of which was the language issue.[117]

During the summer of 1988, the Moldovan movement grew by leaps and bounds with the formation of two informal organizations—the Alexe Mateevici Literary and Musical Club, and the Moldovan Democratic Movement in support of Restructuring (MDM), both backed by *Literatura şi arta*.[118] The Mateevici Club owed its name to the early twentieth century Moldovan poet and Orthodox priest whose later poems were pointedly nationalistic. Mateevici's famous poem, "Our

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[114] "Tvorit" na iazyke pravdy," *Sovetsakaya Moldaviya*, 15 January 1988.

[115] A decree passed on May 16, 1941 after Bessarabia came under Soviet occupation, replaced the Latin alphabet, first introduced in the province in 1917, with the Cyrillic. The Latin script had also been used in the MASSR from 1932 to 1938. See King, *The Moldovans*, pp. 81-85. See also my discussion of the introduction of the Latin script in 1917, above.

[116] Kathlenn Mihalisko, "*Komsomol"skaya Pravda* Defends Special Historical Issue of Moldavian Students" Newspaper," RL 182/88, 27 April, 1988.

[117] Singurel, "Moldavia on the Barricades."

[118] Ibid., and Vladimir Socor, "The Moldavian Democratic Movement: Structure, Impact and Initial Impact," *Report on the USSR*, 24 February, 1989.

Language,' is an elegy to the Moldovan language.[119] The Club opened branches all over the Moldovan Republic. In a long-standing East European tradition, the Mateevici Club was concerned with popularizing Moldovan and Romanian literature, music, and culture in general, and with raising the status of the Moldovan language and culture in the republic. The Club was led, among others, by Anatol Şelaru, a young research doctor with the Epidemiological Institute, and Dinu Mihail, a literary critic. There was considerable overlap between the leadership of the Club and the Moldovan Democratic Movement.[120]

From the beginning the MDM was equally concerned with democratization and national rights. While mainly ethnically Moldovan, the MDM opposed chauvinism, and strove to attract Moldovan Jews, Ukrainians, and Russians. Its program encompassed national, political, cultural, linguistic, economic, demographic, ecological, and human rights aspects. Its tone was tolerant and pluralist, although its primary concern was the national liberation of the Moldovans. In brief, the MDM program called for true sovereignty for the Moldovan SSR within a precisely defined true federation of Soviet states; for more contacts between Romanians and Moldovans; for the radical transformation of the economy—by replacing command mechanisms with market mechanisms, self-management, and varied property forms; for rigorous control over migration processes, especially the immigration of labor from outside the republic, and for stringent review of industrial projects to determine their impact on the local population and the environment; for declaring Moldovan the official language and reinstating the Latin script; and for strict observance of human, civil, and political rights provided for in the Soviet and Moldovan constitutions. The MDM was partly inspired by the earlier experience of the Baltic and Armenian movements with which Moldovan activists had ongoing contacts.[121]

MDM set out to mobilize substantial grass-roots backing by encouraging support groups to form in workplaces, villages, and neighborhoods. By the beginning of 1989, 300 such groups were in existence, attesting to MDM's success. The movement staged several mass rallies in support of perestroika, to observe Human Rights Day and in commemoration of the Stalinist deportations of Moldovans in 1949. While local authorities attempted to stop these, they were overruled by the more *glasnost*-minded politicians in Moscow.[122] At all these rallies, and the even bigger ones staged in the beginning of 1989, demonstrators invoked Gorbachev by carrying his portraits and chanting his name, alongside slogans on the language issue, against migration and the current Moldovan government.[123] This indicates that the Moldovan national movement considered the

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[119] Ciobanu, *Cultura românească*, pp. 281-284. On Mateevici see also my discussion above.

[120] Jonathan Eyal, "History Catches Up and a "Separate Language Disappears," *Report on the USSR*, 24 February 1989, and Socor, "The Moldavian Democratic Movement."

[121] Socor, "The Moldavian Democratic Movement."

[122] Ibid.

[123] Vladimir Socor, "Recent Mass Rallies and Demonstrations in Soviet Moldavia," *Report on the USSR*, 19 May 1989.

Moscow leadership an ally (at least before the 1989 strikes and before the stand-off between Lithuania and Moscow, in which the Moldovan Supreme Soviet—since the March 1990 elections dominated by Popular Front supporters—sided with Lithuania).

Responding to the "Appeal to the All-Union Party Conference" and to the public demonstrations that began in the summer of 1988, Moldova"s official leadership made concessions and played for time. An Interdepartmental Commission on the Study of the History and Problems of Development of the Moldovan Language was set up, the Pushkin State Theatre in Chişinău was split into a Moldovan and a Russian section, a Russian-Moldovan phrasebook was published, and some Russian words were eliminated from the official Moldovan lexicon. At the same time, attempting to "divide and rule" the authorities began paying more attention to the cultural needs of the Gagauz, Bulgarian, and Jewish minorities. The protests themselves, however, persisted, and even gained momentum.[124] Semi-spontaneous demonstrations began taking place around Chişinău on most Sundays, at which placards in Moldovan and using the Latin script began to appear.[125]

From the summer of 1988 all of Moldova was engaged in a linguistic debate involving the literary and linguistic community, the non-literary intelligentsia, workers, and peasants. Three main demands emerged from this turmoil: Moldovan was to become the official language of the republic, the identity of the Moldovan and Romanian languages was to be officially recognized, and there was to be a return from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet.[126]

Prior to September 1, 1989, there had been no "official language" in Moldova, but Russian was widely used in enterprises, the bureaucracy, public meetings, the Supreme Soviet, and at workplace and school meetings. All public signs were in Russian, as were geographic names and the names of main streets. Thus, in the absence of a *de jure* official language, Russian had become the *de facto* state language, with Moldovan relegated to the private sphere of the lower status and more rural Moldovan population. Moldovans who sprinkled their speech with Russian words had better chances of promotion and of becoming part of the political elite than those who, insisting on speaking pure Moldovan, might be accused of nationalism. These pressures resulted in the deterioration of the language. As Dan Ionescu, a Radio Free Europe researcher wrote at the time, "Moldavians increasingly speak an almost unintelligible mixture of Romanian and Russian."[127]

Moldovan activists claimed that the deterioration of their language was the result of insufficient schools with Moldovan as their language of instruction. According to them, forty percent of the kindergartens and secondary schools in Moldova were Russian, although ethnic Russians were only thirteen per-

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[124] Eyal, "Soviet Moldavia."

[125] Singurel, "Moldova on the Barricades."

[126] Eyal, "Soviet Moldavia."

[127] Dan Ionescu, "Soviet Moldavia: The State Language Issue," *Report on the USSR*, June 2, 1989.

cent of the Republic's population. The specific situation of some cities was even worse: no Moldovan school existed in Tiraspol, a very Russified eastern city, for a Moldovan population of 25,000. In the capital, of 198 kindergartens only 18 were Moldovan, although forty-two percent of Chişinău's population was Moldovan. Instruction was all in Russian in the Republic's higher education institutes.[128] Those who opposed the institutionalization of Moldovan as an official language argued that Moldovan was linguistically inadequate to modern tasks. Petr Skripnichenko, a chief mechanic at a plant in Tiraspol, expressed the typical opinion that Moldovan could "not function in the production sphere," and that there was "no Moldovan technical language."[129] Such statements by non-Moldovans, reminiscent of the Moldovans' own opinions in 1917-18, reflected the renewed ghettoization of Moldovan under Soviet rule, but the Moldovans had gained in self-confidence, and were no longer the ones making such statements.

In Moldova the language and alphabet issues—that is, whether Moldovan and Romanian are in fact the same language, whether the Latin alphabet should be reintroduced as a more suitable writing system for Moldovan than the Cyrillic script, and whether Moldovan should be declared the official language of the republic—thus became the first and perhaps most important battlefield on which *demokratizatsiia*, *perestroika*, and *glasnost* were fought out. Even after public opinion declared itself overwhelmingly in favor of the three language changes, the party leadership attempted to stall. In November 1988 the Party Theses "Concrete Actions to Affirm *Perestroika*" were published, in which the authorities tried to regain ground and indicate the official stance. They claimed that despite the appearance of linguistic identity, Romanian and Moldovan were in fact separate languages. Finally, they argued that the Cyrillic alphabet should stay, not only because it was uniquely suited to the phonetic system of Moldovan, but also because it would be too expensive to switch to the Latin script, and because of the subsequent enormous education task that changing alphabets would entail. Rather than ending the struggle, however, the "Theses" intensified it. A reply entitled "Anti-Theses" came in *Literatura şi arta* from playwright Dumitru Matcovschi, and the Writers' Union pleaded for help in an "Appeal to All People of Good Faith." In response they got tens of thousands of signatures and Moldovans offered to raise funds in order to pay for the costs of shifting alphabets. Students demonstrated and formed their own independent League of Democratic Students during the ensuing turmoil.[130]

By the end of 1988 the hard-liners were forced into retreat, claiming that the Party Theses had been drafted only as a framework for discussion. On November 1 the Scientific Council of the Moldovan Academy of Sciences had sided with the opposition's three language demands. The Interdepartmental Commission set up earlier was then enlarged to make room for members of the opposition and for less orthodox linguists. On December 28 the Commission recommended

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[128] Ibid

[129] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, no. 37, 13 Septemeber 1989, translated in *FBIS-SOV* 19 September 1989.

[130] Singurel, "Moldavia on the Barricades," and Eyal, "Soviet Moldavia."

that Moldovan be made the official language, that the identity of Romanian and Moldovan be acknowledged, and that the Latin script be reintroduced.[131]

Although apparently total, this victory was not immediate. The MCP leadership attempted to stall again and only make some of the recommended changes, and even then in modified form. Semion Grossu suggested that a Latin alphabet would be introduced, but not the one used for Romanian. A campaign was mounted to try to misinform unsophisticated Moldovans that they would have to learn to speak the Latin language, rather than just learning a new alphabet. *Glasul* (The Voice, a common enough periodical name, but one that in this case must be a reference both to the "voice" of the suppressed Moldovan language, and to *glasnost*), became the first Moldovan periodical approved for publication in the Latin alphabet. It had at first to be printed illegally in Latvia because of local obstacles. The Moldovan public was not taken in, suspecting that once again the leadership would try to bypass the promised reforms. Moldovans showed their displeasure in repeated mass rallies in January through March 1989, numbering as many as 70,000 demonstrators.[132]

Despite these rallies, the leadership at first proposed ambiguous draft legislation making Moldovan the official language, but giving Russian also an official status as the language of inter-ethnic communication, and ignoring the alphabet issue altogether. The Writers' Union criticized the official draft language laws as a farce and proposed alternative legislation. By mid-August, because of the Moldovans' unrelenting pressure, the official version of the draft legislation had been revised and had become acceptable to the Moldovan intelligentsia. The softening of the official line at the top, however, had the effect of mobilizing party hard-liners below them, who in turn mobilized the Russians and Ukrainians of the republic in a popular "internationalist" movement against that of the Moldovans.[133]

The final act in Moldova's language legislation drama was played after the politically heated summer of 1989.[134] The season began with the formation of the Popular Front of Moldova (PFM), which organized many rallies and gathered over one million signatures in favor of the pro-Moldovan language bill. The Moldovan movement gave rise to a strong backlash among Russians and other non-Moldovans who felt threatened by the Moldovan upsurge and the impending language changes that would promote the status of Moldovan and demote

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[131] Dan Ionescu, "Soviet Moldavia: A Breakthrough," *Report on the USSR*, 24 March 1989.

[132] Ibid.; Vladimir Socor, "Moldavian Writers Publish Unauthorized Periodical in Latin Script;" Report on the USSR, 7 April 1989; and "Recent Mass Rallies and Demonstrations in Soviet Moldavia," *Report on the USSR*, 19 May 1989.

[133] P. Rashkov, "Moldavia: The Situation Worsens," *Trud*, translated in *FBIS-SOV* 11 September 1989; Dan Ionescu, "Soviet Moldavia: The State Language Issue," *Report on the USSR*, 2 June 1989; and Vladimir Socor, "Politics of the Language Question Heating Up in Soviet Moldavia," *Report on the USSR*, 8 September 1989.

[134] For a journalistic account of that summer's political developments in Moldova, see Dmitry Kazutin, "A Hot Summer: What Preceded the Strikes in Moldavia," *Moscow News*, 3-10 September 1989.

Russian. Non-Russians, especially Gagauzi, were particularly afraid that they might be forced to learn not one but two foreign languages, Moldovan in addition to Russian.

On May 20, 1989, the PFM was founded at a meeting held at the Moldovan Writers' Union in Chişinău. The PFM was a coalition of several unofficial groups—the Moldovan Democratic Movement, the Mateevici Club, the Cultural Clubs Movement, the Green Movement, the League of the Unemployed, the Democratic League of Students, the Society of Historians, and the Moldovan Cultural Association based in Moscow. Some sympathetic non-Moldovans also spoke in support of the Movement.[135] The founding of the PFM should be seen in the context of the Moldovan activists' previous experience which had strongly suggested the need for unification. Activists were to combine forces to resist the divisiveness fostered by the authorities. A larger and stronger movement would result from Moldovan and non-Moldovan unofficial groups uniting to break the coalition between conservative authorities and non-Moldovans in the Republic. The Front's name was chosen carefully: The Popular Front of Moldova—to welcome non-Moldovan ethnics into its ranks. The founding conference issued an appeal addressed "To All Citizens of the Republic" calling for all ethnic groups in Moldova to join forces in supporting reform, demanding cultural rights for all ethnic groups, and warning against the leadership's divide-and-rule tactics in maintaining power and resisting reform. The Front was also intended to be a solution to the republican leadership's continued refusal to legalize the unofficial groups and to allow them access to the media. The PFM would act as an umbrella organization for its component groups in talks and negotiations, thus strengthening all of them, it would make links with kindred opposition groups in the USSR, and it would coordinate joint public actions of the diverse groups in pursuit of common goals.[136]

The PFM Program was a radicalized version of the demands of the previous unofficial groups. It called for an end to the *nomenklatura* system; for reforming the school system to establish more Moldovan, Ukrainian, and Gagauz schools; for an end to migration aimed at altering the republic's ethnic composition; for an end to inter-ethnic strife; for ecological action; for openness in the media; for a reevaluation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact labeled "a criminal agreement between two totalitarian states"; for complete sovereignty (as guaranteed by the constitution of the republic and the USSR); for a return to national symbols such as the use of the red, yellow, and blue flag of the 1917-1918 Moldovan Democratic Republic, and the celebration of the medieval Moldovan Prince Stephen the Great as the Republic's national holiday; for the formation of territorial military units based exclusively on local recruits; and for the right to establish consular and more intense cultural relations with other states, particularly Romania.[137]

The backlash to the language issue and to the Moldovans' assault on the Russified status quo was coordinated by Party committees in Russian-dominat-

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[135] Vladimir Socor, "Popular Front in Moldavia," *Report on the USSR*, 9 June 1989.

[136] Ibid.

[137] Ibid.

ed areas, and by the International Edinstvo movement, to which was added on August 23, 1989 the *Soyuz Trudyakhshchikhsya Moldaviy* (Union of the Workers of Moldova), a group of managers, trade union leaders, and Party activists who organized a series of extended protest strikes that paralyzed Moldova's railroads and industry in the late summer and fall of 1989. The opponents to reform seem to have been inspired by their counterparts in the Baltic area, where purely political strikes also occurred.[138] Two-hundred enterprises were idled by political strikes in Tiraspol, Bendery, Beltsy, Rybnitsa, and other Russian-speaking industrial towns in the east of Moldova.[139] The goal of Edinstvo, the Soyuz, and the strikers was to continue with the obstruction of language reform and thus to attempt to stop the decline of Russian from its privileged *lingua franca* position. This platform gained broad support among Russian and Ukrainian workers.[140]

While Semion Grossu clearly sympathized with the strikers, he could not easily satisfy their demands. The Moldovan community's patience had run out, and, since under the new political rules of the game, numbers mattered, Grossu had to heed the Moldovans. The gigantic rally organized by the Popular Front in Chişinău on August 27, 1989 brought out over half a million people. Many of the participants were Moldovan peasants who converged on the capital marching on foot from all parts of the republic and from adjoining areas annexed to Ukraine in 1940, carrying the national flag and displaying slogans that read "We Demand State Language," "The People Recognize the Latin Script," "Legalize our Latin Identity," "Our Langauge—A Sacred Treasure," "Stop Russification," "We Demand Republican Sovereignty," "We Have no Anti-Soviet Demands," etc. Among the speakers at the rally were also a Ukrainian, a Jew, and a Bulgarian from Moldova, as well as representatives from the Baltic, Armenian, Ukrainian, and Georgian popular fronts.[141] The rally was an effective show of strength timed to impress the Supreme Soviet delegates before the session at which the language laws were to be voted on. According to Vladimir Socor, a writer for Radio Liberty:

> On the eve of a critical session of the republican legislature, the rally demonstrated the popular front's political strength, its ability to mobilize the peasants politically, its links with similar movements in other Soviet republics, and, perhaps most importantly at this juncture, the support of the peasantry—which forms the great majority of the ethnic Moldavian population—for the language demands articulated by Moldavia's educated stratum.[142]

In its last stages, the language struggle in Moldova attracted the attention of the all-union press and of Mikhail Gorbachev. But for the first time since the Moldovan movement had begun in 1987, Moscow was no ally to the Moldovans, interceding instead on behalf of the anti-Moldovan strikers and of the politicians

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[138] See Glebov and Crowfoot, eds., *The Soviet Empire*, pp. 168-169.

[139] TASS report, 8 September 1989, reported in *FBIS-SOV*, 12 September 1989.

[140] Socor, "Politics of the Language Question Heating Up," and "Moldavian Proclaimed Official Language in the Moldavian SSR," *Report on the USSR*, 22 September 1989.

[141] Socor, "Politics of the Language Question Heating Up."

[142] Ibid.

who favored concessions to the strikers in the form of recognizing Russian as the language of inter-ethnic communication, or of having both Moldovan and Russian as official languages.[143] A compromise solution was reached on September 1, 1989, after four days of non-stop Moldovan Supreme Soviet debates broadcast on radio and television. The legislative session took place under intense popular pressure, that is, within hearing distance of continuous demonstrations outside the chambers. The delegates were clearly being watched by their ethnic constituencies. The new laws designated Moldovan as the state language of the republic, they approved a return to the Latin alphabet, but Moldovan and Russian were both confirmed as languages of inter-ethnic communication.[144] This compromise fell short of the strikers' wishes, many of whom continued their stoppages until late into September.[145]

Clearly shaken by the language struggle, the Grossu leadership had its days numbered even after the compromise solution was reached. Indeed, the crisis was not yet over when the strikers finally went back to work. Emotions were still so aroused in November that the anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7 provided yet another occasion for confrontation. Now that the Moldovans had won a victory over language matters, they seemed ready to take on other challenges. The Popular Front staged a provocative protest to the traditional official military parade. The 40,000-strong counterdemonstration outnumbered the official parade. The demonstrators, who had obtained permission to march past the podium, carried placards with slogans characterized by *Sovetsakaya Moldaviya* as "antiparty and antisocialist." And so they were: "The Party — the Cynicism, Shame, and Insanity of Our Time," "Down with Communist Dictatorship," "The November Putsch," "The October Revolution Drowned Democracy in Blood." Others were openly pro-Romanian: "Sfatul Țării — the Will of the People,[146] "No to Borders Dividing Romanian Kin."[147] Law enforcement officers attacked the protesters brutally, and arrested several of them. This elicited another demonstration three days later, in protest against the arrests and violence. The November 10 demonstration turned into an even more violent affair: 142 militiamen and Interior Ministry troops were wounded as Popular Front supporters attempted to storm the Ministry of Interior building in Chișinău. About 50 civilians were hurt as well.[148] It was midnight before the demonstrators dispersed, but not before calling for Grossu"s resignation. Following the imposition of exceptional measures, in an emergency plenum of the Moldovan Central Committee on November 16, with members of the CPSU Central Committee present,

[143] See Francis Clines, "Language Now Roils Soviet Moldavia," *New York Times,* 31 August 1989, and Socor, "Moldavian Proclaimed Official Language."

[144] Socor, "Moldavian Proclaimed Official Language."

[145] TASS report on 25 September 1989 in *Report on the USSR*, 29 September 1989.

[146] Sfatul Țării was the Bessarabian Diet, which voted for union with Romania in 1918. See above.

[147] *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, 11 November 1989, translated in FBIS-SOV, 15 November 1989.

[148] *Moscow News*, 26 November - 3 December 1989.

the demonstrators' call was heeded. Theirs had, of course, not been an isolated demand. For all of 1989, PFM-organized demonstrations had shouted "Government crisis;" and called for the government's resignation, as had the literary intelligentsia in the weekly *Literatura şi Arta.* Grossu was the last of Brezhnev's appointees as a republic party leader to be "transferred" out of power.[149]

In Petru Lucinschi, who replaced Grossu, Moldova got its own smooth *perestroika* and *glasnost*-style leader. Relatively young, Lucinschi, a Moldovan who remembered his roots, was chosen both for the form and substance of his political abilities. He demonstrated his popular credentials by making his inauguration speech in Romanian, and he found ways to compromise with the unofficial groups that had brought about Grossu's downfall. Soon after his election, he met with representatives of the PFM and the two sides resolved not to use force in political confrontations, and to begin a thoroughgoing renewal of cadre.[150]

Though Lucinschi was a far more flexible, able, and suited-to-the-time leader than Grossu, his rule became more challenging and complex by the day. The ethnic Moldovan community had achieved two major victories in 1989—the language law of September and the downfall of Grossu in November. But rather than being satisfied, the Moldovan polity had been politicized and polarized by these results. Both Moldovans and the other nationalities of the Republic had also become more politically sophisticated and more ambitious over the previous three years, and they used their growing skills in a struggle fought as if "to the end." Furthermore, the revolution in Romania in December 1989 made it possible to envision a future reunification with Moldova. This strengthened the hand of extremists on both sides of the Moldovan-Russian divide, and on both sides of the Prut.[151] Even Communist Party and government leaders of the new stripe, such as Petru Lucinschi and Mircea Snegur, the president of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet, were no longer dismissive of this possibility. When asked about secession and unification, their replies were not categorical, but pragmatic, one saying that "to raise the question of Moldova's secession now would be untimely;" and the other that "most residents of Moldova do not want to be reunited with Romania," but do want closer contacts with Romania.[152]

Lucinschi, a man of ambition, seemed prepared to save the party by having it jump on the bandwagon of the Popular Front.[153] His flexibility made dialogue with the PFM possible, but by the same token, it alienated the beneficiaries of the old Soviet system, the Russian-speaking communities in Tiraspol, Bendery, Rybnitsa, and elsewhere. This population felt itself disenfranchised by the

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[149] TASS, 16 November 1989, reported in *FBIS-SOV*, 16 November 1989, and Vladimir Socor, "Party Leader of Moldavian SSR Replaced," *Report on the USSR*, 1 December 1989.

[150] Socor, "Party Leader of Moldavian SSR Replaced," and Vladimir Socor, "Personnel Changes at Moldavian Plenum;' *Report USSR*, 15 December 1989.

[151] Rallies in Moldova began calling for reunification with Romania. See The Center for Democracy in the USSR, *The Express Chronicle,* 30 January 1990.

[152] Radio Moscow World Service, 14 January 1990; *Report on the USSR*, 19 January and *Moscow News,* 8 April 1990, cited in *FBIS-SOV,* 11 April 1990.

[153] See Francis Clines, "Republic by Republic, Soviet Vote Points to a Murky Political Future, *New York Times*, 25 February 1990.

changes, it mourned Grossu's stable rule and the lost privileges of the Russian language, and it feared that it might not be able to compete with Moldovans for jobs requiring knowledge of the new official language. Rather than reconcile itself to the new language law, to the newly-legal tricolor flag (which looked just like the Romanian flag),[154] or to the newly-elected two-thirds Moldovan majority in the Supreme Soviet, the Russian-speaking minority withdrew behind autonomist and internationalist slogans. In January 1990, in referenda in Tiraspol and Rybnitsa, voters opted overwhelmingly for administrative autonomy, linguistic freedom, and incorporation into a future Dniester Autonomous Republic.[155]

Ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and other Soviet elites, of whatever ethnicity, who stood to lose in a democratized and nationally reconfigured polity defended themselves by invoking internationalism against the Moldovan movement.[156] Turning the complaints of the nationalist intelligentsia on their head, a worker and USSR people's deputy from Bendery, N. Kostishin, referred in old-fashioned Stalinist terms to the "nobility and genuine internationalism which the Russian people have displayed and continue to display with regard to the other peoples of our great country":

> They [the Russians] did without, they went short of food and sleep and sent the additional forces and funds to accelerate the development of the Baltic Republics, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and our own Moldavia. Indeed the national intelligentsia of the Union republics was largely trained in Russian educational establishments. The doctors, professors, and candidates who received their education and diplomas in Moscow and Leningrad are seriously arguing about the "Russian empire" and "Soviet expansionism."[157]

Among other things, it was precisely to the selfless Russians in their midst, and to the training of Moldovans in Russian institutions—and the corresponding scarcity of an indigenously educated Moldovan intelligentsia—that Moldovan nationalists were objecting.

With their new-found internationalism, the Russian-speakers in Moldova seemed to be "bad sports" about losing their privileged position in the newly-democratized politics of Moldova. But their attitude was also influenced by the intolerance of Moldovan extremists; these physically harassed ethnic Russian deputies on their way in and out of the Supreme Soviet building, and violence generally intensified.[158] The bitterness of some of the Moldovan nationalist intel-

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[154] TASS, 11 May 1990, in *FBIS-SOV,* 14 May 1990.

[155] Moscow TV Service in Russian, 1 February 1990; *1zvestiya*, 2 February 1990, translated in *FBIS-SOV,*2 February 1990; and TASS International Service in Russian, '3 February 1990, translated in *FBIS-SOV*, 2 February 1990. The referenda were deemed unconstitutional.

[156] King, The Moldovans, pp. 181-189.

[157] See interview in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* translated in *FBIS-SOV*, 20 April 1990.

[158] See "Fists Against Deputies," *Pravda*, 24 May 1990, translated in *FBIS-SOV,* 25 May 1990, and Stuart Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova"s Civil War," *International Security* 21, no.2 (Fall 1996), pp. 123-126.

ligentsia may also have troubled Russian-speakers. A poem by Leonida Lari, a Moldovan poet and pro-unification activist, provides an eloquent example:

> I don't have the power to break people in two,
> But I hope that what happened to us will happen to you.
> With a bit of bitter bread in your sack,
> Among innumerable laws and rules
> May you too wander from century to century
> Looking for a thin wedge of justice.
> And when attacked in your own house,
> And chased from your own place,
> May you forget all about class struggle
> And dream of simple liberty instead.
> When beaten and crowded by strangers,
> You lose your own place by your own hearth,
> May you beg for the Russian language
> The way we have been made to beg for ours.
> And when your customs and your soul have been stolen
> May you too have to wander lost between commissions and tribunals,
> May you also go through fire, hell, and flood
> To save the sparkle of your sickle and your hammer.
> And may you be told a simple truth
> That you are good like those Turks in our past
> Who chained us to their carts. Remember?
> You chained us to your food wagons and scattered us in 1940,
> And then removed from our graves the bodies of our dead
> And put your dead in there instead.
> I don't have the power to break people in two,
> But I hope that what happened to us will happen to you.
> And when you've suffered as we have,
> I pray that you be cured forever of your lust for liberating others.[159]

In September 1990 the self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic seceded and a bloody civil war ensued in which the Soviet (later Russian) Fourteenth Army was also involved. By 1992 the armed conflict was over but Moldova lay in fragments. The tiny break-away state of Transdnistria has a majority of "Russophones" in its population, and it holds much of the industrial infrastructure of Moldova. Russophones mainly consist of Russians and Ukrainians, but anyone who identifies with Great Russian culture and is nostalgic about the Soviet past may belong to this group which seems to be in the process of becoming a nation. Despite the hammer and sickle symbol of peasant-worker class solidarity on its flag, and the internationalist rhetoric wielded by its leaders, the insistence on

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[159] Poem titled "Ruga de zi si de noapte," (Prayer for Day and for Night) *Al noulea val* (Chisinau: Glasul, 1993), pp. 18-19. It was read on National Public Radio, *All Things Considered* on March 21, 1990, translation by Andrei Codrescu. Since 1992 Lari has lived in Romania and has been an MP of the Christian Democratic National Peasant Party, and of the extreme right-wing nationalist Greater Romania Party.

Russian as the official language and on the use of the Cyrillic alphabet for writing Romanian suggest that the Transdniestrians are not nationally neutral, and that internationalism is one of the founding myths of their nation.[160]

Conclusion

The 1980s Moldovan national movement seemed to be modeling itself after the earlier Moldovan National Party that had emerged in the late Russian Empire. But the 1980s movement was more fully developed, more truly nationalist, and more sophisticated than its forerunner in 1917-18. As they had once before, nationally conscious Moldovans resuscitated the Latin alphabet, they received official acknowledgement of the identity of the Moldovan and Romanian languages and they made Moldovan the official state language. They made the expansion of Moldovan schools and publications a major priority. They attempted to rename the Moldovan Supreme Soviet, Sfatul Țării and they restored the flag of the Moldovan Democratic Republic. The frontiers between Moldova and Romania became freer in May 1989. On June 23, 1990, Moldova's Supreme Soviet proclaimed the sovereignty of the Republic.[161] As in 1917-18, the more recent Moldovan movement was able to obtain such spectacular results partly because of a revolution in the capital, and partly because of the local agitation of the Moldovan intelligentsia.

But the similarities end there, and at a deeper level important differences abound. Unlike in 1917-18 when Romanians from the Old Kingdom, Transylvania, and Bukovina lent indispensable aid to the Moldovans in Bessarabia, the 1980s Moldovan movement was completely indigenous. The national and social agendas of the PFM were better integrated than in 1917. As elsewhere in Gorbachev"s Soviet Union, it was the Russians and Russified industrial workers and bureaucracies that were invoking internationalism in their defense of the status quo, and not the Moldovans. Internationalism had, after all, become the untruthful banner of Soviet elites as they re-imposed empire on non-Russian areas, and as they extended their power into the center of Europe. Unlike in 1917 when socialism seemed to be the ideology of the future, in 1989, in the face of the East European revolutions, socialism appeared entirely discredited. Unlike 1917, when Moldovans were overwhelmingly rural and unschooled, the Moldovan masses in the 1980s were highly literate and upwardly mobile. Under Soviet rule Moldova had experienced high levels of urbanization, as a result of which ethnic Moldovans had reclaimed the urban areas of their republic, which had previously constituted Russian and Jewish enclaves. These differences suggest that the Moldovan national movement of the late 1980s was more grounded and better equipped than its predecessor in 1917-1918. Yet the development of the Moldovan national movement did not necessarily imply a "Romanian solution."

In 1990 Robert Segal, a broadcast journalist for the American radio show *All*

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[160] Kaufman refers to "the ethno-nationalist conflict in Moldova [as] Moldovan vs. Soviet or Russian nationalism." Kaufman, "Spiraling," p. 127.

[161] King, *The Moldovans*, p. 148.

Things Considered, interviewed a Moldovan woman from the village of Costeşti about the importance of the Latin alphabet and the desirability of Moldovan independence. She replied that the Latin alphabet was very important, and independence was a good idea. When asked further if she thought that Moldova should join Romania, she said that the borders should be free, but the Romanians "should be masters in their own home, and we in ours."[162] For nearly two decades, the Costeşti villager"s dispositions have prevailed, while calls for unification with Romania, mostly voiced by intelligentsia nationalists before the mid-1990s, have gone unheeded.[163] Her "two-state solution" evinced the confidence of the new Moldovans who in 1990 and beyond have not needed unification with the mother country in order to assert their identity and expand the purview of their language.

Recenzent: dr. Virgiliu Bîrlădeanu
01.12.2007

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[162] National Public Radio, *All Things Considered segment on Moldova*, 21 March 1990.

[163] In a referendum held in March 1994 with a very high turn-out, 95 percent of the voters responded "yes" to the question: "Are you in favor of the development of Moldova as an independent state...?" See Jeff Chinn and Steven D. Roper, "Ethnic Mobilization and Reactive Nationalism: the Case of Modova" *Nationalities Papers* 23, no. 2 (1995), p. 312.

THE RISE OF MOLDOVAN-ROMANIAN NATIONALISM IN BESSARABIA (1900-1917)[1]

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Abstract

In the article "The Rise of Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism in Bessarabia (1900-1917)", I analyze qualitatively, and, even more importantly, quantitatively, the rise of the Moldovan-Romanian national movement in Bessarabia between 1900 and 1917, before the beginning of the Russian Revolution. The quasi-non-existence of a Bessarabian Moldovan-Romanian national movement before 1900 was chronologically followed by the weak national movement of 1900-1917.

The article discusses extensively the "ethnic basis", and especially the Moldovan-Romanian "ethnic basis", including the prevalent primary Moldovan identity, which made the beginning of the nation-building process possible. It also emphasizes the facilitation of Moldovan-Romanian nation-building by exposure to the Russian-language educational system (or, more typically, a lack thereof). The impact of the class and economic sectoral structure, including the manner in which industrialization hindered the development of the national movement, is also analyzed. Widely overlooked data and nuances, as well as the impact of other variables, are also not ignored.

Introduction

In the period before 1917, national identity in Bessarabia experienced two periods of development. The first phase, which can be described as an era of mass passivity, lasted from the first appearance of "Român" and "Moldovan" as ethnonyms for the local population until 1900-1905. The second phase - the emergence of the national movement - occurred between 1905 and 1917. This article discusses the evolution of national identity during these two phases, concentrating on two unusual aspects of the process of national development. First, national identity in Bessarabia developed in a complex relationship to modernization and urbanization. Second, two national identities developed simultaneously in Bessarabia out of the same ethnic group – one Moldovan, the other Romanian. Yet in the development of a *national movement*, both "Moldovan" and "Romanian" *nationalists* participated as members of a common cause.

The development of national identity in Bessarabia cannot be easily matched to processes of modernization or urbanization, as predicted by many theorists, such as Gellner and Hroch. For example, modernization in the form of expanding education, and the related growth of literacy, can be connected to the development of national identity in Bessarabia, but not so with modernization in the form of industrialization. The relationship between urbanization and Moldovan nationalism is also complex, as the spread of support for Moldovan nationalism was disproportionately rural rather than urban until 1917. Most of the nationalist activists of the period 1900-1917 also originated from the clergy and the traditionally free peasants, and especially the younger descendants of these groups, while only a minority came from either the nobility or the descendants of the serfs. Finally, the importance of issues related to class, and particularly the peasant focus on the redistribution of land, hindered the national movement in various ways before 1917.

The question of self-identification has made the issue of Moldovan-Romanian ethnicity and nationalism yet more complex. The proponents of the Romanian ethnic identity have viewed Moldovans as a regional, sub-ethnic group of the Romanian ethnic group. This line has tended to be disproportionately shared by those who were substantially better educated than average. The predominant self-identification of most Moldovans has historically been "Moldovan."

Ethnicity and the Origins of "Romanian" and "Moldovan" Identities in Bessarabia

Dominant theories of national identity, such as those of Anthony Smith, Miroslav Hroch, Ernest Gellner, and Roman Szporluk, tend to suggest that there are clear trajectories through which ethnic groups become nations, and through which ethnic identity develops into a national identity.[2] The development of

[2] My own outlook is consistent with those of Anthony Smith and Roman Szporluk. I partly agree but also disagree with Miroslav Hroch"s views, and I disagree with those of Ernest Gellner. For more details, see Ionas Aurelian Rus, "Variables Affecting Nation-Building: The Bukovinian Romanian Case from 1880 to 1918," presented at the 7th Annual Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), Harriman Institute, Co-

Moldovan and Romanian nationalism in Bessarabia, however, begs more subtle treatment, beginning even with the definition of an ethnic group.

Anthony Smith attributes a number of characteristics to ethnic communities (*ethnies*), including a proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of a common culture, an association with a specific "homeland," and a feeling of solidarity shared by significant segments of the population.[3] While this might generally be true in the cases of more typical ethnic identities, in the Bessarabian Moldovan case, the patterns are more complex. There is only a subjective basis for a "Moldovan" nation (or ethnic identity). Bessarabian Moldovans (or "Moldavians"), are not distinct from the Romanians, except for some differences of sub-dialect and manner of expressing oneself.[4] Although the Bessarabian Moldovans are, by intersubjective ethnographic standards, ethnic Romanians, their predominant self-identification has historically been "Moldovan." Other elements of Smith's definition are shared historical memories, and one or more differentiating elements of a common culture. They are not necessarily useful in differentiating Bessarabians with a "Moldovan" identity from individuals who also possess a "Romanian" one, particularly during the period until 1917. Clearly, in Bessarabia, "Moldovan" and "Romanian" identities have historically been subjective.[5]

To further complicate matters, many of those who have previously written on the subject have often used "Moldovan," "Bessarabian Romanian," "Moldovan-Romanian," and other similar terms interchangeably. Although it may cause confusion initially, I will also follow this same rule, as it should serve to reinforce the overlap – rather than distinctness – of these two "ethnic groups." Whenever necessary, I will specify the nature of the ethnic consciousness of the relevant groups.

Originally, "*român*" or "*rumân*,"[6] which would now be translated as "Romanian," meant "Roman." However, in the late medieval and early modern periods, the term "român" also began to be used to identify the local population in the principality of Moldova, thus acquiring an ethnic connotation. The term was apparently used in this context by only a minority of the population, however, while the majority called themselves "Moldovans." Both sub-groups, moreover, spoke the same language and shared a common culture. Thus, one "ethnic group" came to have two distinct ethnonyms. The documentary record indicates that the overwhelming majority of those with an exclusively "Moldovan" identity were peasants, and that those who had a Romanian consciousness were overrepresented among the intellectuals.[7] For those members of Moldova's elites who possessed both identities, the Romanian identity was ethnic, linguistic, and cultural, but non-political. By contrast, the "Moldovan" identity was used by the same people in reference to the population of Moldova, the Moldovan state, and had political connotations.[8]

During the Russian Tsarist period, the Moldovans/Romanians were officially counted as "Moldovans," and never as "Romanians." The latter term was not even a Russian census category during the pre-1917 period. The Moldovans/Romanians represented 47.58 percent of the province's population, or 920,919 out of 1,935,412 inhabitants, according to the Russian census of 1897, which classified the population by mother-tongue. Even if one adjusts for the Russified Moldovans, who were counted as Russian-speakers, the "Moldovans" represent-

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Nationalities (ASN), Harriman Institute, Columbia University, April 2007. Yet both identity groups followed the Julian calendar during the period discussed in this article.

[6] "Român" was the variant used in Moldova; "rumân" in Transylvania and Wallachia.

[7] Some of the various members of the elites, including Dimitrie Cantemir, whose books are available to present-day researchers, displayed a "Romanian" identity. The early modern peasant folktales transmitted from generation to generation identified the peasants as "Moldovans." See, for example, Vlad Georgescu, *The Romanians* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1991), 15-16, 18, 41-42, 67, 70-71; Dimitrie Cantemir, *Descriptio Moldaviae* (Bucuresti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1973), 298-299, 337-341 and passim and *Cronica Ghiculeştilor* (Bucureşti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1965). Also see Ionaş Rus, "Românii şi minoritarii in Basarabia interbelică," in *Revista de istorie a Moldovei,* 1:17 (January-March 1994), 29-30; and Rus, *Self-Determination*, p. 9-11 and passim.

[8] See Cantemir, p. 298-299, 337-341, 365-367, the use of ethnonyms in the folktales in Mihai Canciovici, *Domnitori romăni in legende* (Bucureşti: Editura Sport-Turism, 1984) and Octav Păun and Silviu Angelescu, *Legende populare romăneşti* (Bucureşti: Editura Albatros, 1983), and the discussion in Rus, "Românii şi minoritarii;" and Rus, *Self-Determination.*

ed only 52.15 percent of Bessarabia's population, or 1,009,400 people, according to Soviet sources. A Bessarabian-born Romanian historian arrives at an almost identical proportion, namely 52 percent.[9]

During the period of Russian rule in Bessarabia, which lasted from 1812 until 1917, most Moldovan-Romanians identified themselves as "Moldovans" rather than as "Romanians." However, the percentage of the latter group was growing. The documented cases of people officially classified by the Russian Tsarist authorities as "Moldovan" peasants who possessed a "Romanian" national consciousness included disproportionately literate people, even among the peasants.[10] Yet only 10.5 percent of all the adult Bessarabian Moldovan males, and 1.7 percent of the adult Moldovan females, could read and write according to the census of 1897. The American agricultural expert Louis Guy Michael observed that most of the literate Bessarabian Moldovan-Romanian peasants "felt a nearer loyalty to Bucharest [i.e., the capital of Romania] than to Petrograd [Russia's capital]" by 1915.[11] There was a great deal of overlap between literacy and a Romanian ethnic self-identification and nationalism, even though Moldovans went to Russian-language schools.[12]

A different pattern applied to the southwestern and southern Bessarabian counties of Cahul and Ismail. They had been temporarily returned to Moldovan rule from 1856-1859, and after the union of Moldova with Wallachia in 1859, fell under Romanian rule until 1878, when they were returned to Russia. The influence of Romanian schooling did create a significant proportion of inhabitants with a Romanian national consciousness. A substantial majority of these individuals were peasants who also knew literary Romanian, and not just the local spoken sub-dialect. This was facilitated by the fact that Romania, unlike Russia, followed a more pro-active policy in the areas of the promotion of literacy and education. This manifested itself through a policy of mandatory elementary education.[13]

The increase in the number of inhabitants with a Romanian self-identification should be seen as part of a process of nation-building. One might view

[9] Michael Bruchis, The USSR: *Language and Realities - Nations, Leaders, and Scholars* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1988), 276-278; and Alexandru V. Boldur, *Istoria Basarabiei* (Bucureşti: Editura Victor Frunza, 1992), 492.

[10] Onisifor Ghibu, *Pe baricadele vieţii: În Basarabia revoluţionară (1917-1918) – Amintiri* (Chişinău: Editura Universitas, 1992), 33, 47, 52-55; and Ioan M. Ciolan, Constantin Voicu, and Mihai Racoviţan, *Transylvania: Romanian History and Perpetuation or What Official Hungarian Documents Say* (Bucharest: Military Publishing House), 145-146.

[11] See Louis Guy Michael, *More Corn For Bessarabia: Russian Experience 1910-1917* (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1983), 113. This was largely due to the feeling that the landed estates would be redistributed to the peasants under Romanian rule.

[12] See Institutul Central de Statistica, *Recensământul General al Populaţiei României din 29 Decemvrie 1930* (Bucureşti: Monitorul Oficial, Imprimeria Naţională, 1938-1940), vol. 2, p. XXXII-XXXIII.

[13] See Alex Drace-Francis, *The Making of Modern Romanian Culture: Literacy and the Development of National Identity* (London, New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2006), passim.

the phenomenon as being rooted in a greater self-consciousness linked to modernity. Most of those with a Romanian identity, as compared with only a small minority of the self-identified Moldovans, were nationalists.[14]

Although the Bessarabian Moldovans are, according to intersubjective ethnographic standards, ethnic Romanians, their predominant subjective ethnic identity has been "Moldovan." At the same time, for various reasons, during the early part of the twentieth century, many of them have acquired a "Romanian" ethnic consciousness, and a predisposition toward "Romanian" nationalism. As we shall see, these circumstances have had an important impact in influencing the national movement in Bessarabia.

The Bessarabian Moldovans/Romanians before 1900

Before around 1900, one cannot speak about a significant Moldovan national movement, or about the involvement in it of individuals who were not aristocrats. Modern nationalism was mainly an aristocratic phenomenon during that period. The masses, and especially the peasants, were rather passive and inert, despite their ethnic, and especially social, grievances. Yet the process of nation-building had already started.

Anthony Smith argues that the transformation of an *ethnie* into a nation takes place through a movement from passive subordination of the community to its active political assertion.[15] This is an important process related to, among other factors, the growth of national movements. I would argue that a national movement is, in Smith's words, "a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize its national will."[16]

The "Moldovan-Romanian national movement in Bessarabia" is a useful, empirically based term or definition. It refers to networks and groups of nationalist, politically active Bessarabian Moldovan-Romanians, regardless of ethnic self-identification, whose goal was to promote Moldovan-Romanian nationalism. Some of these people had a predominantly "Romanian," and some of them had a primarily "Moldovan," identity and nationalism. It would appear that all the nationalist groups mentioned in this article included both categories of people. They worked for similar goals that transcended variations in ethnic self-identification. The size of the group with a "Romanian" consciousness in the national movement was substantially higher than among the general Moldovan population. In 1917, and possibly in previous years, most Moldovan-Romanian nationalist activists apparently did have a Romanian national identity. This is partly explained by the fact that the more politically mobilized sections of the population, namely the literate inhabitants, were particularly likely to have a

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[14] Even so, it would be difficult to agree fully that Walker Connor's definition that "a nation is a self-aware ethnic group" is particularly useful for the Moldovan case. See Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a...," in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 43. After all, national consciousness could have a "Moldovan" or "Romanian" character.

[15] Smith, passim.

[16] Smith, p. 72.

"Romanian" identity.[17]

The Moldovan-Romanian nationalist movement was very weak during the nineteenth century and during the first years of the twentieth. During the nineteenth century, it did not involve the masses employed in agriculture. The latter formed almost 90.4 percent of the Moldovan-Romanian population according to the Romanian census of 1930, and an even larger proportion during the period of Russian Tsarist rule (1812-1917).[18] Around 95.5 percent of the Bessarabian Moldovan-speakers were rural inhabitants according to the census of 1897, as were 93.2 percent of the Bessarabian Romanians according to the 1930 census.[19] The fact that the majority of the Moldovans who were peasants was so large arguably hindered the growth of the national movement. So did the fact that the Russian language was socially regarded as the appropriate urban language.[20]

Among the causes of this phenomenon that have been suggested by historians were the repressive Russification of the Russian Orthodox Church, school and administration, and the end of the use of the Moldovan language for any public functions. These changes are historically associated primarily with the period from the 1860s onward. However, the most important explanation for this pattern was the pre-political, pre-activist frame of mind of the overwhelmingly illiterate serf peasants and of their descendants. They represented about five-sixths of the Moldovan population, and, to a lesser extent, of the other non-noble sections of the group.[21]

[17] For evidence of the continued existence of a Moldovan-Romanian national movement during the post-1989 period, see, for example, William Crowther, "Nationalism and Political Transformation in Moldova," in Donald Dyer, ed., *Studies in Moldavian: The History, Culture, Language and Contemporary Politics of the People of Moldova* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1996).

[18] *Recensământul*, vol. 5, p. 18.

[19] See Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995), 92 and Irina Livezeanu, "Urbanization in a Low Key and Linguistic Change in Soviet Moldavia (Part 2)," *Soviet Studies,* XXXIII: 4 (October 1981): 590-591.

[20] See Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, p. 90 and passim. Similar patterns were also discernible in the case of the Ukrainian national movement in the region of Kherson neighboring on Bessarabia. See, for example, Oliver H. Radkey, *Russia Goes to the Polls: The Election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, 1917* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), passim. Also see Gheorghe Cojocaru, "Cu privire la problema Adunării Constituante în Basarabia în anul 1917," part 2, in *Revista de istorie a Moldovei*, no. 3 (7), July-September 1991. Also consult Ionas Aurelian Rus, "The Roots and Early Development of "Moldovan"-Romanian Nationalism in Bessarabia (1900-1917)," in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie A.D. Xenopol*, vol. 33, 1996, p. 287-301. The only case of weaker nationalism among a major group in the European part of the Russian Empire was the Belarussian one. On the Belarussian case, see Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 53-54 and passim, and Nicholas P. Vakar, *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956), passim.

[21] Consult, among others, Prince Serge Dimitriyevich Urussov, *Memoirs of a Russian Governor* (London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1908); and Grigore Constantinescu, "Din Vremuri Țariste," in Iurie Colesnic, *Basarabia Necunoscută* (Chişinău: Universitas, 1993),

The causes of the Russification policy practiced by the Russian state and religious authorities throughout the entire empire were complex, but they were generally intended to enhance efficiency, uniformity and loyalty toward the state throughout the polity. They had, from the point of view of the Russian authorities, many unintended consequences. These were popular apathy, discontent and ambivalence toward the authorities.

The multi-ethnic, multi-cultural character of Bessarabia also played a role in preventing the early development of Moldovan nationalism, or at least increased the number of its actual or potential opponents, and negatively affected its potential viability. Russian official statistics and archival data show that in 1817, Moldovans formed 78.2-86.9 percent of the population of the province. The percentage of non-Moldovans increased from 1812 onward, even between 1812 and 1828, when Bessarabia was briefly a Moldovan autonomous province of the Russian Empire.[22] The Moldovans formed 58.2 percent of Bessarabia's population in 1835, 51 percent in 1858 and 47.6 percent in 1897.[23]

The key explanation for this demographic change was the colonization of the province, especially up to the 1860s, with, or other forms of immigration into the province of the members of, a number of non-Romanian ethnic groups. These included Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Bulgarians, Gagauz (Christian Turks originating from Bulgaria), Jews, and others.[24]

A number of demographic characteristics of the province also increased the difficulties of nationalist mobilization. One was the fuzziness of ethnic boundaries, especially outside the peasant class, caused by Russification. Differentiations were less clear-cut than in some other areas of the world. This partly explains the great salience of class identification. There is a universal consensus that hundreds of Moldovan nobles, thousands of Moldovan urban inhabitants became completely or partly Russified, that is, switched their colloquial language to Russian. Tens of thousands of rural ones became completely or partly Russified or Ukrainianized (that is, switched their colloquial language to Russian). Some of these cases occurred before the 1860s, and an even larger number occurred subsequently.[25]

Up to the last decade of the nineteenth century, the only politically minded and politically active Moldovan group was the numerically small landed aristocracy.[26] Only 4,031 out of 2,521,277 Bessarabians (0.16 percent) were nobles in 1916.[27] Only 22 percent of the Bessarabian nobles used "Moldovan" as their

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[22] George F. Jewsbury, *The Russian Annexation of Bessarabia: 1774-1828* (Boulder, Colorado: Columbia University Press, 1976), 77-161.

[23] Michael Bruchis, The USSR: *Language and Realities*, p. 276-278.

[24] See Jewsbury, passim.

[25] Dumitru Dogaru, "Năpădenii, un sat de mazili din Codru," *Sociologie Românească* 2:7-8 (July-August 1937): 297; *Recensământul*, vol. 2, p. 50-51; and L. T. Boga, "Populația," in Ștefan Ciobanu (ed.), *Basarabia: Monografie* (Chișinău: Universitas, 1993), 71.

[26] Consult Urussov; and Colesnic, p. 35-36, 250.

[27] Boga, p. 71.

native language in 1897, while most used Russian.[28] Throughout the nineteenth century, numerous Moldovan nobles periodically demanded the greater use of the Moldovan, as opposed to the Russian, language in the public sphere. They requested political autonomy for Bessarabia even less frequently.[29]

During the 1860s, there were a few unsuccessful petitions signed by peasants who demanded that the *de facto* switch from the Moldovan to the Russian language in teaching in the village schools, which was occurring during that decade, be reversed. The petitioners also demanded more Moldovan-language schools. Yet these petitions quantitatively pale in comparison to those of 1869 in favor of the improvement of the lot of the peasants. Numerous literate inhabitants of 135 Bessarabian villages, most of whom had a Moldovan ethnic majority, signed the latter petitions.[30]

Some Moldovan students learned very little in the Russian schools because of their lack of knowledge of the Russian language, repeated a number of grades, or, even more typically, simply did not attend school. The American agricultural expert Louis Guy Michael was in charge of managing the "More Corn for Bessarabia" program (1910-1916) of the provincial government. He explains that the Moldovans "were often irregular in their attendance at school taught in Russian by Russians." This explains why on average they got less out of school than the members of other ethnic groups did.[31] As a result, only slightly more than 6 percent of all the adult Bessarabian Moldovans could read and write in Russian according to the census of 1897.[32] The low level of literacy explains why the Moldovan/Romanian national movement became a mass movement only after the period discussed in this article.[33]

In the early stages of the national movement, mass education was not the key factor. The education of the elites and of the "modernized peasants," who were potential local/village leaders, was more salient. The ten best students in numerous rural schools were selected to take part in the boys' and girls' clubs

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[28] The data are from Seymour Becker, *Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia* (Dekalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1985), 185. Also consult, among other sources, Charles Upson Clark, *Bessarabia: Russia and Roumania on the Black Sea* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1927), 111-112.

[29] See Ştefan Ciobanu, *Basarabia: Populaţia, Istoria, Cultura* (Chişinău: Universitas, 1992), 47-60; Ion Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei* (Chişinău, Cernăuţi, Bucureşti, 1991); and Boldur, p. 454-455.

[30] Consult Nistor; Boldur, p. 483-484 and Petre Ştefănucă, "Obiceiuri şi Credinţe de la Nişcani în legătură cu locuinţa," *Sociologie Românească* 3:7-9 (July-September 1938): 366-369.

[31] See Michael, p. 51; and Colesnic, p. 230. Michael was directly involved in the teaching of groups of schoolchildren how to raise corn in a more efficient, American-style way. He was a good observer of the educational process in Bessarabia.

[32] See, among other sources, Keith Hitchins, Rumania, 1866-1947 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 248; and David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* (New York; Greenwood Publishers, 1968), 510.

[33] See Rus, "Roots," p. 287-301 and Irina Livezeanu, "Moldavia, 1917-1990: Nationalism and Internationalism Then and Now," *Armenian Review* 43:2-3, 153-193.

which participated in the "More Corn for Bessarabia" program.[34]

The National Movement (1900-1917)

The period from roughly 1900 to 1917 can be seen as the time when a politically significant modern Moldovan national movement emerged and became a long-term force. For the first time, most of its members were non-aristocratic. In fact, they originated from some of the groups of the population that could be classified as neither nobility, nor the illiterate descendants of semi-serfs. They came from the more socio-economically and culturally advantaged clergy and the traditionally free peasants, and especially the younger descendants of these groups. However, this movement was not very strong, and the Moldovans in most localities were not touched by it. It did not obtain the actual support of a large section of the Moldovan population. Nor was it able to build itself as a mass movement through channeling the existing popular discontent on other issues, such as the agrarian question, into sympathies for it. The average Moldovan peasant perceived this issue as more important than the national question. Industrialization and urban tradition had nothing to do with the national movement.

Anthony Smith's definition applies well to this case. Nationalism is "an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation.'"[35]

Moldovan-Romanian nationalist groups emerged in 1898-1905.[36] During the 1905-1907 Russian Revolution, a number of Moldovans, though, because of passivity, inertia and other reasons, not very many of them, took part in it. They clearly demonstrated their opposition against Russification, and their desire for cultural and territorial autonomy. Even larger numbers of peasants showed that they desired more land from the unpopular, mostly urban-dwelling, absentee landowners. The latter happened to be overwhelmingly Russian or Russified. They were leasing land to unpopular, mostly Jewish, *arendars*, leaseholders who subleased it to the peasants.

The various Moldovan nationalist currents, which were emerging during the 1905-1907 revolution, were not united. The ephemeral "Moldovan Cultural Society" was a continuation of previous aristocratic nationalism. It demanded the end of Russification and a return to teaching in Moldovan. The nationalism of this group was, as one can see from its program and activities, cultural rather than political. It had 400 members in 1905, and 600 in May 1906, including

34 See Michael, p. 50 and passim.

35 Smith, p. 74. Also see the discussion of the spread of national consciousness and of the changes in values in Deutsch, p. 152-155 and passim.

36 Consult Nistor; Boldur; Colesnic, and Ciobanu, *Basarabia: Populația*; Hitchins, p. 249. Also see Michael Davitt, *Within the Pale: The True Story of Anti-Semitic Persecutions in Russia* (London: Hurst and Blackett, Limited, 1903), 56. Also see "Manifestul Program al partidului național-antisemit," in Jean Ancel, ed., *Documents Concerning the Fate of Romanian Jewry During the Holocaust* (New York: The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 1986), vol. 1, p. 3, vol. 11, p. 65; and Constantinescu, p. 288-289.

both men and women.[37] However, the Moldovan nobles did not make a common front even among themselves. Various factions among them were always in different partisan camps, which were at odds with each other over all sorts of economic, financial and other issues.

A populist, national democratic group that emerged during the 1905-1907 revolution included only a slightly larger number of "nationalist activists." I define the latter category as people who did more than just passively read Moldovan nationalist newspapers, or sign nationalist petitions. They were mostly current or former students of the Theological Seminary of Kishinev (Chişinău), the capital of Bessarabia. They organized themselves around the newspaper *Basarabia* ("Bessarabia"). Apparently twenty-six out of thirty contributors to the newspaper, all of whom were males, were young people.[38] The group obtained the support of a number of priests, teachers, other intellectuals, and non-aristocratic agriculturists, especially young literate ones. It demanded education in the Moldovan language, land reform, Bessarabian autonomy, universal suffrage, and the creation of a cooperative movement.[39] In all-Russian politics, the leadership and activists of the group were mostly Socialist Revolutionaries in sympathies. They were non-Marxist, left-wing, rural-oriented, or peasant-oriented populists.

The program of this nationalist group, more than that of the above-mentioned aristocratic nationalists, is consistent with Miroslav Hroch's model of the fight of the nationally activated population in "small nations." The Czech Marxist historian's model is useful even though the Bessarabian Moldovans do not fit perfectly in the category of "small nations" under "foreign" rule as described by Hroch. This is due to the Moldovan vs. Romanian identity issue. Hroch argues that these nationalist movements fought for "equal rights, national language and culture, for a share in economic prosperity, for social liberation and political autonomy." This characterization certainly applies to the above-mentioned populist movement.[40]

The Russian civil and Orthodox Christian religious authorities grudgingly allowed the publishing of various Moldovan/Romanian newspapers, whether in the Latin characters used in Romania, or, more commonly, in the Cyrillic ones used in Russia. Nevertheless, they harassed these publications and the national movement in general. They accomplished this through censorship, occasional arrests, and transfers of "subversive" elements to other parts of the empire, starting

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[37] Constantinescu, p. 289.

[38] Ştefan Ciobanu, "Din istoria mişcării naţionale în Basarabia (Ziarul Basarabia)", in Colesnic, p. 276-277.

[39] Andrei Popovici, *The Political Status of Bessarabia* (Washington, D.C.: School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1931), 113, 116-117.

[40] Miroslav Hroch, "How Much Does Nation Formation Depend on Nationalism?" in *East European Politics and Societies*, 4:1(1990): 109-113. Hroch"s model of national mobilization is useful for understanding the Bessarabian Moldovan case, yet his selected cases are more straightforward and less ambiguous than the case discussed in this article. See Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

in 1906-1908. One of the changes that was not reversed was the introduction of teaching in Romanian at the theological seminary. This was the place where most of the "nationalist activists" were studying, or had previously studied.[41] In 1905, a church congress decided that Moldovan could again be used in church services. However, elementary schools for Moldovans continued to be in Russian.

It is rather clear, as I have argued elsewhere, that the politicized Moldovan-Romanian national movement of 1905-1907 was still rather weak.[42] There were many thousands of Bessarabian Moldovan-Romanian nationalists and readers of the Moldovan nationalist press. However, the number of known nationalist activists was apparently about one thousand before 1917. Because of the repression, many individuals of nationalist leanings stopped engaging in nationalist activities, or became less active. As a result, by 1910, according to the local Russian Orthodox archbishop, only fifteen to twenty priests were nationalist activists. They were actively and energetically involved in the Moldovan national movement, and were therefore regarded as dangerous. There were roughly a thousand, mostly Moldovan, Bessarabian Eastern Orthodox priests.[43]

The national movement did not yet have any resonance with the average Moldovan. In 1905-1906, some Moldovan grievances were expressed through meetings convened in a few localities. Mass petitions addressed to the central authorities called for the distribution of land to the peasants, and for national linguistic rights, in that order. Nevertheless, in numerous, possibly even in a clear majority of the, villages, nobody was involved in the national movement.[44] Therefore, no activity in favor of Moldovan nationalism or the Moldovan language occurred in them during the period of Russian Tsarist rule. Not surprisingly, the national movement was not able to get its members elected to the Russian Duma (parliament). The newspaper *Cuvânt Moldovenesc*, founded in 1913, had a circulation of only 10,000 by the middle of World War I.[45]

Only a minority of the agrarian discontent was channeled towards the national movement, which was demanding land reform. Most rural discontent manifested itself through spontaneous agrarian unrest. The non-nationalist character of the agrarian strife is significant. It would seem to indicate that most peasants found their Moldovan identity relevant only in terms of language, traditions and culture, not in the political and social arenas. Besides, even the above-mentioned petitions signed by peasants show that land reform was apparently a more important priority than ethno-linguistic rights. John Armstrong correctly argues that "a lower class (especially in sedentary agricultural societies) cannot constitute a group as persistently conscious of its identity as an

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[41] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1969), 235.

[42] See Rus, "Românii şi minoritarii," p. 30-31.

[43] Popovici, p. 107; Nicolae M. Enea, "Cultele," in Ciobanu, *Basarabia: Monografie*, p. 301.

[44] See, for example, T. Al. Stirbu, "Vălenii de lângă Prut," *Sociologie Românească* 3: 10-12 (October-December 1938): 521.

[45] See Nistor, p. 272-273.

ethnic collectivity."[46] However, the motivation of the desire for land reform was largely based in interests, which can sometimes counterbalance the impact of ethnicity.

In the period up to 1917, only a small minority of the non-aristocratic nationalist activists were the descendants of *țărani* (peasants) who had obtained land through the land reform of 1868 that was implemented in the province. Instead, they were largely the educated sons of clergymen. Most of the young "nationalist activists" of rural origin were the sons (or, in one case, the daughter) of Orthodox Christian priests, deacons and cantors. The Orthodox clergymen together with their families represented only 0.30 percent of the population of the province (7,496 people in 1916).[47]

Somewhat less commonly, they originated from the class of non-aristocratic agriculturists who had always been free and had historically owned their own land (*răzeși*). This group represented about 12 percent of the rural population of central Bessarabia. Even less commonly, the activists originated from the group of *mazili* (peasant-nobles, the descendants of the nobility), who represented 2.03 percent of the population in the province in 1916.[48]

One cause of this pattern was the fact that these individuals were not literally from land-hungry small peasant backgrounds. Their families had the mentality of peasant proprietors rather than of dependent peasants, and were on average better off economically than the latter. Part of the explanation, derived from a large number of individual biographies, is that the people of these social backgrounds had benefited from a more privileged upbringing. This included greater educational opportunities, parental interest in their education, and the internalization of their parents' urgings to channel them toward education, than most Moldovan *țărani* had experienced.

The "nationalist activists" came from overwhelmingly Moldovan villages, in which the members of their ethnic group represented between 80.73 percent and 98.60 percent of the population according to the Romanian census of 1930.[49] I have data on the attitudes toward Moldovan nationalism of the parents of more than two dozen nationalist activists. Only four of them, including the only non-aristocratic important female activist in the national movement, seem to have been brought up in families in which the parents were Moldovan-Romanian nationalists. Parents with "Romanian" nationalist views brought up two of them. Two others came from households with "Moldovan" nationalist parents, yet the activists, as adults, acquired a "Romanian" identity. This illustrates the process of the growth of the number of nationalists, and especially of nationalists with a "Romanian" identity, over time. However, all of them had absorbed a feeling of ethnic identity from their villages.

The role of industrialization, which Ernest Gellner and other theorists em-

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[46] Boldur, p. 377-378, and John Armstrong, "Nations before Nationalism," in Hutchinson and Smith, p. 143.

[47] Colesnic, p. 250; and Boga, p. 71.

[48] Hitchins, p. 241.

[49] Ghibu; Colesnic; and *Recensământul*, vol. 2.

phasize as a factor in the development of nationalism, was unimportant in Bessarabia, at least among Moldovans.[50] Anthony Smith and other analysts have accurately observed the fact that nationalism is not the product of the bourgeoisie, or of capitalism, and does not "serve" the interests of one particular class in opposition to other sections of the same nation.[51]

By 1900, there were very few Moldovan industrialists, merchants, proletarians, bureaucrats, or urban inhabitants in general. According to the Russian census of 1897, 47.6 percent of the inhabitants of Bessarabia spoke Moldovan as their mother-tongue, 19.6 percent spoke Ukrainian, 11.8 percent Yiddish, and 8.2 percent Russian.[52] By comparison, 37.2 percent of all urban inhabitants were Yiddish-speakers, 24.4 percent were Russian-speakers, 15.8 percent spoke Ukrainian, and only 14.2 percent Moldovan.[53]

Jews represented 76.4 percent of all of those engaged in commerce, and 35 percent of all the artisans, of the province in 1897. By 1902, 49.3 percent of the workers in enterprises employing 6 to 50 persons, and 74.8 percent of those working in enterprises with 50 to 500 persons had been born in the Russian and Ukrainian provinces of the empire, and were overwhelmingly Russians, Jews and Ukrainians. In 1923, only 40.46 percent of all the industrial entrepreneurs were Romanians, including 12.86 percent of those in urban areas, as compared to 72.14 percent who were Jewish, and 43.97 percent in rural localities. In 1930, only 19.08 percent of those actively employed in industry, including handicrafts, were Romanians. By contrast, 38.75 percent were Jews, and 25.26 percent were Russians and Ukrainians. Only 16.62 percent of those employed in the textile and garment industries, including 18 percent of those who were employed in textile enterprises, were Romanians, and 50.03 percent were Jews. Only 10.91 percent of those actively employed in commerce were Romanians, while 69.97 percent were Jews. Among merchants, the percentages were 17.61 percent and 63.17 percent in 1938.[54]

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[50] See, for example, Ernest Gellner, "The Dramatis Personae of History," *East European Politics and Societies* 4:1(1990):126-127, 131 and Hroch, "How Much," p. 106.

[51] Smith, passim.

[52] See Livezeanu, *Cultural*, p. 90.

[53] Livezeanu, "Urbanization," p. 592.

[54] See Edward H. Judge, *Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of a Pogrom* (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 26; Hitchins, p. 243; Ciobanu, *Basarabia: Populaţia*, p. 44-45; Clark, *Bessarabia*, p. 23 and *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia* (New York: The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia Inc., 1948), vol. 2, p. 247. Consult Isaac M. Rubinow, *Economic Condition of the Jews in Russia* (New York: Arno Press, 1975), 554 and Eugen Weber, "Romania," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., *The European Right: A Historical Profile* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1966), 529-530. Also see Ezra Mendelsohn, *The Jews of East Central Europe Between the World Wars* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1983), 277; Victor Scărlătescu, "Comerţul Intern," in *Aspecte ale economiei româneşti. Material documentar pentru cunoaşterea unor probleme în cadrul planului economic*, 1939, p. 207; Const. I. Lungu and T. Al. Ştirbu, "Basarabia economică," in Ciobanu, *Basarabia: Monografie*, p. 396-402; *Enciclopedia României* (Bucureşti: 1938-1943), vol. 4, p. 360; *Recensământul*, vol. 7, p. L-LIV; and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, Direcţia Generală a Arhivelor Statului, Serviciul Iaşi, Fond Reşedinţa Regală a Ţinutului Prut, Dosar nr. 2 (1748), 1940 (folder no. 2 or 1748 for the year 1940), f. 162, 184.

The members of the Moldovan industrial and commercial classes were not involved at all in the national movement before 1917. Moreover, comparatively few pre-1917 Moldovan nationalists were the offspring of the members of the Russian estate of the "townspeople". This statistical category included 564,200 urban and rural inhabitants (22.38 percent of the total provincial population), and 4,330 "merchants" (narrowly defined) in 1916.[55] The Moldovan nationalist activists were substantially more likely to live in urban localities than the average Moldovan. Yet they were less likely to be of urban descent. This is indicative of the fact that Moldovan nationalism did not correlate with an "urban tradition", but with recent urbanization.

Roman Szporluk's category of nations without a modern economy, where nevertheless nationalism is developing in the area of civil society/culture is useful for understanding the case of the Bessarabian Moldovans.[56] One has to agree that the Eastern European pattern postulated by Szporluk, that nationalism first appeared in the area of culture, is applicable to the Bessarabian Moldovans.[57]

The years from around 1900 until 1917 should be seen as the time when a somewhat politically significant modern Moldovan national movement emerged and became a force. Although it was not strong, the authorities could not ignore it. Although for the first time mostly non-aristocratic, it did not touch most of the Moldovans.

Some nationalist activists originated from some of the groups of the population that could be classified as the traditional middle strata, even though the term middle class would not be appropriate. They tended to be the descendants of the members of these groups. However, industrialization and urban tradition had nothing to do with the national movement. Moldovan-Romanian nationalism did not become a mass movement before 1917. This was partly because of the greater salience of the agrarian question, which was perceived by the average Moldovan peasant as more important than, and separate from, the national question.

Conclusions

The first two phases in the development of Moldovan-Romanian nationalism were the era of mass passivity, which lasted up to around 1900-1905, and the period of the emergence of the national movement (from 1900-1905 to 1917). During the latter period, numerous Moldovans did possess an ethnic identity and other proto-nationalist characteristics.

Some elements of modernization facilitated nation-building in Bessarabia. This can certainly be said about education, and the related growth of literacy, but not about industrialization. The relationship between urbanization and Moldovan nationalism is complex. Support for Moldovan nationalism was disproportionately rural rather than urban. This went hand in hand with the dis-

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[55] Boga, p. 71, 241.

[56] Roman Szporluk, "In Search of the Drama of History: or, National Roads to Modernity," *East European Politics and Societies* 4:1 (1990): 141-144, 146.

[57] Ibid, p. 141-143.

proportionately urban places of residence of the nationalist activists. Yet the urban nationalists were not of urban descent, but literate, more or less educated first-generation inhabitants of the urban localities.

The background of the individuals who were involved in the national movement for the period up to 1917 has much explanatory power. They were typically the sons of priests or the sons of other categories of the population that were intermediary between former "peasants" as defined by the laws, and the aristocracy. Most of the illiterate descendants of these "peasants" were primarily (and originally exclusively) concerned with the issue of agrarian reform, and they were substantially underrepresented among the supporters of the national movement. Moldovan-Romanian nationalism in Bessarabia up to 1917 may be partially explained by cultural factors and by structural factors related to the dismantling of feudal patterns, but not by economic performance or development narrowly defined.

The importance of issues related to class, and particularly the peasant desire for land reform, hurt the nationalist cause in various ways before 1917. The aristocratic character of the early national movement was eventually surmounted since the nobility never controlled the activities of the non-nobles in the national movement. But the issue of self-identification has influenced Moldovan-Romanian ethnicity and nationalism. The proponents of a Romanian ethnonational identity have perceived the "Moldovans" as a regional, subnational group or identity, and this view has been correlated with a higher level of education. The identity of most Moldovans, then, has historically been "Moldovan."[58]

Recenzent: dr. Irina Livezeanu
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[58] See Rus, "Variables." This paper was a pilot project for my dissertation, *Variables Affecting Nation-Building: The Impact of the Ethnic Basis, the Educational System, Industrialization and Sudden Shocks*. In this larger study, which is summarized in this paragraph, I am looking at the impact of the above-mentioned four independent variables on nation-building, on the evolution of the spread and intensity of nationalism. I am introducing to the study of nation-building something that is de-emphasized in the current scholarship, namely a systematic quantitative measurement of the intensity of nationalism on four dimensions (integrative, satisfactional, identificational and symbolic). Their sum is the intensity of nationalism score. This provides a framework for the quantitative testing of the impact of various independent variables. Some of the pre-existing theories are confirmed; an ethnic basis (language, culture, identity, etc.) similar to the desired end-product and the growth of education help nation-building. Others are disconfirmed. It has been widely assumed that industrialization fosters nation-building, but my research indicates that it tends to hinder it. Sudden shocks (collapses of empires, wars and revolutions) change the intensity of nationalism scores significantly during very short chronological periods.

THE HOLOCAUST OF BESSARABIAN JEWRY IN THE HISTORY-WRITING OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: NEW DEVELOPMENTS

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Abstract

The article analyzes recent Moldovan publications on the Holocaust of Bessarabian and Bukovinian Jewry during World War II, a subject which still remains a sensitive one in Moldova. It critiques a brochure by the former Romanian dissident currently residing in Paris, Paul Goma, and a book by the professional Moldovan historian Sergei Nazaria. Unlike some other Moldovan writers, both authors explicitly recognize the fact of the mass murder of Jews in the provinces in the summer of 1941 but their treatments of the subject, the article argues, are still in some respects inadequate. The article shows how and why it is so in every particular case by drawing on the original archival research. It concludes by stating that Moldovan society still has to come to terms with its own past and that Moldovan historians have to develop ways to talk about their country"s recent history in a more meaningful and less partisan manner.

I first analyzed how the topic of the Holocaust of Bessarabian Jewry is treated in Moldovan history-writing in 2002. Having examined both the Soviet-era texts and the writings which had appeared in the 1990s, I concluded that those events constituted "a part of Moldovan national history that the Moldovan society had been unable to come to terms with."[1] During the Soviet period, Moldovan historians were virtually prohibited from even mentioning the mass murder of Jews by the Romanian and German authorities in 1941, and were forced to dissolve Jewish tragedy in the universalizing discourse on the suffering of all Soviet people at the hands of the Nazis. This situation was, of course, more or less common to Soviet historiography as a whole, but in the Moldavian SSR it was worse than in some other republics of the Soviet Union where censorship was not as strict. In the first decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, historical accounts of the Holocaust of Bessarabian Jewry remained apart from the standards of international Holocaust studies.

Furthermore, during the first post-Soviet decade, Moldovan historians who researched and published on the World War II period tended to simultaneously minimize and justify the persecution of Jews. Justification was achieved by referencing the Jews" supposed betrayal of the Romanian during late June and early July Romanians were forced to withdraw from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina under the Soviet threat and German pressure, and during the subsequent year of Soviet occupation until Romanian troops returned in July 1941. I linked this tendency to minimize and justify Jewish suffering and persecution with the tradition of Romanian nationalist historiography which was emulated by this group. This tradition is characterized by a tendency to present the Romanian nation as a victim of all possible others, and to gloss over any misdeeds the Romanian state committed against minorities and foreigners.[2] On the other hand, traditional Soviet-type discourse which survived in the writings of Moldovan historians who write in Russian, and many of whom reside in Transnistria, ignored the problem of the Holocaust.[3]

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[1] "From Silence to justification? Moldovan Historians on the Holocaust of Bessarabian and Transnistrian Jews," *Nationalities Papers* vol. 30. no. 3 (2002): 449.

[2] Ibid., p. 435- 457. When I was writing this article I was unaware of a book on the history of Bessarabia during World War II by Veaceslav Stavilă which was published in a fairly small number of copies. (*De la Basarabia românească la Basarabia sovietică: 1939-1945* (Chişinău: Tipografia Centrală, 2000). The quality of this text is higher than that of the books I did review, but in his treatment of the Holocaust in the province, Stavilă is practically indistinguishable from the other authors: Jews are blamed for their own misfortune which is seen as deserved punishment for acts of treachery they supposedly committed. Simultaneously mass murder of Jews is blamed "mostly" ("*mai ales*") on the German troops and deportations to Transnistria are explained away as an attempt of the Romanian authorities to save Jewish lives. (See, pp. 123-124).

[3] Transnistria (Russian *Pridnestrov"e*) is the easternmost strip of land on the left bank of the Dniester River (together with the right-bank town of Bender/Tighina) which unilaterally proclaimed "independence" from Moldova in 1991 and since then remains an unrecognized entity supported economically, militarily and politically by Russia. It also corresponds, largely, to the Romanian-occupied Transnistria to which Bessarabian and Bukovinian Jews and Roma were deported during World War Two. On the Transnistrian

As this article goes to press, the Moldovan scholarly community remains profoundly divided into two camps, both of which see their respective tasks as advancing a particular identity project for the country. Among historians following the Romanian nationalist tradition, "Moldovans" equals "Romanians," and in Soviet-type historical discourse, "Moldovans" means a "separate nation." Partidul Comunistilor din Republica Moldova (the Party of Communists from the Moldovan Republic), which has been in power since 2001, supports and promotes the views of this latter group of historians, who are a minority within the profession. Historians of the former group denounce the writings of this government-supported minority as "anti-scientific" and "anti-national."[4] But over time, the problem of the Holocaust has gradually acquired higher visibility and attracted more historians and other intellectuals into debates over it. This article sets itself to show how and why these changes have occurred and what they mean for the quality of Moldovan discourse on national history.

Since this article is historiographic in character, it does not dwell on the events of the summer and fall of 1941 at any length. Still, a brief description of what took place is necessary. When the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia together with northern Bukovina and the Herţa district (a part of the Old Kingdom of Romania) in June 1940, there lived in Bessarabia, according to the official Romanian data, a little more than 206,000 Jews comprising 6.5 percent of the province"s population (today"s Republic of Moldova comprises the bulk of Bessarabia plus a narrow strip of land on the left bank of the Dniester river; northern and southern Bessarabia belong to Ukraine). About 73,000 lived in Northern Bukovina and Herţa district where they comprised about 12.0 per cent.[5] When the Romanian army, followed by the gendarmerie and police, returned to these lands in July-August 1941, they indiscriminately killed Jewish civilians. German forces also participated in the massacres, in particular Einsatzgruppe D. The exact number of those killed cannot be established with precision, but a recent authoritative estimate places it anywhere between 45,000 and 60,000.[6] (Some Jews probably managed to escape to the east but their number could not have been large given the rapidity of the German advance and the chaos which overwhelmed the Soviet railway system). The remaining Jews were interned in

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school of history writing see my "Creating "a People": A Case Study in Post-Soviet History-Writing," *Kritika*: *Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* vol. 4, no. 2 (2003): 411-448.

[4] See Elizabeth A. Anderson, "'They are the priests': the role of the Moldovan historian and its implications for civic education" in *Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education*, June 2007, Vol. 37 (3), p. 277-290.

[5] Calculated on the basis of the data of the Romanian Central Institute of Statistics published in Lya Benjamin, ed., *Evreii din România între anii 1940–1944: Izvoare şi mărturisiri referitoare la evreii din România* , vol. 2: *Problema evreească în stenogramele Consiliului de Miniştri* (Bucharest: Editura Hasefer, 1996), pp. 73, 79, and Sanda Golopenţia, ed., *Anton Golopenţia: Opere complete, vol. 2: Statistică, demografie şi geopolitică* (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedică, 2002), p. 549.

[6] International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, *Final Report* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2005), p. 382.

ghettos and concentration camps where they were starved, many dying from disease, and others being summarily executed. In October and November the survivors were deported by the Romanian authorities to Transnistria – a territory between the Dniester and Southern Bug rivers over which Romanians ruled according to the German – Romanian agreement from September 1941 to March 1944. The deportations were accompanied by robberies, beatings and executions of some victims. In Transnistria their suffering continued in concentration camps and ghettos: they were beaten, overworked, starved to death, left to die from various epidemics, as well as summarily executed. All in all, according to the same authoritative assessment, between 105,000 and 120,000 of the deportees perished there.[7]

The history of Bessarabia in the twentieth century was often tragic. Pogroms, revolutions, wars, famines, violent changes of regimes - many of them oppressive – followed one another. But even against this background, the suffering of the province"s Jews was exceptional. While during the first year of Soviet occupation (June 1940-June 1941) police repression was harsh, the number of executions was relatively small (by Soviet standards), probably amounting to between one and two hundred persons.[8] In June 1941, i.e. on the very eve of the German-Romanian attack, Soviet authorities deported between 17,000 and 22,000 people from Bessarabia to the east.[9] After the war and their re-annexation of Bessarabia the Soviets carried out two more mass deportations from the territory of the Moldavian SSR. In July 1949, they deported 11,263 families, i.e. more than 35,000 people, and in April 1951 – 723 families, i.e. about 2,600 people.[10] The fate of these people was very harsh but many of them, certainly a majority of the victims of the last two deportations, survived and by the early 1960s returned to Moldova.[11] One might expect that these deportations and the suffering of their victims would have moved to the very center of historical research and public debate in independent Moldova after the end of the Soviet regime, but in fact the fate of Bessarabian Jews has received little attention and inadequate treatment during the first decade of independence.[12]

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[7] Ibid.

[8] See Guvernământul *Basarabiei, Basarabia desrobită: drepturi istorice, nelegiuiri bolşevice, înfăptuiri româneşti* (Institutul de arte plastice "Târnava," 1942), 95-110. After their return to the province in July-August 1941, Romanian authorities investigated Soviet crimes in the territory and published their findings in the cited book.

[9] See the Soviet documents published in Valerii Ivanovich Pasat, *Trudnye stranitsy istorii Moldovy, 1940-1950 gg.* (Moscow: Terra, 1994), pp. 26, 161, 164–65.

[10] See idem., "Vvedenie" in ibid., p. 55.

[11] Ibid., pp. 56-58.

[12] In 1946-47 horrible famine visited the republic which claimed more than 100,000 and possibly up to 200,000 lives (see Anatolii Mikhailovich Tsaran, "Vvedenie," in idem., ed., *Golod v Moldove: sbornik dokumentov* (Kishinev: "Shtiintsa," 1993), pp. 9-10). There were several causes for this calamity, both natural – an exceedingly severe drought which followed the devastation of the war – and man-made: the incompetence and callousness of the authorities who requisitioned from the peasants not only agricultural surpluses but also grain which was absolutely necessary for their survival. Still, no intention to make these people die can be detected in the policies of the authorities, however criminally

The impetus for change in history writing came from the political sphere rather than from within the profession. In the first years of the current decade international pressure increased on the Romanian government to retract its previous inconsistent stance on the responsibility of the Romanian World War II administration for the death of hundreds of thousands of Romanian Jews. The pressure reached its apex in June 2003 when a government spokesman denied that the Romanian state could be held responsible for the Holocaust of Romanian Jewry; as a result of the international outcry, the government changed its position.[13] Shortly afterward, President Ion Iliescu initiated the creation of an international commission on the Holocaust in Romania under the chairmanship of Elie Wiesel. The commission, comprising a broad range of scholars from Romania, Israel, and the United States, published in 2005 a *Final Report* which laid down the basic facts of the Romanian Holocaust and offered a biting critique of Holocaust-deniers.

It is against this background of international pressure on Romania that the broad popularity of a brochure by Paul Goma, titled "The Red Week: June 28 – 3 July 1940, or Bessarabia and the Jews," should be seen.[14] Paul Goma is an important Romanian dissident writer who was exiled due to his courageous stance against the communist authorities in the 1970s and 1980s. He thus acquired international standing and significant political and cultural capital in his country.[15] In Moldova, his name carries additional weight due to his Bessarabian origin and his publicly proclaimed loyalty to this land and its people.[16] After the publication of Goma"s brochure, his became a cause célèbre in Moldovan nationalist circles. In 2002, for example, Hyde Park, a Chişinău-based non-governmental organization with a right-wing political orientation, created a web-page dedicated to Paul Goma, and in 2003 posted his brochure on line. Since then this page was dismantled, but Hyde Park"s website still regularly posts information on Goma and invariably takes a pro-Goma attitude whenever the writer comes to the center of public attention due to the numerous scandals

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negligible and callous they were. On the difference between the policies that were intentionally murderous and those which had as its unintended consequence massive deaths of civilians see Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 323-325.

[13] On the international scandal and the government"s retraction see Reuter, "Romania Acknowledges Role in Holocaust," June 17, 2003.

[14] Paul Goma, *Săptămâna Roşie 28 iunie – 3 iulie 1940 sau Basarabia şi evreii: eseu* (Chişinău: Museum, 2003). The brochure was also published in Romania (Bucharest: Editura Vremea XXI, 2004).

[15] Cf. Michael Shafir quoting a Western specialist in East European affairs who told him in the early 1980s that "Romanian dissent lives in Paris and his name is Paul Goma." Quoted in idem., *Romania, Politics, Economics and Society: Political Stagnation and Simulated Change* (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Riener, 1985), 168.

[16] In June 2005 Paul Goma received the most prestigious annual prize "Omnia" of the Union of Writers of the Republic of Moldova for 2004. See *Timpul*, 24 June, 2005. See also Dinu Mihail"s panegyric on Paul Goma on the occasion of the writer"s seventieth birthday in *Moldova Suverană*, 29 September, 2005. In 1944 Goma"s family took refuge in Romania fleeing Soviet repression.

in which he features.[17] On October 2, 2005 Hyde Park organized a celebration in the center of Chişinău dedicated to Goma"s seventieth birthday.[18] As acquaintances in Moldova have conveyed to me, "The Red Week" is very popular, and many pro-Romanian Moldovans consider it a more authentic version of events than anything else on this topic.

Goma did not conduct any original research for this brochure and all documentary evidence that he cites had been previously published; he acknowledges as much and references his quotations rarely. His ideas are also not new. They can be found in the writings of other right-wing Romanian publicists who minimize the Holocaust or deny its uniqueness.[19] New is the verve and radicalism of Goma"s language combined with a candidness in the acceptance of the Romanians" responsibility for the destruction of Jewish communities in Bessarabia and Bukovina. Unlike Anatol Petrencu, whose books I analyzed at some length in my 2002 article and who manages in the same text *both* to negate the destruction of the Jews *and* to justify it, Goma admits that "200,000 Jews weigh on the consciousness of Romania – [but] it is known that any crime starts with *one*"[20] [Original emphasis]. However, he claims that the violence was mutual, and that the cycle was started by the Jews during the "red week" (June 28 – July 3, 1940) of the Romanians" withdrawal from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina following the Soviet ultimatum. He asserts that the Jews attacked, humiliated and killed the retreating Romanian soldiers, who had strict orders not to open fire under any circumstances lest they provoke a war with the USSR. He goes even further in claiming that the Sovietization of the provinces, including mass arrests, deportations and confiscation of property following the Hitler-Stalin pact, was also carried out by local Jews, and that all of this was not accidental but rather a consequence of the Jews" hatred of the Romanians. According to Goma, the Jews of Bessarabia after the 1918 (re)unification of that province with Romania were nostalgic for Russian rule because under the tsars "they had more rights than the autochthonous population," and because according to "one of the Zionist utopias" the Jewish motherland (eretz) was to be built [in that province]."[21] As such, the Jews were, in 1940 "the puppet" of Russian imperial interests, because by definition they were "viscerally opposed to the national idea – of all others [except themselves]."[22]

Goma"s central idea is that the Jews of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina were indeed killed indiscriminately by the Romanians in 1941, but not qua Jews. As he puts it, they were not killed as an "ethnie," but rather as traitors; they

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[17] The page"s address was: http://www.goma.curaj.net. Hyde Park"s website"s address is http://www.curaj.net.

[18] See http://romania.indymedia.org/ro/2005/09/1031.shtml.

[19] See International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, *Final Report* (Iaşi: POLIROM, 2005), 333-380. There one can find references to other recent publications by Goma on the Holocaust theme.

[20] Goma, *Săptămâna Roşie*, 6.

[21] Ibid., 19-20.

[22] Ibid., 8,18.

were punished for their treasonous behaviour in 1940. Goma adds that in July and August 1941 not only Jews were killed, but "thousands of non-Jews as well: Russians, Ukrainians, Gypsies, Bulgarians, Gagauzi, Romanians were beaten, lynched, hanged, cut in pieces, drowned, burnt; [they] *were killed in revenge* for their dirty, criminal acts during that dreadful year of Soviet occupation (original emphasis)." He cites the story of his uncle who served in the Romanian army in 1940-41 and returned to his native village in July 1941. Having found nobody from his family, since all had been either deported or shot by the NKVD (the Soviet security police), he went berserk and killed with a shovel a neighbour who had denounced his wife and daughter to the NKVD out of greed. This villager was his uncle"s distant relative, and wanted to obtain his home.[23]

Thus in Goma"s presentation the Jewish tragedy becomes a part of the wider calamity, for which the Soviets were ultimately responsible. This, however, does not necessarily contradict his insistence that the Jews" misfortune was somehow self-inflicted: because they were "the puppet" of "the Russian" and actively supported the Soviet occupiers, it was only natural that they should suffer the most at the hands of vengeful Romanians.

It may be argued that, in his allusions to the supposed unchangeable and atemporal nature of "the Jews," Goma comes too close to the lunatic anti-Semitism of the extreme right to warrant serious criticism. But his version of the 1941 events in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina as a mini-civil war in which Jews were just one of the victims, alongside members of other ethnic groups, and were the object of justified revenge for their own misdeeds, is novel in the Moldovan context. Goma"s account of the anti-Jewish massacres in 1941 appears in fact more sophisticated and therefore more credible than that of historians like Anatol Petrencu who flatly deny the mass murder of Bessarabian Jews.

It may also be argued that as a popular work by a non-historian, Goma"s brochure does not deserve a professional critique. But after decades of manipulation of historical production for political purposes public distrust of professional historians is ubiquitous in post-communist societies, including Romania and Moldova. In this context the public is often oblivious of the boundary between serious historical research and undocumented essayistic texts.[24] For that reason some segments of Moldovan society may treat Goma"s brochure as telling *the* true story of the bloody summer of 1941. As such it appears that a response to Goma is needed.

Goma"s version is factually wrong on several counts. First, his evidence of Jewish misdeeds comes from the reports produced by the Romanian military immediately following their evacuation, and from newspaper articles which referred to (rumours of) lynchings and murders of individual Romanian officials

[23] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[24] On the prominent place occupied by dilettante essayism in post-communist Romanian discourse on public contemporary Romanian history see Irina Livezeanu, *Romania"s Cultural Wars: Intellectual Debates about the Recent Past* (Washington, D.C.: The National Council for Eurasian and *East European Research*, 2006) and idem., *The Poverty of Post-Communist Contemporary History in Romania* (Washington, D.C.: The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, 2006).

and officers during the evacuation. He ignores, however, the later and more reliable findings of the army that virtually disqualified the initial panicky reports, which conveyed an erroneous sense of mass violence against the retreating Romanians. For example, according to a General Staff report from July 1940, the Romanian army only lost five officers during the withdrawal, of whom two committed suicide, two were shot dead by the Soviets, and one by the (Romanian) gendarmerie "while running" (i.e., most probably deserting his post).[25] Recent research also indicates that many Romanian civil servants initially believed to have been killed barbarically during the Romanian retreat were later found alive and unharmed in Romania and that the behavior of the Jews in June-July 1940 was not as uniformly anti-Romanian and pro-Soviet as many Romanian publicists and politicians asserted at the time and in the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal.[26]

Second, there is no conclusive evidence that the Jews were overrepresented in the Soviet punitive bodies that persecuted local Christians in 1940-1941. Goma cites the names of the NKVD officials in Bessarabia who organized executions and deportations, and all of them appear to have been Slavs – not Jews.[27] While it is conceivable that some Jews may have had Slavic names, it is unlikely that all or most of these names belonged to Jews. This was a problem Romanian propagandists already faced in 1942. In the volume *Liberated Bessarabia*, published by the Romanian governorship of the wartime province, "the Jews" are blamed on almost every page for all the devastation visited upon Bessarabia since June 1940, without practically any proof, but the only order of "expulsion" (from the village of Cubei in May 1941) published in the volume was signed by and addressed to persons with unmistakably Slavic names.[28] Wartime Romanian officials tried to find evidence that would support their anti-Semitic convictions, as correspondence between the chief of provincial gendarmes Colonel Teodor Meculescu and the gendarme county (*judeţ*) commanders in August 1942 shows. In a circular letter Meculescu expressed outrage that his subordi-

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[25] Document published in Florica Dobre, et al., eds. *Anul 1940: Armata română de la ultimatum la dictat. Documente*, vol. 1 (Bucharest: Editura Europa Nouă, 2000), 265, doc. # 106.

[26] See Mihai Pelin, *Legendă şi adevăr* (Bucharest: Edart, 1994). I dealt with this issue at somewhat greater lengths in ""Model Province": Explaining the Holocaust of Bessarabian and Bukovinian Jewry," *Nationalities Papers*, 34: 4 (September 2006): 485-487.

[27] Goma, *Săptămâna Roşie*, pp. 66, 68. Over one hundred proven executions are cited by Goma. The figure he cites with respect to deportations – 200,000 – appears to be an exaggeration by an order of ten. The reason for this discrepancy, which is to be found in many other publications by Romanian authors, was most probably the fact that many of those who left Bessarabia in 1940-1941 for work in the Donbass coal mines in eastern Ukraine or fled in fear of deportation are sometimes counted among the deported. On the Soviet recruitment campaign for work in the Donbass coal mines see Veaceslav Stavilă, De la Basarabia românească la *Basarabia sovietică, 1939-1945* (Chişinău: Tipografia Centrală, 2000), 40.

[28] See Guvernământul Basarabiei, *Basarabia dezrobită: drepturi istorice, nelegiuiri bolşevice, înfăptuiri româneşti. Iulie 1942* ([N.p.]: Institutul de arte grafice "Marvan" S.A.R., [n. d.]), p. 269.

nates failed to find proofs of Jewish involvement, and he ordered them to redouble their efforts. The data that he received back from Bălți county (the only ones that appear to have survived) could but deeply disappoint him: of 114 "chiefs of all levels" only 22 were Jews, of 98 "top civil servants" – 12 were Jews, and of 27 "chiefs of police" – not a single one was Jewish.[29] But even if individual Jews could be proven to have participated in actions against retreating Romanians, would this justify the destruction of all the Jews of Bessarabia?[30] It is enough to ask this question for the absurdity of such a supposition to become apparent.

Third, while Goma is right that non-Jews suspected of collaboration with the Soviets and of denouncing Romanians to the Soviet police organs in July and August 1941 were indeed lynched and killed by the Romanian army or local population alongside the Jews, the patterns of violence against those two groups were very different. Individual Christian collaborators were sought out, arrested, and beaten, but they were rarely killed. The prevalent treatment of such persons was violent but not murderous. Instead of being summarily executed they were generally sent to the local courts to be tried for collaboration with the enemies. They usually received sentences from several months to several years" imprisonment, sometimes with confiscation of their property and withdrawal of their Romanian citizenship; this often entailed deportation to Transnistria, but the death penalty was never applied. This pattern can be detected from the massive files of the Soviet Extraordinary Commission for the Investigation of the Crimes of the Fascists and Their Collaborators, which in 1944 and 1945 interrogated witnesses and exhumed victims" bodies in 32 out of 54 districts (*raions*) of the Moldavian SSR and in the Chernivtsy region in Ukraine.[31] The Soviets were, for obvious political reasons, especially interested in documenting the persecution and killings of Soviet activists; the fate of Jews qua Jews interested them only in the second or third place. But what they found was a consistent pattern of the murder of Jews *en masse*, men, women, and children, with killings conducted not in the disorganized lynch-type manner by a mob, but rather systematically by the Romanian army and gendarmerie with the active participation of local sympathizers. To give only one example, in the ethnic Ukrainian village of Kisilevka (Chisileuță) in northern Bukovina in the late June or early July of 1941 local extremists arrested and shot 46 people, most probably all Jews; they also wanted to shoot non-Jewish Soviet activists, but the gendarmes forbade them to do so. Later the activists were court-martialed and received various sentences,

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[29] Romanian National Historical Archive, Bucharest, Fond Direcția Generală a Poliției, file 236/1941, 14ff.

[30] Goma cites the name of the NKVD chief of section in the town of Orhei Goldenberg, along with many Slavic-sounding names. Goma, *Săptămâna Roşie*, 69.

[31] Files on Moldavian SSR are kept in the Moldova National Archive, Fond 1026 Inventory 1. Their copies are available in the archival collections of the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (hereinafter referred to as USHMM RG-54.002M). Files on Chernivtsy region are kept in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), Fond 7021 Inventory 79; their copies are available in USHMM RG-22.002M Reel 14.

but nobody was condemned to death.[32]

As the recently made available files of the Soviet and Romanian post-war tri-
als of war-time criminals convincingly show, Romanian gendarmes and army of-
ficers persistently *commanded* the round-up and execution of Jews while simul-
taneously forbidding the killing of Christian collaborators with the Soviets. For
example, when in late June or early July 1941 all the population of the township
of Sculeni located on the 1940-1941 Soviet-Romanian border, was evacuated to
the right bank of the Prut river by the army, Romanians created a commission
of identification composed of local extremists, mostly former members of the
Cuzist and Legionary parties. The commission selected Jews and Christian col-
laborators and put them in two separate groups. The same day 311 Jewish men,
women and children were machine-gunned by the Romanian soldiers. Follow-
ing this execution several members of the identification commission harassed
Soviet activists and informed them that they too would be executed shortly:
"Soon you communists will be no more." They apparently demanded from the
Romanians that such an execution be arranged, but one officer (according to
an eyewitness account), consulted his superiors in Iaşi before making a deci-
sion, and he released the non-Jewish activists. They were allowed to return to
Sculeni where they were later rearrested and tried, but they received relatively
minor sentences.[33]

Obviously, Goma remains unaware of this material as he has never worked
in the archives. This can hardly be held against him since he does not pre-
tend to be a professional historian. But he also ignores easily accessible pub-
lished works that have proven beyond a doubt that the mass murder campaign
of July and August 1941, was planned in advance and systematically organized
by high-placed Romanian officials, primarily the Deputy Interior Minister and
close confidant of Marshall Ion Antonescu, General Constantin (Picky) Vasiliu,
and the Chief Praetor (Marele Pretor) of the Romanian Army, General Ioan Topor.
So, as Jean Ancel was first to show, using materials from the post-war Roma-
nian trials of war criminals, on the eve of the German-Romanian breakthrough
(July 3) Vasiliu and Topor summoned gendarme units assigned to serve in the
newly "liberated" provinces in various localities along the right (i.e. Romanian)
bank of the Prut River, and instructed them to "cleanse" Bessarabia and north-
ern Bukovina of Jews.[34] These works were published in Romanian several years

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[32] Ibid., file on Chiţmani raion (district), pp. 31-39. The ethnicity of those 46 shot is not
indicated in the documents, but it can be safely assumed to have been Jewish: it was the
hallmark of the Commission"s style to keep silence, more often than not, on the ethnicity
of the victims as long as it was Jewish. I deal with different aspects of local Christians"
attitude towards the mass murder of Jews as well as of the Romanian state"s protection
of non-Jewish collaborators against the rage of their embittered neighbors in "Patterns
of Violence: Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern
Bukovina, July-August 1941," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, vol.
8, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 749-787.

[33] See Archive of the Moldovan Information and Security Service (former Soviet KGB), file
№ 6224, esp. p. 39v. RG-54.003M.

[34] See Jean Ancel, "The Romanian Way of Solving the "Jewish Problem" in Bessarabia

before Goma"s brochure. Goma"s bibliography is quite substantial and includes works by Romanian historians on Bessarabian history, but not a single text on the persecution of Jews in the province in 1941. This refusal to engage, or even acknowledge the existence of works dealing with his subject seems to be a deliberate strategy on his part.

As an intellectual living in France, Goma is aware of the current debates over the Holocaust"s uniqueness and its comparability with the crimes of communism. These were energized by the publication of Stéphane Courtois et al.",s, *Le Livre noir du communisme*, by claims of Jewish exploitation of the Holocaust by authors such as Norman Finkelstein in his *Holocaust Industry*, and by the echoes of Jan Gross"s *Neighbors*.[35] References to these books appear in his brochure, suggesting that his discussion of the Bessarabian problematic is framed by a wider intellectual context involving crucial issues of twentieth century European history and contemporary politics. Goma sees those debates as part of an ongoing struggle between Jews and Christians: while the latter demand recognition of their suffering in the twentieth century, at the hands of the Soviets, local communists, and their Jewish agents, the Jews refuse them this right by overemphasizing Jewish suffering during the Holocaust and denying its comparability with any other instance of genocide or catastrophe. We, Romanians, he seems to say, are ready to accept our guilt vis-à-vis the Jews, but only if the Jews also admit their guilt vis-à-vis us Romanians: the Jews have "to come to the same table of mutual admission of responsibility, as every other ethnic community," concludes Goma.[36]

Paul Goma thus identifies with a minority of European intellectuals who are increasingly annoyed by the demand that their nations accept their share of guilt for Jewish suffering during World War II, and who try to deflect that debate by referencing communist crimes and attempting to implicate Jews qua Jews in them. As such he does not say anything that is truly new for anybody who is familiar with Western debates, but in the Moldovan context, and especially in the Moldovan Romanian-speaking milieu, his brochure can be seen in a slightly different light. While being on almost every count wrong and malicious, he at

and Bukovina, June-July 1941" *Yad Vashem Studies* vol. 19 (1988): 186-232; idem., *Contribuții la istoria României: problema evreească*, vol. 1 part2 (București: Hasefer, 2001), pp. 111-142. See also Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940-1944 with the forward by Elie Wiesel* (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2000), 90-108. Romanian version: idem., *Evreii sub regimul Antonescu* (Bucharest: Editura Hasefer, 2007).

[35] See Stéphane Courtois, et al., *Le livre noir du communisme: crimes, terreurs et répression.* (Paris : R. Laffont, 1997); idem., *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*; translated by Jonathan Murphy and Mark Kramer; consulting editor, Mark Kramer, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Norman G. Finkelstein, *The Holocaust Industry: Reflection on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering* (London and New York: Verso, 2000); Jan Gross, *Neighbors*: *The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) and Antony and Joanna B. Michlic, eds., *The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

[36] Goma, *Săptămâna Roșie,* p. 86.

least admits to the mass slaughter of Jews by Romanians in 1941, a fact that is flatly denied by more intransigent nationalistic historians.

While Goma"s brochure was the single most important development on the history of the Holocaust among Romanian-identified Moldovan writers and readers, at the other end of Moldova"s cultural and political spectrum, an important book of a very different character appeared shortly after Goma"s brochure. This publication should also be placed in political context. The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova won parliamentary elections in February 2001 and has ruled the country ever since having won reelection in 2005. The party takes a fiercely anti-Romanian position and has announced its intention to reform history education in Moldova"s schools. The party wanted to replace the "history of the Romanians," which had been taught since the fall of communism, with the "history of Moldova" which would promote Moldovan as opposed to Romanian national identity.[37] This political change opened space to historians who shared this position and who had been marginalized in the Moldovan academic community dominated by pro-Romanian nationalists during the previous decade. One such historian, Sergiu Nazaria[38], published *The Holocaust in Moldova* in 2005.

Nazaria, who holds a doctorate in history, currently teaches at the State Institute of International Relations in Chişinău. He served briefly as Deputy Minister of Education in the first communist government in 2001-2002. Despite his dismissal, Nazaria has preserved some connections with the government and the communist party, and he has played a central role in the creation and promotion of a new government-sponsored history textbook for secondary schools.

Nazaria"s book on the Holocaust first appeared in Russian and later in Romanian as well. Its publication was accompanied by a scandal. The Russian version was published twice. The first printing in a tiny circulation of fifty copies was done at Nazaria"s own expense since he could not find a sponsor[39]; this version carried the names of four authors, with Nazaria listed first (but other authors were also implied in the "et al."). Immediately following this first edition, one of the authors, Alexandru Moraru, made a declaration renouncing his authorship and calling the book "anti-Romanian" and "in contradiction with his (i.e., Moraru"s) convictions." He asserted that Nazaria had included him without his consent and, in fact, against his express refusal to sign the text. Nazaria, in turn, said that he had never been informed of Moraru"s unwillingness to assume authorship, and that the whole affair was a bolt from the blue for him.[40] Nazaria suggested that after the publication Moraru was subjected to psychological pressure from his colleagues and thus decided to rescind out of fear for his career.[41]

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[37] On the debate on textbooks in Moldova see my "Narrative, Identity, State: History Teaching in Moldova," *East European Politics and Societies*, 16:2(2002): 415-446, and Elizabeth A. Anderson, "Backward, Forward, or Both? Moldovan Teachers" Relationship to the State and the Nation," *European Education*, 37:3(Fall 2005): 53-67.

[38] He also publishes as Sergei Nazaria in Russian.

[39] Interview with the author, October 2005.

[40] *Timpul*, 29 April, 2005.

[41] Interview with author, October 2005.

In the second Russian and in the Romanian editions Nazaria appears as sole author of the book. The other three initial authors did not protest.[42]

The book has a strong anti-Romanian nationalist bias. Nazaria states in the introduction that, as someone who has been participating in the process of "reform of our historical education," he has engaged "in numerous and never-ending debates with the historians who represent the Romanian-nationalist current in today"s Moldovan historiography." During those debates he "encountered," in his words, "the wildest falsifications of [Moldova"s] historic past, especially with regard to the role of national minorities in [Moldovan] history." He goes on to say that in some textbooks written by these historians that role is represented "in an exclusively negative light, as something that constantly hinders the development of the "Romanian nation."" Against this background and with the purpose of "unmasking all these piles of lies and falsifications, [and] of mounting some resistance to the rising Nazism, anti-Semitism, [and] totally wild intolerance..." there appeared, he states, "the necessity for the work of a historian, who would tell the truth about the 1941-1944 period of our history and, in the first place, about the tragedy of the Jewish people."[43]

The book continues in the same militant tone all the way through to the very end. The primary targets of his attack are Anatol Petrencu, Viorica Nicolenco, as well as the Romanian historians Gheorghe Buzatu and Ioan Scurtu whom Nazaria charges with anti-Semitism, revisionism, sympathy to Antonescu and Hitler, and even with being indistinguishable from the latter.[44] The tone of the book and the language employed in combating the author"s opponents does not help its credibility, but the main argument is a sound one. It includes the following points: that in war-time Romania, Jews were persecuted qua Jews and not for crimes committed, whether imaginary or not; that in Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transnistria, they were subjected to especially harsh and savage treatment in the summer and fall of 1941, including mass executions of civilians, men, women and children; that these killings and subsequent deportations of Jews were meant to "cleanse" the province of all representatives of that ethnic group altogether; that the mistreatment of Jews in Transnistria amounted to their continuous genocide; and that the suffering of Bessarabian, Bukovinian and Transnistrian Jews was part and parcel of the Holocaust of European Jewry.

Here again it should be stressed that while none of these theses is new to

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[42] Sergei Nazariia, Dmitrii Danu, Alexandr Moraru, Iurii Zagorchia, et al., eds., *Kholokost v Moldove* (Kishinev: CEP USM, 2005). In the main body of this article the names are rendered in their Romanian form, while in the title of the book they are transliterated from the Russian original according to the Library of Congress rules of transliteration. Romanian version: Sergiu Nazaria, *Holocaust: File din istorie (Pe teritoriul Moldovei şi în regiunile limitrofe ale Ucrainei, 1941-1944)* (Chişinău: Tipografia Centrală, 2005). All references are to the original Russian version.

[43] Nazariia, et al., *Kholokost v Moldove,* p. 4.

[44] Ibid., p. 22, reference to Ion Varta, author (in co-authorship with Demir Dragnev) of *Istoria românilor. Epoca contemporană.* (Chişinău: Civitas, 2001). See more of the criticism in Nazariia, et al., *Kholokost v Moldove*, pp. 58-63. See also a very harsh criticism of Anatol Petrencu signed by Nazaria and others in *Moldova Suverană*, 7 October, 2005.

those familiar with Western and Israeli research on the subject, in the Moldovan context its publication by a professional historian of non-Jewish descent is very important. Furthermore, the author uses a wide range of sources, including previously inaccessible archival materials, recently conducted interviews with survivors, and publications of important sources from Romanian archives.[45] But the book"s flaws are also numerous, and they are revealing about both the state of the historical profession in Moldova and of Moldovan society more generally.

Nazaria"s major aim is to indict the Romanian government and the Leader of the State (Conducător), Ion Antonescu, for what they did to the Jews in general, and to the Jews of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transnistria, in particular. He successfully accomplishes this task. But Nazaria stops short of raising further questions of importance for an adequate treatment of his subject. He glosses over the fact that in 1941, the Romanian government pursued two different policies towards the Jews: in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria, on the one hand, and in the rest of the country, on the other. While in the former areas the policy was extremely violent and even murderous, in Romania per se Jews were subjected to privations, exploitation, heavy discrimination, and the like, but were not killed en masse. Why was it so? What were the general aims of the government, how did the policy in the eastern provinces fit into the wider aims of Antonescu and his entourage, and into their understanding of what post-war Romania should be like? It could be argued that this question is crucial, and that if no answer is given, then, by default, the old myth of the "punishment" of the Jews for what they supposedly did in 1940 and 1941 under the Soviets would be constantly resurrected as the only conceivable explanation for the events of the summer and fall of 1941.

Second, Nazaria"s tendency to see Antonescu"s policy towards the Jews as identical to that of Hitler, i.e. based on the determination to kill all the Jews of Europe (or all of Romania) may go too far. Historians have for decades debated the origin and timing of the decision on the "final solution," i.e. exactly when and for what reasons the fine line between the idea of "purifying" Europe by deporting all Jews to Madagascar or some other distant land and the determination to kill all of them, was crossed. Although no consensus has so far emerged, very few historians believe that the decision to annihilate all the Jews of Europe had been made by Hitler before the fall of 1941.[46] What was, then, Romanian policy

[45] The most frequently cited sources are: Lya Benjamin, ed. *Evreii din România între anii 1940-1944* vol. 1: *Legislaţia antievreească* (Bucureşti: Hasefer, 1993); *Problema evreească în stenogramele Consiliului de Miniştri* (Bucureşti: Hasefer, 1996); and Marcel-Dumitru Ciuca, et al., eds., *Stenogramele şedinţelor Consiliului de Miniştri: guvernarea Ion Antonescu* (hereafter referred to as *Stenogramele* published in 1997-2003) vol. 1-7 (Bucharest: Arhivele naţionale ale României, 1999-2004).

[46] See, e.g., Christopher R. Browning, with contribution by Jürgen Mathäus, *The Origin of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939 – March 1942* (Lincoln: University of Nebrasca Press, 2004), esp. 309-373 and Christian Gerlach, "The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of German Jews, and Hitler"s Decision in Principle to Exterminate all European Jews," translated from German by Stephen Duffy in *Journal of Modern History,* 70:4(1998): 759-812. Even Richard Breitman who believes that Hitler took this decision before the outbreak of operation Barbarossa makes it clear that until

in the eastern provinces in the summer of 1941, before Hitler gave his murder-ous order: to exterminate all the Jews in eastern provinces, or to "purify" those regions of Jews by both killing and deporting them? Making this distinction may seem to be splitting hairs, but in reality the difference—if it existed—was important, both for the Jews, whose chances of survival from the fall of 1941 onwards were greater in the Romanian than in the German zone of occupation, and for our understanding of the Romanian aims and policies in the "Jewish problem." If, as seems to have been the case, Antonescu was committed to the idea of deporting Jews "beyond the Urals," without bothering too much about how many of them would perish in the meantime, but had not (yet?) adopted the project of the final solution in the summer and fall of 1941[47], then in our quest for understanding the dynamic of the policy of cleansing the country of Jews we have to look more closely at the role of the local factors, of the pressures from be-low, which seem to have been in the case of Romania of no less importance than in the case of Germany.[48] Unfortunately, Nazaria seems to be unaware of this problem, like, once again, the other historians who have written on this subject from a non-apologetic position.[49]

Rather than performing a critical inquiry into the Holocaust in Moldova, Nazaria unfortunately slips into a narrative whose primary effect is to de-legiti-mate Romanian claims to Moldova. Thus his presentation of Jewish suffering and persecution becomes a secondary concern, shaped to the needs of the first. For example, Nazaria flatly presents the Romanian return in 1941 as an occupation of the province by an outside invader - not as the region"s legitimate liberation by the army under the command of the lawful authority.[50] He explicitly links his stance on this issue to the ongoing debate on the future of the Moldovan state, stating that "if the Republic of Moldova, which our opponents christened by (its) colonial name "Bessarabia," is "a Romanian land liberated in 1941," then Moldovan state-

the fall of that he conveyed his plan to very few people, primarily to Himmler. See idem., *The Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the Final Solution* (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 1991).

[47] See Ion Antonescu in the Council of Ministers on October 6, 1941: "In what the Jews are concerned, I have taken measures to remove them definitely and totally from these regions [of Bessarabia and Bukovina]. The measure is being implemented. I still have in Bessarabia about 10,000 Jews, which in several days will be passed across Dniester, and if circumstances will allow me, than across Urals." (Marcel-Dumitru Ciuca, et al., eds. *Stenogramele*, vol. 5, p. 56.

[48] The role of local initiative has for a long time been a major preoccupation of the histori-ans of the German Holocaust. A book by Christopher R. Browning in n. 46 above is a good illustration in this regard. I deal with these issues at greater length in my ""Model Prov-ince": Explaining the Holocaust of Bessarabian and Bukovinian Jewry," and "Patterns of Violence: Local Population and the Mass Murder of Jews in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, July-August 1941," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* (Fall 2007).

[49] Among those who adopted a more apologetic and exculpatory stance, Alex Mihai Stoe-nescu emphasized the role of the army in pressing for and implementing harsher anti-Jewish measures; see his *Armata, Mareşalul şi evreii: cazurile Dorohoi, Bucureşti, Iasi, Odessa* (Bucharest: RAO International, 1998).

[50] Nazariia, *Kholokost v Moldove*, pp. 172-173.

hood is illegal today as well, because it in reality represents part of another state, "flesh of Romania"s flesh"."[51] The point is not that Nazaria is not entitled to his political stance, nor that this stance is less "correct" or "historically justified" than the one taken by his opponents. Rather, it is that by tying his historical research to that political position he makes himself less trustworthy in the eyes of those who might be committed to the reunion of Moldova and Romania but who would not necessarily turn their backs on all arguments and evidence on the Romanian policy towards the Jews in the eastern provinces during World War II.

Nazaria gets carried away by his own rhetoric of condemnation of the "Romanian occupiers" and makes two claims that are either completely wrong or at the very least extremely doubtful. The first is that in the summer of 1941 the Bessarabian population was hostile to the entering Romanian troops and continued to harbor hopes of an eventual Red Army victory, even at the height of Nazi successes.[52] He even claims that, "if the impossible had happened and in 1940 a referendum had been conducted ... under international control, the population would not have voted in favor of Romanian sovereignty."[53] This is a bold claim, and Nazaria brings forth no evidence to substantiate it. Indeed, everything we know about Soviet rule in 1940 and 1941 leads us to the opposite conclusion: that many - maybe a majority - of Bessarabians would have welcomed Romanian troops as bringing them liberation from the Soviet oppression. No matter how oppressive Romanian rule was in Bessarabia between 1918 and 1940, it was generally better than the horrors of Soviet arrests, deportations, confiscations, and requisitions in 1940 and1941. In this context Goma"s claim that for him and other "Bessarabian, Bukovinian, and Herțan Romanians Antonescu remains: "Marshall the Liberator"" is understandable.[54] Nazaria"s failure to even mention the Soviet crimes in 1940 and 1941 in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, while he finds it possible to digress into a discussion of the events of 1918 in order to condemn Romania"s "annexation" of Bessarabia, further adds to the impression that he is too engaged with Soviet and post-Soviet politics to be a trustworthy historian of the Holocaust.

Second, since Nazaria clearly sees the destruction of the Jewish communities in Bessarabia and northern Bukovina as a calamity brought to the provinces from abroad, by a foreign and basically hostile power, he ignores the role of the local population in the destruction of their Jewish neighbors. Though he occasionally acknowledges that many local residents (he calls them "traitors" or "collaborators") played an important role in rounding up, escorting to the place of execution and in shooting Jews[55], he explains those instances away

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[51] Ibid., pp. 174-175.

[52] Ibid., pp. 174, 196.

[53] Ibid., pp. 174.

[54] Goma, *Săptămâna Roșie*, 78. Goma uses the qualifier "all" Romanians, not "many," however; that sweeping generalization that cannot be accepted. "Herțan" here refers to the residents of the district (*ținut*) of Herța, Bihor county (*județ*) of the Old Kingdom that was annexed by the Soviets in 1940 together with Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.

[55] Ibid., pp. 71, 86, 90.

as the actions of déclassé elements, unleashed and directed by the Romanian authorities.[56] Instead, he spends a lot of time evidencing instances of sympathy and support by the local Christians for the Jews, and makes the following generalization:

> the majority of the Moldovan people and representatives of other nationalities, residing in the territory of the republic, sympathized with their Jewish co-citizens. But it is undoubtedly also correct that without this sympathy, without real, even if almost always only occasional, support from the Orthodox population in hiding the Jews none of them could have survived.[57]

He strongly implies that those instances of support would have been much more forthcoming had there been no Romanian policy of "severe punishment," up to execution of all those who attempted to support the Jews.[58]

Once again, the point is not that cases of Christians supporting Jews in hiding were non-existent, nor that the research on this subject matter is not worth conducting: on the contrary, given that the Soviets discouraged public discourse on the Holocaust, and that from the late forties a form of state anti-Semitism – more or less overt – existed, those Christians who did support Jews in 1941 had very real reasons to keep silent on that part of their biography. This is why it might indeed be the case that the real number of those local Christians who supported Jews in Bessarabia and Bukovina is higher than previously assumed. But it is still true that only a small part of Bessarabian Jews survived the war and that written sources pertaining to that province only very rarely speak of support and sympathy to Jews on the part of the locals and much more often of their support for actions of murderous "purification." Though of course perpetrators" assessments of the population"s moods must be read with *grano salis*, it is instructive that in the Chişinău city administration there was nothing comparable to the resistance to deportations mounted by the Mayor of the city of Cernăuţi, Traian Popovici, and a group of his supporters in the municipality.[59] No serious researcher can escape the conclusions that a great majority of Christians in Bessarabia (less so in Bukovina, probably still less in Transnistria) were indifferent to the fate of the Jews; a minority - maybe even a substantial minority - rejoiced in seeing their misfortune and participated in their persecution, plundering of their property and murder; and only a tiny minority was ready to support the Jews putting their own life and well-being at risk.

Thus the last and the most serious flaw of Nazaria"s book is that he refuses to admit that the non-Jewish residents of Bessarabia (as well as northern

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[56] Ibid., pp. 185, 195-196.

[57] Ibid., p. 196.

[58] Ibid., p. 195. In my own research I was not able to find a single case of an execution of a Christian as a punishment for helping Jews, though I did find instances of alleged threats of execution.

[59] On Traian Popovici and his resistance see Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania*, pp. 155-156, 159, 165-168, 172, 291. In 1969, Traian Popovici was recognized by the Yad Vashem as one of the "righteous of the nations." See International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, *Final Report*, 283.

Bukovina and Transnistria) bear their own share of responsibility for the fate of their Jewish co-citizens. Instead, he succumbs to the fairly common temptation to blame "others," in this particular case, Romanian authorities whom he labels "occupiers," for these crimes and to exonerate the community with which he identifies from any guilt. Because he sees Bessarabian Christians ("the Moldovan people") as having nothing to do with the criminal policy towards the Jews except resisting it – unfortunately, only occasionally - it is fairly easy for him to attack Romanian policy toward the Jews and indict Antonescu: it is the policy of "others," and condemning it reflects well on Moldovans.

Nazaria"s approach reappears in the new textbook on contemporary history published in the fall of 2006 with the approval of the Ministry of Education, of which Nazaria is the main author. Created according to the 15th recommendation of the Council of Ministers of Council of Europe "Teaching History in the Twenty First Century," the textbook narrates both the history of Bessarabia and Transnistria and the history of the rest of the world with the space divided between the two in proportion 50:50 (previously Moldovan students studied world history and "the history of Romanians" as separate subjects covered in separate textbooks).[60] While it is not the place here for a general assessment of this textbook, which is as controversial in Moldova as any, suffice it to mention that the history of the Holocaust is treated in a separate four-page long chapter (the book as a whole has 207 pages) which dwells mostly, but not exclusively, on the events in Bessarabia and Transnistria. The blame is laid squarely at the door of Hitler and Antonescu, "the two responsible for the Holocaust," and of the German and Romanian occupiers, while Christian Orthodox residents of the territories are credited with helping their Jewish neighbours. It is asserted that "all in all during the years of occupation of our republic "Romanian and German liberators" exterminated ca. 500,000 citizens of Jewish origin" – a claim that is in all probability exaggerated (the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romanian estimates the overall number of Jewish victims at the hands of Romanian authorities as being between 280,000 and 380,000).[61]

As the history of Holocaust-denial in many countries shows, there is little hope that the most intransigent deniers will ever change their mind, no matter how much hard evidence is brought forward by historians working on the subject: chances are they will always claim that it is inconclusive. But one can expect that other, more open-minded people will listen and be able to confront that part of their country"s past in a more meaningful way. It is not at all inconceivable that one day not only those Moldovans who do not identify as ethnic

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[60] Sergiu Nazaria, Alexandru Roman, Mihai Sprînceană, Sergiu Albu-Machedon, Anton Dumbravă, Ludmila Barbus, *Istorie: epoca contemporană. Manual pentru clasa a IX-a* (Chişinău: Cartea Moldovei, 2006), esp. pp. 2-4.

[61] Cf. ibid., pp. 142-145 and ICHR, *Final Report*, pp. 380-381. However, criticism formulated by Ionaş Aurelian Rus according to which this claim attests to the textbook"s authors" intention to exonerate Nazis for the deaths of Jews whose extermination is attributed to Romanians is far-fetched. This argument by Rus is cited in Aurelia Felea, "Note pe marginea declaraţiei Institutului Georg-Eckert din Braunschweig, 15 decembrie 2006" in *Jurnal de Chişinău*, March 30, 2007 N 563.

Romanians, but also those who do, will find it possible to discuss the Holocaust in Bessarabia and Transnistria honestly. Indeed, the first, tentative signs of this happening are already in evidence.

On November 9, 2004, Hyde Park, the Moldovan NGO known for its pro-Romanian political stance and its support of Paul Goma, organized a public discussion in the village of Pepeni; the forum focused on the barbaric murder of 300 to 350 Jews that had taken place there in early July 1941 under the command of the Romanian Gendarmerie but carried out by local Christian residents. Both Jews and non-Jews participated in this discussion.[62] At least one Moldovan historian whose cultural orientation is firmly pro-Romanian, Igor Caşu, has been increasingly taking a more dispassionate and open-minded attitude toward the discussion of problems of the Holocaust in Romania.[63]

Nevertheless, Moldova still has a long way to go in examining the Holocaust. While the justificatory/exculpatory discourse is no longer the only available one in the Moldovan scholarly community, the basic division of the Moldovan historical profession into two seemingly irreconcilable camps coalescing around two identitarian options: pro- or anti-Romanian remains. More often than not the Holocaust problematic is transformed from an object of academic research into a cause of factional in-fighting among historians. For the sake of their profession"s credibility, Moldovan historians must resist the temptation to use this problematic to further political interests. This is one of the most important professional challenges they face at the moment.

Recenzent: dr. Jennifer Cash
01.12.2007

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[62] On this discussion see http://www.iatp.md/pepeni/ConfPepeni.html, last consulted July 2007. The Pepeni massacre was thoroughly investigated in 1945; see Archive of the Moldovan Security and Information Service, file #1846 USHMM RG-54.003M.

[63] See his two-part-text on Moldovan historiography of the Holocaust "Istoriografia şi chestiunea Holocaustului: cazul Republicii Moldova" in *Contrafort*, no. 11-12 (November-December 2006): 145-146, and ibid., no. 1-3 (January-March 2007): 147-149. The first part was presented at the October 16, 2006 conference in Chişinău.

POLITICAL LITURGIES AND CONCURRENT MEMORIES IN THE CONTEXT OF NATION-BUILDING PROCESS IN POST-SOVIET MOLDOVA: THE CASE OF "VICTORY DAY"

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Abstract

The study analyses the symbols, discourses, and practices of "Victory Day" commemoration that has resumed its role of the idéologème in the official nation-building discourse in the Republic of Moldova. The research aims to investigate the semantic metamorphosis of the May 9 holiday and thus circumscribes the following objectives: (1)to contour the ideological patterns of the official nation-building discourse, (2)to analyze the reflection of this discourse in the collective memory, and (3)to identify the vectors of memory and of amnesia that may consolidate, destroy or, eventually, facilitate the reconciliation of community, beyond the current government"s political interests and ideological projects of nation-building in the Republic of Moldova.

Today is the 9th of May 2007 and Chişinău is preparing for a "red calendar day". I find the trolleybus terminal station in the vicinity of a huge poster with the message "May 9 – Victory Day" guarded, symbolically, by the tricolour of "sovereignty" of the Republic of Moldova. I get into the first trolleybus together with several other morning travellers. A price of five minutes paid; the numerous groups of veterans appearing like from a scenario of May 9 from the Soviet epoch and the trolleybus is full. Everyone is hurrying to the ceremony, with smiling faces and full chests of medals. Among the veterans I have noticed teenagers with black-and-orange bands identical to the ones of the Russian order of "St. George". Another group of young people gets in at the next stop, bearing badges and bands with the European Union symbols printed on them. The driver's voice announces the stations; passengers pervade the city"s streets; and together with them, a lot of medals with red stars, with black-and-orange bands, yellow-blue ones, a lot of badges and flags with "European" symbolism. Lots of flowers shed on the streets, symbolically marking-off the commemoration of the holiday of May 9. Meanwhile I realized, as I prepared for fieldwork at the Military Glory Complex "Eternitate" where it is already the third year I am going to attend the political liturgy of the "higher top government"[1] dedicated to the "Day of Victory in the Great War for the Defence of the Motherland", that I am missing a red carnation ...

Introduction

The studies dedicated to collective memory unanimously acknowledge the idea of unlimited possibilities of governments to control the individual and collective consciousness and to manipulate them with images of the past. The competition for symbols and monopolization of images of collective memory sometimes becomes the major segment in the battle for political legitimation. "As a rule, history is used for finding bases for legitimation, and to its resources various actors refer when formulating objections, the ones interested to institute other legitimations. This is why history is permanently being "oversought", [...] issue of parallel or contradictory discourses that stimulate the critical spirit only owing to their mutual opposition."[2] There exists a series of factors able to stimulate a new perspective of historical writing, including the events related to the World War II; James M. Mayo affirms "historical facts and their interpretation have changed radically the understanding of the past"[3].

One should mention that this article is not anyhow designated to re-establish the historical reality but to depict the images and the roles assumed by these images in the perpetuation of identity and collective memory of the post-

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[1] Expressions as "the top government of the Republic of Moldova", "the first men in state" or "the representatives of the higher top structure" are the official formulas used by public discourse for power identification in a tributary to the Soviet language manner of power legitimation – "высшее руководство страны/республики".

[2] Al. Zub, *Istorie şi finalitate. În căutarea identităţii,* Iaşi, 2004, p. 31.

[3] J. M. Mayo, *War Memorial as Political Memory,* in *Geographical Review,* vol. 78, no. 1, 1988, p. 62-75.

totalitarian period. Although this fact may seem to confirm the theory of M. Halbwachs on the existence of several collective memories in a society, in this case we deal not with a multitude of collective memories but with the parallel existence of opposite social representations of the same subject.[4] In this sense are remarkable the words of John R. Gillis on the essence of any collective or individual identity, whose sense of existence in time and space are the commemorations; the contents of these determine the assumed identity.[5]

The objects of study in this article are the symbols, discourses, and practices of commemoration of "Victory Day," in the context of nation-building processes in the Republic of Moldova. These shed light on the semantic metamorphoses of May 9 as an ideological concept of the government. The research circumscribes the following objectives: (1)to contour the ideological patterns of the official nation-building discourse, (2)to analyze the reflection of this discourse in the collective memory, and (3)to identify the "vectors of memory"[6] and of amnesia that may consolidate, destroy, and/or facilitate the reconciliation of community, beyond the current government"s political interests and ideological projects.

The deconstruction of the post-totalitarian scenario of the holiday, among other procedures, provides the basis for a comparative analysis of the government's discourse with respect to collective memory. In the context of May 9 commemorations, the myth of "Liberators" functions to glorify the Soviet soldiers and to marginalize the memory of the Bessarabian soldiers who served in the Romanian Army. The ruling party's attitude to the veterans of both the Red and Romanian Armies corresponds to the role attributed to these veterans in nation-building projects. And vice versa, veterans" integration into the official scenario of the "Victory Day" illustrates their interaction with the rhetoric and the symbols of the governing party.

Fieldwork has been effectuated mostly in the capital of the Republic of Moldova, Chişinău, following the official scenario of the ceremony of May 9 as it takes places. I used both participant-observation and questionnaires during field research. Respondents were selected according to their age, aiming to collect perceptions anchored in various epochs of this holiday: both in the Soviet period and post-1991, after the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Moldova. Here one must mention that the author avoided delimitation by ethnic criteria, although the capital-city and the whole country are deeply multicultural. By following these principles I gave the opportunity to "ordinary people" to choose the communication language – respectively the Romanian /Moldavian or Russian languages - and thus got the chance to understand the impact of ideological discourse over self-identification mechanisms through language.

The empirical material is fortified by theoretical studies and documentary research. Besides the theoretical resources and field data and documents accumulated during the period of 2007-2008 in the collective research project

[4] M. Halbwachs, *On collective memory*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992.

[5] John R. Gillis, (ed.), *Commemorations: the politics of national identity*, Princeton, 1994.

[6] N. Wood, *Vectors of memory: legacies of trauma in postwar Europe*, Berg, Oxford, 1999.

"New and Ambiguous Nation-Building in Southeastern Europe"[7], this study represents a direct continuity of the post-doctoral stage (2005-2006) focused on empirical data collected in the Republic of Moldova and subsequently developed during a period of documentation at the University of Pittsburgh, made possible by the Fulbright Scholarship Program. I had the occasion to first present the ideas included in this study[8] at the international scientific conference "Memory, History & Identity in Bessarabia and Beyond"[9] at that time.

Ideological metamorphoses of the national identity project (1991-2007)

Before passing to the analysis of the symbols, discourses, and practices of commemoration associated with "Victory Day" and their contextualization in nation-building project in the Republic of Moldova, I first propose to consider the ideological metamorphoses that have marked this process from the inside of the governing power's discourse. Here we have to state that the elaboration of political identity in the Republic of Moldova after 1991 has faced radical ideological transformations, having evolved from the concept of independence with a "post-totalitarian" character to a concept with a "national Moldavian" character.

In 1991 and the years immediately following, the declaration of independence; elaboration of new national and state symbols; public condemnation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty, of the establishment of the Soviet regime, and of the atrocities committed by the Communist Party in Moldova; rejection of Soviet public ideology and symbols; return to the pre-Soviet *județ* administrative system; and change of street names – all served to affirm democratic perspectives and identity structures. Under the leadership of President Mircea Snegur, the period 1991-96 was marked by attempts to recover the collective consciousness and to suppress totalitarian ideology.[10] During this time the monument to Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt (whose name is assigned to numerous localities of the country), was reinstalled in the capital-city, while monuments to V. I. Lenin were

[8] I would like to express my deepest considerations to those who contributed with encouragements, objections, suggestions, and critics at the elaboration of this article, especially to Professors Irina Livezeanu, Kirk Savage, Ulf Brunnbauer, and Jennifer Cash. Anyway, the whole responsibility for the published material is assumed by the undersigned.

[9] The Scientific International Conference *"Memory, History & Identity in Bessarabia and Beyond"*, University of Pittsburgh, October 20-21, 2005 with the support of Arts & Sciences Dean"s Office of the University of Pittsburgh, UCIS, REES, Departments of History, Cultural Studies, Anthropology, Political Sciences and the Department of English Language of the University Carnegie Mellon; See for details: http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/romania/.

[10] Accordingly to the Decision of the Parliament"s Presidium of the Republic of Moldova, August 25, 1991, all consequences of the Communist ideological propaganda have been designated to be excluded from the "social circuit".

destroyed in mass.[11] It was also within this period, from 1991-1994, when the policy of pro-Romanian identity expressed by the concept "two states – one nation" was developed at the official level and legitimated by the self-identification of official rhetoric with the cultural, national and historical symbols appropriate to Romanian identity.[12]

The post-totalitarian condition was not fertile soil for identity policies. The ambiguity of economic and political relations and the *interstitio* state of being "between East and West" left an ideological space for rehabilitating the theory of "moldovenism", the main ideas of new ideological discourse being centered on the existence of a distinct national consciousness of the people living East of the Prut river, without negating "certain similarities between the culture, history and language of Moldavians and Romanians."[13]

This ideological turn occurred on the February 5, 1994 during the convocation of "Casa noastră - Republica Moldova" ("Our Home – the Republic of Moldova"). Probably initiated as a response to the Russian model "Наш дом – Россия" ("Our Home – Russia"), it was during this congress that Snegur reintroduced the Soviet syntagm the "Moldavian nation"[14], saying that the nation no longer wants to be "an exchange coin or anybody's sacrifice, no longer wants to hear that the country is wanted by someone as territory, as if it had no real owners" and that "the decision [of proclamation of independence] may and should be considered as a fulfilment of the unchanged desire of the nation to continue the tradition of Moldavians as a national state".[15] The President"s speech fundamentally reoriented identity policies in the Republic of Moldova. The new political concept of "two states – two nations" was legitimated by the Constitution,[16] and in recent years the authorities have insistently tried to implement the new concept by replacing all discussions of history as "History of Moldova" rather than "History of Romanians"[17].

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[11] After 2001, some monuments dedicated to V. I. Lenin have been re-installed in the public spaces, co-existing till present alongside the symbols of post-Soviet independence, i. e. the main street from the city of Rîşcani, district of Rîşcani, during the Soviet period named "V. I. Lenin", after 1991 has been re-named "Strada Independenţei" ("The Independence street"). At the moment, being crossed by other renamed street "Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt" after 1991, it is again marked symbolically by the monument of V. I. Lenin, re-installed here after 2001.

[12] Regarding this period, important steps of passing from "moldovenism" to "românism" could be reiterated, i. e. the Decision of the Parliament on new national symbols (1990), the Declaration of Suzerainty (1990), the Declaration of Independence (1991).

[13] See: Flavius Solomon, *De la RSSM la Republica Moldova*, in Solomon, Fl., Zub, Al. (eds), *Basarabia. Dilemele Identităţii*, Iaşi, 2001, p. 73-82.

[14] The Soviet historiography on the concept and ideology of "moldovenism" has been mainly represented in works signed by A. M. Lazarev, E. Russev, P. Sovetov etc.

[15] A public speech by Mircea Snegur made as the President of the Republic of Moldova on occasion of Congress "Casa noastră - Republica Moldova", February 5, 1994.

[16] See: *Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.*

[17] Article 1.1 from the new Constitution adopted on 29 July 1994 provides that "[T]he Republic of Moldova is a sovereign and independent, unitary and indivisible country.", while article 13.1 provides that "[T]he language of state in the Republic of Moldova is Moldavian

Even under the conditions of a general reticence towards the symbols of Soviet ideology, and a promotion of national and pro-Romanian ones by the overwhelming majority of society, the structures of power have managed to re-orient the discourse and practices of collective memory towards the celebration of the "Moldavian nation". The commemoration of August 27, 1991 (Independence Day) and August 31, 1989 (Romanian Language Day) were originally celebrated to express detachment from the identity structures of *Homo Sovieticus*, but since 1994 have been used to promote the image of a "Moldavian nation" built on "Moldavian" traditions, history, and language, that are purportedly different from Romanian ones. These celebrations seek to re-model the topography of "memory places", and to symbolically legitimate the ideological concept of statehood and the construction of the "Moldavian nation" as an imaginary community.

After Petru Lucinschi was elected President of the Republic of Moldova (1996-2001) the identity project continued to evolve in the direction of "moldovenism". The appeal to the myth of the "historical and cultural continuity" of the "Moldavian nation" was materialized in Decree no. 666-II of July 2, 1998, signed by the President Lucinschi "on the celebration of some memorable days of national and universal history and culture in the years 1998-2000", that among others provides for the "official commemoration of the 640th anniversary of state independence of the Moldavian country". Hot debates within the academic community over the justifications for presenting an image of historical continuity between the Moldova of Ştefan cel Mare and post-totalitarian Moldova, were quick to appear. As a result, the national "pro-Moldavian" policy became anchored in another ideological extreme of "friendship between nations". For example, in President Lucinschi"s speech on Independence Day (Ziua Independenţei) and [Romanian] Language Day (Ziua Limbii [Române]) at the "Piaţa Marii Adunări Naţionale" ("Great National Assembly Square") on August 27, 1999 respectively stressed the "unity of all citizens of the country (Republic of Moldova) – Moldavians, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauzians, Bulgarians, Jews. [...] All nationalities living in the Republic must become our treasure and pride".[18] This idea paved the way for the formula of a "multinational Moldavian nation", developed and intensively promoted in the spirit of the "Soviet multicultural nation" by subsequent pro-communist governments.

The radical changes in the ideological project of constructing a "Moldavian nation" have occurred as a result of the parliamentary elections of 2001 when the Communist Party of Moldova came to power. Since February 2001, the structures of power and official discourse have triggered a campaign to

language, applied in Latin alphabet". In this version, the Supreme Law of the Republic of Moldova is still raising disputes, regarding the argument about "ignorance of scientific truth" and "return to Soviet values", which have been cruelly "legalized" by the Constitution". See: N. Dabija, *Lista blestemaţilor*, in *Literatura şi Arta*, 14 decembrie, 2006.

[18] A public speech by Petru Lucinschi made as the President of the Republic of Moldova on occasion of national celebration "Independence Day" and "Our Language", Great National Assembly Square, 27 August 1999.

persuasively promote the existence of a "[multinational] Moldavian nation" in a new ex-Soviet state. This project has been activated through the recovery of the symbols of totalitarianism, Soviet iconography and slogans, mythology of "brotherhood of nations", "glory of the Soviet soldiers - liberators", consolidation of "national (Moldavian) traditions" and not least, manipulations of nostalgia[19].

The idea of "Moldavian" patriotism was symbolically signalled by the ideological concept "Republic of Moldova - my Motherland". Thereafter the authorities began to evoke the images of the past by large scale collective commemorative events that actively involved masses of citizens in rituals justifying the continuity of the Republic of Moldova "over centuries". In this manner, events and historical images were selectively introduced into collective memory. At the initiative of the Communist-led government the "Year of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt" (2004) was celebrated, as was the anniversary of "60 Years of Victory" (2005). Monuments to the "Soviet Soldier-Liberator" were renovated, the military glory complexes "Capul de Pod Şerpeni" (district Anenii Noi, 2004) and "Eternitate" (Chişinău capital-city, 2005) were fully reconstructed, and "15 years of Independence of the Republic of Moldova" (2006) was celebrated. With time, "Independence Day" was transformed, during the period of 2004-07, into "Republic Day"; the project "Moldavian Village" was inaugurated, and new "national holidays" as "Wine Festival" was instituted – all these being only some of the aspects of using the events of the past and legitimating Communist power through identity policies.[20]

Following Soviet patterns, the ideological project of "Moldavian nation" transposes its "multinational" dimension through the promotion of "international festivals" in the spirit of "eternal friendship between nations". The essence of the concept "multinational Moldavian nation" is correspondingly developed by the suppression of symbols and holidays that are associated with Romanian identity.

In this manner, since 2001 we have witnessed the marginalization of national holiday such as – "(Romanian) Language" Day of August 31, the reticence toward celebration of the "Great Unification" of Bessarabia with Romania of March 27, 1918 and "liberation of Bessarabia from Soviet occupation" of July 26, 1941, or, ignoring of commemorations of Soviet deportations" victims of June 13, 1941 and July 6, 1949. Although the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of the Republic of Moldova has claimed numerous Romanian traditions as "ancestral traditions of Moldavian nation", the current President"s speeches reveal an aggressive attitude to Romanian cultural and historical values, and in one speech he even identified Romania as "the last empire of Europe"[21].

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[19] Svetlana, Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*, New York, 2002.

[20] The year 2009, accordingly to the Decision of the President Voronin, is declared the year of official celebration of the 650th Anniversary of "Moldavian statehood".

[21] *Vladimir Voronin consideră că România este "ultimul imperiu al Europei",* available at: http://stiri.rol.ro/content/view/91940/2/2007.

Simultaneously, the political structures of opposition by competitive discourses promote the idea of unity Romanian nation, culture, history, and language by reviving the images from collective memory and the public symbols with messages closed to national Romanian values. It is in this context, the active renovation of cemeteries, commemoration of Romanian soldiers on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, organization of historical Romanian holidays and anniversaries of Romanian writers should be understood.

Here one must acknowledge that the victory of communists on the elections of 2001 and later, in 2004, has profiled new interests of legitimating political structures related to the problem of national identity and respectively, of mechanisms of selection, transmission, and storage of collective memory. The potential to legitimate political projects by exploiting images of the past has resulted in numerous cases of the instrumentalization of memory, and has triggered a campaign to reanimate identity symbols. The central role in this campaign has been conferred on "Victory Day".[22] In 2001, for the first time during ten years of independence, large scale manifestations dedicated to "Victory Day" and to the memory of heroes who died for the independence of Motherland were organized.[23] From that moment, the scenario of the holiday

[22] In the Republic of Moldova the "Victory Day" continues to be celebrated, accordingly to the Soviet tradition, on the 9th of May, when the European countries celebrate other holiday – the "Day of Europe". Under a new title "Ziua Victoriei şi a Comemorării Eroilor Căzuţi pentru Independenţa Patriei" ("The Day of Victory and of Heroes dyed for the Independence of Motherland Commemoration"), short version – "Ziua Victoriei" ("Day of Victory") and replacing the Soviet name "Ziua Biriuinţei" ("Day of Winning"), this date preserves its official status from the Soviet times: it became part of officially declared "national holidays" of the Republic of Moldova. See: *Codul Muncii*, Art. 69, modified by the Law nr. 434-XII, 26.12.90 and confirmed by the Law nr. 692-XII, 27.08.91.

In this regard, the executive secretary of the Social Democratic Party of Moldova "Patria-Rodina", Valentin Krylov, in an interview accorded to the BBC Radio have been remembered the context in which the old name "Day of Winning" was substituted and new name was approved: "First of all, the [present] name was adopted as a political compromise at the beginning of the 1990th by a special commission. ... I have participated personally. (...) In the frame of this meeting two absolutely different opinions have been faced and the name-compromise was chosen (...) as the holiday that will unify the society that will not be oriented toward confrontation". See: *Chişinău: ceremonii de Ziua Victoriei*, BBC, 9 mai, 2008, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/romanian/moldova/story/2008/05/080509_ziua_victoriei.shtml.

[23] Thus, by the Decree of President (Decree nr. 12-III, April 25, 2001 regarding the holiday "Ziua Victoriei şi a Comemorării Eroilor căzuţi pentru Independenţa Patriei", in *Monitorul Oficial al Republicii Moldova*, nr. 47-48, Chişinău, p. 33.), "as a sigh of deepest thankfulness for the heroism manifested by the participants at the war with fascism, for commemoration of those who dyed on the battlefield in the name of peace and welfare of the next generations, highly appreciating the [Moldavian] people"s traditions of commemoration the veterans who supported the war"s difficulties, and for commemoration of the 56th Anniversary of Big Victory over fascism" in 2001 was constituted the Commission for organisation the "festivity" of May 9. Among symbolical actions recommended by the Commission, most of them were inspired from the Soviet epoch ceremony: organisation of "thematic evenings and traditional meetings with veterans of World War II", bringing contribution at "the preservation of the tradition of looking after the soldiers tombs", "organization of the festival of patriotic song, sportive competitions and other manifesta-

becomes clearly detached from the policy of previous post-Soviet governments which made an equidistant commemoration of World War II events. The propagandistic arsenal of the totalitarian period has been taken up with fidelity and considerable efforts have been made to accommodate it on the move to the new political realities and interests. Such ideological patterns as "Great War for the Defence of the Motherland" and the "Great Victory of May 9, 1945", the propagandistic *clichés* of commemoration of "Soviet soldier-liberator" and the "role of Red Army in the liberation of Europe from fascist plague", in line with the political mythology of "secular Moldavian-Russian friendship", "Soviet liberation" and "German-Romanian occupation" are intensively used by the power structures, after 2001. The initiative of 2001 has been developed and applied successively in the succeeding years of communist governance, and a multitude of competitive discourses of collective memory and identity has been reactivated in line with the expected discourse of memory.

The tendentious selection of images of the past and identity rhetoric from the collective consciousness does not imply the observation of historical truth or impartiality of academic discourse. Most often the politics of memory and identity bear a message of loyalty to the authorities and sometimes denote an obvious propagandistic character. In my opinion, these realities constitute a notorious confrontation between the discourse of collective memory and identity, on the one hand, and the legitimating discourse of power, generally focused on the ideological project of constructing the "Moldavian nation"[24], on the other hand.

The construction of national identity since 2001 in the Republic of Moldova has been modelled on the ideology of "moldovenism" resuscitated from the Soviet period, but re- contextualized to independence, and pursued in a centralized manner with the discourse of "pro-Romanian" identity that was used as basis for the identity processes during the first years of independence put away into the shadows. Actions designed to reanimate Romanian national consciousness that continue to be initiated by the parties of opposition and supported by a considerable part of the society of the Republic of Moldova are generally small in scale compared to the actions of the "pro-moldovenist" official structures.

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tions consecrated to the Victory Day", "it is recommended to the directors of enterprises, organizations and institutions [...] to organize actions of dyed heroes" commemorations" and "to find solutions for the material and social problems", and „mass-medias structures and the State Company "Teleradio-Moldova" will reflect amply the actions of preparations and celebration the anniversary".

[24] The today "moldovenism" claims that Moldovans represent a different nation than Romanian nation, different "Moldovan" language and in the same time exalts benefactions of the USSR in the area between Prut and Dniester. This ideology of "moldovenism" can be seen in works signed by the leading theoreticians of "moldovenism", "History of Moldova" by Vasile Stati and, accordingly, "Statehood of Moldovan people" by Victor Stepaniuc, and it is based on the idea that Romanians have occupied in January 1918, the Democratic Republic of Moldova, and liberated in 1941 by the Red Army.

Victory Day - Between Soviet Tradition and Post-Totalitarian Innovation,

Or "Moldovenism" *From Above*

Coming back to the official scenario of the "Victory Day" in the capital-city of the Republic of Moldova, Chişinău, one should mention that for over seven years this celebration has been conducted without essential changes: wreath-laying at the monument of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt and "Focul Veşnic" ("Focul Veşnic" derived by translation of the original Russian name "*Вечный Огонь*") an official meeting and military parade at the Military Glory Complex "Eternitate", and a festive concert in the "Piaţa Marii Adunări Naţionale" with fireworks late in the evening.

In 2007, the symbolic ceremony held at the monument of the Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt[25] began with the suspension of public transport. The festive actions dedicated to May 9 began here with the ceremonial laying of wreaths and flowers at the monument, and an official opening by the in corpore officials of the Republic of Moldova headed by President Voronin.[26] The ritual is consumed without any political discourse or coomunication with the audience, in the tacit presence of representatives of diplomatic mission accredited in Chişinău, the media and the few passersbys who manage to infiltrate the sacred space of commemoration monopolized for the moment by the structures of power[27]. People wishing to lay flowers at the monument for other com-

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[25] The monument was inaugurated in the center of Chisinau in the context of the 10th anniversary of Great Union, at 29 April, 1928. The statue is dedicated to the Gospodar of Medieval Moldova Stephen the Great (1457-1504). Stephen the Great is pictured accordingly to a miniature from the 15th centuries, in the crown and the rich garb of the Moldovan Gospodar, raising the cross and squeezing his mighty sword. The Moldovan State Emblem is depicted on the pedestal and acanthus - from Byzantine culture - represented the connection with Byzantine church. Because of political and ideological contexts, the monument changed the place in 1940-42, 1942-44, 1944-45, and 1971-1989, being restored in 1942, 1945, and 1990. In the post-Soviet period the monument continues to be (mis)used by the power discourses, reviving concurrent memories and identity practices beyond the scientific arguments. In the context of "Moldavian nation-building" project the monument and respectively the image of Stephen the Great symbolizes "the independence of the statehood Republic of Moldova" competing, mainly, with the pro-Romanian discourse that follows the idea of a "national" and "European" symbolism of Stephen the Great, projected in the collective memory narratives.

[26] During my field-working observation a constant difference was attested regarding the chromatic symbolism of flowers laid at the monuments in the context of this commemoration. The power representatives" bunches of flowers are usually marked symbolically by the red colour, preponderantly red carnations, in a revolutionary-communist-Soviet style, and thus contrasting evidently with bunches of flowers, preponderantly white flowers, as symbol of peace and conciliations, laid by the representatives of diplomatic missions.

[27] The previous governments (1991-2001) used to follow symbolically the same scenario – from the Monument of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt to the Military Glory Complex "Eternitate", but without stressing the significance of "Victory Day" and its symbolism in the context of nation-building project from the Republic of Moldova. At that period, the main role in national consolidation was attributed, as have been mentioned

memorations, are temporarily prevented access to the monument while these rituals are performed by the "top people of the state". Later, the media would describe the confusion of many of the capital"s citizens over the "invention" of a symbolic connection between the "Great Voievod" and the "Soviet soldier -liberator" that this ritual produced.

After the ritual at the monument of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt the motorcade headed by the government representatives goes to the central point for the remaining commemorations – the Military Glory Complex "Eternitate". Here the President enters the celebration in the presence of "men in black" checking the public at the entrances to the territory of Memorial. The mission of the "forces of law and order" is complicated by the multitude of street sellers, beggars, people with huge bunches of tulips, narcissuses and lilac; all these are crowding on the way to the sacred place of the ceremony, some of them hoping to get some spare change or Christian alms from the people arrived to the commemoration of the Great Victory, or of the memory of ones sacrificed for that Victory.

I managed to get a red carnation, paying well more than I should have, and got lost in the multitude of people hurrying to the opening of the ceremony. Using the experience of previous years, I employ the "in charge carnation", by fitting its short stem into the bag filled with field-working utensils, as a symbolic "permit" to enter the territory of the Complex "Eternitate". Medals, the red ribbon, or most recently the black-and-orange ribbon[28], the pioneer tie or the badge of Komsomolist, all guarantee unhindered access to the ceremonial space. I acknowledge that, in spites of the red carnation, I did not manage to avoid the penetrating gaze of the representative of "public law and order" followed by the stupid question "where are you going?". My laconic but not convincing answer made him ask more questions relating to matters of

above, to the holydays conquered in the context of battle for Moldova"s independence: August 31 1997 – "Ziua Limbii Române" and, respectively, August 27 1991 – "Ziua Independenţei".

[28] In 2008 the Union of Komsomol Youth from Moldova will develop between May 6 and 9 the action "Георгиевская ленточка" ("The ribbon of St. George"), took over from the Russian Agency РИА Новости, who initiated it in 2005 in Russian Federation and in other ex-Soviet states in the context of the 60th Anniversary of the Victory under the slogan "Я помню! Я горжусь!" ("I remember! I am proud!"). The ribbon, accordingly to the opinion of the organisers, express symbolically the thankfulness toward the veterans and the commemoration of those who died during the war. See: "Георгиевская ленточка" "Я помню! Я горжусь!"; available at: http://gl.9may.ru/.

It would be mentioned that the semiotics of this orange-black ribbon goes down deeply in the history of Russian Empire and does not extend on the European cultural area; as for the slogan, in 2008 in the capital-city of Moldova, its message was cha(lle)nged radically by the "pro-Romanian" identity discourse, emerging ambiguous interpretations among ordinary people versus power. Thus, alongside the above mentioned message "Я помню! Я горжусь!" of the orange-black ribbons spread in 2008, other symbol - the map of the Greater Romania (coloured only in green) - was printed anonymously during only one night, additionally to the message "Noi nu uitam!" ("We do not forget!") on all tabloids of "9 Mai – Ziua Victoriei" that have been placed at the main buss-stations from Chişinău in the context of the official discourse commemorations.

"security": What am I going to do there? Escaping from one by one controls of "men in black" and being not disposed to lose precious time in explications for the last security cordon, I change my strategy on the move and take out my camera, tape recorder, notebook, and pencils and identify myself as a "mass-media correspondent", as the notion of "researcher" or even worse – "anthropologist" (as known from the previous experience), provokes too much suspicion and may result in being barred access to the official ceremony. Here, I should say, it was hard for me to make peace with the tribute of image paid for the violent incursion into the other domain in exchange for the privilege of field-working during the political liturgies.

I watch the festive moment, being "integrated" into the group of reporters. The audience is very different from the one observed at the Monument of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt; it is mostly represented by veterans and pioneers. I have also noticed the presence of a completely indifferent segment, without any interest in the things happening around them. As it turned out later, these were delegates from districts and villages throughout the country. They arrived at the Memorial Complex by the transport provided for "those willing to participate at the Victory Day manifestations in the capital-city". Among them I have also noticed students from the capital"s lyceums who have arrived at the ceremony due to the directors" insistent "suggestions" regarding the importance of personal presence at the Victory of 1945 commemoration.

In the center of attention, on a red carpet that symbolically frames the sacred space of power, stand the "first governmental officials" (the President, the Prime-minister and the Speaker), accompanied by His High Eminence Vladimir – Metropolitan of Chişinău and Moldova. They are backed on the one side by representatives of official structures (the cabinet of ministers, foreign ambassadors, leaders of political parties and formations, including the opposition,[29] and on the other side – by "ordinary people", who constitute the vast majority of the audience. Both "camps" are marked by the elements of symbolic decoration: the power structures stand with the flag of the Republic of Moldova raised high behind them as a central national symbol, while the "ordinary people" hold personally, alongside the flags of the Republic of Moldova, the flags of Komsomol Organization, and the flags of Organization of veterans from the War for the Independence of the Motherland. The front rows of this multitude are guarded by public authorities, tinting the *décor* of the ceremony with the phosphorescent green colour of their uniforms. To the side, not moving and present primarily as a ceremonial attribute, were the military band, the Guard of Honour, the group of soldiers waiting for "their moment" of Military Parade or the wreath-laying ritual.

The meeting is opened with a speech by the representative from the veter-

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[29] Some time later, I will understand the real aim of their involvement into "Victory Day" commemorations, mainly organised by the Communist Party from Moldova. The idea was to take this opportunity for distributing among veterans the electoral posters for the coming soon election of the Mayor of the capital city. In 2008 we will see the same situation.

ans of the Red Army, followed by a speech by the representative of the (Komsomolist) youth, followed by a speech by the President that began in the state language (Moldavian) and ended in the language of "inter-ethnic communication in the Republic of Moldova" (Russian). The opening discourses play up the themes of the "liberation of the Moldavian land", "glory of the Soviet Army", "brotherhood in arms", "blue sky above our heads" and "no one is forgotten, nothing is forgotten". A minute of silence is marked by the sounds of time ticking away and ending with a gun salute for the memory of the victims of the "Great War for the Defence of the Motherland". The next step, really spectacular especially for the children present, is the ceremony performed by the Honour Guard when laying flowers at the "Focul Veşnic". "The top persons of state" legitimate the act by a symbolic touch. Then follow the representatives of the Metropolitan of Moldova headed by His High Eminence, the Metropolitan of Chişinău and Moldova, of the cabinet of ministers and representatives of diplomatic missions.

Only after the said persons finish their parts, is access granted to other members of the audience: party leaders, political organizations, veterans, youth, children, and so on. Now is the moment at which those for whom the ceremony has been organized – the simple people – actively appear. They participate with piety in the ritual of laying flowers at the "Focul Veşnic" and then benefit from the full attention of those around them. Here begins the sacred time for the World War II veterans. It is the holiday when they are given a lot of flowers and words of thanks, when their memories are solicited, when they are asked to pose for photographs with their grandsons and great grandsons "as memory" or for the "wall newspaper".

It is the day when these individuals" lives regain the sense of values, presently dressed in slogans and ideologies, for which they fought and for which they lived in the time of their youth, when they dreamed, and when they were strong. The celebration scenario has no place for painful memories, although they are plentiful and abundant in the memory of those years, especially because the ceremonial stage leaves no space for the commemoration of those deported to Siberia, those whose property was forcibly nationalized, or for those who were "industrialized" or russified by the policies of "cultural revolution" triggered after May 9, 1945. The absence of Romanian Army veterans in this scenario confirms their inconvenience for the government"s militating rhetoric, centered on the myths of the "Enemy", the "Besieged Fortress" and the "Motherland in danger", all inherited from the Soviet epoch.

Regardless of these details, war veterans participate as live witnesses of the events "selected" by the official discourse for legitimating the current power. They accept this role with joy even if the commemoration scenario is based on half-truths, instrumentalised and distorted by the implications of political (and populist) discourses. The veterans consciously perform the role they have learned by heart during the Soviet period, trying to live their own celebration that to a greater extent is marked by the pleasure of being in the attention of others than by the ideological concept of official commemoration.

One should mention that the veterans" entrance to the holiday occurs in the absence of the "top government" persons who have already managed to quickly withdraw from the celebration, the same way they appeared, without interacting with the event"s invitees. This fact denotes another attitude to the memory of the veterans. The symbolic passing of roles performed in the space of the celebration marked the crucial moment of transformation of "Victory Day" from a "celebration *for* the people" into a "celebration *of* the people"[30]; "holy celebration", as the veterans use to call it with piety and love.

The festive part of the scenario is followed by a series of "manifestations" performed in the public space, contouring the *ludic* dimension of the holiday. The concert of military orchestras with repertories from the Soviet period, soldiers dressed in Soviet-fashion clothes and the World War II military technology elements can be seen in front of the "Patria" ("Motherland") Cinema; next to which is located an improvised camp kitchen, where the veterans of the Red Army[31] are awaited, as provided by scenario, with porridge and the wartime traditional "*100 грамм фронтовых*" ("the 100 grams for the front"[32]. Important concerts have been organized each year (2001-2007) in the "Piața Marii Adunări Naționale" until late in the evening, ending with fireworks, the number of which, as a rule, coincides with the anniversary of the celebration of May 9.

The atmosphere of the ceremony is supplemented by the thorough propagandistic decorations prepared before the celebration: a campaign to decorate public spaces with posters announcing "May 9" and "Victory Day"[33], media depictions of meetings with and between veterans of the Red Army, the organization of competitions of patriotic songs and viewings of epochal films about the "Great War for the Defence of the Motherland" – all these being persuasively broadcasted by the public TV channels of "TV Moldova 1" and the channels loyal to the political power, such as "TV NIT". In recent years, oppositional media have centered their attention on the commemoration of the totalitarianism victims and the celebration of "Europe Day". The significance of these is not yet clearly visible on the background of symbols promoted by the discourse of the actual governance dedicated to "Victory Day". In this context the opposition press has commented on the festive events of 2007 as

[30] See: John E. Bodnar, *Remaking America: public memory, commemoration, and patriotism in the twentieth century*, Princeton, 1992.

[31] In the Republica Moldova there are 8.446 participants at the World War II, 3.027 persons with the status of war participants, 2.187 - war invalids, and 5.125 – war widows. The most "younger" are 80 years old; available at: http://www.vedomosti.md/index.php?doc=1.

[32] The attributed by the official scenarios to the wartime"s "100 grams of vodka" symbolical message is exploring only one part of veterans" memory. Accordingly to the narrations of veterans, the "100 grams" are still deeply associated with war period atrocities and tragedies.

[33] It should be noted that up to the collapse of the USSR, the May 9 holiday was celebrated as the "Winning Day"; the term "victory" was being avoided, because it sounded too Romanian-like.

being "traditional and clunkily festive, Victory Day came again this year on the May 9, in the same Soviet military style and fashion."[34]

In this sub-chapter, I propose to analyze in more detail the topography of the scenario described above, seeking to draw the symbolic map of the places of memory from the point of view of the discourse of actual governance. One must mention that the central role in the scenario of commemoration is attributed to the flower-laying ceremony at the monument of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt and at the "Focul Veşnic" at the Military Glory Complex "Eternitate". The selection of these realms of memory determines the priority conferred by the legitimating discourse to the respective public symbols that themselves represent the palette of ideological pillars of "moldovenism".

The monument to Lenin that stood in the heart of the capital-city and was the central figure in the commemorations of Victory Day during the Soviet times has now become a marginalized symbol in the collective memory of post-totalitarian societies, being inadequate for the discourse of the current power for constructing the nation. In this way, the ideological gap of the new "national gallery of historical characters" is filled by the power"s invocation of the historical significance of the Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt personality and deeds as the "founder of Moldavian statehood"[35]. The decision to begin the ceremony by paying homage to the memory of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt is an attempt to compensate for the imagological gap that occurred after the collapse of the USSR. With the end of Soviet power, the image of Lenin as the "leader of the proletariat" was ideologically de-sacralized, and new images were necessary to legitimate the new project of nation-building, actually represented by the concepts of the "statehood of the Republic of Moldova" and "moldovenism". The monument of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt, although it is also a symbol close to the "pro-Romanian" discourse of collective memory, continues to be instrumentalised by the "pro-moldovenist" discourse of the government.[36] The centralized attempt to replace the key symbol of the Soviet epoch (in this case, the monument of V. I. Lenin) with the image of the post-Soviet Independence"s symbol (respectively, the monument of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt) is implemented from above through mechanisms of selective memory and forgetting. The government"s efforts to approach these monuments in the context of May 9 public "manifestations" is meant to substitute the ideologies of these "realms of memory", and thus to instrumentalise them for the construction of a festive topography of "moldovenism"; It is an attempt to "moldovenise" the public space of the capital-city. However, this idea is not promoted exclusively by the communist government; the previous governments also followed a similar scenario for Victory Day, the only difference being that at

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[34] P. Amariei, *9 mai: un război neterminat?*, in *Ziarul de Gardă*, 2007; available at: http://garda.com.md/129/editorial/.

[35] See for a comparative study: Lucian Boia (ed.), *Mituri istorice româneşti,* Bucureşti, 1995.

[36] Accordingly to the officially decision, the year 2004 was declared "Anul Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt" ("The Year of Stephen the Great").

those times (1997-2000), the ritual was not part of the ideological engineering of nation-building, or at least of constructing a "Moldavian nation".[37]

The invocation of "Moldavian statehood historical origins" by ideological anchoring of collective imagination to the periods of medieval glory of Moldova and times of Ştefan cel Mare is meant to propagate the idea of the "Moldavian state *continuity*". In this context, the Republic of Moldova pretends to have carried the glory of Ştefan cel Mare through the centuries, while the "Moldavian nation" is consolidated around the image of the common ancestor and hero – Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt. The chronological connection between the medieval epoch and the contemporary period of "moldovenism" is articulated by the propagandistic context of the Soviet period of "secular brotherhood between the Russian and Moldavian people" and the living memories of the Soviet Socialist Moldavian Republic (SSMR), which was declared (August 2, 1940) part of the Soviet Union and equal within the "15 sister republics". The vehement rhetoric of the higher government levels against the "Romanian-fascist occupation" of the Soviet territory of SSMR during the period of 1941-1944 strengthens the perceived legitimacy of the "Soviet liberator" against the "Romanian-Fascist occupant", and underlies the construction of the myth that Chişinău and Moldova were "restored" after World War II due to the courage and efforts of the Soviet Army.

The symbolic laconism and sobriety of the ritual performed at the monument of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfant by the power structure is compensated by the festivity and grandeur of the scenario implemented at the Complex "Eternitate". The use of this memorial as a sacred space for the celebration may be explained by the symbolic value that has been persuasively assigned to this "realm of memory" by the discourse of the governing party. President Voronin repeatedly characterized the memorial "Eternitate" as the "the most sacred of sacreds", of all the public monuments in the Republic of Moldova dedicated to World War II[38].

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[37] A similar study about the significance of December 1 in the context of Romanian festive topography is signed by Elena & Constantin Bărbulescu, *1 Decembrie la Cluj*, in C*aiete de Antropologie Istorică*, anul IV, nr.1 (7), 2005, Cluj Napoca, 2005, p. 293 – 312.

[38] The monument was erected in 1975, in the context of the 30th anniversary of the Victory of May 9, 1945. Occupying a huge amount of space, the Memorial of Victory is still "crowned" with the 25-metre pyramid made of five conventionalized rifles that have been conceptualized to unite the whole complex and simultaneously to divide it into the sector of the soldiers" burial place and the square for meetings. A large five-point star, with the Everlasting Fire, blazing in its centre, is at the base of the pyramid. Along the north-western side of the memorial there are six stone steles, representing scenes of battle from the period of the World War II. The monument should be regarded, according to the initial message of its creators, as a proclamation of victory in a land "liberated" by the Soviet Army: "It was constructed in commemoration of the soldiers who died for the liberation of Moldavia and its capital - Kishinev from the fascist invaders at the time of Great War for the Defence of the Motherland in 1941-1945". See for details: http://www.kishinev.info/monuments_ro/111902/.

From 1989 until 2001, the Memorial was practically forgotten, and was not present

One must mention that the wreath-laying of May 9 has a longer repertory, as it includes other public monuments, such as "Mama Îndurerată" ("Mother in Pain"), inaugurated on the territory of the memorial in memory of soldiers fallen for the Independence of Motherland during the war on Dniester, or dozens of other monuments dedicated to the "Unknown Soldier" in the entire republic. As a part of the scenario implemented by the powers, they widen considerably not only the area but also the spectrum of symbolic memory places used by the government in connection with "Victory Day". The commemorations of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt, the "Soviet soldier-liberator", and the "heroes of the war for the Motherland Independence" among others are designed to model the collective memory with new symbolic images from the gallery of historical national mythology.

Here I also should mention the "representative" value of the flower garlands laid at the central place of the ceremony – "Focul Veşnic" - at the "Eternitate" Complex. The previously mentioned succession of participants in the flower-laying is in accord with the hierarchical principal established by the political regime and the roles performed in compliance with the nature of the celebration gives an absolute image of the prestige held by each collective community represented in the commemorative practices of "Victory Day". Placing the audience on stage, as provided by the scenario, even to the detriment of the agenda, is rooted in the rituals performed during the Soviet epoch; the composition of the presidency and tribunes reiterates a similar representational pattern. Meanwhile, as in the Soviet times, the ordinary people participated in a centralized/controlled fashion in the official part of the public celebrations, without the right of initiative and in absolute compliance with the roles prescribed in the scenario elaborated by the government.

The tendencies to abusively control the historic, artistic and religious dimensions of the festive ceremony of "Victory Day" and their artful play-up under the pretext of paternal care for the "Moldavian people", denote the ideological employment of "places of memory" by post-Soviet strategies application for power legitimation that follow and symbolically contour a new "Moldavian" topography in collective consciousness. The direct involvement of veterans in the official scenario of commemoration implies the re-orientation from Soviet epoch identity structures which were built on a loyalty to imperial totalitarianism, to post-Soviet identity practices, drawn on "Moldavian" national sentiment.

The Republic of Moldova - My Motherland Versus My Motherland – the USSR,

as a site of memory in the context of the post-Soviet Moldovan power discourse. But with the inauguration of the communist government in 2001, the situation changed. The Victory Memorial reappeared after 2001, in the framework of official holydays and celebrations reminiscent of the Soviet epoch, being totally renovated at the initiative of power structures for commemoration of Victory Day in May 9, 2006 and renamed as Military Glory Complex "Eternity"; re-named accordingly to the power discourse"s signification of this holiday.

Or "Moldovenism" *From Below*

Trying to consider more attentively which of the "communities of memory" the government means to target group in its official celebration I have, thus, identified a mostly made by the World War II veterans group. This fact is confirmed by the veterans" perception of the May 9 political liturgy:

> Alexandru, veteran, engineer: *"Victory Day will continue to exist as long as there are veterans to remember and celebrate it."* (author's translation from Russian)

The community of veterans, together with their families and relatives, fully fits into the context of the celebration scenario. However, the topographic itinerary of the places of memory visited by the veterans differs substantially, both in concept and performances, from the one prescribed by the power"s scenario. The essential difference is marked in the official part of the ceremony upon the arrival of veterans to the Military Glory Complex "Eternitate" and by the laying of flowers to the monument of Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt. The ideological messages of "liberation of the Motherland by the Soviet soldier" and that of the "Moldavian statehood continuity" represented by the propagandist formula *"Moldova since the times of Ştefan cel Mare – the Soviet Socialist Moldavian Republic – the Republic of Moldova"*, leaves no space for other symbolic analogies in the memory of the veterans' community. The "Liberation" myth is perceived at the imaginary level and at the level of collective memory, separated from the myth of "statehood continuity", the latter falling under the impact of selective remembering and forgetting mechanisms controlled by the veteran community rather than the ones designed by the power discourse. Reticence with regard to the historical symbolism involved in the discourse of state legitimation is obvious. The veterans preferred to follow the reduced formula of the Soviet scenario than to accept the version reviewed in the post-Soviet style, remaining devoted to the symbolic message invoked by the monument of the "Soviet soldiers" and the "Eternal Fire" at the Military Glory Complex "Eternitate". In other words, the selective choice of official topography in the commemoration of "Victory Day" reveals essential gaps in the perception of the government"s message by the entire veteran community.

I propose to develop this dimension of the "moldovenism-building" ideological project through "Victory Day" commemorations in the following section. More precisely, I will consider the perception of the "moldovenism" ideology *from below* in the context of the May 9 celebration.

I have tried, firstly, to determine how the celebration"s message is perceived by the veterans present at the "Victory Day" commemoration at the Complex "Eternitate". Upon being asked "*what is the significance of the day of May 9 for you?*" participants replied in the following ways:

> Maria, veteran: *"Victory Day is a holy day for us because millions of lives were sacrificed on the way to victory."* (author's translation from Russian)

Alexandru, veteran, engineer: "*[Victory Day] it is an international victory*". (author's translation from Russian)

Olga, veteran, very proud of the fact that her husband was commander of the first Katiushas during the war: "*This is the year's most beloved celebration for me.*" (author's translation from Russian)

Constantin, veteran, fought on both fronts: "*... for us it is a day of sorrow ...*". (author's translation from Russian)

I have observed that the metaphoric perception conferred by President Voronin to the sacred space where the ceremony of "Victory Day" is performed as "*the most sacred of sacreds*" is complemented by the same metaphoric perception attributed by the majority of World War II veterans to the sacred time when the commemoration is consumed, "*Victory Day*" – "*sacred day*". This fact attests, as I have mentioned above, to the semantic metamorphoses of the official discourse as it falls under the unofficial incidence of the memory discourse through the transformation of "Victory Day" as a "celebration *for* the people" into a "celebration *of* the people". As a *lieu de mémoire*, the May 9 celebration becomes an arena of symbolic interactions, contested discourses and political manipulations. While the political leaders employ the events of the past to fortify patriotic sentiments and civil devotedness, ordinary people continue to accept, re-formulate and inclusively, ignore these messages[39].

Although it is affirmed that "memories often represent a deviated way of forgetting"[40], most often, when asked what they remember and commemorate in the "sacred day" of May 9, the answers given by veterans generally fit into two categories of images of the past that were supported, in their turn, by behavioural models, symbols, and commemorative practices: *the memory of Victory*, and *the memory of War*. The first image, about the memory of Victory, is articulated through the myth of "the glory of Red Army", the commemoration of the "Soviet liberator", and the clichés of "Soviet patriotism"; it represents the palette of memories contoured in discussions with veterans who were relocated to Moldova in the period immediately following the "liberation". The second image, about the memory of War, is articulated through the horrors and sacrifices suffered and made by each nation in this war, through the obligation of the living to commemorate the fallen, and through references to general human values, traditions, and other themes; it is generally reflected in the discussions maintained by veterans who were originally from the left bank of the Prut River and were enrolled in the Red and/or Romanian Army, depending on the prevalence of political power in the region.

How can this differentiation be explained? And to what extent does it coincide with the image of the "Motherland" – an *idéologème* circumscribed in the context of the May 9 commemorations to the totalitarian iconography and

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[39] John E. Bodnar, *Ibidem*, p. 20.

[40] J. Le Rider, *Memorie şi istorie. Locurile memoriei în Europa Centrala in Cultura memoriei în Europa Centrală*, C. Valcan, I. Ilian (eds.), Timişoara, 2005, p. 165.

fortified by the obstinacy of calling World War II the "Great War for the Defence of the Motherland"? Furthermore, the *idéologème* "Republic of Moldova - my Motherland" comes to legitimate the sacrifices made for the Soviet Motherland by the selective employment of collective imagination. The Soviet rhetoric of "patriotic" battle, love, and duty is actually taken up by the governing party and articulated for the project of "moldovenism". The collected fieldwork materials reflect, concomitantly, opinions contradictory to the power discourse. Quite often the ordinary people affirmed that the "ones that have fallen for the Motherland" were not asked on whose side they would like to fight and for which "Motherland" they were ready to die:

> Viorel, teacher of geography, 31 years: *"It was a tragedy for the entire world. The soldiers were not asked which army they would like to join."* (author's translation from Romanian)

> Nicolae, veteran: *"We were called to defend the Motherland from Siberia to Potsdam and then to recover Soviet power here."* (author's translation from Romanian)

In this context, answers to the question "*What does Motherland mean for you?*" are following two-fold construction: (1)*"My Motherland is the Soviet Union"* (often followed by the specification "... the place where we were born and where we live") and (2)*"My Motherland is my village. There is the Motherland"*.

The perceptions manifested by the overwhelming majority of people present at Complex "Eternitate" are marked by the Soviet period ideological templates. The imagology of these people and their concepts of "Motherland" originate in the memory of a glorious past and overlap relatively easily with the *memory of Victory*. None of the interviewed persons wanted to remember the consequences of liberation: deportations, famine, or the cultural marginalization to which Moldova"s population was subjected. At the same time, another imagology of the Motherland as the place where one lived, most often expressed in the formula "my Motherland is my village!" was narrated by the few veterans of Romanian Army, present at the ceremony among other spectators "invited from the districts". Their vision of "Victory Day" is represented by the *memory of War*.

One has to mention here that the first category of answers is generally represented by veterans of the Red Army, most of them being Russian-language speakers who remained in Moldova after the end of World War II. The second category of answers was most often given by Romanian/Moldavian language speakers, who originated from the left bank of Prut River, and had served in either or both the Red and Romanian Armies. In this context I have tried to understand the experiences and the values used in the construction of the image of the Motherland as expressed by the formulas "My Motherland is the USSR" or "My Motherland is my village" and to what extent the mythology of "liberation", "victory" and/or "sacrifices made for the Motherland" that are now being intensely employed in the confrontations between the discourse of power and the discourse of memory may be applied to the more recent post-

Soviet concept – "Republic of Moldova - my Motherland".

In response to the question on why they decided to spend the rest of their lives in Moldova, a significant part of the respondents, using the Soviet syntagma "*солнечная Молдавия*" ("the sunny Moldova"), or, by using the pro-Romanian discourse"s syntagma "Basarabia" for what is currently called the Republic of Moldova, the answers have revealed the schemes articulated above about the "victory" *versus* "war", and "country [the Soviet Union]" versus "homeland [the native village]". In this manner, according to research conducted over several years, I have identified the employment of an entire series of Soviet *clichés* regarding the "duty to the Motherland":

Nicolae, veteran: "*We have liberated this land and remained here for work.*" (author's translation from Russian)

Alexandru, veteran: "*I remained to do my military service here.*" (author's translation from Russian)

The soldiers, having returned from the battlefields even in times of peace continued to fight against the image of the enemy, and to build socialism in the territories "liberated" by the Red Army. Most often these perceptions refer to the campaign of rebuilding post-war Chişinău, albeit according to a "center-periphery" perspective:

Vladimir, a military reservist: "*Chişinău was a large village needing reconstruction.*" (author's translation from Russian)

Tatiana Petrovna, arrived to Chişinău in August 1949, engineer from Nijegorod: "*Chişinău was defeated by hunger, ruins were all around, [there were] so many victims …*" (author's translation from Russian)

It must be stated that the statements of veterans reflected not only the pride for helping to construct the "bright future of the Soviet people" but also to the profound conviction that the speaker had personally contributed to the recovery of the "Moldavian people" in the family of nations:

Nadejda, veteran: "*Chişinău was destroyed after the war and our devotion to the Motherland made us reconstruct it from ruins.*" (author's translation from Russian)

Tatiana Petrovna: "*Tthe victory of the Soviet Union was a Victory of all nations … We came to the Memorial [...] to commemorate the participants in this bloody war.*" (author's translation from Russian)

And vice versa. The perceptions of the Romanian Army veterans, in line with the perception of non-veteran inhabitants of the capital who were eyewitnesses to the period of despair that came after 1944, differ essentially from the above mentioned witnesses; they blames the Red Army for the destruction of buildings, explosion of entire quarters in the so-called "Iaşi-Chişinău liberation campaign", and the disastrous situation brought to the city by Soviet power.

It is clear that both the sentiment of pride and belief in the Soviet past "glory", the war traumas and crimes experience, and the knowledge of the sacrifices and victims made for victory, hold a crucial place in collective memory, painfully marking collective identity.

In the numerous discussions held with participants at official May 9 celebrations in Chişinău, I have observed some essential changes that have appeared in the unofficial portions of the day"s activities. For example, concerts and competitions of patriotic songs with Russian melodies of the Soviet epoch diluted with "Moldavian folk music" are organized on the National Assembly Square; while in the "Eternitate" memorial park, a group of different ages relive their "private" memory of war and of mates fallen in action. In their hands, these people hold portraits of Soviet marshals and generals from World War II (yet Stalin"s image has never appeared among them during all these years). Accompanied by the guitars of several amateurs[41] and under the eyes of a large circle of admirers, these people have been following their own scenario of commemoration by singing Russian songs that were in vogue during the war, not only patriotic ones, selected from their own memories and not impregnated with the message delivered by the actual government.

Through such symbolic mechanisms, memories of war are transmitted at the level of families and generations. Also, it is worth noting the presence of a large number of young people at the ceremonies. They lay flowers and congratulate the veterans, usually in Russian. The congratulation wording is the same for each veteran and pronounced with piety, following the models taken up from the Soviet epoch: "Спасибо за Победу!" ("Thank you for the Victory!"). This fact is observed, especially, from the perception of Victory Day by members of the younger generation who actively participate at the celebration:

> Saşa and Katea, 17 years old: "*[The Victory Day] commemorations represent the sentiment of pride for our parents and grandparents. We have come here to remind ourselves [about this day], to congratulate the veterans and to give them flowers of peace.*" (author's translation from Russian)

Near the "Clopotul Tăcerii" ("Bell of Silence") – an architectural detail that was added to the Complex "Eternitate" after the renovation of 2005 - people went in lines to ring the bell. Being asked what this gesture means for them, they gave me very different answers: "*for the memory of fallen victims", "for the memory of grannies*", and even "*a cry into the silence of all soldiers of Europe*". A substantial number were also performing this ritual for the immortalization of their own memories by taking photographs to have "a memory of *this* day".

Some time later at the "Focul Veşnic" in the center of the commemorative space, a group of young adults appears holding above their heads the slogan "*Моя Родина – СССР*" ("My Motherland – the USSR"). Being asked what does

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[41] The amateurs represented the Cenacle of Bards *"Товарищ Гитара"* ("Comrade Guitar") from Chişinău, placed in the building of the Center of Jewish Culture. They came to the Military Glory Complex "Eternitate" to commemorate the people who died in the war times by accompanying the songs from and about the wartime. See for more details the Cenacle"s web-site: http://www.festival.hobby.md/kirkin.html.

"Motherland" means for them considering that they have hardly any experience of living in the USSR, since more than a decade has elapsed since its collapse, they stress other aspects represented in their vision of the respective slogan:

> Piotr, 27 years old, came to Chişinău from the Southern part of the Republic of Moldova and Jenea, 20 years, from Chişinău: "*The USSR made the biggest contribution and the biggest sacrifice for the victory, while nowadays attempts are being made to marginalize this contribution. (...) The Republic of Moldova is the result of efforts of those who fell under the Soviet flag and we are proud of that and try to remind others of the people thanks to whom it has won the victory – to the USSR and the Soviet soldier*". (author's translation from Russian)

Piotr and Jenea from the very beginning have defined the commemorative significance attributed to May 9 as one of the most important for the values they share: *"It is a day of memory"*. At the end of discussion they assure me that "they do not feel nostalgia for the Soviet epoch, at least in the historical format known by everybody", but "share the values of socialism" and hope for the renaissance of the USSR, eventually, "in other geopolitical frameworks, possible, even on the territory of Europe ..." Their presence is immediately noticed by visitors, a considerable part of whom hurry to get shot at the background of the respective slogan because such pictures would be *cool*, without being preoccupied by patriotic or nostalgic sentiments. However, this slogan, like the entire scenario of celebration, fails to fortify the government"s message that "the Soviet Army is a liberator of the USSR". On the contrary, this sign symbolically undermines another dimension of the power discourse regarding the ideological concept "Republic of Moldova - my Motherland" that is crucial to the government"s legitimation of "Moldavian statehood". I have noticed that this segment of the audience manifests a reticent but not contesting perception of the official narration of Victory Day. Their actions are determined by the visions and inertia of collective mentality, while the attitudes are based on the previous experience that in being re-lived contribute to the formation of collective identity. Beyond the celebration and use of "moldovenism" promoted by the authorities, this segment of participants expresses its own identity formed by inert elements of mentality, nostalgia for the past, and previous experience projected onto the vision of the present. In this manner, the legitimating discourse of the government - through its scenarios built out of Soviet propaganda to further post-Soviet ideological projects of nation-building - actually nourishes memories and contradictory identity constructions, facilitating the fragmentation of society.

Veterans of World War II – Detween the Myths of "Liberators" and "Occupants"

The images of World War II battlefields, the memorial plates, and the slogans and posters dedicated to "Victory Day," tell us - in the key of power discourse - about the "Glory of the Soviet Army" and the "gratitude of the Mol-

davian people". The official narration selectively exposes scenes of victory and glory, but tacitly omits scenes of terror and horror with the aim of resuscitating only one image of World War II: the scenes of victory of the Soviet soldier-liberator. The official scenarios of commemoration do not leave any space for conciliation and tolerance for the "Others", and for the sharing of glory with other countries that won this war. Regardless of the official recognition of equality in rights with the veterans of the Red Army, for example, veterans of the Romanian Army still consider themselves continuously marginalized. The image of these people and the memory of the celebrated events cannot be reconciled with the government"s discourse about the significance of May 9 in post-Soviet Moldova. The "ordinary people", however, are of the same opinion as Andrei from Chişinău:

> *"It is good that the soldiers of the Romanian Army are not forgotten. In my opinion, we must understand that they were not the ones to begin the war, they simply performed their duties as soldiers".* (author's translation from Romanian)

In rural communities, at the official ceremony dedicated to May 9 that takes place before a subsequent religious service, most representatives of local administrations said that the people from the both sides of the barricades were not guilty for being involved in the massacre of war. Several times, when assisting at the commemorations of Victory Day I heard opinions of the following type:

> Gheorghe, 56 years old: *"People are not guilty; the fallen ones (...) must be remembered. It is natural to remember. No matter if they were Soviet or not, people did not go to the war on their own (...)".* (author's translation from Romanian)

Quite often, especially in rural communities, people prefer to replace the Soviet symbols – the red stars on the monuments of the Unknown Soldier, for example, with Christian symbols like crosses. These symbols are peacefully combined, regardless of the contradictive ideologies they represent. The simultaneous commemorations of people fallen during World War II and all deceased villagers, on May 9 and "Paştele Blajinilor" ("Paternal Day"), are also illustrative. According to Orthodox Christian tradition, people go to cemeteries and give alms for the memory of the "righteous ones" on "Paştele Blajinilor". I develop this idea by reference to empirical materials collected in the context of commemoration practices of 2005, including the Chişinău community. But first of all, I would like to mention the coincidence that happened in that year, when the religious holiday "Paştele Blajinilor" coincided with the 60th Anniversary of the Victory over Fascism.

Although "Paştele Blajinilor" has a flexible date and "Victory Day" has always been celebrated on May 9, these two holidays coincided in 2005. The entire community of the Republic of Moldova was called by the tradition and sentiment of Christian-Orthodox identity to commemorate the dead. The most

widespread cultural practice was represented by tombside rituals of com-
memoration to "all those who are no longer with us", whether fallen in battle
or deceased during times of peace. Sofia and Vasile, both pensioners, stated:

> Sofia, 67 years old and her husband Vasile, 75 years old: *"[„Paştele Bla-
> jinilor"] is an important day for our families, we come to the tombs and
> honour their memory: both of the ones fallen in battles or deceased during
> the times of peace, as true orthodox Christians".* (author's translation
> from Romanian)

These people are not making any associations between the memory of
the "deceased ones" and the image of the "great victory of the Soviet people".
Furthermore, the people at cemeteries discussed with piety and compassion
the ones that have fallen in the World War II. Attempting to understand, by
comparison, the perception of these two holidays, I found some more categori-
cal explications:

> Gavriil, 80 years: *"I was there as well [at the memorial "Eternitate"], but I
> refused to participate at the ceremonies because that is a foreign place for
> me … The Soviet Army was an army of occupation and Victory Day for my
> compatriots is not only a day of liberation from the fascist occupation but
> also the day of a new occupation – the Soviet one."* (author's translation
> from Romanian)

These aspects are still alive in the collective memory of the Republic of
Moldova society. The dilemma of following the official discourse or of honour-
ing the tradition of Christian commemoration by exceeding the political con-
notations has generated the idea of a new conciliation that is become more
and more popular:

> Ion, 55 years old, physician: *"This day must become a day of reconcilia-
> tion when we are to honour all the people that are no longer with us, ac-
> cording to the Christian ritual: we are to go to church, visit the tombs, and
> light candles for their souls."* (author's translation from Romanian)

Perhaps namely for this reason, two years later, a family of ethnic Ukrain-
ians from the Republic of Moldova, that has found the name of a distant rela-
tive on a granite slab at the Military Glory Complex "Eternitate", has decided
to organize a symbolic Christian commemoration during the official ceremony
of May 9, 2007: with alms, burning candles, and warm words shared with us
in all languages (Romanian/Moldavian, Russian, Ukrainian). In the opinion
of these people, it is important not only to not forget "the departed" but also
to commemorate them.

To be able to compare the perception of the official scenario by the in-
habitants of the capital compared with that of "ordinary people" in other lo-
calities, in 2006, I undertook fieldwork outside the capital city. During this
time, the people from the Ialoveni town, when asked about the significance of
the holidays and rituals performed in the context of "Paştele Blajinilor" and

"Victory Day" affirmed that they "celebrated both occasions", both during the Soviet period and in the present:

> Gheorghe, 56 years old: *"We come to commemorate them, to remind ourselves of them, to give handouts, we wish ourselves to be healthy in order to be able to commemorate them (...) we have always come to the cemetery."* (author's translation from Romanian)

> Olga, 55 years old: *"My father returned from the war (...) and on May 9 we used to lay flowers at the monument [erected in the center of the town], both at the cemetery and at the monument ... all veterans met together and it was a holiday (...). We used to go to the cemetery during the Soviet time as well."* (author's translation from Romanian)

> Anastasia, 75 years old: *"That's the way it is here, that's the tradition... May 9 was celebrated by my brothers who returned from the battlefield, now I go to church and give handouts, and then I go to the monument".* (author's translation from Romanian)

Thus, ordinary people have managed to accommodate the ideological discourse by traditional commemoration practices in an unforeseen context, giving honour to their compatriots and their own relatives. The traditions of commemorating "Soviet heroes" that were intended to legitimate Soviet power did not make roots in the collective memory, being gradually replaced by Christian forms of commemoration. In the post-Soviet period, when society faced radical changes, and an official re-writing of the past was imposed "from above" to legitimate a new order, the resulting "invented traditions" have also only experienced a partial and temporary success. In most rural localities the solution for remembering has been found in the Christian tradition and spirit that have assured the perpetuation of identity for centuries.

When studying the rituals of celebrating the holidays of May 9 in localities throughout the republic, I have noticed "local" mutations, "from below", conditioned by the discourse "from above", illustrated by an accommodation to the scenarios and behavioural models practiced by local people. Notorious examples include cases when images of local heroes originating from the respective communities are substituted for the image of the "liberating soldier", and when monuments are erected for their honour close to churches, as for example, in the village of Sărata Galbenă, in Hânceşti district. Also, in some localities the total abstraction of discourses and symbols promoted by the government has been found. Such abstraction is illustrated by the exclusion and marginalization of major monuments to Soviet heroes from local community memory, as in the Şerpeni village of Anenii Noi district, in the Caracui village of Hânceşti district, and sometimes even by the transfer of traditional and religious values to monument sites, when, for example religious objects are placed near abandoned monuments, as in the village of Congaz, in Comrat district.

Appealing to E. Durkheim's theory, I have stated that in some communi-

ties of the republic, a tendency exists to evoke rituals and commemorative practices as mechanisms for fortifying solidarity within a community, and not as contexts for social, cultural, or political contestations and disputes. Considering the identity patterns anchored in the collective memory (especially of local and confessional identities), one must acknowledge the devotion and piety manifest in the performance of these rituals. The memory, owing to its presence in any action of perception, reflection and communication, is one of the essential conditions for the identification of each person. Memory becomes the major medium for the building up of such identities.

The ruling governments both during the Soviet and post-Soviet times are preoccupied not by the past itself, but by the past reported to the needs of the present and to the perspectives of future development. The so called "recoveries" of national traditions and memory "reconstructions" of the historical figures are likely to be part of an ideological program, their value being limited to militant symbolism, sometimes anachronic. The phenomena of "inventing" new traditions, recovering the "glorious past", destroying old monuments and erecting new ones – are only the most "obvious" segments of the process of identification of a society in the context of new changes. The authorities of the Republic of Moldova are interested not only in re-writing history but also in the re-organization of collective memory, regardless of its reticence to the radical and discordant changes. The president Voronin himself affirmed that "taken together, these monuments constitute important reference points for the statehood and spirituality of our nation".

Following the idea of Vladimir Tismăneanu, national pride does not contain anything bad in it. Tragedy occurs when this natural sentiment ceases to mean just "love for the small group to which we belong in the society" and is exacerbated, transformed into ideologies of hostility, hatred and envy.[42]

May 9 – the War of Holidays

On "Victory Day" during recent years, Chişinău has been marked with a wide spectrum of symbols - national and ideological, historical and political, cultural, and sportive. This makes us think that the inhabitants of Chişinău, like the entire community of the Republic of Moldova, celebrates May 9 depending on its own anchorage of identity in the discourse of the past. The day of May 9 itself has become a "place of memory" in this post-Soviet space and has begun to mean simultaneously Victory Day, Europe Day, the Day of the Final Football Cup of Moldova, as well as a birthday, name-day, and other personal or family holiday.

I would like to mention that in the President"s official speech[43] in 2007, he stressed the need for "attention to the preservation of the memories of the past" and declared that "there will never be historians or politicians capable of

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[42] Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Fantasmele salvării. Democraţie, naţionalism şi mit în Europe post-comunistă*, Iaşi, 1999, p. 196.

[43] *Это праздник со слезами на глазах* in *Независимая Молдова*, 11 mai, 2004; available at: http://www.nm.md/daily/article/2004/05/11/0101.html.

underestimating the importance and significance of the eternal facts of hero-ism of the nations of the former USSR and of the nations in the anti-Hitlerist coalition". By reference to the "Soviet nation" and allusion to the idea of the "Moldavian people" as a "multi-ethnic people", the President did not abstain from mentioning the fact that the Moldavian nation is striving to a "common and luminous European future", but "without giving up its heroes, or senti-ments of recognition and gratitude to all the people who gave us freedom".

The ambiguity of the discourse of power related to the international project and European Union integration quite often is in contradiction with the inter-nal project of nation-building. This contradiction has been outlined in the way that state symbols are arranged at the Complex "Eternitate". For example, in 2007 only the flag of the Republic of Moldova, a national symbol, appeared in the center of attention, as already mentioned above. In previous years, as partially supported by the official discourse of the President (2004),[44] the flags of the Republic of Moldova, capital city, and European Union, were flown together. The commemoration of 2007 was transformed both in sense and in practical dimension as the symbolic combination of these flags was present only in the background of the Memorial, being too small to be perceived by the public, but in unison with the power's discourse about "Victory Day" *versus* "Day of Europe".

The "conflict" between the two holidays at the level of political elite of the Republic of Moldova became perfectly visible in 2006 at the plenary session of Parliament when the majority communist fraction rejected the opposition"s invitation to adopt at least one declaration dedicated to the "Day of Europe".[45] In 2008, "Europe Day" will be celebrated on May 8, since the Republic of Moldova officially celebrates "Victory Day" on May 9.[46] These semantic con-frontations are selectively perceived by ordinary people. For example, Fio-dor, a maxi-taxi driver, affirms that "May 9 is the day of liberation for all of Europe."[47]

In the towns of Balți and Cahul – two important urban localities located in the north and in the south of Moldova, respectively, public activities dedi-cated to Europe Day were organized for the first time. In Cahul, for example, they ended with the cultural action "Hora Europei" ("Hora of Europe" with the participation of artistic teams from the locality. In Balți, a TV program

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44 *Mesajul dlui Vladimir Voronin, Preşedintele Republicii Moldova, cu ocazia Zilei Europei* (Chişinău, 9 mai 2004))"; available at: http://www.president.md/press.php?p=1&s=1795&lang=rom.

45 See the recorded version of these discussions in the Parliament of the Repub-lic of Moldova, on May 4, 2006; available at: http://www.parlament.md/news/plenaryrecords/04.05.2006/.

46 The prime-secretary of the European Commission Delegation in the Republic of Moldova, Paolo Berizzi, at the official meeting with mass-media representatives has been mentioned that the initiative to organise these actions on May 8 pertains to the Commission and does not represent a request on behalf the Chişinău authorities.

47 *Что для вас означает 9 Мая?* in *Независимая Молдова* 2007; available at: http://www.nm.md/daily/article/2007/05/11/0306.html.

with discussions on the theme of European integration was organized. Owing to the official celebration of "Victory Day", however, these activities were performed on May 8.[48]

In 2008, celebrations dedicated to Europe Day have become even more evident in the localities of the republic. In the capital, festive events began on May 8 with a laying of flowers to the logo of the EU at the entrance to the Alley of Classics in the public park "Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt" and thereafter continued at the National Theatre "Mihai Eminescu" by a show of garments design "Culorile Europei" ("Colours of Europe") and the Gala of European Premiums where were decorated the winners of competitions dedicated to this event. Similar events were organized on May 17 in Bălţi and on May 23 in Cahul. In the future, the European Commission intends to organize similar events on a rotation basis in other towns, including even Tiraspol.

Specifically, in the center of the capital a meeting of representatives from various liberal parties was organized in recognition of Europe Day. The symbolic iconography was represented by the distinct national and European signs – tricolour ribbons, flags of the European Union, banners with inscriptions "We want to be in EU and NATO!". The pro-European rhetoric was continued by the reading of common declaration on the opportunity of unification of pro-European forces, symbolically topped by the "Hora Unirii" ("Hora of Unity"). The most frequently met slogans, in the context of celebration of Europe Day were centered on the idea "Europe – our home". This concept was applied to all projects of national(-ist) identity: pro-Romanian or pro-Moldavian.

Conclusions

We have ascertained the evident ambiguity of the discourses and practices of commemorating "Victory Day", the holiday circumscribed by the official discourse, through selective mechanisms of memory and amnesia, at the nation-building project. (Re)construction of national identity by appealing to the practices of commemorating the ones that have fallen or the ones that participated in the World War II continue to reflect the metamorphoses of confrontation between the discourse of those in power and the discourse of collective memory. The places of memory associated with the events of the World War II have changed the symbolic message depending on the official discourse and in compliance with the justification interests of the governing party; these existed in parallel with the imagination and collective memory of the society in the Republic of Moldova. During the post-Soviet period the public symbols have changed for several times the semantics and the perception by the society, depending on the collective identity of the "imagined community".

Such changes were in all times reflected in the rituals of commemoration and construction of collective identities, stimulating the efforts at the highest

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48 *В Молдове будет впервые отмечен День Европы*, in *Salut.md* 2007; available at: http://www.salut.md/print.php?contid=21197.

levels of government to store, select and transmit collective memory. By participating in the politics of commemorating the "Soviet soldiers - liberators" society does not forget the Christian ritual of commemorating the deceased. To be more precise, these rituals, alongside the images of official discourse, leave space for the portraits of the ones that continue to live in the collective memory as members of such "imagined communities", i. e., as relatives, fellow villagers, friends etc. Most often, in the traditional practices of commemorating the deceased, the frontiers between the memory of the "liberators" and "occupants" begin to disappear by giving up space to the memory of the victims of "totalitarian regimes".

Victory Day for the inhabitants of the Republic of Moldova, as well as for communities in other ex-Soviet republics continues to be a controversial holiday. The selective use of images of the past that - depending on the "vectors" of memory - appear "glorious", "tragic" or "foreign", brings back ambiguously in the collective consciousness the luxury of political liturgy, its origins being deeply rooted in the epoch of "totalitarian night". Considered in the context of the collapse of the USSR, the scenarios of anachronic celebration of "Victory Day" and veneration of the "liberators" diminish substantially the symbolic message of the official title of the holiday, namely the commemoration of the "heroes fallen for the defence of independence and integrity of the Motherland". A considerable part of *heroes* continue to be marginalized by the legitimating power discourse, regardless of the reconciling and pacifist discourse of collective memory. The selective commemoration of the soldiers of the Red Army and condemnation to oblivion of the soldiers enrolled in the Romanian Army leads to the fragmentation of society and provokes identity tensions, *grosso modo* centered on the two major discourses: the discourse of legitimation of "Moldavian statehood" and the discourse of re-construction of "Romanian national(ist) identity". I consider that depending on the affiliation of the society to the "pro-Moldavian" (post-imperial) discourse instrumentalised by the power or the "pro-Romanian" (national-*ist*) promoted by the considerable number of "communities of memory" during the celebrations of May 9, "Victory Day" offers new imagological supports, prolific to the transfer of sacred images related to the collective identities.

The slogans elevating the Motherland and glorifying the Soviet soldier–liberators constitute the key moment of confrontation of "communities of memories" suppressing from inside the process of nation-building in this space. The government"s initiative to commemorate "Victory Day" in the style of the Soviet tradition and the simultaneous persuasion of the ideological concept "My Motherland – the USSR" are in contradiction with the national post-totalitarian idéologème – "Republic of Moldova - my Motherland". The power narrative does not have a paradigm elaborated in common with the entire society regarding the past events and applies abusively new models and ideological projects on the collective (historical) memory. In this context, local communities within the Republic of Moldova have elaborated their own mechanisms for perpetuating collective identity based on ancestral values: religion, family,

daily labour, and ethnic and cultural traditions, as opposed to the political valences of government"s discourse. In this case the tradition of commemoration, in line with language and history, represents a dimension of resistance within collective memory against the amnesia promoted by official ideological discourse of this period.

Summarizing all that has been mentioned above, I draw the conclusion that the celebration of May 9 in the context of nation-building project in the post-Soviet Moldova represents an arena of symbols, discourses and practices of collective memory. The community from Moldova – a community of concurrent memories - does not accept *in integrum* the discourse of the Communist authorities related to the historical past. In this case the reflection of the *idéologème* "May 9 - Victory Day" in the collective consciousness is a notorious proof of the multi-voiced collective memory referred to the discourse of the governance. The process of selective remembering and forgetting in a post-Soviet project of nation-building, mediated by the discourse of the government is indispensable of contradictory competitive collective memories existence, sometimes even parallel, which are to equilibrate the discourse about the future of the past in the Republic of Moldova.

Recenzent: dr. Irina Livezeanu
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TEACHING HISTORY IN A (NEW) MEDIA WORLD: HISTORICAL NARRATIVES, THE AUDIOVISUAL, AND THE DIGITAL PAST

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Abstract

The article aims to explore a type of historical content that historians have only begun to talk about – the stories of the past that are suffused through popular films and television programs and their newest incarnations in the digital world. The author purpose is to consider both old and new forms of media as they relate to the representation, diffusion, and discussion of the past, with particular attention to what it means for creating narratives for new generations.

The research considers the relationship between media and history in two ways: (1)to expand the idea of a history as a narrative of words to understand how historical narrative is realized as an interactive and visual medium, and (2) to suggest that media versions of history can be seen as another type of "textbook" – that is a source of narratives and images that shape historical

material into genres and formats that have their own qualities and values.
       Encounters with history today are not confined to books or the classroom -
and never were. All sorts of public structures, from statues and war memorials,
to museums and mausoleums, were intended by the states and institutions that
sponsored and financed them to mark the "places" of history. Holidays and anni-
versaries were established to celebrate or re-enact historical events, as signposts
in historical memory. In this essay I want to explore a type of historical content
that historians have only begun to talk about – the stories of the past that are
suffused through popular films and television programs and their newest incar-
nations in the digital world.
       My purpose is to consider both old and new forms of media as they relate to
the representation, diffusion, and discussion of the past, with particular attention
to what it means for creating narratives for new generations. I will consider the
relationship between media and history in two ways. First, I want to expand the
idea of a history as a narrative of words to understand how historical narrative is
realized as an interactive and visual medium. Intentionally I choose the history
textbook as both object and metaphor. Moldova has exemplified to Europe and
beyond the seriousness of discussing national history in terms of its teaching
and textbooks. Much has been written about the public discussion surrounding
evaluation of its history textbooks, new generations of textbooks advocated by the
Council of Europe, and the problems with their adoption in the early part of the
21st century.[1] The fact that I was able to read online, download, and otherwise
access so much of this discussion of history textbooks in Moldova – in English - is
just one example of how the media world has diffused historical narratives and
their analysis into chat rooms and websites far beyond national borders. To ex-
plore the way in which history and political discourse are intertwined and impli-
cated requires the recognition that the media world is only one click away.
       Second, I want to suggest that media versions of history can be seen as an-
other type of "textbook" – that is a source of narratives and images that shape
historical material into genres and formats that have their own qualities and
values. The media is a public story-teller that uses historical narrative, with
dramatized heroes and larger than life conflicts, which personalize history and
provide stories and images with which history books and their readers interact.
From "old media" like television and film to new media like the internet, stories
of the past are now uploaded, streamed, and blogged. Many of these images and
stories help to shape what might be called "cultural memory." As one thoughtful
commentator has remarked, not only are memories "often produced and repro-
duced through cultural forms, but also the kind of circulation that exists be-
tween personal memories and cultural memories – the personal photograph, for

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[1] In English see Stefan Ihrig, "Democracy (Dis)Connected - Discourses Of Democracy And
Of The Inter-War Period As (Mis)Guiding Lights In The History Textbooks In Moldova and
Romania," CEU Political Science Journal 1 (2007): 27-43; Wim van Meurs, History Text-
books in Moldova, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2003; Vladimir Solonari, "Narrative,
Identity, State: History Teaching in Moldova," Eastern European Politics and Societies 16,
no. 2 (Spring 2002): 414-445.

instance, that ends up in the public arena, or the Hollywood film that "becomes" part of an individual"s memory of an event."[2] So just as history books intend to provide historical explanations through narrative that guides the interpretation, so too do mediated histories provide templates for producing and reproducing cultural understanding of the past. To the extent that professional historians have left narrative history for more specialized problems and approaches, a discussion of historical narrative and its media representation becomes important to thinking about teaching history in a (new) media world.

A discussion of teaching history in a media world also adds an important dimension to an understanding of tensions in educational policy more generally. As Jan Germen Janmaat has argued, many new post-Soviet nations are caught between the demands of nation building and the demands of "democratization," as proscribed by the European Commission, Council of Europe and other EU bodies. History textbooks epitomize this tension. However, he adds a third competing demand – "globalization" - that is challenging all nations in educating their populations for skills and problem-solving to compete in the international marketplace.[3] There is no greater symbol of globalization than media, and the availability of counter-narratives, alternative histories, and international dialogue means that understanding the potential and challenges of media-made historical narratives becomes imperative.

In the remainder of this essay I will discuss the relations between more traditional narrative and media modes of presenting and interpreting history. I also pay special attention to the role and contribution of professional historians, as too often the practice of history and its media representations are seen entirely at odds with each other. Although only few examples can be offered, I hope that the suggestions will prove stimulating for further explorations of the relationships. I begin with the narrative.

The Master Narrative and "National" History

The idea of "national history" has long been associated with the magisterial work of one author, providing a literary narrative of the emergence of a nation. The "master narrative" of history is linked with nation building itself, as many nineteenth-century European historians combined style with imagination to memorialize history in a national story. The great stylists, who persuade and seduce through aesthetic language, of course remain "great" in our historical imagination. Yet increasingly since the 1960s, the entry of new groups into the ranks of professional historians and the analysis of historical narratives themselves[4] has led to a distrust of a more literary style in professionally written his-

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[2] Marita Sturken, "Memory, consumerism and media: Reflections on the emergence of the field," Memory Studies 1 (January 2008): 73-78, here 74.

[3] Jan Germen Janmaat, "Nation Building, Democratization and Globalization as Competing Priorities in Ukraine"s Education System," Nationalities Papers 36, no. 1 (March 2008): 1-23.

[4] Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in the Nineteenth-Century in Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

tory and the elaboration of specialized knowledge has all but overwhelmed the synthesizer[5].

In many parts of the world, as historical research became increasingly professionalized, with its own network of associations, institutes and rewards, education emerged as a separate professional specialty and history teachers were trained in education departments or pedagogical institutes, not within departments of history[6]. The twentieth-century spread of mass education brought not only the need for more teachers but also the coordination of their teaching through the mass production and distribution of textbooks. History textbooks were written to match age or grade-based curricula, their pedagogical goals intertwined with "appropriate interpretations." Whatever the political system, larger political bodies participated in shaping history textbooks throughout the twentieth century. The "history of history textbooks" has been debated at the highest political levels[7].

Research on the history of history textbooks has overturned the idea that historical narratives in other nations have been without controversy. For example, in the United States during the 1990s the US Congress became concerned about American students" declining test scores and deficient knowledge of American history but the attempt to develop national history standards ended in scandal[8]. The knowledge gap was blamed on the turmoil of the 1960s, when the presumed consensual narrative of US history was overturned[9]. However, new research on American history textbooks shows much earlier struggles over interpretations of the US Civil War and the challenges from textbooks written for private Catholic education. Pressure from newer immigrant groups, blacks, women, and other minorities for inclusion in US history texts also began long before the 1960s.[10] So, even in a rich nation with commercial textbook publishing, textbooks have a past and a presumed consensus may not necessarily stand for all and for all time.

Europe too has experienced its share of debates on the "history of history", including textbooks. As Stefan Berger has argued, national histories of Europe tended toward homogenization but paradoxically ended up "producing diversity

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[5] See a summary of text and the postmodern "turn" in Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacobs, Telling the Truth about History (New York: Norton, 1994), 231-237.

[6] A history of this development in the United States is offered in Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree and Ross E. Dunn, History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1997).

[7] See Nash, et al., History on Trial, chap. 6, for descriptions of debates in Britain, Germany and other countries.

[8] The national history standards (http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/nchs/standards/) are still available at the National Center for History in the Schools.

[9] Frances Fitzgerald, America Revised: History Schoolbooks in the Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1979).

[10] See Joseph Moreau, Schoolbook Nation: Conflicts over American History Textbooks from the Civil War to the Present (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003; Jonathan Zimmerman, Whose America? Culture Wars and the Public Schools (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).

and dissonance by inspiring their own counter-narratives, which were informed by different methodological and political perspectives."[11] In Europe too, traditional narratives were destabilized after World War II and from the 1960s the rise of different sorts of history, from social and cultural history to new emphasis on everyday life and contemporary history, meant that historians often did not speak a common language and questioned the omniscience and uniformity of master narratives. In contrast, the emergence of new European nations in the 1990s brought the task of writing a new story of the nation, and nation-building seemed to require a reinforcement of unifying symbols and master narratives that often no longer served the resulting multicultural populations. Along with the documented history of Moldovan history texts, there have been intense debates about and research on history books in Romania,[12] Ukraine,[13] and Russia,[14] for example.

Still, it might also be presumed that there is a progression in the teaching and writing of history that evolves along with the nation. Writing in the 1920s and 1930s R.G. Collingwood suggested that histories tended to first be written as nationalistic histories, then as histories of progress, and only later as "objective" history.[15] The idea that so-called "objective" history can wait for times of stability and achievement is still attractive. But, as has been documented for the American history profession, however, objectivity may be an illusive goal even for a powerful and stable nation.[16] It may be more fruitful, therefore, to think

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[11] Stefan Berger, "Writing National Histories in Europe: Reflectionson the Pasts, Presents, and Futures of a Tradition," in Konrad Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger, eds. *Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories,* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 54-68, here 56. Stefan Berger, Mark Donovan, and Kevin Passmore, <u>Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800</u> (London: Routledge, 1999). Stefan Berger, editor, <u>Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective</u> (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

[12] For Romania, see Dan Pavel, "The Textbooks Scandal and Rewriting History in Romania – Letter from Bucharest," <u>East European Politics and Societies</u> 14, no. 2 (2000): 179-189, Mirela Murgescu, "Memory in Romanian History: Textbooks in the 1990s," in Maria Todorova, ed. <u>Balkan Identities. Nation and Memory</u> (London: Hurst, 2004) and Lucian Boia, <u>History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness</u> (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001).

[13] Several studies published in English have already analyzed the first generation of Ukrainian history textbooks and student response. They include Nancy Popson, "The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the "Ukrainian Nation"," <u>Nationalities Papers</u> 29, no. 2 (2001): 325-350; Jan G. Janmaat, "Identity Construction and Education: The History of Ukraine in Soviet and Post-Soviet Schoolbooks," in Taras Kuzio and Paul D"Anieri, eds., <u>Dilemmas of State-Led National Building in Ukraine</u> (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2001); Cathy Wanner, "Educational Practices and the Making of National Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine, " <u>Anthropology of East Europe Review</u> 13, no. 2 (Autumn 1995); and Stepanenko, <u>The Construction of Identity and School Policy in Ukraine</u> (Commack, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 1999).

[14] See also W.B. Husband, "Secondary School History Texts in the USSR: Revising the Soviet Past, 1985-1989," <u>Russian Review</u> 50, no 4 (October 1991): 458-470. See also Joseph Vajda, "The Politics of the Re-Writing of History in Russia: School Textbooks and Curriculum Material," <u>Education & Society</u> 18, no. 3 (2000): 99-124.

[15] Collingwood, <u>The Idea of History</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

[16] Peter Novick, <u>That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical</u>

about whatever can be called a "national history" not from the view of consensus but as a living text, part of its time and sensitive to the age and readiness of its students and the world in which they live.

Taking this type of approach does not eliminate the need for a core narrative in history textbooks. Far from it. The American attempt in the early 1990s to construct national standards foundered, among other things, on the abundance of historical "examples" or "problems" that seemed to overwhelm the stated pedagogical aims and bury a narrative core.[17] The "story" of history appears to be essential in teaching, even as professional historians have deconstructed that same story. What has been the role of professional historians in this new environment?

A textbook story of the nation requires the self-consciousness of the professional historian to be combined with the story-telling gifts that enable young children or teenagers to find coherence, if not always easy answers. Professional historians have provided precise and professional language in which to express their research findings and have contributed phrases and careful wording to the narrative that aid the interpretation of major events and troubling moments so that the narrative neither descends into "victimology" nor so skims over difficult historical problems that the pursuit of historical truth is fatally compromised.[18] The "new history" is increasingly incorporated into textbook narratives by enhancing political history with developments in society, economy, culture, science and technology. Professional historians provide "an interpretative thesis," an idea that can carry the chapters but does not necessarily determine the written outcome of all events. This interpretative thesis is often communicated by the title. Choosing a theme that goes beyond the political allows for positive portrayals of individuals even in times of hardship or controversy.

Historians have expanded the peopling of history, attributing importance and achievements to a greater range of participants. Looking beyond the "political correctness" debate as it has been characterized in both positive and negative terms, most all nations have more than one cultural group, language, religion, or ethnicity, and decisions regarding their representation are critical to portraying an inclusive nation and communicating with students.

Thomas Carlyle"s invocation of heroes is not abandoned; rather heroes in today"s celebrity-sodden media environment have more flesh and blood and survive more detail. In American history, for example, revised scholarly views of Thomas Jefferson and his relationship to slavery (portrayed in a Hollywood film) have come to public attention, but his contributions to the founding of the nation have remained strong. In the late 1990s eleven American historians were asked to discuss what should be portrayed in American history textbooks. The foremost historian of American immigration argued persuasively that celebration was as important as analysis in encouraging students" engagement with history.[19] Humanizing heroes does not have to undermine the nation as a pro-

Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[17] Nash, Crabtree and Dunn, History on Trial, 101-102.

[18] Jeremy Black, "Contesting the Past," History 93, issue 310 (April 2008): 224–254.

[19] John Higham, "Teaching American History," American Scholar 67, no. 1 (Winter 1998),

tagonist in its own history.

In sum, in spite of all the manifestations of the "new history" in deconstructing the past and its representation, a narrative – admittedly one that is more inclusive and more socially oriented - seems to remain central as both a core to which explanations are attached and as a template for media storytelling. Over the last fifty years, this story has become increasingly interactive and visual.

Textbooks as Interactive and Visual Media

The conventional boundaries of a textbook have always extended beyond what is between the two covers. Textbooks are "interactive media," even if the interaction is first between reader and book. Classroom teachers extend and help interpret the meaning of a textbook through classroom discussion, whether amplifying or circumscribing. Examinations -the questions asked and the reward or criticism for student"s answers - also extended a textbook"s meaning and reinforced historical interpretations. Extracurricular student participation in historical reconstruction of events has often occurred through field trips to battlefields and museums, or school pageants and parades. So thinking of the historical textbook in interactive terms is not new. Discussion outside the classroom, media representations, and current events that refer to the past also build upon or challenge conventional narratives. Thus, a historical narrative in a textbook may be a prerequisite, but it rarely if ever stands alone in the learning of history.

Faced with students who increasingly resist memorizing "names and dates" as history, new modes of pedagogy have tried to operationalize Carl L. Becker"s idea that "each person is his/her own historian,"[20] by supplementing the history textbook with the "stuff" of history – problems and sources. By treating explicitly the problems that historians face and offering the student examples of how new interpretations emerge, teachers can bring their own creativity to pass along the ongoing developments in professional historiography. An objection might be raised that students are not yet ready for the complexity that engages the professional historian. Of course, teaching must be age-based and appropriate for the students" capacities. However, students should not be underestimated either. The older style of teaching history, often laced with ideology or "factology," did not satisfy students in earlier days and students are no longer limited in their sources of information. Thus, a national history may be written in the expectation of domestic needs and desires but is interpreted by students who are well aware of the global context.

One form of elaborating textbook narratives to enhance interactivity is the inexpensive supplement. A teacher"s manual has been one of the most common forms, which supplies classroom exercises, exam questions, and study guides; new forms include prototype versions of the charts and maps that can be copied or turned into overheads to aid in-class lectures and discussions. Other inexpensive booklets on particular historical problems, events or persons, contain

96-97. The entire forum is worth reading for the range of views presented.

20 Carl Becker, "Everyman his Own Historian," Presidential Address to the American Historical Association, 1931.

documents or multiple sources that offer a challenge for more mature students or material for student reports.

The inclusion of primary sources, whether as supplement or quoted excerpts in the narrative, provide "materials" of history as part of the interactive environment so that students might experience the making and telling of history as an ongoing and vital process. Sources are expanded to include not only political documents or elite pronouncements but also excerpts from diaries, memoirs, newspapers, and songbooks that represent history "from below." The idea of "voicing history," that is, giving voice to ordinary people, has meant that eye witness accounts and travelers" reports, and even folklore and transcripts of oral histories[21] have made their way into the source base. The goal is to represent the actual words that a range of people might use from all walks of life, which can bring dignity to the range of occupations and life styles. "Voices" preserved in periodicals and journals from earlier times are also important to present intact, so that students are able to "hear" by reading or reading out loud how the language has evolved and they can learn to interpret the vocabularies and styles of earlier ages.

The verbal has also been enhanced by the visual. Historical narratives today, whether in texts or in media form, rely on the visual not just as "illustration" but as a repository of history.[22] The traditional history textbook now relies on visual materials like paintings and photographs, representations of the physical environment from architecture to monuments, and maps of a multitude of geographies, "real" and "imagined," are part of the historical narrative.[23] A portrait no longer presents only a physical likeness of a person but also signals power and class, time and place. The circumstances of its painting, including the selection of the subject, and of its disposition - who ordered it, where it hung, how it was discussed - all have come to be attributed as part of the making of meaning. Even photographs, once considered mechanical records of reality, have become foci of debate in areas such as representing ethnicity, representing "the people," and representing gender, among other issues.[24] Pictures of the "famous" - the portraits, statues and photographs of leaders in particular – have received a great deal of attention. In fact, leaders have often been among the best at perpet-

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[21] See, for example, the oral histories of Moldovan women in the project coordinated by Irina Nechit, Femeia în labirintul istoriei: istoria verbală (Știința: Soros Foundation Moldova, 2003). For workers" history, see for example in English, Lewis H. Siegelbaum and Daniel J. Walkowitz, Workers of the Donbass Speak: Survival and Identity in the New Ukraine, 1989-1992 (State University of New York Press, 1995).

[22] In fact, the museum as a source of debate about the past has been called a not a source of discourse but "place of gaze." Cited in Gabriela Cristea and Simina Radu-Bucurenci, „Raising the Cross: Exorcising Romania"s Communist Past in Museums, Memorials and Monuments," in Peter Apor and Oksana Sarkisova, eds. Past for the Eyes: East European Representations of Communism in Cinema and Museums after 1989 (Budapest: CEU Press, 2008), p. 277.

[23] Peter Burke, Eyewitnessing: The Use of Images as Historical Evidence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

[24] See, for example, Louis P. Masur, ""Pictures have now become a necessity"" The Use of Images in American History Textbooks," Journal of American History 84, no. 4 (March 1998): 1409-1424.

uating their own images[25] and so attending to their representations can provide another window into politics.[26] Also, educators have found that simply "representing" leaders seemingly excludes others from their own history and also does not take advantage of the heightened visual environment of today"s students. Thus, a compelling historical narrative can include extended picture captions and sometimes extended textual discussion to bring historical images to life.

Textbooks increasingly depend upon format design and graphics as ways of elaborating the text without losing the central narrative. Making themes visible on the printed page can consist of a graphic device like a timeline, the use of symbols (as in computer programs), and color or font choice for major themes, making sure that the core narrative is always clearly marked by design. Once the core narrative is literally visible and unmistakable, other graphic design elements can enhance the interest of the page. Insets, common in newspaper and magazine articles, can supply "contrasting views" or provide a vivid description of an event or biography. Charts, maps, timelines and other graphic devices elaborate the textual narrative. Lists of data and dates are now designed not only for memorization but also for analysis, as a way to present masses of data in a comparative context.[27] Obviously the digital world has affected book design and overall, given globalized graphic styles available from computer gaming to advertising, textbook design has to be adapted not only so that no page is "boring," but also to reinforce and elaborate the prose narrative in a way expected in the new media environment.

In sum, while historians are rightfully concerned with prose, today"s textbooks benefit from multiple sources, imaginative design, and innovative visual material to enhance and complicate while retaining the value of the narrative.

Film, Television and Media History

However much attention and elaboration is given to a textbook through innovative design and creative teaching, historical films at the theater or on television may be among the first historical "explanations" that may be encountered by students. Historians may argue about whether or not films compete with, overwhelm or support more traditional forms of history, but these "old media" have been public storytellers for whole of the twentieth century and even in the new media environment are a staple of media content, whether viewed in the

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[25] Leo Braudy, The Frenzy of Renown: Fame and its History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

[26] Alice Mocanescu has looked at paintings of Ceausescu as evidence of the leader cult in Romania. See also her chapter, "Surviving 1956: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and "The Cult of Personality" in Romania," in Balazs Apor, et al. The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2004).

[27] One interesting development in Chinese history education is the use of two different font sizes to cope with demands for memorization. Passages in large-type fonts are planned for learning and small-type fonts are optional, to channel student"s energy "from the heavy task of memorization to analysis, deliberation, and the improvement of their intellectual faculties." Wang Hongzhi, "The Reform of History Textbooks and Future Trends," Chinese Education and Society 32, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 1999): 62-67.

theater, on television or on DVD. Historians may complain that the cinematic form of historical "explanation" is too simplistic, too biographical, or too biased. But films have also been recognized by those in power as presenting the type of historical narrative – celebratory, patriotic, dramatic, and moral – that those interested in projecting the nation find the most congenial and persuasive. This power of historical film is well-known from the Soviet era, such as Stalin"s personal support of biographical films on cultural heroes and the required school viewing of Sergiu Nicolaescu"s 1970 megaproduction of Mihai Viteazulto in Romania.[28] Since 1991 the globalization of the cinematic offerings in post-Soviet states has increased the availability of a range of historical narratives that have been produced outside the nation and which provide elaborate and cohesive stories that may easily be compared with textbook versions of history.

The historical films that have the greatest public resonance are narrative historical films. These films may have a greater or lesser fidelity to an historical event, and often insert fictional characters into the narrative to dramatize the impact of historical events on individuals. Still, as one historian remarked, even if filmmakers "always prefers a good story to an accurate historical narrative, movies none the less often send a good proportion of their audiences back to the history books."[29] It is this quality of generating interest in history that has potential for teaching.

Narrative films also provide compelling images that may shape both individual memories of events and "collective" memories reinforced by shared viewing of these media narratives. As one thoughtful film historian commented,

> "Cinematic images have created a technological bank that is shared by many and offers little escape. It increasingly shapes and legitimizes our perception of the past. Memory in the age of electronic reproducibility and dissemination has become public; memory has become socialized by technology. History itself, so it seems has been democratized by these easily accessible images, but the power over what is shared as popular memory has passed into the hands of those who produce these images."[30]

Recognizing the power and influence of film, increasingly professional his-

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[28] On Soviet biopics see Marsha Siefert, "Russische Leben, Sowjetische Filme: Die Filmbiographie, Tchaikovsky und der Kalte Krieg," in Lars Karl, ed. Leinwand zwischen Tauwetter und Frost Der osteuropäische Spiel- und Dokumentarfilm im Kalten Krieg (Berlin: Metropol, 2007), 133-170; on the use of the film Michael the Brave see Dragos Petrescu, "Communist Legacies in the "New Europe": History, Ethnicity, and the Creation of a "Socialist" Nation in Romania, 1945-1989," in Konrad Jarausch and Thomas Lindenberger, eds. Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing Contemporary Histories (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 47-48.

[29] Richard J. Evans makes this remark in his introduction to a provocative journal issue entitled "Redesigning the Past: History in Political Transitions," Journal of Contemporary History 38, no. 1 (2003): 10.

[30] Anton Kaes, History and Film: Public Memory in the Age of Electronic Dissemination, History and Memory 2, no. 1 (1990): 112, cited in Tamar Ashuri, "Television Tension: National versus Cosmopolitan Memory in a Co-Produced Television Documentary," Media Culture & Society 29 (Jan 2007): 31.

torians are advising on films, doing research and writing on films, and using stories behind films to explain the historical stakes and contexts.[31] The power of these images and of an event-centered history can be operationalized by professional historians and teachers in many ways. Making historians" comments on films available to teachers and students in some form can bring in an appreciation of what the historian has to offer. For example, the Newsletter of the American Historical Association has begun to feature a column in which senior historians offer their interpretation of a film and its representation of an event or problem, such as Richard Stites writing on "The Pawnbroker" or James Sheehan writing on "Grand Illusion." Such commentary on films, distributed in an accessible fashion, could provide a model for distributing both films and serious writing to be used in the classroom.[32]

Television presents another opportunity for teaching that might be of particular importance in Moldova. According to a November 2007 public opinion poll, television remains the major source of information for almost 87 percent of respondents and the most reliable for almost 53 percent, coming second as the institution that enjoys the most trust of the population (59 percent).[33] In many countries the public radio and television organizations have joined with educators to broadcast particular films or documentaries for which lesson plans have been distributed ahead of time. While in the United States the partnership between historians, media and educators has a long history, especially with regard to major television events structured around the US Civil War or World War II, there have been other types of curriculum development around commercial or documentary films, including roundtables or interviews with historians following the showing of the film. It might be possible to work with the Teleradio public broadcasting authority or even use the potential of community broadcasting, which I understand is made available by the 2006 Audiovisual Code for the Republic of Moldova,[34] in which educators and media professionals might work toward scheduling or even creating programming with educational possibilities.

What of television and the professional historian? Documentaries shown on television, from channels like Discovery or National Geographic, usually integrate the voice of the expert into the "true" stories being told. Certainly many

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[31] Robert Rosenstone, Visions of the Past: The Challenge of Film to Our Idea of History (1995) and History on Film/Film on History (New York: Longman 2006); Marcia Landy, ed. The Historical Film: History and Memory in Media (Rutgers University Press 2000). Vivian Sobchack, ed., The Persistence of History: Cinema, Television, and the Modern Event (New York: Routledge, 1996).

[32] One website in English that catalogued Moldovan films, including historical films, showed a range of possibilities. http://www.iatp.md/FilmMoldova/the%20history%20 of%20the%20moldovan%20film%20%20.htm

[33] "Barometer of Public Opinion - November 2007". http://www.ipp.md/files/ Barometru/2007/Press_release_BOP_nov_2007_English.doc

[34] Moldova Audiovisual code of 2006 viewed at http://www.soros.md/programs/mass_ media/mass_media_subprog_4/en.html. Also recommended is Tamara Caraus, "Moldova," in Media Ownership and its Impact on Media Independence and Pluralism, 321- 346; online version at http://www2.mirovni-institut.si/media_ownership/pdf/moldova.pdf

historical documentaries are included on these channels and many fine historians have appeared on or been involved in creating documentaries. There is also a renowned history of historians hosting such documentaries, especially in Britain, as inaugurated by A. J. P. Taylor"s unscripted lectures in the 1960s. He has been described as "literate, leisured, and learned," and known for his "democratization of seriousness," a tradition carried on by Simon Schama and Niall Ferguson in their recent television histories of Britain and the Empire for the BBC. In these cases the "presenters," as the historians who narrate and appear on screen are called, have to have sufficient self-confidence and an appeal to "big ideas" in order to play to TV values and mass knowledge as compared to the particular knowledge of scholarship. Not unlike the case with textbooks, the narrative is foregrounded and the "episodes" of history are incorporated into the scale and sweep of people and events. In the new broadcast histories, ordinary voices are always heard and ideas are "worn lightly."[35] While these British examples may not be immediately practicable for Moldova, they are instructive in pointing out the attributes of historical story-telling that work on television.

As suggested by these comments on British television histories, television as a history story-teller is not an easy fit with professional historians. However, it may be possible to use television series with a historical setting to initiate discussions of historical events. Certainly that happened with Germany"s importation of the US melodrama, "Holocaust," in the 1970s[36] or the US melodrama, "Roots," which inaugurated a discussion of slavery during that same decade. While many television series and special events are often guilty of a "historical presentism," that is, introducing current political concerns into the portrayal of the past, this problem also is not absent from other uses of the past in political discourse. Therefore, the value of television for history teaching in a media world may come in smaller forms – taking advantage of scheduled showings of movies to provide a live professional commentary, or a coordinating a television event with distributed lesson plans or historical texts to read as classroom preparation.[37] One way this is increasingly happening is in the digital world.

Digital History

What is now called "digital history" began as many small projects, long before the internet became such a part of the 21st century. One of the first modes was the history CD-ROM, in which the historical narrative was elaborated with

[35] Comments by Janice Hadlow, "The History Boys," Lecture at Oxford University, 30 Jan 2007.

[36] Siegfried Zielinski and Gloria Custance, "History as Entertainment and Provocation: The TV Series "Holocaust" in West Germany, "New German Critique", 19, no. 1 (Winter, 1980): 81-96.

[37] In the US the "History Channel" (http://www.thehistorychannel.com/) has formed a partnership with National History Day (http://www.nationalhistoryday.org/) and also sponsors innovative teaching projects. See also Gary R. Edgerton and Peter C. Rollins, eds., Television Histories: Shaping Collective Memory in the Media Age (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2001).

linked images, maps, timelines, and other visual aids. The attraction of CD-ROM technology is that once produced, it can be easily duplicated and used without internet access on a standalone computer or on projector that also showed DVDs, and therefore be shared throughout a school. For example, the CD-ROM on Polish history, Multimedialna Historia Polski na tle Europy 950-1991…, uses a rosette church window as its icon, with imaginative graphics, photos of historic sites, a searchable index and a multitude of maps linked to relevant texts. The timeline across the bottom of the map screens offers a visual slide show of territorial change and the sidebars feature key subject areas. Notably, the maps and subjects include, as the title suggests, all of Europe as an appropriate interpretative context. The commentary is individual essays written by 40 prominent Polish historians.[38] This CD-ROM combines the technological advantages with integrated history, changing borders, and professional commentary.

Another type is represented by what its originator, a professor, calls a multimedia documentary history, which builds on a master narrative, rather than just a timeline, to represent "an authorial voice and a substantive intellectual argument." He believes that a recognizable narrator is important, but additionally provides linked evidence to test that authorial position. Whether the participants accept, contest, reinterpret or challenge the authorial position, "their imagining of the arguments and their responses to them can now carry a dimension of authenticity - both from written texts if this is required and desired, but also from direct access to the contextualised accounts by people who have been and are part of the making of [the multicultural nation.]"[39] While this particular CD-ROM is about Australia, and required funding, a large conceptual commitment, and a range of expertise, nonetheless such a model can suggest ways in which narrative can be incorporated into multimedia history and might motivate advanced graduate students in pedagogical institutes and history programs to use their ingenuity to propose such projects – and create them as part of their educational requirements.

By far the fastest growing area of digital history is the website. Websites are not necessarily organized around a narrative and are usually designed for individuals to follow their own paths through links and searches. Online archival possibilities for history-related content were recognized early by governmental institutions. For example, the US government sponsors sites for key historical documents[40] and the

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[38] "Multimedialna Historia Polski na tle Europy 950-1991…" (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne I Pedagogiczne, 2002) (www.wsip.com.pl). Two CD-ROMs, not previewed by the author, also exist for Ukrainian history. "The History of Ukraine" (Atlantic publishers) includes a chronology, historical documents, and biographical information and "The History of Ukraine: The Era of Bohdan Khmelnytsky" (no publisher listed) represents a multimedia history of the war of 1648-1658, including battle maps and adapted texts from documents. Both are in Ukrainian and can be found at www.UMKA.com.ua.

[39] Andrew Jakubowicz, "New Media and the National Imaginary: The Making of "Making Multicultural Australia – a Multimedia documentary," Framework: The Journal of Cinema and Media, http://www.frameworkonline.com/42aj.htm, accessed February 2008.

[40] See http://www.ourdocuments.gov/

National Archives[41], which includes discussions of how to teach with documents. The European Navigator[42] presently includes over 15,000 items on post-1945 European history. The photos, audio and video clips, press articles and cartoons, are posted with explanatory synopses, tables and interactive maps and diagrams "selected, created, processed and validated by a multidisciplinary team of specialists in European integration." It too is designed for students and teachers and emphasizes "documentary materials." Individual historians or departments have also designed "digital libraries" of documents; Moldova is included in travel accounts from the 19th and 20th centuries and World War I document collections[43] and in an Internet Modern History Sourcebook[44]. Teachers and students are the intended audience for many of these sites, some of which have specific suggestions for how teachers might use documentary collections.[45] Of course the web design and language of the documents represent a set of choices that may need to be negotiated across different political interests, but increasingly multilingual versions are posted for domestic and also for international audiences. Such websites could be a way of augmenting a history textbook narrative. They also represent a type of "interactivity" that could be extended to online study guides, sample tests and quizzes, and other features that use existing videogame technology and formats to enhance student participation.

It is no accident that so many important websites that offer gateways into national and international histories include the word "memory." The digital world has become a major site of history and memory. In the United States, the Library of Congress site is called "American Memory"[46] and offers more than 7 million digital items from more than 100 historical collections on the subject of American history and includes a learning page for self-study. Memorial, the Russian organization so influential in perestroika, has a bi-lingual web presence[47] and the new history of Russian private life under Stalin, The Whisperers, is supported by a digital archive. Memoria.ro[48], "a digital library of interviews, memoirs, oral history studies, books and images of Romania's recent history," uses the vocabulary of interactivity, "an open book" and wants "to offer those wishing to share their experience and publish their memories or their research a place with an audience larger than that of any traditional library." While not created by historians, "Memoria.ro cannot succeed in becoming a reference site without attracting professional historians, whom we invite to share the results of their research with the public, to contribute to the site by publishing stud-

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[41] See http://www.archives.gov/digital_classroom/index.html

[42] See http://www.ena.lu/

[43] See http://eudocs.lib.byu.edu/index.php/History_of_Romania:_Primary_Documents

[44] See http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/modsbook25.html

[45] The Center for History and New Media (http://chnm.gmu.edu/index1.html) has free software for displaying museum and other historical materials, and in World History Matters has essays about evidence and analyzing sources.

[46] See http://memory.loc.gov/

[47] See http://www.memo.ru/eng/

[48] See http://www.memoria.ro/?location=en

ies and opinions, to interact with our readers by answering their questions." This site remains online, but seems to have stopped growing some years ago, a casualty of website dependence upon passion and funds. In Moldova, the IATP (Internet Access and Training Program) sponsored by USAID and IREX, has provided some workshops for teachers and has hosted several sites. The Soros Foundation-Moldova, through their e-Moldova program, has also sponsored many projects for extending access to information, with an emphasis on rural areas and public libraries.

Several reasons might be given for why digital history is not yet feasible for Moldova. Although certainly internet access is low outside urban areas, the International Telecommunication Union reports that as of August 2007 almost 20 percent of the population of Moldova has access to internet.[49] Even more important, in a public opinion poll about the most important sources of information, over 20 percent of those respondents between 18 and 29 listed the internet.[50] One can only expect these numbers to increase.

Even where current computer availability is low, however, it is important to plan for computer use to broaden the base for student use and adoption as computer penetration increases. The contemporary funding environment is receptive to financing the purchase of computer hardware for educational purposes and certainly the best students will want to enter into the technological environment. Computer skills are among the most desirable in as a factor of globalization and the larger marketplace for employment and information.

Some might worry that computer access might undermine national identity for Moldovans, especially the young. However, recent research suggests that Russians in Moldova do not use the internet to link to "external homelands"[51] but, paradoxically, actively distinguish themselves from the larger Russian community in Russia and in effect act as agents of globalization within their own community.[52]

Obviously these developments require finances, resources, and expertise. But they are suggestive of how cooperative efforts among museums, libraries, archives, teachers" organizations, television channels and government might be gradually envisioned and mobilized. Taking advantage of already existing resources provides multiple beneficial options as well as supporting and amplifying history textbooks by putting national resources on virtual display. Such projects would also make Moldovan history and culture available to others, both inside and outside the country.

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[49] 727,700 Internet users as of Aug./07, 19.5% of the population, according to the International Telecommunication Union http://www.internetworldstats.com/euro/md.htm

[50] Barometer of Public Opinion (November 2007), p. 30 (in Romanian).

[51] This concept is developed by Rogers Brubaker in Nationalism Reframed: Nationalism and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999).

[52] Robert A. Saunders, "Denationalized Digerati in the Virtual Near Abroad: The Internet"s Paradoxical Impact on National Identity among Minority Russians," Global Media and Communication 2, no. 1: 43-69.

Practicalities and Implications

What I have presented thus far is an optimistic scenario, based on existing models and the best of what has been done in coordinating the potential of media for history teaching and learning. Such possibilities need to be embraced in order to look to the future. However, it is important to also stress cautions and guidelines in pursuing new projects. First, all such options and potentials do not diminish the relevance of well-written, synthetic and coherent historical narratives to be available for different levels of knowledge and preparation. History textbooks and historical narratives for a broader public do matter. But thinking of them interactively, as part of a network of institutions and media materials, may help to see them as a beginning and not an endpoint of writing history.

Teachers need to be carefully and respectfully considered as the persons who engage the interactivity of the history text. In research from 2003 based on interviews with over 20 secondary school history teachers in Moldova, it seemed clear that due to low pay and few opportunities for advanced training, teachers have few incentives and little if any support for integrating new techniques.[53] Any effort to create new educational projects with a range of partners including media institutions, universities, cultural institutions, and NGOs should include teachers as part of their creation and build in the possibility for informational seminars that travel to the teachers, so that the fruits of their inclusion can be passed on to students.

Much of this material suggests a style of teaching that is designed for independent study and learning. This approach implies that the writing of textbooks must involve input from teachers and may require some new modes of teacher training, at both pedagogical institutes and summer courses. In turn teachers have the experience to assess today"s students, not to project how students ought to respond or behave. Research has found that teachers can be highly active in subtly changing the accent or focus to a more tolerant stance.[54] The relation of teaching to learning is one that continues to evolve, as does the world in which the teaching and learning take place.

Professional historians have a large role to play in this new media environment. Whether it is writing a more traditional narrative, advising on a film or television project, incorporating media into their own teaching, reviewing books and films for public media, advising on museum and other commemorative projects, talking to the press on historical issues, or encouraging the next generation of historians to engage in new media projects – in all cases the need for understanding the role of coherence, evidence, complexity and erudition in the construction of narrative explanation remains. Even "the spatial disposition of the modern art gallery presents the visitor with nothing less than an iconographic program and

[53] Elizabeth A. Anderson, "Backward, Forward, or Both? Moldovan Teachers Relationship to the State and the Nation." Journal of European Education 37, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 53-67.

[54] Peter W. Rodgers, ""Compliance or contradiction"? Teaching "History" in the "New" Ukraine. A View from Ukraine"s Eastern Borderlands," Europe-Asia Studies 59, no. 3 (May 2007): 503-519.

a master historical narrative."[55] Recognizing the many ways in which historical narratives are incorporated into media forms will help make those media forms amenable to be used for teaching and critical thinking.

Professional historians might also enlist their university students in various media history projects. The construction of websites is certainly a pragmatic goal and one that would appeal to students or groups of students as a collective project. The survey, analysis and review of existing media, from films and television series to existing websites would also provide worthwhile material for both the creation of new projects and the integration into the training of teachers to feel comfortable in using these materials. A serious review of the relations between media and history would provide a useful topic for graduate research. Such activities do not necessarily require large investments of funds, although they are often attractive for external funding. Rather they require the enthusiasm and skills of the coming generation and a respect for the products.

Yes, of course, in contrast to the attractive image of the historian as the solitary creator of the historical narrative, mass producing that narrative whether as a book, a film, or a CD-ROM requires funds. The source of those funds, whether the state, an NGO, or a private publisher, always brings with it questions about motives and agendas. In places where the distrust of government sponsorship runs high,[56] it might be assumed that the market conditions under which several history textbooks are published in wealthy nations are free of institutional influence. However, to take the example of the United States, populous states like Texas, New York and California, have state commissions that select which textbooks can be adopted; therefore, to be marketable a national history must meet the perceived needs of those states and may compete more on "design values" than on significant differences in the historical narrative.[57] Commercial interests, especially as history books and educational software are integrated into larger media conglomerates, have a stake in merchandizing knowledge for profit. Thus creative assemblage of multiple founders, transnational partnerships, and local expertise can help ensure that multiple uses and agendas may be accommodated.

Professional historical scholarship, especially the new types of historical investigation that deconstruct historical representations, does not always translate seamlessly into public discourse. Often state or institutional attempts to create moments for collective remembering backfire. For example, in the United States the text for the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum"s planned exhibit marking the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, which featured the hull of the plane that dropped the bomb on Hiroshima, sparked a highly publicized

[55] Paul Connerton, "Seven Types of Forgetting," Memory Studies 1, no. 1 (January 2008): 60.

[56] Elizabeth A. Anderson, ""They are the priests": the role of the Moldovan historian and its implications for civic education," Compare: A Journal of Comparative Education 37, no. 3 (June 2007): 277-290.

[57] Gilbert T. Sewall and Stapley W. Emberling, "A New Generation of History Textbooks," Society (Nov/Dec 1998), 78-83. Twenty out of the 50 states "adopt" textbooks. Mark Slater, "A Page Out of the History-Text Debate," Christian Science Monitor (1 December 1997): 11.

controversy among historians, veterans groups, and anti-nuclear war activists.[58] Neither is professional historical scholarship, whether done locally or from outside the country, always welcomed into the public sphere. The long history of the emergence of any type of public discussion of the holocaust is one obvious example.[59] The 2007 debate over the memorialization of the 1878 Batak massacre in Bulgaria is another.[60] In such cases, especially in new nations or nations overcoming what is considered a problematic recent past, it is often the case that some events or symbols are more amenable to deconstruction than others, usually the "recent past" – hence the range of books and websites on the gulag.[61] Words like "myth" and "invention," now a staple of professional historiography, do not translate literally into popular speech. Thus professional historians exercise care in entering the popular arena directly.

Media institutions have their own agenda. Journalists look for a story, and sometimes that story is the past and its deconstruction, not its celebration.[62] It is not always easy for professional historians to be cited or heard in interviews, as quotes and soundbites often eliminate the very context the historian is trying to establish. Therefore, some understanding of how the media works is important. This is true for students, teachers, and professional historians alike. This "ability to access, analyze and evaluate the power of images, sounds and messages which we are now being confronted with on a daily basis and are an important part of our contemporary culture, as well as to communicate competently in media available on a personal basis" has been called "media literacy."[63] Teaching about the backstage workings of media in the construction of history (and all else) would be important for future generations of students so that media histories can be evaluated as sources as well as actors in history. Evaluating websites is certainly part of that task.

The power that derives from telling the national story is so important that it

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[58] Edward Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, eds. History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past (New York: Metropolitan, 1996).

[59] An ongoing discussion was sparked by the publication of Jan Gross"s book Neighbors in 2001. See, e.g., Dariusz Stola, "Jedwabne: Revisiting the Evidence and Nature of the Crime," Holocaust and Genocide Studies 17, no.1 (2003): 139-152 and Gabriel N. Finder, "Contested Memories: Poles and Jews during the Holocaust and Its Aftermath," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 2005 73, no. 1: 284-287.

[60] See, for example, BIRN – Balkan Investigative Reporting Network 24 April 2007 (http://www.birn.eu.com/en/79/15/2680/). It is significant that the uproar over the "demythologizing" of the "representations" 1876 Batak massacre, a key symbolic event in Bulgarian national history, took place through posted videos at YouTube and in television backlash.

[61] Holocaust sites include the one that evolved from Steven Spielberg"s oral history project related to his film; among other gulag sites is the "Gulag: Many Days, Many Lives" (http://gulaghistory.org/).

[62] Barbie Zelizer, "History and Journalism," in Taking Journalism Seriously: News and the Academy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004).

[63] European Commission definition at http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/media_literacy/index_en.htm. See also the Center for Media Literacy http://www.medialit.org for educational materials.

is unavoidable that social institutions and groups will fight over access. Mass-produced stories also call for resources, financial and otherwise. Therefore, it is important not only to spread the institutional responsibility for historical story-telling across the society but also to give students and the public the tools to be able to see how the story is constructed, not simply condemn the story-teller. Incorporating the existing media world into the teaching of history and providing tools for its deconstruction and reconstruction is increasingly important to finding providing an entry into the global community. The virtual world can allow opportunities to express contradictions and multiplicity of views, the attractions of primary sources, and the delight in historical narrative to attract and nurture the future generations.

Recenzent: dr. Tomasz Pawelec
01.12.2007

COLLECTED MEMORIES, COLLECTIVE AMNESIA, AND POST-COMMUNISM1

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I.   Introduction

We begin with three anecdotes.

A.   Lewis Coser writes: "I came to this country [the USA] as an immigrant shortly before Pearl Harbor .... I felt for a long time that there was something in my relations with native Americans that blocked full communication, and that there was a kind of impassible barrier between us. It was only after I remembered Halbwachs's work on memory, which I had read at the Sorbonne, that I was able to put a finger on the reason for this mild estrangement between us. I then realized that they and I did not share enough collective memories .... I was excluded from their collective memory and they from mine."[2]

B.   James V. Wertsch relates: "While on a trip to Moscow in 1997, I spent a day at a high school known for its strong students and excellent instruction. In addition to observing several classes, I had the opportunity to engage some eleventh grade students in a discussion about World War II, and in this context I asked about the role that the United States had played in this conflict. In response, 'Sasha', a sixteen-old boy, turned to me and said something like the following: 'The United States made a lot of money from selling arms and other things to countries during the early years of the war, but did not really contribute as an ally. In fact, along with Great Britain it refused to open a second front in 1942 and again in 1943. It was only after the U. S. A. and Britain began to think that the Soviet Union might win the war by itself and dominate post-war Europe that they became concerned enough to enter the war in earnest by opening a second front in 1944.' ... He made his presentation in a straightforward, confident manner, displaying little doubt or

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[2] Lewis A. Coser, "Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs, 1877-1945," in: Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, edited and translated by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 21. One might speculate on the impact on American academia and the eventual effect on American "collective memory" of the huge influx of European émigrés after 1933. See Laura Fermi, *Illustrious Immigrants: The Intellectual Migration from Europe, 1930-41*, second edition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1971).

hesitation. It was almost as if he was providing an eye-witness account of what had happened .... I wondered: Where did Sasha and other members of his generation get this account of the past? After all, neither he nor anyone else in his generation actually witnessed the events - indeed, they were not even born until nearly four decades after World War II was over. The obvious answer was that they had learned about World War II at school, at home, from the media, and so forth."[3]

C. Oliver Sacks includes in his book of neurological studies a parable of memory deficit. Sachs begins with a reminder from Luis Buñuel that "memory is what makes our lives. Life without memory is no life at all .... Our memory is our coherence, our reason, our feeling, even our action. Without it, we are nothing ..." Sacks asks us to consider what kind of "person" we get when one loses part of memory "and, with this, his past, and his moorings in time?"[4]

This person is Sacks' patient, "Jimmie G.", a man with "an extreme and extraordinary loss of recent memory - so that whatever was said or shown to him was apt to be forgotten in a few seconds' time."[5] Interestingly, Jimmie's memory stopped in 1945, some thirty years before his contact with Sacks. "He is, as it were, ... isolated in a single moment of being ... he is a man without a past (or future), stuck in a constantly changing, meaningless moment .... Only connect - but how could he connect?"

Sacks discovered that Jimmie's problem owed to alcoholism's effect on his brain tissue and had erupted as retrograde amnesia when he retired from the Navy in 1965, losing a highly structured and regulated lifestyle. As a result of this memory deficit, Jimmie was often "fatigued, and somewhat irritable and anxious, under the continuing pressure of anomaly and contradiction."

What did Lewis Coser, Sasha, and Jimmie G. have in common? They furnish three different but significant examples of the importance of memory. Coser's realization that his fund of memories differed from those of his new American colleagues and neighbors is a relatively benign, but important, instance of the presence of collected memories in all societies. Sasha's version of World War II is a case - possibly dangerous, possibly not - of generational "memory" obviously learned from school and the media. Jimmie G., on the other hand, is a metaphor for memory deficit, a form of amnesia that made him a dysfunctional individual, and which has contributed to the existence of dysfunctional societies in post-Communist Eastern Europe.[6] Lastly, these anecdotes illustrate the importance of story and history for our memories, both collected and individual.

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[3] James V. Wertsch, *Voices of Collective Remembering* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 4. The "sort of collective memory at issue in this case is what I shall term "textually mediated,"" he writes. p. 5.

[4] Oliver Sacks, *The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales* (New York: Harper Perennial Books, 1990), p. 23.

[5] Sacks, Man Who, 1990, pp. 23 ff. relates this fascinating story. A similar story is told by A. R. Luria, *The Man with a Shattered World: The History of a Brain Wound* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

[6] Paul E. Michelson and Jean T. Michelson, "Post-Communist Romania: A Dysfunctional Society in Transition," in: Adrian-Paul Iliescu, ed., *Mentalități și instituții. Carențe de mentalitate și înapoiere instituțională în România modernă* (București: Ars Docendi, 2002), pp. 61-97.

II. An Assumption

A basic assumption needs to be made clear from the outset. I am very uneasy with a good deal of what seems to be very loose references in some of the literature to collective entities. I don't believe that there are any substantive collective entities as such other than metaphorically. Human actions are in the end the actions of individual humans, something that Max Weber made clear nearly a hundred years ago.[7] This assumption is sometimes referred to as methodological individualism.[8] "Action ... exists only as the behavior of one or more individual human beings." We make a significant error, Weber argued, when we speak of "social collectivities, such as states, associations, business corporations, foundations, as if they were individual persons." Instead, "in sociological work, these collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action."[9] I hope that we can avoid this error.

III. Definitions

Let us move now to defining some of the key terms. First, "memory". John Sutton writes, "'Memory' is a label for a diverse set of cognitive capacities by which humans and perhaps other animals retain information and reconstruct past experiences, usually for present purposes .... Some memories are shaped by language, others by imagery. Much of our moral life depends on the peculiar ways in which we are embedded in time."[10] For Yadin Dudai, memory includes both "The retention over time of learned information" or "of experience-dependent internal representations, or of the capacity to reactivate or reconstruct such representations."[11] Finally, there was the classical Greek perception of Memory

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[7] Max Weber, "Basic Sociological Terms," (1922) in: Max Weber, *Economy and Society* edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), Volume I, Ch. 1.

[8] For an excellent survey of the subject, see Joseph Heath, "Methodological Individualism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entries/methodological-individualism/>, last accessed 4 March 2008. See also F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science. Studies on the Abuse of Reason* (New York: The Free Press, 1955), Chs III-VIII; and Lars Udehn, *Methodological Individualism* (London: Routledge, 2001).

[9] Weber, "Sociological Terms," in: Weber, *Economy and Society,* 1968, Volume I, p. 13. Italics in the original. Heath, "Methodological Individualism," 2005, points out that this is not the same thing as the atomism found, variously, in Hobbes or Ludwig von Mises. Nor need it go as far as J. W. N. Watkins" demand for rock-bottom explanations or the rational choice theorists (Mancur Olson) or the critics of functionalism (Jon Elster). I agree with Heath that actions can and often do function at the subintentional level, something that a Weberian action-theoretic explanation"s focus on intentional actions tends to neglect.

[10] John Sutton, "Memory," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/memory/>, last accessed 4 March 2008.

[11] Yadin Dudai, *Memory from A to Z. Keywords, Concepts, and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 157.

as the mother of the muses, which, of course, include the muse of history.

Secondly, "collective memory". This is a concept whose modern usage owes largely to the work of Maurice Halbwachs. Halbwach's approach to the sociology of knowledge lacks some of the objectionable baggage of his interwar contemporaries such as Karl Mannheim.[12] First of all, he was a part of the French tradition of Emile Durkheim. Secondly, Halbwachs started out as a Bergsonian which played a moderating role in his Durkheimian collectivist psychology.[13] Thirdly, Halbwachs was deeply influenced by his first academic post at the University of Strasbourg (1922-1935) where he interacted with Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, and others in the soon-to emerge *Annales* group, though he remained critical of historians "for emphasizing description rather than explanation ..."[14]

Early on, Halbwachs seemed to privilege the collective. In his 1925 *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* he wrote that "it is only natural that we consider the group itself as having the capacity to remember .... we speak of a physical or moral quality which is supposed to be inherent in the group, and which passes from the group to its members."[15]

By the end of his life, Halbwachs had backed off of this dubious stance. Lewis Coser summarizes: "Collective memory, Halbwachs shows, is not a given but rather a socially constructed notion. Nor is it some mystical group mind .... 'While the collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember.'"[16] Coser continues: "It is, of course, individuals who remember, not groups or institutions, but these individuals, being located in a specific group context, draw on that context to remember or recreate the past .... For most Americans Independence Day evokes affectively toned memories, and for Frenchmen, Bastille Day ... has crucial historical weight. 'Every collective memory,' says Halbwachs, 'requires the support of a group delimited in space and time.' (Let us remark in passing that almost everywhere that Durkheim speaks of 'Society' with a capital S, Halbwachs speaks of 'groups' - a more cautious usage.)"[17]

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[12] See Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1936), especially Ch. V.

[13] Cf. Coser, "Introduction," 1992, pp. 2-5.

[14] Coser, "Introduction," 1992, pp. 5 ff. Halbwachs served as a member of the board of the Annales d"histoire économique et sociale from 1929-1939. Coser notes that "the union between sociology and history that the bright young men of Strasbourg had dreamed of in the twenties and early thirties was never consummated." p. 11. Also helpful is Patrick H. Hutton, "Maurice Halbwachs as Historian of Collective Memory," in his *History as an Art of Memory* (Hanover NH: University Press of New England, 1993), pp. 73-90.

[15] Partially translated in Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 1992, pp. 54, 59. An electronic text of *Cadres* is now available online at http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/ Halbwachs_maurice/cadres_soc_ memoire/cadres_soc_ memoire.html, last accessed 4 March 2008.

[16] Coser, "Introduction," 1992, p. 22. The quotation is from Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, translated by Francis J. Ditter, Jr. And Vida Yazdi Ditter with an introduction by Mary Douglas (New York: Harper-Colophon, 1980), p. 48. This unfinished work was published posthumously in 1950.

[17] Coser, "Introduction," p. 22, quoting Halbwachs, *Collective Memory,* 1980, p. 84.

James V. Wertsch's *Voices of Collective Remembering* has an instructive chapter entitled "Collective Memory: A Term in Search of a Meaning" that takes this discussion one step further.[18] He writes: "It is not obvious how to catalogue all the interpretations of memory that now clutter the conceptual landscape, especially since these interpretations often exist in the form of implicit assumptions rather than explicit formulations." In addition, problems with the word have been "exacerbated by the rhetorical uses to which it has been put, a point that led John Gillis to argue that it may be 'losing precise meaning in proportion to its growing rhetorical power.'"[19] Lastly, the search for a usable past - that is, "an account of events and actors that can be harnessed for some purpose in the present"[20] - has led to history wars across the world[21] as well as to the "cearta pentru istorie" so prevalent in Romanian culture.[22]

The conceptual confusion is also evident in *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,* which gives as its primary definition of collective memory, "The ability of a community to remember events" and as its second definition, "The collection of memories shared by a common culture."[23] Lastly, there are those who muddy the waters by using the term "collective memory" in a fashion analogous to Carl Jung's "collective unconscious."

What then of "collective memory"? I would like to argue that use of the phrase "collected memories" would help us to avoid some of the misunderstandings or misconceptions connected with the phrase "collective memory." James F. Young argues for "collected memory" because "societies cannot remember in any other way than through their constituents' memories."[24] At the same time, we also need to recognize that "relatively unstable individual memory may need support from more stable external scaffolding or props. Experience attunes us to certain

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[18] Wertsch, *Collective Remembering*, 2002, pp. 30-66.

[19] Wertsch, *Collective Remembering*, 2002, p. 30. On collective memory generally and on the "depreciation" of the term by "surplus use," see Alon Confino, "Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 102 (1997), pp. 1386-1403.

[20] Wertsch, *Collective Remembering*, 2002, p. 31. It should be noted that what follows generally excludes memory issues associated with the Holocaust. However instructive and important these might be, their pursuit here would take this discussion too far a field.

[21] For an example from American case, see Edward T. Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, eds., *History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), especially Paul Boyer"s contribution, "Whose History Is It Anyway? Memory, Politics, and Historical Scholarship," pp. 115-139; and for Germany and Israel, Daniel Levy, "The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel," *History and Theory*, Vol. 38 (1999), pp. 51-66, which explores "the relationship between revisionism and collective memory, and the ways in which both are reflective of and contribute to the reformation of national identification." (p. 51)

[22] Al. Zub, *Biruit-au gîndul* (Iaşi: Editura Junimea, 1983), p. 33. Cf. Alexandru Duţu"s discussion of the philosopher-patriot in Romanian culture in his *European Intellectual Movements and Modernization of Romanian Culture* (Bucureşti: Editura Academiei, 1981), pp. 70 ff.

[23] Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003.

[24] See James F. Young, *The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. xi.

information or regularities or artifacts which we can exploit in the present."[25] Lastly, it seems obvious that memories held by various members of a group will vary from person to person. Hence, "collected memories."

Collected memories are also linked in my thinking with three other concepts: firstly, the idea of political culture; secondly, what de Tocqueville called "habits of the heart"; and, thirdly, the idea of myth or mythhistory. Political culture is a widely recognized construct defined as "the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that give order and meaning to a political process and that provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behavior in the political system ... the product of both the collective history of a political system and the life histories of the members of that system."[26] Its purpose is to provide "a means of linking micro-analysis and macro-analysis."[27]

Habits of the heart are a subset of the mores of a people. In the words of de Tocqueville, these apply "not only to 'moeurs' in the strict sense, which might be called the habits of the heart, but also to the different notions possessed by men, the various opinions current among them, and the sum of ideas that shape mental habits. So I use the word to cover the whole moral and intellectual state of a people."[28] Such shared values or "Shared truths that provide a sanction for common effort have obvious survival value. Without such social cement," William McNeill argues, "no group can long preserve itself. Yet to outsiders, truths of this kind are likely to seem myths ..."[29] In the end, "A nation or any other human group that knows how to behave in crisis situations because it has inherited a heroic historiographical tradition that tells how ancestors resisted their enemies successfully is more likely to act together effectively than a group lacking such a tradition."[30]

The third linked concept is the idea of mythistory delineated by McNeill. Pattern-recognition is a significant attribute and function of both language and humans. It is our ability to not lose sight of the forest for the trees or sight of the trees for the forest. This leads to pattern-recognition in history and thence to what may be called collected memories and social myths.[31] "Men are and always have been myth makers, seizing upon the significant by leaving out the trivial, so as to make the world intelligible .... For human minds imperiously demand

[25] Sutton, "Memory," 2004. Sutton elsewhere notes that "Public scaffolding of various forms, in the physical, symbolic, and social environment, can trigger the specific form and content of individual memory." Cf. Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

[26] Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1966), pp. 104-105.

[27] Pye, Aspects, 1966, p. 104.

[28] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* edited by J. P. Mayer (Garden City NY: Anchor Books, 1969), p. 287.

[29] William H. McNeill, *Mythistory and Other Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 7.

[30] McNeill, *Mythistory*, 1986, pp. 13-14.

[31] McNeill, *Mythistory*, 1986, pp. 82-95.

historical experience to have shape and meaning ..."[32]

Thus, writes McNeill, "Myth lies at the basis of human society .... This is mankind's substitute for instinct. It is the unique and characteristic human way of acting together. A people without a full quiver of relevant agreed-upon statements, accepted in advance through education or less formalized acculturation, soon finds itself in deep trouble, for in the absence of believable myths, coherent public action becomes very difficult to improvise or sustain."[33] McNeill wonders whether a kind of Herderian language-created culture and folkspirit for each linguistic group might actually exist,[34] but if we substitute "collected memories" here for "myth," we have a pretty good definition of what we have been talking about.

Such collected memories are very real since ideas themselves are real. It is clear, therefore, that a tabula rasa approach to post-Communist Southeastern Europe is completely unrealistic. We were soon to learn (or re-learn) after 1989 that the past is more often than not prologue. In the words of one analysis, this "coincidence of macro-change with micro-continuity on the individual level, together with the sense of panic, urgency, and uncertainty resulting from the former, led individual as well as nascent collective actors to making the best possible use of the assets and orientations acquired under the old regime."[35] In other words, the use of collected memories, which were part of the legacy of Communism, and manipulation of the national past in post-Communist Southeastern Europe, was unavoidable.

Halbwachs' willingness to make a distinction between history and memory is very helpful here. The chapter on "Historical Memory and Collective Memory," has a section entitled "The Ultimate Opposition Between Collective Memory and History,"[36] in which he writes: "The collective memory is not the same as formal history and 'historical memory' is a rather unfortunate expression because it connects two terms opposed in more than one aspect .... General history starts only when tradition ends .... one purpose of history might just be to bridge the gap between past and present..."[37]

Halbwachs goes on: "Collective memory differs from history in at least two respects ... for it retains from the past only what still lives .... History divides the sequence of centuries into periods, just as the content of a tragedy is divided into several acts. But in a play the same plot is carried from one act into another .... In effect there are several collective memories. This is the second characteristic distinguishing the collective memory from history." History looks at things from

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[32] McNeill, *Mythistory*, 1986, p. 91.

[33] McNeill, *Mythistory*, 1986, p. 23. Cf. Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality* (New York: Harper, 1968), especially pp. 1-20; 181-193; and my "Myth and Reality in Rumanian National Development," *International Journal of Rumanian Studies*, Vol. 5 (1987), Nr. 2, pp. 9-11.

[34] McNeill, *Mythistory*, 1986, p. 56.

[35] Kazimierz Slomczynski and associates, *Mental Adjustment to the Post-Communist System in Poland* (Warsaw: IFiS Publishers, 1999), p. 190.

[36] Halbwachs, *Collective Memory*, 1980, pp. 78-83.

[37] Halbwachs, *Collective Memory*, 1980, pp. 78-79.

the outside and focusses on the long duration; collective memory looks at things from the inside and focusses on the short run, "often much shorter than the average duration of a human life."[38] Thus, "Halbwachs envisioned a sharp division between history and collective memory, with the former beginning where the latter ceased. History helped prevent forgetting. Collective memory was the spontaneous product of a group, while history was scientific and 'objective.'"[39]

This argument has been forcefully taken up by Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi:[40] "Memory and modern historiography stand, by their very nature, in radically different relations to the past. The latter represents, not an attempt at a restoration of memory, but a truly new kind of recollection .... The historian does not simply come in to replenish the gaps of memory. He constantly challenges even those memories that have survived intact .... The point is that all these features cut against the grain of collective memory which ... is drastically selective. Certain memories live on; the rest are winnowed out, repressed, or simply discarded by a process of natural selection which the historian, uninvited, disturbs and reverses. The question remains whether, as a result, some genuine catharsis or reintegration is foreseeable. Certainly at the present moment the very opposite seems to be the case."

Paul Ricoeur puts it this way: "Historians work with documents, while documents are already a break with memory ..."[41] History can instruct memory and memory can instruct history, but they are not the same thing.[42] In the end, "Man is capable of making memories and of making history."[43]

Jörn Rüsen has also approached this problem in the context of the history and philosophy of history, noting that history's method undermines memory and memory undermines history's method. Some have tried to resolve this, Rüsen writes, by trying to evacuate history from academic study, particularly those who want to take the so-called linguistic turn, but this would be fatal to history as a discipline and would turn it into just another ideology. Historiography utilizes memory, but also has its own logic, he concludes.[44]

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[38] Halbwachs, *Collective Memory*, 1980, pp. 80-86. See also David Loewenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 210 ff.

[39] Philip Francis Esler, *New Testament Theology: Communion and Community* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2006), p. 220.

[40] Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Zakhor: Jewish History and Jewish Memory* (New York: Schocken Books, 1989), pp. 94-95.

[41] Paul Ricoeur in dialogue with Sorin Antohi, "Istorie, Memorie, Iertare," *Xenopoliana*, Vol. 11 (2003), Nr. 3-4, p. 7.

[42] Ricoeur, "Istorie," 2003, p. 9.

[43] Ricoeur, "Istorie," 2003, p. 10. There are several obvious puns here. For a Romanian take on Ricoeur, see Florin Cântec, "Memorie şi uitare în istorie. Repere din istoriografia franceză," *Xenopoliana*, Vol. 11 (2003), Nr. 3-4, pp. 34-40. For a fuller account of Ricouer"s position, see his *Memory, History, Forgetting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), pp. 281-411, including sections on "the Dialectic of Memory and History: Memory, Just a Province of History?", pp. 384 ff., "Memory, in Charge of History?", pp. 389 ff., and his reactions to Halbwachs, pp. 393 ff., Yerushalmi, pp. 397 ff., and Nora, pp. 401 ff. This work deserves more space than can be given here.

[44] Jörn Rüsen, "Desfacerea ordinii istoriei - modernitate, postmodernitate, memorie," *Xe-

The interesting result, according to Hans Meyerhoff in a phrase cited by Yerushalmi, is that "a situation has developed which is quite paradoxical in human terms: The barriers of the past have been pushed back as never before; our knowledge of the history of man and the universe has been enlarged on a scale and to a degree not dreamed of by previous generations. At the same time, the sense of identity and continuity with the past, whether our own or history's, has gradually and steadily decline. Previous generations *knew* much less about the past than we do, but perhaps *felt* a much greater sense of identity and continuity with it."[45] Exploration of the consequences of this situation would be highly desirable.[46]

IV. Collected Memories

Thus far we have established
A.   that collected memories are real, but collective memory is not;
B.   secondly, that such memories are related to, but quite distinct from, history (seen as historiography or *wissenschaft*). And
C.   thirdly, collected memories are significant for the study and understanding of history and culture as well as for motivating individuals and societies.

This leads to the question: How are "collected memories" in this demythologized sense formed? From the very earliest points in the life cycle, the individual undergoes a socialization or civilizing process, through his or her parents, playmates, schooling, leisure activities, peer group pressures, churches, formal and informal organizations, popular culture, festivals, mass media, governmental activities, and so forth.[47] These issues are not being neglected by Romanian scholars, as witness the special issue in 2003 of *Xenopoliana* published in Iaşi which contains a series of very significant articles related to these themes.[48]

The most striking exploration of collected memories is found in Pierre Nora's massive seven volumes *Les Lieu de mémoire*,[49] in which an army of specialists analyzed and studied "memory sites" in French history.[50] The way in which Nora saw his enterprise was revealing: it was to be "a history ... less interested in

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nopoliana, Vol. 11 (2003), Nr. 3-4, pp. 16-28.

[45] Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 1989, p. 79.

[46] Cf. Adrian Cioroianu, *Focul ascuns în piatră: despre istorie, memorie, şi alte vanităţi contemporane* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2002).

[47] Examples are William M. Johnston"s *Celebrations: The Cult of Anniversaries in Europe and the United States* (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991); and Mona Ozouf"s *Festivals and the French Revolution* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1988).

[48] Such as Andi Mihalache"s "Pentru o istorie culturală a ideii de patrimoniu," pp. 158-179, which advances eight hypotheses about memory and the past, including one dealing with the search for permanences of the past in times of change; and Sorin Iftimi"s analysis of Iaşi monuments "Iaşii în bronz şi marmură. Memoria statuilor," pp. 180-197.

[49] Pierre Nora, ed., *Les Lieux de mémoire. La Republique. La Nation. Les France* (Paris: Gallimard, 1981-1992), seven volumes. An abridged translation appeared as *Realms of Memory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996–1998), three volumes.

[50] See the review essay by Hue-Tam Ho Tai, "Remembered Realms: Pierre Nora and French National Memory," *American Historical Review*, Vol. 106 (2001), pp. 906-922.

causes than in effects; ... less interested in 'what actually happened' than in its perpetual re-use and misuse, its influence on successive presents; less interested in traditions than in the way in which traditions are constituted and passed on."[51] This program further serves to highlight the difference between history and memory proposed above.

One major vehicle for the creation of collected memories is commemoration, an area that has been given reams of attention.[52] Commemorations would include, *inter alia*, national holidays,[53] the erection of memorials and statues, iconography, the naming of streets, cemeteries, funeral practices, film,[54] monuments to unknown soldiers, interpretation centers, national and regional museums, historical preservation districts, and special sites. Halbwachs played a leading role in inaugurating such investigation of commemoration with his study of how the Holy Land came to appear in the geography of memory.[55]

Obviously commemoration issues are and will continue to be an important area of research. A wide-ranging study of the Romanian propensity to "anniversaromania" would be useful.[56] The case of commemorative statues for Ion

[51] Nora, *Realms of Memory*, 1996, Vol. 1, p. xxiv, as quoted by Tai, "Remembered," 2001, pp. 907-908.

[52] See Hutton"s "From Collective Mentalities to Collective Memory in Contemporary Historiography," Hutton, *Memory*, 1993, pp. 2 ff. for a discussion of Philippe Ariès, *Western Attitudes toward Death from the Middle Ages to the Present* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); D. Harvey, "Monument and Myth," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 69 (1979), pp. 362-381* (on Sacré Coeur in Paris); Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789-1880* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Eric Hobsbaum and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). For other examples, see John Gillis, ed., *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Maria Bucur and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds., *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (West Lafayette IN: Purdue University Press, 2001). For clarification of the role of context in historical memory, see Barry Schwartz, "The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory," *Social Forces*, Vol. 61 (1982), pp. 374-397.

[53] Nico H. Frijda, "Commemorating," in: James W. Pennebaker, Dario Paez, and Bernard Rimé, eds., *Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives* (Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997), pp. 103-127.

[54] See Juanjo Igartua and Dario Paez, "Art and Remembering Traumatic Collective Events: The Case of the Spanish Civil War," in Pennebaker, *Collective Memory*, 1997, pp. 79-101; Roger F. Cook "Good Bye Lenin!: Free-Market Nostalgia for Socialist Consumerism," *Seminar. A Journal of Germanic Studies*, Vol. 43 (2007), pp. 206-219, on "ostalgie"; and Dina Iordanova, "Whose is this Memory?: Hushed Narratives and Discerning Remembrance in Balkan Cinema," *Cineaste*, Vol. 32 (2007), Nr. 3, pp. 22-27.

[55] Maurice Halbwachs, *La Topographie légendaire des évangiles en Terre Sainte: étude de mémoire collective* (Paris: Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1941), partially translated in Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, 1992, pp. 193-235 (the conclusions). For commentary, see Hutton, *Memory*, 1993, pp. 80-84.

[56] For Cuza, see Al. Zub, "Posteritatea lui Cuza Vodă," in Leonid Boicu, Gh. Platon, and Al. Zub, eds., *Cuza Vodă în memoriam* (Iași: Editura Junimea, 1973), pp. 581-629. For early anniversary celebrations for 1848, see Mihai Chiper, "Aniversări disputate ale revoluției pașoptiste (1859-1866)," *Xenopoliana*, Vol. 11 (2003), pp. 198-207. For another Romanian holiday, see Maria Bucur, "Birth of a Nation. Commemorations of December 1, 1918,

Antonescu in Romania and the reaction to them is another example.[57] Yet another interesting study would be the examination of the vicissitudes of street names in, say, Bucureşti and Chişinău.

Since the 19th century, the role of the media in creating and fostering collected memories has been another critical factor in the process.[58] This involves the orality-literacy issue explored by McLuhan, Ong, and others.[59] In addition there is the very pertinent issue of "image" developed in Daniel Boorstin's The *Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America*:[60] "The new social science historians produced group caricature .... such caricature became the image into which an individual was expected (and often tried) to fit," leading to the Age of Media and the Age of Advertising and PR in which "images have become more vivid than originals" or can be airbrushed and photoshoped to do so.[61] The study of mass media in South Eastern Europe is in its infancy; this would be a ripe area to pursue.[62] Literacy is another underdeveloped area.[63]

and National Identity in Twentieth-Century Romania," in Bucur and Wingfield, *Staging*, 2001, pp. 286-325. On anniversaries generally, see Johnston, *Celebrations*, 1991.

[57] See Andrei Pippidi"s "Un monument pentru mareşal," and "O statuie de prisos," in his instructive collection of essays, *Despre statui şi morminte. Pentru o teorie a istorie simbolice* (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2000), pp. 227-232; Dan Pavel, *Etica lui Adam* (Bucureşti: Editura Du Style, 1995), pp. 103-158; Michael Shafir, "Negation at the Top: Deconstructing the Holocaust Denial Salad in the Romanian Cucumber Season," *Xenopoliana*, Vol. 11 (2003), Nr. 3-4, pp. 90-122, and his "Memory, Memorials, and Membership: Romanian Utilitarian Anti-Semitism and Marshal Antonescu," in Henry F. Carey, ed., *Romania Since 1989: Politics, Culture, and Society* (Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 2003). Also instructive are Pippidi"s opening essay, "Mormintele ca repere ale identităţii naţionale," in: his *Statui*, 2000, pp. 11-32; and Katherine Verdery"s *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), passim.

[58] See Walter J. Ong, *The Presence of the Word: Some prolegomena for cultural and religious history* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985); and Thomas de Zengotita, *Mediated: How the Media Shapes Your World and the Way You Live in It* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2005).

[59] In addition to the works cited in the previous note, see Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), and *Understanding Media: The Extension of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964; Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (London: Methuen, 1982); and Brian Stock, *The Implications of Literacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). For further discussion, see Hutton"s comments on "Memory and Changing Modes of Communication," in his *Memory*, 1993, pp. 13-17. Benedict Anderson"s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd edition (London: Verso, 1991) also emphasizes the impact of print and literacy.

[60] New York: Harper Colophon, 1964.

[61] Boorstin, *Image*, 1964, pp. 202-204. On advertising, see pp. 205 ff., and public opinion polls, pp. 235 ff.

[62] See Eugen Denize"s *Istoria Societăţii Române de Radiodifuziune*, three volumes in four (Bucureşti: Societatea Română de Radiodifuziune, 1998-2002); and Peter Gross, *Mass Media in Revolution and National Development: The Romanian Laboratory* (Ames IA: Iowa State University Press, 1996).

[63] See Raluca Tomi and Marian Stroia, "Călătorii străini despre cultura scrisă, ştiinţă şi creaţia populară din Principate (1822-1847)," in Ileana Căzan and Irina Gavrilă, eds., *Soci-*

There is of course the role of schooling, as illustrated by the Coser and Russian school anecdotes above. In Coser's case, he was eventually brought into the sphere of American collected memories by increased cultural literacy, one of the reasons why the study of history is so significant and relevant.

The cultural literacy argument is that there is a body of basic information which is essential for a person to have a grasp of if they are to be considered educated and, indeed, if they are to make much progress in being educated. This information is largely historical in nature. Research, summarized by E. D. Hirsch's *Cultural Literacy*[64] has shown "the immense importance of cultural literacy for speaking, listening, reading, and writing." It is argued by Hirsch and his allies that such information is not just useful in itself. It is "essential to the development of reading and writing skills," skills which every educated person desires to have and to improve. In addition to being essential to becoming a better reader and writer, "knowing what others probably know is crucial for effective communication." Thus, it turns out, reading, writing, and communication skills cannot really be taught apart from the acquisition and possession of the specific cultural and historical information which constitutes cultural literacy.

In terms of the impact of schooling in South Eastern Europe, three examples will illustrate the point. First there is Mirela-Luminița Murgescu's *Între "bunul creştin" şi "bravul român". Rolul şcolii primare în construirea identităţii naţionale româneşti (1831-1878)*,[65] replete with revealing quotations from text books and manuals - often written by important Romanian cultural figures such as Ion Creangă, A. D. Xenopol, and others - which show how the Romanian elite used textbooks to build the nation.[66]

A second work is Charles Jelavich's *South Slav Nationalism - Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914*,[67] which demonstrates that post-World War I "Yugoslavism" failed to create a unified South Slav state as a result of the conflicting and incompatible presentations of the past in Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian school books.

Thirdly, there was the so-called "War of the Alternative Manuals" in the late 1990s Romania. The preoccupation with having "official" textbooks and trying to get them to toe the right line was illuminating. This was followed in the early 2000s by the scandal of the Romanian Academy's poorly-thought out and ill-

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etatea românească între modern şi exotic văzută de călători străini (1800-1847) (Bucureşti: Oscar Print, n.d.), pp. 243-264.

[64] New York: Vintage Books, 1988, pp. 3 ff.

[65] Iaşi: Editura A 1992, 1999. See also her contribution ""Fatherland" and "Nation" for Schoolchildren Textbooks and the Concept of Nationhood in Romanian Schools," to Andrei Pleşu, et al., *Nation and National Ideology. Past, Present, and Prospects* (Bucureşti: New Europe College, 2002), pp. 266-287.

[66] Of particular value in this connection is the theme issue of *Xenopoliana*, Vol. 12 (2004) on "A Scrie şi a Citi. Practici, Simboluri, Tipuri de Lectură." The role of the military in "educating" young people is also worth further examination. See Raluca Tomi, "Aspecte ale modernizării infrastructurii şi a armatei din Principate în viziunea călătorilor străini," in Căzan and Gavrilă, *Societatea românească*, n.d., pp. 174-200.

[67] (Columbus OH: Ohio State University Press, 1990).

conceived tratat, which revealed the poverty of the Romanian historical establishment.[68]

Education is particularly significant because of the generational effect on and in collected memories. We have already seen this illustrated in the story of Sasha the Russian student. The research of Howard Schuman and his associates has demonstrated that memories of nation or the world "come especially from adolescence and early adulthood," that is "the teens or early 20s." This leads them to conclude that there is a kind of "generational imprinting" process in which collected memories are formed by the time one exits from higher education.[69] This has significant implications for such memories and their persistence in post-communist societies.[70]

Political culture is another important area involving collected memories.[71] Lucian Pye writes: "In transitional societies there is great confusion because the political cultures tend to be fragmented and people do not share common orientations toward political action .... In transitional societies there is often little congruence between public issues and private interests. Psychologically uprooted people who feel insecure because their old and once highly ordered world has been disrupted may turn anxiously to political action in order to find a new sense of belonging, a new sense of identity."[72]

My wife and I have examined some of these issues in our study of post-Communist Romania.[73] We suggest there a number of political, social, cultural, spir-

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[68] On these episodes which await fuller accounts, see Dan Pavel, "The Textbook Scandal and Rewriting History in Romania: Letter From Bucharest," *East European Politics and Societies,* Vol. 15 (2001), pp. 179-189; Ovidiu Pecican, "Războiul manualelor alternative," pp. 157-159, and "Noul tratat de istorie al Academiei," pp. 164-167 in his *Poarta leilor. Istoriografia tânără din Transilvania* (1990-2005), Vol. I (Cluj-Napoca: Editura Grinta, 2005); Cătălina Mihalache, "Communism in Post-Communist History Textbooks. What is to be Remembered," *Xenopoliana*, Vol. 11 (2003), Nr. 3-4, pp. 123-142; Shafir, "Deconstructing," 2003, p. 103; and Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), pp. 19-25.

[69] Howard Schuman and Jacqueline Scott, "Generations and Collective Memories," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 54 (1989), pp. 359, 377-378. See also Howard Schuman, Cheryl Rieger, and V. Guidys, "Generations and Collective Memories in Lithuania," in N. Schwartz and S. Sudman, eds., *Autobiographical Memory and the Validity of Retrospective Reports* (New York: Springer Verlag, 1994), pp. 313-333, and Howard Schuman, Robert F. Belli, and Katherine Bischoping, "The Generational Basis of Historical Knowledge," in Pennebaker, Collective Memory, 1997), pp. 47-77.

[70] One might speculate here on the impact that the education of the new generation of many post-Communist countries is taking place in the West, a repeat of the 19th century pattern. See Elena Siupiur, *Intelectuali, elite, clase politice moderne în Sud-Estul european. Secolul XIX* (Bucureşti: Editura Domino, 2004).

[71] See my "Romanian Perspectives on Romanian National Development," *Balkanistica*, Vol. 7 (1981-1982), pp. 92-120, for a discussion of the Romanian pre-occupation with national becoming and how this impacted Romanian political culture prior to World War II.

[72] Pye, *Aspects*, 1966, pp. 105-106. For Moldova today, see Jennifer R. Cash, "Origins, Memory, and Identity: 'Villages' and the Politics of Nationalism in the Republic of Moldova," *East European Politics and Society*, Vol. 21 (2007), pp. 588-610.

[73] Michelson and Michelson, "Post-Communist Romania," in: Iliescu, ed., *Mentalități și instituții, 2002*, pp. 61-97.

itual, and psychological "therapies" that might help dysfunctional, transitional societies make their way to "normalcy." Pye also writes: "Does there not have to be a fundamental change in the outlook and personalities of people if they are to successfully move from the traditional world into modern life? ... The task of development thus boils down to the blunt need to change the attitudes and feelings of people." Unfortunately, the "confusion and uncertainty of men of affairs over the place of attitudes in the development process is matched by equal uncertainty and disagreement among social scientists."[74] 1989 looked like a promising new era, but unfortunately, dysfunctional leaders and societies were not able to break with their dysfunctional pasts and habits. Alas.

The Tocquevillian tradition has been very successful in the last three decades in promoting the importance for cultures and communities of habits of the heart. The Civic Virtues approach has been most successfully advanced by Robert D. Putnam in two books: *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*[75] and Bowling Alone: *The Collapse and Revival of American Community.*[76] Putnam emphasizes the impact of social capital, especially civic engagement and voluntarism (defined as "generalized reciprocity-the practice of helping others with no expectation of gain)."[77]

Robert Bellah and his associates also contributed to this focus with the widely discussed study *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life.*[78] Bellah argued that "a study of mores gives us insight into the state of society, its coherence, and its long term viability."[79] His group defined community "in a strong sense: a *community* is a group of people who are socially interdependent, who participate together in discussion and decision making, and who share certain *practices* that both define the community and are nurtured by it. Such a community is not quickly formed. It almost always has a history and so is also a *community of memory,* defined in part by its past and its memory of its past."[80]

The third aspect, mythistory, has, in contradistinction to the others, already been the focus of intensive study related to Romanian culture and civilization. Two early pieces were Stephen Fischer-Galati's 1981 "Myths in Romanian

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[74] Pye, *Aspects*, 1966, pp. 89-91.

[75] Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

[76] New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000.

[77] Putnam, *Bowling*, 2000, p. 505. For a fuller application of Putnam"s ideas to Romanian society, see Paul and Jean Michelson, "Voluntarism and the Restructuring of Romanian Society," an unpublished lecture delivered at the Romanian Embassy Lecture Series, Washington DC, 17 March 1994, which identified ten areas in which voluntarism builds civic virtues and fosters civil society.

[78] New York: Harper and Row, 1985. It should be noted in passing that Bellah"s analysis is far superior to its recommendations.

[79] Bellah, *Habits*, 1985, p. 275.

[80] Bellah, *Habits*, 1985, p. 333. Pleşu, *Nation and National Ideology*, 2002, pp. 308 ff. contains a section on "Nation, State, and Civil Society," which is relevant here, especially Bruce Haddock and Ovidiu Caraiani, "Legitimacy, National Identity, and Civic Association," pp. 377-389.

History,"[81] on the use of myth as a function of the search for political legitimacy in the 19th and 20th centuries; and my 1987 "Myth and Reality in Rumanian National Development,"[82] an attempt to demythologize Romanian national development and explain the persistence of myths in Romanian culture.[83]

Subsequent to 1989, this area exploded, especially under the impetus given by Lucian Boia and his associates. Boia published or edited several volumes: *Mituri istorice româneşti* (1995),[84] *Miturile comunismului românesc*, two volumes (1995-1997),[85] *Două secole de mitologie naţională* (1999),[86] and *Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească* (Romanian edition 1997; English edition 2001).[87] Boia's work, which focused particularly on sensitive and almost taboo topics in Romanian history and culture and was especially critical of the way in which history was exploited to promote nationalist ideology, stimulated a lot of response, some of it irrational, some of it more reasoned defenses of national priorities. Noteworthy among the latter was Ion-Aurel Pop's *Istoria, Adevărul, şi miturile* (Note de lectură) (2002),[88] a kind of extended review and rebuttal to Boia's work. Pop makes the interesting point that while Boia's *History and Myth* appears to deal with Romanian historiography its real focus is Romanian culture and consciousness.[89] This would explain the heated reactions which Boia's work provoked.[90]

Mention needs to be made here of the contribution of the historians at Iaşi, who began publishing themed issues of a new journal, *Xenopoliana* in 1993. In addition to a number on "Istoria ca Discurs Demistificator,"[91] other issues appeared dealing with "Discurs Istoric şi Integrare,"[92] "Postmodernism, Postcomunism, Postistorie,"[93] "Învăţămîntul Istoric azi,"[94] "Elitele. Repere. Secvenţe.

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[81] *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 15 (1981), pp. 327-334.

[82] *International Journal of Rumanian Studies*, Vol. 5 (1987), Nr. 2, pp. 5-33.

[83] For a commentary, see Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu, "Destinul miturilor istorice contemporane ale românilor. Au ele un viitor?" *Xenopoliana*, Vol. 6 (1998), Nr. 3-4, pp. 34-48.

[84] Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii Bucureşti, 1995.

[85] Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii Bucureşti, 1995-1997. A selection of these papers was published under the same title in 1998 by Editura Nemira, Bucureşti.

[86] Bucureşti: Editura Humanitas, 1999.

[87] Bucureşti: Editura Humanitas, 1997, 2nd edition=2000, English edition=2001, published by Central European University Press in Budapest, under the title *History and Myth in Romanian National Consciousness*.

[88] Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 2002.

[89] Pop, *Istoria*, 2002, p. 12.

[90] Another seminal "demythologizing" work is Sorin Mitu"s Geneza identităţii naţionale la românii ardeleni (Bucureşti: Editura Humanitas, 1997), translated into English as National identity of Romanians in Transylvania (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001). Pleşu, Nation and National Ideology, 2002, pp. 78 ff. contains a section on "The Emergence of the Idea of Nation and of Nationalist Ideologies: The National Myths," with contributions by Keith Hitchins, Irina Livezeanu, Leon Volovici, Sorin Alexandrescu, and Simona Corlan-Ioan.

[91] Vol. 6 (1998), Nr. 3-4

[92] Vol. 1 (1993).

[93] Vol. 2 (1994).

[94] Vol. 3 (1995).

Controverse,"[95] "Nationalism. Etnicitate. Minorități,"[96] "Modernizarea în Spațiul Românesc,"[97] "Comunismul în România: Ideologie, Întemeieri, Dileme,"[98] "Confesiune, Societate, Națiune,"[99] "Istorie şi Identitate,"[100] "Discursul Istoric la Început de Secol şi de Mileniu,"[101] "Istoria culturală astăzi,"[102] "History and Society Since 1970,"[103] "Memorie şi Uitare în Istorie,"[104] "A Scrie şi a Citi. Practici, Simboluri, Tipuri de Lectură,"[105] "Liberalismul Românesc. Tendințe, Structuri, Personalități,"[106] and "Ritualuri Politice în România Modernă."[107]

This is important work because of the dangers connected with the use/abuse of history syndrome referred to earlier. Paul Valéry had this to say: "History is the most dangerous product which the chemistry of the mind has concocted. Its properties are well known. It produces dreams and drunkenness. It fills people with false memories, exaggerates the reactions, exacerbates old grievances, torments them in their repose, and encourages either a delirium of grandeur or a delusion of persecution. It makes whole nations bitter, arrogant, insufferable, and vainglorious."[108] Indeed.[109]

V.   Collective Amnesia

Because of space and time constraints, I am going to say a lot less about Collective Amnesia or Collective Forgetting. Nor am I going to address - other than mentioning it here - the relevant idea of "confabulation," that is "The making up of narratives and details, of the filling in of gaps in memory" or "The falsification of memory in the absence of deceitfulness occurring in clear consciousness in

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[95] Vol. 4 (1996).

[96] Vol. 5 (1997).

[97] Vol. 6 (1998).

[98] Vol. 7 (1999), Nr. 1-2.

[99] Vol. 7 (1999), Nr. 3-4.

[100] Vol. 8 (2000).

[101] Vol. 9 (2001).

[102] Vol. 10 (2002).

[103] Vol. 11 (2003), Nr. 1-2.

[104] Vol. 11 (2003), Nr. 3-4.

[105] Vol. 12 (2004).

[106] Vol. 13 (2005).

[107] Vol. 14 (2006).

[108] Quoted in David Hackett Fischer, *Historians" Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1970), pp. 307-308.

[109] Mentalities issues are heavily related to our problem here, but are going to have to be deferred. See the work of Alexandru Duțu, such as his *Livres de sagesse dans la culture roumaine; introduction à l"histoire des mentalités sud-est européennes* (București: Editura Academiei, 1971); and of Simona Nicoară and Toader Nicoară, beginning with their *Mentalități colective şi imaginar social: istoria şi noile paradigme ale cunoaşterii* (Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitara Clujeana/Mesagerul, 1996). Much the same has to be said about the studies of the "imaginarul" such as Lucian Boia, *Jocul cu trecutul. Istoria între adevăr şi ficțiune*, second edition (București: Editura Humanitas, 2002); and the varied and provocative writings of Daniel Barbu.

association with amnesia."[110]

Amnesia is the "loss or absence of memory."[111] "What we call 'forgetting' in a collective sense occurs when human groups fail - whether purposely or passively, out of rebellion, indifference, or indolence, or as the result of some disruptive historical catastrophe - to transmit what they know out of the past to their posterity," Yerushalmi writes.[112]

The catastrophic memory loss of Oliver Sachs' Jimmie G., the lost mariner, is almost too perfect an analogy for post-Communist Romanian social amnesia. The deficit memory situation for Romania began with the virtual denial by the post-1989 FSN regime of anything untoward in Romania until the very last years of the Ceauşescu regime. The irony of this is that Romanians were thus in the position of being very history conscious (obsessively so) and yet without a contemporary history. It is as if large segments of the government and the public were affected by a retrograde amnesia that has wiped out virtually everything since 1945.[113] Even the events of December 1989 and after were so shrouded in the mists of massive dissimulation and manipulation that a dozen variant "realities" could easily be put forward with virtually equal credibility.[114] Similar processes can be observed in Moldova and other post-communist countries.

Post-Communist Romanians, thus, often appear as deprived of contemporary memory as Jimmie G. The efforts of dissidents more or less fell in "a pit into which everything, every experience, every event, would fathomlessly drop, a bottomless memory-hole that would engulf the whole world," leaving the Romanians a people "who, in effect, had no 'day before".[115] It is not a coincidence that after 1989 both tourist information and the National History Museum seemed to make a point of ignoring Romania's Communist epoch.[116]

It is both tempting and useful to take Sacks' story of his patient as a metaphor for contemporary Romania, where amnesia can be viewed as a reaction to being removed from the structured environment of their Soviet system. And the fatigue, irritability, and anxiety of post-Communist Romanians are simply one more indication of a dysfunctional society. "When you've lost too much, you'll be

[110] Dudai, *Memory*, 2002, p. 54.

[111] Dudai, *Memory*, 2002, p. 10.

[112] Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 1989, p. 109.

[113] See Kevin Walsh, "Collective Amnesia and the Mediation of Painful Pasts: The Representation of France in the Second World War," *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, Vol. 7 (2001), pp. 83-98.

[114] Cf. Richard Andrew Hall, "The Securitate Roots of a Modern Romanian Fairy Tale: The Press, The Former Securitate, and The Historiography of December 1989," *RFE/RL East European Perspectives*, Vol. 4 (2002), Nr. 7-9, on the Internet at www.rferl.org/eepreport/; Cristina Maria Pantiru, "Miturile politice ale Revoluţiei din 1989," *Sfera Politicii*, Vol. 9 (2001), pp. 40-45; Peter Siani-Davies, "The Revolution after the Revolution," in: Duncan Light and David Phinnemore, eds. *Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms With Transition* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 15-34; and Peter Siani-Davies, *The Romanian Revolution of December 1989* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

[115] Sacks, *Man Who*, 1990, pp. 29-36.

[116] See Duncan Light, "Tourism and Romania"s Communist Past," in: Light and Phinnemore, *Post-Communist Romania*, 2001, pp. 9-75.

an orphan even from your traditions."[117]

One significant difference, of course, between post-Communist Romania and Sacks' case study is that the element of prevarication is not present in the latter. Jimmie G's deficit mentality was a product of neurological causes. The Romanian case has been made more difficult by the presence of mendacity on many levels, motivated by widely differing interests, but mendacity nevertheless.[118]

Coser cites György Konrad on the post-Communist situation of East European intellectuals: "Today only the dissidents conserve the sentiment of continuity. The others must eliminate remembrances; they cannot permit themselves to keep the memory …. Most people have an interest in losing memory."[119] For some countries, such as Romania or Moldova, where dissidence was weak or virtually non-existent, most intellectuals form part of the ranks of those wishing to forget. Conversely, there were and are many political interests after 1989 which benefited from promoting selective memory, a nostalgia for the alleged benefits of Soviet-style society while forgetting or minimizing the Gulags, the Securitatea, and the whole invasive, infantilizing paraphernalia of Communism.[120]

On the positive side, there have been the commendable efforts involved with the Process of Communism: the Memorialul Sighet project and the work of the Tismaneanu Commission. It is hard to know sometimes if Romanian culture has too much memory or not enough, but perhaps it is what is remembered and forgotten that is important and not the quantity.

These issues leave us with yet another question raised by Yerushalmi: "Is it possible that the antonym of 'forgetting' is not 'remembering,' but *justice?*[121] Ricouer makes a similar distinction between the "private world of forgiveness"

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[117] Ioana Ieronim, "An Orphan from Tradition," in Ioana Ieronim, *The Triumph of the Water Witch, translated by Adam J. Sorkin* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Bloodaxe Books, 2000), p. 43.

[118] It would be interesting to contrast Sachs" memory deficit Jimmie with Alexander R. Luria"s mnemonist who could forget only with extreme difficulty. See A. R. Luria, *The Mind of a Mnemonist: A Little Book about a Vast Memory, new edition* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). The mnemonist turned out to be unable to abstract or synthesize. Compare Borges" Ireneo Funes (the Memorious), who as a result of an accident, could remember everything, including things that he had not experienced from things associated with them. "Two or three times he had reconstituted an entire day; he had never once erred or faltered, but each reconstitution had itself taken an entire day. "I, myself, alone, have more memories than all mankind since the world began," he said to me. And also…"My memory, sir, is like a garbage heap".… Funes remembered not only every leaf of every tree in every patch of forest, but every time he had perceived or imagined that leaf." But, like Luria"s mnemonist, this came at a great price: Funes "was virtually incapable of general, platonic ideas" and "not very good at thinking. To think is to ignore (or forget) differences, to generalize, to abstract." Jorge Luis Borges, "Funes, His Memory," in his *Collected Fictions* translated by Andrew Hurley (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), pp. 131-137.

[119] Coser, "Introduction," 1992, p. 22.

[120] See Mikhail Heller, *Cogs in the Wheel* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988), *passim.*

[121] See Yerushalmi, "Reflections on Forgetting," in his *Zakhor*, 1989, pp. 105-117 (the quotation is on p. 117); and Paul Ricoeur on forgetting, pp. 412 ff. and forgiving, pp. 457 ff. in his *Memory, History, Forgetting*, 2004.

and the "public world of justice." The point is not to forgive others, but to ask others for forgiveness.[122] Of course, an entire paper could be devoted to the issues of "Collective responsibility" and "Collective guilt".[123]

Some Conclusions

Collected memories are needed, they are fabricated both consciously and sub-consciously, they are generationally developed. These facts have significant implications for the future. Al. Zub has cogently written: "The present utilizes intensively and in multiple ways the resources of the past."[124] This raises a number of problems for post-Communist countries such as Romania and Moldova.

"How much history do we require?" asks Yerushalmi. "What kind of history? What should we remember, what can we afford to forget, what must we forget? These questions are as unresolved today as they were then [a hundred years ago]; they have only become more pressing."[125]

McNeill points out that groups with believable myths may find themselves in trouble because some myths are positive and some are treacherous: "... myths may mislead disastrously. A portrait of the past that denigrates others and praises the ideals and practices of a given group naively and without restraint, can distort a people's image of outsiders so that foreign relations begin to consist of nothing but nasty surprises .... it is obvious that mythical, self-flattering versions of rival groups' pasts simply serve to intensify their capacity for conflict."[126]

This is seconded by Yerushalmi: "Myth and history condition action. There are myths that are life-sustaining and deserve to be reinterpreted for our age. There are some that lead astray and must be redefined. Others are dangerous and must be exposed."[127]

Shafir notes "the absence in Romania of 'guilt-culture and the dominance of the 'shame culture,'"[128] a concept skillfully elaborated by Sorin Antohi. The absence of a guilt-culture, according to Antohi, leads Romanians to "regularly attributing Romania's tribulations to external causes...a gigantic national *lapsus* that makes us regard the infrequent appearance of a pathetic author in search of local or individual responsibility for public misfortunes and faults as a betrayal or perversion."[129]

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[122] Ricoeur, "Istorie," 2003, p. 5-6.

[123] A helpful discussion of "transitional justice" may be found in Jane L. Curry, "When an Authoritarian State Victimizes the Nation," *International Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 37 (2007), pp. 58-73.

[124] Al. Zub, "Disciplina memoriei," *Xenopoliana*, Vol. 11 (2003), Nr. 3-4, p. 3.

[125] Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 1989, p. 107.

[126] McNeill, *Mythistory*, 1986, pp. 14-15; 23.

[127] Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 1989, pp. 99-100.

[128] Shafir, "Deconstructing," 2003, p. 117.

[129] Sorin Antohi, *Civitas imaginalis:Istorie şi utopie în cultura română*, second edition (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 1999), p. 264.

The all too familiar images and slogans here include the "în calea răutăților" image, in which one expects the worst and thus contributes, perhaps, to the happening of the worst; the Mioritic/passivist mythology, in which Romanian culture bends like a reed in the face of overwhelming force ... and spends a lot of time with its face in the mud.[130] And in the 19th and 20th centuries, one of the principal tasks of Romanian scholars, particularly historians, was "the recuperation of collective dignity" in the face of the insults of Romania's neighbors.[131]

This, in turn, according to Shafir, leads to a failure to distinguish between individual and collective responsibility.[132] It is, writes Shafir, one of the responsibilities of historians to help move Romania from a shame-culture to a guilt-culture while helping it to see responsibility for metaphysical guilt (as distinct from criminal or political guilt). The difficulty is that "the search of a 'usable past' in post-Communist East Central Europe involves the contradictory endeavor of having to overcome the immediate past without leaning on what preceded it, namely the authoritarian past antedating Communism. Thus far, only a few Romanian historians have dared to attempt doing that, and the outcome of their efforts is far from clear.[133]

The pedagogical function is seconded by William McNeill in a chapter of Mythistory entitled "History for Citizens." Indeed, the "central failure" of historians in the 1960s and 1970s was their failure to produce works that were both effectively written and relevant.[134] A study published in 1990 by the American Historical Association argued that among the values of the study of history are to help people and peoples to

• "Participate knowledgeably in the affairs of the world around them, drawing upon understandings shaped through reading ...

• See themselves and their society from different times and places, displaying a sense of informed perspective and a mature view of human nature ...

• Exhibit sensitivities to human values in their own and other cultural traditions, and, in turn, establish values of their own.

• Appreciate their natural and cultural environments."[135] But if people won't study history or read it, then our efforts have died on the launching pad.

[130] For some of this, see Zub, *Biruit-au*, 1983, pp. 11 ff.

[131] Zub, *Biruit-au*, 1983, p. 12. Compare Vasile Pârvan"s dismay at the "distrust, almost disdain, with which we are treated by academics here [Berlin in 1905]." quoted on p. 25.

[132] Shafir, "Deconstructing," 2003, p. 118. Cf. Doris Gödl, "Challenging the Past: Serbian and Croatian Aggressor-Victim Narratives," *International Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 37 (2007), pp. 43-57, on the instrumentality of collected memories of aggression and victimhood.

[133] Shafir, "Deconstructing," 2003, p. 119, 121. Compare Iordanova, "Whose is this Memory?" 2007, p. 1, who writes: "The more I look at Southeastern Europe"s cinema, the more it seems that all important films from the region ultimately deal with historical memory. More specifically, history is treated as something to endure, to live through, a process where one does not have agency but is subjected to the will power of external forces. Someone else ultimately decides your present and future."

[134] McNeill, *Mythistory*, 1986, pp. 96 ff.

[135] Myron Marty, et al., *Liberal Learning and the History Major* (Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 1990), p. 11.

Yerushalmi has a number of very pointed things to say in connection with the above. Many people "are in search of a past, but they patently do not want the past that is offered by the historian."[136] The choice, however, is "not whether or not to have a past, but rather - that kind of past shall one have."[137] The difficulty is that "those who are alienated from the past cannot be drawn in by explanation alone; they require evocation as well."[138]

McNeill also warns us to be aware of unintended effects of demythologizing: "Truth and intellectual honesty are no doubt served by noting the yawning gaps between democratic ideals and social practice." However, problems arise when scholars challenge "prevailing myths without regard for the costs arising from the disintegration of belief ... Frequently, the effect of such scholarship is to substitute a divisive for a unifying myth."[139] The demythologizers often go too far, winding up by undermining the doing of history at all.

Yerushalmi agrees. "Historiography," he concludes, "... cannot be a substitute for collective memory, nor does it show signs of creating an alternative tradition that is capable of being shared. But the essential dignity of the historical vocation remains, and its moral imperative seems to me now more urgent than ever. For in the world in which we live it is no longer merely a question of the decay of collective memory and the declining consciousness of the past, but of the aggressive rape of whatever memory remains, the deliberate distortion of the historical record, the invention of mythological pasts in the service of the powers of darkness. Against the agents of oblivion, the shredders of documents, the assassins of memory, the revisers of encyclopedias, the conspirators of silence, against those who, in Kundera's wonderful image, can airbrush a man out of a photograph so that nothing is left of him but his hat - only the historian, with the austere passion for fact, proof, evidence, which are central to his vocation, can effectively stand guard. And so, given that we cannot draw the lines between too much and too little historical research ... I will take my stand on the side of 'too much' rather than 'too little,' for my terror of forgetting is greater than my terror of having too much to remember. Let the accumulated facts about the past continue to multiply. Let the flood of books and monographs grow, even if they are only read by specialists. Let unread copies lie on the shelves of many libraries, so that if some be destroyed or removed others will remain. So that those who need can find that this person did live, those events really took place, this interpretation is not the only one."[140]

Let us close with the three anecdotal examples we began with. Lewis Coser was separated as an immigrant from the collected memories of his new country, but in the end he made good choices, he learned, adapted, and thrived. The fu-

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[136] Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 1989, p. 97.

[137] Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 1989, p. 99.

[138] Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 1989, p. 100.

[139] McNeill, *Mythistory*, 1986, pp. 32-33. Compare Edouard Gans: "The break with the intimacy of the old existence has indeed occurred, but the deeper return to this intimacy has not taken place." Quoted in Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 1989, p. 86.

[140] Yerushalmi, *Zakhor*, 1989, p. 116-117.

ture of Sasha the Russian student's collected memories is less certain: he might become part of the building of a healthy nation on the ruins of the old; he might not. This will depend on choices made, but also on the dysfunctional heritage of the former USSR. And Jimmie G.? From years of abuse, his collected memories had become frozen in time, his brain-deficit caused amnesia irreversible, his choices foreclosed. For some post-Communist countries it may already be too late.

So this is our problem: collected memories are essential to functional societies. On the other hand, these memories can be healthy and unhealthy. If they are unhealthy, it is uncommonly difficult to break with them.[141] McNeill argues that historians need to be both myth makers and myth breakers,[142] while, as Andrei Pippidi underlined, "choosing of memories is also the choice of a future."[143] Leszek Kolakowski warned: 'The muse of history is gentle, learned, and unassuming, but when neglected and deserted she takes her revenge, and blinds those who scorn her."[144] We are going to need all the help we can get.

Recenzent: acad. Andrei Eşanu
01.12.2007

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[141] McNeill, *Mythistory*, 1986, pp. 23 ff.

[142] McNeill, *Mythistory*, 1986, p. 35.

[143] Pippidi, *Statui şi morminte*, 2000, p. 78.

[144] In his 1986 Jefferson Lecture, "The Idolatry of Politics," *The New Republic*, 16 June 1986, pp. 29-36.

DISCURSUL IDEOLOGIC ÎN COMUNISMUL ROMÂNESC. METAMORFOZELE SALE DE LA STALINISM LA NAŢIONAL-COMUNISM (1947-1965)

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Abstract

The scientific interest for the research of the ideological communist discourse appeared especially after the sixties in the West of Europe being considered by some analysts as a new field of multidisciplinary research. The ideological analysis of communism was an extremely audacious enterprise taking into account the difficulties encountered by the communist system, especially in U.R.S.S., after the Second World War. Because of its limited ability to change the reality according to its goals, the communist discourse intended to enoke in the magical sense of the word, a reality that does not actually exist. The argumentative discourse based on manipulative techniques and widely spread through literate, journalistic and educational means, was founded on the principle of the "Chinese drop"! As all the ideological communist experiences, the Romanian communism develops an ideal discourse based on specific techniques such as the magical mechanism of symbolic neutralization, of perpetual concealment of political defaults in all ages.

Interesul ştiinţific pentru cercetarea discursului ideologic al comunismului s-a manifestat în Occidentul european, cu precădere după anii `60 ai secolului XX, fiind considerat de către unii analişti un nou teritoriu în cercetarea pluridisciplinară. Analiza ideologică a comunismului a reprezentat o întreprindere temerară, în condiţiile perpetuării postbelice a sistemului comunist, în frunte cu URSS. Tonalitatea epocii postbelice a fost, în general, cea a speranţei, a remontării unui neoumanism cultural şi politic, de aceea mediul cultural şi politic occidental al anilor `50-`60 a fost dominat de o criză a marilor ideologii politice, au fost supuse criticii şi "anatemizate"fascismul şi nazismul, făcute vinovate de ororile războiului,în vreme ce comunismul, ca ideologie, a avut o soartă mai indulgentă, deşi a reprezentat o *religie politică* cu consecinţe dramatice în istoria secolului XX! În august 1961, construirea unui mare Zid, care despărţea Berlinul în două, a marcat o ruptură politică între Ocidentul, care se definea democratic şi Estul communist, dar existenţa URSS şi a noilor state socialiste de după Cortina de Fier dovedeau că terenul era pregătit pentru marea utopie practică a comunismului. Slăbirea fermităţii contra comunismului s-a resimţit şi în atitudinea Bisericii catolice, pentru că, după 1960, toate enciclicele, apoi Conciliul Vatican II (1962-1965) au pus capăt cruciadei anticomuniste a Bisericii.[1]

Neliniştile politice legate de Răboiul Rece, au inspirat o serie de iniţiative politice, filosofice, ştiinţifice, culturale, dar nu mulţi au fost cercetătorii care s-au încumetat să decripteze ideologia comunistă, căci riscul de a fi desemnaţi adversari ideologici a fost imens, ca urmare a politizării tuturor activităţilor cultural- ştiinţifice. În Occident, mai ales în Franţa mulţi intelectuali şi politicieni, mai ales din tânăra generaţie, au devenit adepţi ferverţi ai lui Marx. Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus şi Simone de Beauvoir, simpatizanţi al marxismului, au reprezentat ghizii şi modelele ce au inspirat noile generaţii de tineri intelectuali occidentali. Fascinaţia marxismului s-a bazat pe fixarea unor idealuri şi directive utopice şi pe o pretinsă flexibilitate în tactică şi în practică, care lipsea capitalismului. Fără a sesiza că această, aşa-zisă flexibilitate, acoperea arbitrariul, simpatizanţii marxismului au găsit alternativa radicală pentru critica capitalismului "ruinat", în contrast cu un comunism ce părea durabil, solid şi expansiv. Sub masca unui limbaj politico-filosofic marxismul oferea proiecţia unei eschatologii optimiste, care urma să satisfăcă păturile dezavantajate material, dar şi pe intelectualii care criticau *alienarea*, ce semnifica limitarea posibilităţilor umane. Generaţia tânără a anilor'60 rezulta masiv din exodul rural generalizat, de aceea nu s-a regăsit în atmosfera frustrantă a marilor oraşe universitare occidentale, devenind sursa unor mutaţii inexorabile. Mai 1968, avea să apară ca un moment revoluţionar, un eveniment fondator, care punea capăt unei lumi capitaliste, considerată drept rău construită. *Revoluţia juvenilă* din '68 a deschis *era* unor atitudini noi şi individualiste faţă de autoritate, norme, comportamente, tradiţii şi valori. Schimbarea *aerului timpului* a fost ideologică, favorabilă curentului stângist, iar în această schimbare războiul din Vietnam

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[1] S. Nicoară, *O istorie a secularizării. Avatarurile creştinismului şi triumfalismul mesianismelor noilor ere*, vol 2, Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Accent, 2006, p. 313-314, 318, 324-327.

a avut un rol decisiv! Propaganda stângistă, care condamna în termeni duri războiul din Indochina a dus la *irigarea politică stângistă* a generațiilor de la sfîrşitul secolului XX.[2]

În ultimele decenii, mai ales în orizontul istoriografic occidental, a avut loc o evoluție de la analiza discursului ca procedură de lectură la cea ca *disciplină interpretativă*. În acest sens un rol important l-a avut afirmarea istoriei mentalităților, cu exigenețe interdisciplinare explicite şi cu interes prioritar în sondarea dimensiunilor mentale.[3] În România analiza comunismului s-a dezvoltat abia după 1989 şi cu mare dificultate pentru că cercetătorii comunismului au fost deseori etichetați drept "vânători de vrăjitoare", de către mulți nostalgici ai vechiului regim, care au rămas tentați să vadă mari realizări şi succese ale Romîniei ceauşiste, acolo unde erau doar fragile improvizații sau răsunătoare eşecuri. Pentru cercetarea fenomenului comunist analiza discursului ideologic reprezintă o formă rafinată de investigație, de interpretare a formelor de limbaj, de înțelegere a forței ideologice. Mai ales prin limbajul cu pretenție ştiințifică, ideologia comunistă şi-a exercitat impactul practic, emotiv şi normativ.[4]

Cercetarea comparatistă, reflecția istorico-antropologică, analiza sociologică contemporană relevă, împreună, complexitatea şi ambiguitatea fenomenului comunist, o experiență dramatică, ce suscită încă dezbateri polemice şi reevaluări permanente. Metoda analizei discursului ideologic a fost suspectată de unii istorici ca o tehnică prea complicată, dar cei care au folosit-o au considerat-o benefică pentru dezvăluirea unor noi nuanțe în conținutul mentalității ideologice. Introducerea, după lungi tatonări şi reconsiderări, a analizei discursului în istorie a generat incontestabil un progres în dezvoltarea capacității de interpretare a trecutului. Dincolo de sensul imediat al vocabularului, istoricul desoperă concepții, reprezentări, simboluri, adică un imaginar politic camuflat în formule dezgolite de sensul familiar, opțiuni politice sau indicii ale unui comportament politic ce miza pe autoritate şi supunere necondiționată. *Geometria* ideologiei comuniste (tocmai pentru că este un instrument al reacției contra adversarului) nu poate fi înțeleasă fără a se ține cont că reprezintă un discurs al luptei intransigente față de întreaga tradiție politico-culturală şi purtătorii acesteia. Istoricul pune în relație documente, compară descrieri eterogene, dar înțelegerea discursului comunist s-a dovedit extrem de complicată, pentru că camuflează realitățile concrete. O analiză a discursului comunist porneşte de la rolul limbajului în politică, de la relația dintre limbaj şi ideologie, limbaj şi putere, de la folosirea acestora pentru evocarea convingerilor politice. Analiza acestui

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[2] J.-F.Sirinelli, *Génération '68*, în "Histoire", nr. 274, mars 2003, p. 66-67.S. Nicoară, *op. cit.*, p. 324-325

[3] Istorici ai mentalităților, ca Roger Chartier, Robert Mandrou, Michel Vovelle, etc, dar şi istorici ai politicii ca Antoine Prost au oferit perspectiva unei schimbări de metodă, care depăşea pe cea marxistă, bazată deseori pe o viziune simplistă şi pătrundea în profunzimile textelor istorice.

[4] Delia Marga, *Introducere în analiza discursului. Cu referire la istorie şi sfera publică*, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Fundaţiei pentru Studii Europene, Cluj-Napoca, 2003, p. 159. Cf. Charles Morris, *Fundamentele teoriei semnelor*, trad. D. Marga, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Fundaţiei pentru Studii Europene, 2003, p.1 33-135.

discurs, ca obiect istoric şi lingvistic, ca sistem de idei, de constrângeri seman-
tice articulate ideologic, permite înţelegerea subânţelesurilor, a conotaţiilor, a
structurii argumentării, aspecte care depăşesc simpla trasmitere de informaţii.
Rolul limbajului politico-ideologic comunist a fost acela de a articula artificial,
prin propagandă sistematică şi agresivă ideologia comunistă, la realităţile şi
mentalităţile româneşti. O ideologie comunistă care s-a vrut o manieră de gân-
dire colectivă, care şi-a asociat un pretins fundament ştiinţific, raţional pentru
a-şi disimula erorile, abuzurile, făţărnicia, minciuna, nu putea avea impact în
mentalităţi, care se schimbă lent, decât prin monopolizarea întregii culturi şi a
întregului cotidian.[5]

Comunismul de tip sovietic, dogmatic, mesianic şi profetic, inaugurat în
România de comuniştii docili lui Stalin şi Uniunii Sovietice după 1946-1947
şi care a durat până la începutul anilor `58-`60 a fost o galopantă *stalinizare*
ideologică şi practică, după modelul şi realizările *marii prietene de la răsărit*.[6]
După al doilea război modial fobia contra fascismului şi a nazismului a atenuat
opoziţia faţă de socialism, mai ales că noile regimuri, care s-au instalat inclusiv
în România după 1947 s-au autointitulat al *democraţiei populare*. Această abilă
glisare terminologică de care au uzat promotorii noii puteri comunisto-staliniste
au înşelat opinia publică, internă şi internaţională,ce vedea naşterea unui noi
sistem, opus celui care se făcuse într-un fel culpabil de traumele războiului
mondial. Prin participarea lor, chiar şi sumară la înfrângerea fascismului şi a
nazismului, comuniştii au primit un credit de care au profitatat din plin. Toată
propaganda stalinistă de după 1945 din România s-a axat pe un prometeianism
tehnic şi pe un voluntarism colectiv, surprins în verbe ca: produceţi, edificaţi,
construiţi, transformaţi, îndepliniţi planul, ajungeţi din urmă sau chiar depăşiţi
capitalismul, etc, ca o condiţie a accelerării mersului spre viitorul fericit! Paridul
comunist, camuflat în denumirea de *muncitoresc*, a evoluat de la "detaşament" al
clasei muncitoare la "avangardă", pentru ca la sfârşitul anilor `50 să devină par-
tidul unic. Modelul membrului de partid era *omul nou*, eroul, imagine centrală
a prometeianismului stalinian: stahanovistul, soldatul eroic, sportivul care bate
recordurile, mama exemplară, pionierul, deja conştient de responsabilitatea faţă
de colectivitate, etc. *Omul nou* sugera forţă, curaj, patriotism, devotament faţă
de Stat şi Partidul comunist. Literatura, arta, presa din anii `50 exemplifica vig-
uros pe *omul sovietic*, "capitalul" cel mai preţios , descris ca o culme a evoluţiei
şi a perfecţiunii umane, o chintesenţă a virtuţilor umane şi cetăţeneşti, o forţă
uriaşă, de nestăvilit contra naturii.[7]

Glisarea, imediat după al doilea război, a ipotezelor marxiste spre dogmatis-

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[5] N. Niţescu, *Sub zodia proletcultismului. Dialectica puterii*, Buc., Ed. Humanitas, 1995,
p. 354.

[6] Florin Constantiniu, Mihail E. Ionescu, *Planul sovietic de comunizare a României (martie
1945)*, "Revista istorică, 4, Buc., 1993, nr. 7-8, p. 657-661. Dinu. C. Giurescu, *Căderea
în comunism. Cum a fost înlăturat guvernul Rădescu? (februarie 1945*), Magazin istoric, 27,
Buc., 1993, nr. 2, p. 22-29.

[7] *Miturile comunismului românesc*, p. 46-58. Cf. J.-P. Sironneau, op. cit., p. 397-399.
Jean- François Soulet, *Istoria comparată a statelor comuniste din 1945 până în zilele noas-
tre*, Iaşi, Polirom, 1998, p. 13.

mul stalinian a făcut posibilă şi la noi vehicularea acelor propoziţii ştiinţifice şi filosofice, sustrase criticii şi constituirea lor într-un domeniu separat, imuabil, intangibil, cel al cetitudinii absolute, al adevărului integral,al sacrul secularizat. Dogamtismul stalinian însemna, ca şi cel marxist-leninist, formularea de idei clare, precise, neinterpretabile, adevăruri absolute, popularizate prin "catehis-mele staliniene". *Ideocraţia staliniană*, puterea care invoca o ideologie "ştiinţifică" şi pretindea tuturor să se conformeze la ea, interzicea pluralitatea de puncte de vedere filosofice, istorice etc, refuza să se supună verdictului experienţei. Orice dogmă seculară, stalinismul a funcţionat în afara unei confruntări cu realul, pretinzând că ea reprezintă soluţia rezolvărilor.[8]

Limbajul ideologic al comunismului a reprezentat o importantă faţetă a sce-nei politice, fiind nu numai un instrument de descriere partizană a realităţilor, a evenimentelor, ci el însuşi a fost un eveniment mediatizat, *un element fun-damenta*l *al reuşitei politice* după cel de-al doilea război mondial. Deşi Româ-nia postbelică trecea prin dificultăţi complexe şi dramatice, în 1948 Mihail Roller scria în *Istoria RPR*, despre "succesele obţinute de regimul de democraţie populară pe tărâmul construirii socialismuliui," justifcând *ascuţirea luptei de clasă*, prin înverşunarea cu care rezistau *duşmanii poporului muncitor*.[9] În spa-tele discursului politic s-au asundeau manevrele calculate ale sovieticilor, care încurajând venirea la putere a comuniştilor - încă din 1944, când au pus mâna pe unele sectoare cheie (justiţie, armată, interne)- au folosit acest "cal troian" pentru propriul control stalinist asupra României.[10]

Prezenţa unui discurs ideologic didactic şi militant, în care aserţiunile au fost simple, minimale, de tipul "puterea este în mâna clasei muncitoare", iar soluţiile directe, a demonstrat prezenţa unei veritabile "gramatici ideologice"ce propunea în anii '50 o punere în scenă a dictaturii proletare şi a proletcult-ismului, ce trebuia asociat întregii societăţi româneşti. Folosirea unor termeni obscuri, ai unor construcţii ambigue în discursul politico-ideologic comunist s-a datorat, nu numai funcţiei sale explicative, ci mai ales *incitative*, presative. Denumirea de *forţe reacţionare*, de *ticăloşi, spioni, asasini, agenturi*, atribuită fostelor partide istorice, de demascare a acţiunilor lor drept duşmănoase, opuse scopurilor *oamenilor muncii*, avea menirea să adâncească păpastia faţă de duşmanii comunismului, care trebuiau *zădrobiţi, izolaţi, demascaţi*.[11] Folosi-rea unor termeni îmbrăcaţi într-o nouă conotaţie, complet negativă ca burghez, moşier, capitalist au avut efect explicativ şi incitativ, iar strategia lingvistică de simplificare sau de sloganizare a expresiilor verbale, dirijismul lingvistic au slu-jit ca tehnică eficientă de modelare mentală a societăţii. Ca să disloce o mentali-tate "capitalistă" revoluţionarii sovietismului au impus noi mituri şi simboluri,

[8] Jean-Pierre Sironneau, *Sécularisation et religions politiques*, Paris, Mouton, 1982, p. 403-409.

[9] M. Roller, *Istoria RPR*, Buc., Ed. de Stat Didactică şi Pedagogică, ediţia 1952, p. 737. D. Marga, *op. cit.*, p. 383-385.

[10] Vezi *Comunismo e comunismi. Il modello rumeno.* Atti del convegno di Messina, 3-4 mag-gio 2004, a cura di Gh. Mândrescu, G. Altarozzi, Accent, 2005.

[11] M. Roller, *Istoria RPR*, p. 739-740. D. Marga, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

de aceea stăpânirea limbajului a fost o miză fundamentală. Prezenta miturilor în discursul politico-ideologic, cel al marelui conducător, al partidului, al omului nou sovietic s-a explicat în anii ʹ50 prin nevoia de unitate nezdruncinată în fața adversarului capitalist, al dușmanului conspirator. Acest gen de discurs neliniștitor a avut rolul de a face din aceste teme niște convingeri larg asumate. În dualismul stalinian polarizarea binelui și al răului se suprapunea asupra claselor, conflictul rezolvându-se prin desființarea adversarilor dictaturii clasei muncitoare.

Ca să poată să se impună și să reziste edificiul dogmatic stalinian a desființat ereziile ideologice, i-a eliminat pe opozanți.Partidul Muncitores Român s-a pretins "avangarda conștientă a clasei muncitoare", *instrumentul mesianic* al acesteia. Utopia unei "vieți noi", (cuvântul *modern* fiind interzis ca fiind burghez și înlocuit cu termenul de *nou*) putătoare de speranță, rupea continuitatea cu istoria modernă românească, ascundea realitatea unuiu univers totalitar, concentraționar, închis și autarhic, care s-a creat, s-a reprodus pe el însuși, însemnând fericirea individuală sacrificată celei colective planificate, raționalizate, exaltarea rolului regulator și autoritar al Partidului și Statului.[12]

Deși a utilizat limbajul "popular" discursul ideologic comunist a apelat consecvent la proceduri persuasive, de genul mascării, conivenței sau a simulării. Este binecunoscut discursul politic *în numele Partidului,* condus de o elită, "putătoare de cuvânt", care vorbea și decidea în numele clasei muncitoare! Deținător al poziției politice, *Partidul* a istrumentalizat propriile concepte de adevăr și cunoaștere, a folosit, pentru fiecare etapă lozinci *adecvate*, ceea ce a constituit tactica dogmatică, necesară legitimării și propagandei sale.[13] Propaganda comunistă a fost concepută ca o aplicare a unei doctrine cu pretenții științifice, de aceea studiul cuvintelor, dar și a enunțurilor dezvăluie un *principiu al imanenței* care a traversat permenent discursul comunist. Sloganele despre desființarea fermă a exploatării, apărarea contra imperialismului, ridicarea permanentă a nivelului de trai și a gradului de civilizație au fost utilizate pentru a justifica lupta intransigentă contra opoziției. Numai că, după 1947 opoziția "burghezo-moșierească" nu a avut mijloacele eficiente pentru a rezista, iar în anii `50 a fost brutal redusă la tăcere. Deși *dușmanul de clasă* era sufocat sau distrus discursul comunist continua să-l prezinte ca pe un monstru conspirativ contra căruia trebuia să se ia cele mai intransigente măsuri.[14] Așadar, aspectul fundamental al discusului comunist a fost cel *conflictual*, care se referea la alterițățile politico-ideologice, pe care le-a atacat, respins și descalificat. Discursul despre adversarii "burgezo-moșierești" a fost tălmăcit, trunchiat, falsificat,

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[12] M. Nițescu, op. cit., p. 136-138. Daniel Barbu, *Destinul colectiv, servitutea involuntară, nefericirea totalitară: trei mituri ale comunismului românesc*, în *Miturile comunismului românesc,* sub dir. lui Lucian Boia, București, Editura Nemira, 1998, p. 176-177. J.-P. Sironneau, *op. cit.*, p. 359, 392-394, 414, 419-420, 429.

[13] N. Nițescu, *op.cit.*, p. 353. *Miturile comunismului românesc*, p. 5, 18. Cf. D. Marga, *op. cit.*, p. 150-151, 160-220. J.-P. Sironneau, *Sécularisation et religions politiques*, p. 374.

[14] Nicu Ioniță, *Detenția-factor de psihopatizare a personalității*, în "Analele Sighet", 2000, 8, p. 149-157. *Mitologia științifică a comunismului,* p. 200. D. Marga, *Introducere în analiza discursului*, p. 437.

prezentat ca un discurs al trădării, de aceea a avut consistența unei *sentințe* de condamnare la moarte. Acest discurs a vizat neutralizarea reală a partidelor istorice, aorganizațiilor publice, a instituțiilor culturale, asociațiilor profesionale etc. Confiscarea averilor celor recalcitranți, întemnițarea vechii clase politice și a intelectualității cu vederi democratice a însemnat dărâmarea sistematică a vechilor structuri, o *tabula rasa* care permitea instaurarea noii ordini.

Complexul de inferioritate a noii puteri comuniste de după 1947, spaima în fața libertății de conştiință a deschis calea *proletcultismului*, a unei pseudo-culturi care a metamorfozat în folosul ideologic comunist toată tradiția culturală, ştiinţifică, artistică autohtonă. Clasa muncitoare nu trebuia să moştenească nimic de la burghezo-moşierime, ea trebuia să ia totul de la început! Veteranii proletcultismului, care s-au manifestat intens chiar după 1947, şi-au creat prozeliți încadrați în "frontul ideologic" (expresie specifică limbajului proletcultist) şi au fost răsplătiți cu funcții şi privilegii materiale, mărind treptat numărul parveniților noului regim.[15] Direcția de Propagandă şi Agitație a Comitetului Central al PMR şi-a asumat în 1956 rolul de a combate şi distruge orice influență a ideologiei capitaliste, prin îmbunătățirea "muncii ideologice", mai ales în rândul intelectualilor, aşa cum se menționa în *Scânteia* din mai 1956. Politizarea culturii a avut efecte agresive asupra "ereziilor" literare sau artistice. Pentru a se da un exemplu de erezie ideologică, de cochetare cu ideile liberale s-a înscenat "cazul Jar", un scriitor mediocru vinovat de "acțiune potrivnică" la adresa Partidului. În ziarul *Scânteia* din iunie 1956 a apărut o aşa-zisă demascare a *cazului Jar*, un individ "nesincer față de partid", un "fățarnic", care "a susținut neadevărul că partidul îi educă pe comunişti să devină laşi şi să se lipsească de orice inițiativă. Jar a îndrăznit să declare un "neadevăr cumplit" şi anume că membrii de partid "gândesc din ce în ce mai puțin" sau într-un anume interviu "a răspândit minciuna cum că în țara noastră s-ar practica represiuni politice împotriva scriitorilor". Acest lucru se întâmpla cu adevărat în Romania anilor `50, dar discursul de demascare a "neadevărurilor" duşmanilor, convertea pervers sensul realităților! Sacrificarea lui Jar prin excluderea din Partid trebuia să aibă un efect purificator, demonstrând mai ales "tăria şi unitatea rândurilor" şi capacitatea de a se curăța de cei care se ridicau împotriva liniei partidului, se foloseau de "arma provocării şi a calomniei"(*Scânteia*, iunie 1956). Mizând pe lipsa posibilității la replică a adversarului politic, mesajul propagandei militante comuniste, demascarea, ironia, îi asigura acestuia culpabilitatea, responsabilitatea trădării, ceea ce presupunea a-l îndepărta din poziția pe care ar fi deținut-o în mentalitatea publică. Toate aceste mijloace lingvistice de manipulare au reprezentat strategia unui război invizibil, o manieră perversă de argumentare şi legitimare a autorității comuniste. Confiscarea limbajului, monopolizarea cuvântului a fost instrumente de putere, eficiente în condițiile

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[15] M. Nițescu, *op. cit.*, p. 122, 145, 374-376. Claudiu Degeratu, *Cadre de partid. Mecanisme de selecție, pregătireşi promovare. Bibliografie selectivă, 1948-1983,* "Arhivele totalitarismului", 1993, 1, nr. 1, p. 190-194. Mihai Dinu Gheorghiu, *Formarea cadrelor conducătoare în România - direcții de cercetare*, "Xenopoliana", 1993, 1, nr. 1-4, p. 101-112.

cenzurii, a reprimării oricărei tentative de exprimare liberă a opoziției.[16]

Specializarea limbajului, sărăcirea voită a acestuia, limitarea posibilităților de alegere a cuvintelor au însemnat o strategie de reprimare violentă a gândirii sociale. *Limba de lemn* a regimului comunist, în care se regăsea metafora luptei dintre buni și răi sau reprezentarea organică a regimului, definit ca matur, planificat, dezvoltat etc. tocmai prin ambiguitatea ei oculta realitatea românească. Una dintre expresiile centrale ale limbajului comunist a fost *lupta poporului muncitor pentru făurirea unei lumi noi*, un proiect propus credibilității și responsabilității colective! Îndoctrinarea, care viza schimbarea limbajului și constrângerea lingvistică ce reprima orice gândire liberă și propaganda în sensul implementării noului cod ideologic au însemnat profunde alterări ale limbajului cultural. Alinierea ideologică la stalinism, campania de sovietizare a impus partidului exigențe dure în politica culturală după 1947.

"Renașterea "mentală și culturală a fost inaugurată mai întâi prin interzicerea presei partidelor burgheze în august în august 1947, pentru ca, după decembrie 1947, să se pună capăt aparentei toleranțe prin interzicea și selectarea riguroasă a producției culturale. *Putrefacția* culturii burgheze era termenul uzual folosit în ziarul *Scânteia*, de la începutul anului 1948. În ianuarie 1948 și revista *Flacăra* a proclamat solemn începerea *dictaturii proletariatului* și s-a declarat o "baricadă ideologică împotriva forțelor imperialiste și antidemocratice, care asigura combaterea și demascarea necruțătoare a ideologiei burgheze și imperialiste, a artei și literaturii decadente.Intelectualii, artiștii, scriitorii, care nu fuseseră sau nu acceptaseră înrolarea în rândul comuniștilor au fost înghesuiți, alături de oamenii politici în rândul păturii "reacționare," contra căreia s-a dezlănțuit furia "luptei de clasă". Noile creații literare au fost considerate o expresie a *democratizării* vieții culturale, până atunci elitiste ori individualiste, "putrede" și cosmopolite. În Raportul Uniunii Scriitorilor din iunie 1956, Mihai Beniuc preciza că "partidul a trebuit să acționeze imediat după 1944 "pentru a pune capăt *antirealismului* din cultură, pentru a pune cultura pe criteriul *realismului socialist*, pe cunoașterea "progresivă a ideologiei marxist-leniniste, dar și pe "aprofundarea limbii ruse"![17]

Reforma școlară din 1948 și pretinsele acțiuni de combatere a analfabetismului au fost manevre de inoculare a ideologiei staliniste, dar și de formare a unei generații noi de intelectuali, care să promoveze *limba de lemn* și *realismul socialist*. În 1953 șeful PMR, Gheorghe Georghiu-Dej se pretindea "dușmanul oricărei nivelări sau egalizări mecanice în materie de creație," *realismul socialist* oferind chiar "cele mai largi posibilități de manifestare" a personalității creatorului. Prioritară era pentru Dej, "realitatea noastră socială și economică"! În același Congres în care vorbise Dej, Miron Constantinescu pomenea de pericolele devierii de la ideologia partidului, a unor inamici, anarhiști sau incompetenți în cultură

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[16] Anneli Ute Gabanyi, *Literatura și politica în Romania după 1945*, trad., I. Cristescu, Buc., Ed. Fundației Culturale romane, 2001, p. 57-58. D. Marga, *Introducere în analiza discursului*, p. 290-292, 446.

[17] A. U. Gabanyi, op. cit., p. 20, 22-23, 30-32. Victor Frunză, *Istoria stalinismului în Romania*, Buc., Humanitas, 1990, p. 171-178.

şi politică. În *Scânteia* din iunie 1956 Dej pare să-şi schimbe atitudinea, fiind dispus să admită *lupta de opinii, bazată pe convingeri reale*. Era doar o manevră abilă (de după moartea lui Stalin, în 1953, ce sugera oarecare destindere a strânsorii dogmatismului stalinist!), pentru că în paginile aceluiaşi ziar, liberalismul, naţionalismul, apolitismul au fost etichetate ferm drept *confuzii ideologice*. Anii 1957- 1958 au coincis cu o înăsprire a demersului ideologic şi cultural-politic, pentru a contracara efectele revizionismului, - înţeles ca o revenire la o anumită tradiţie antecomunistă, - ale influenţelor ideologice străine, dar şi a apolitismului; de aceea, "linia ideologică şi cultural-politică a devenit de-acum obligatorie," nota *Scânteia*, din iulie 1958. Pentru aşa-numitele confuzii ideologice în 1957 mulţi intelectuali, precum C. Noica, I. Negoiţescu, N. Balotă, Al. Paleologu, Şt. Augustin Doinaţi, V. Voiculescu au fost arestaţi şi închişi, iar alţii discreditaţi. Şi Lucian Blaga a fost ţinta discreditării iar printre cei care l-au atacat s-a aflat Mihai Beniuc, care îl eticheta drept un mistic stupid, vinovat de a fi duşman al marxismului. (*Gazeta literară*, februarie, 1959).[18] În acelaşi an, în aprilie 1959 un alt eveniment, mediatizat în presă s-a petrecut în Capitală: procesul demonstrativ" a ceea ce ziarul *Contemporanul* numea "epave ale trecutului", adică doi artişti, un compozitor şi o sculptoriţă, fostă elevă a lui Brâncuşi. Aceştia au fost expuşi demonstrativ judecăţii opinie publice, opinie reprezentată de lucrătorii din fabricile bucureştene. Ziarul a subliniat cu dispreţ descendenţa neproletară a iubitorului de artă modernă, precum compozitorul M. Andricu, şi a legăturii sculptoriţei cu arta occidentală, declarându-i pe ambii "avortoni ai istoriei, respingători şi penibili". Violenţa verbală a presei a încurajat o "mânie îndreptăţită" şi în săla de judecată a împricinaţilor, sală "plină de muncitori şi intelectuali" (*Contemporanul*, mai 1959). Şi ziarul *Scânteia* din septembrie 1959 lua atitudine faţă de pericolul alunecării spre liberalism, iar pentru a domoli o eventuală admiraţie faţă de anumiţi intelectuali şi faţă de creaţiile lor, organul propagandei comuniste sugera o critică severă asupra acestora pentru a se evita orice glisare ideologică. Violenţa limbajului contra celor demascaţi drept trădători culturali avea o încărcătură simbolică, sugerând martelarea acestora.[19]

Pe parcursul anilor `60 a început să se facă simţită chiar la nivelul Partidului, o nouă orientare a liniei politico-culturale, prin acordarea priorităţii de ordin naţional în faţa "internaţionalismului proletar", care-şi jucase cartea! Această mişcare abilă şi confuză a avut scopul de a spori credibilitatea partidului pe plan intern, dar şi de a consolida poziţia de autonomie faţă de Uniunea Sovietică. Discursul ideologic de după 1960 a fost cel al *timpului progres*, care se încarcă de realizarea ideilor cele mai avansate ale prezentului, dar care urmează neabătut calea fundamentală a marxist-leninismului, doctrină ce sugera trecerea la *imperiul libertăţii*, adică la "paradisul" comunist.[20] Noua linie politico-ideologică ce se afirma după anii `60 părea o "liberalizare", dar însemna o confuză aplicare creatoare a dogmatismul marxist-leninist la realităţile socialiste româneşti. De altfel,

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[18] *Ibidem*, p. 48-49, 56, 77, 84.

[19] *Ibidem*, p. 84-86.

[20] Bronislaw Baczko, *Les imaginnaire sociaux. Mémoire et espoirs collectifs*, Paris, Payot, 1984, p. 109, 137.

în raportul lui Dej la cel de-al III-lea Congres al PMR din iunie 1960 se camufla intenţia de accentuare a controlului şi a îndoctrinării publice prin expresia "atragerea marilor mase populare către o activitate conştientă, creatoare de istorie, (care-nn) conduce la creşterea însemnătăţii rolului activităţilor ideologice, precum şi acelor de educaţie politică".[21] În spatele acestui limbaj abstract se camufla noul stil al Partidului, stil ce a presupus o modificare a raportului dintre funcţionarii de partid şi specialiştii diverselor domenii sociale, care începeau să fie recrutaţi în Partid pentru a fi folosiţi eficient în scopuri ideologice şi propagandistice.

Exponenţii *epocii dogmatice* au fost trecuţi, nu fără reacţii de frustrare din partea lor, într-un plan secundar, încurajându-se o nouă generaţie de funcţionari şi de specialişti ai Partidului.S-a lansat ideea că nu mai era necesar un singur "ideolog şef" al Partidului, ci se accepta exprimarea "cu hotărâre" a opiniilor!Acest aer de "democratizare", de "liberalizare" în activitatea politică şi culturală a Partidului nu a însemnat o detaşare de principiile ideologice marxist-leniniste, o încercare de "confruntare" cu alte concepţii politice, ci mai degrabă o formă de autodemascare a opozanţilor. Gh.Gheorghiu-Dej lansa cu cinism, de la tribuna Congresului al III-lea al PMR, iunie 1960 ideea că "multă înţelegere şi răbdare" avusese partidul pentru intelectualitatea românească, pe care a ajutat-o "să se elibereze de balastul concepţiilor retrograde şi să îşi asume gândirea...marxist-leninistă. "Cinismul a fost o altă caracteristică consecventă a discursului politic comunist, fiind exprimat prin transferul culpabilităţii asupra victimelor, intelectuali, preoţi sau ţărani. "Deschiderea" strategică proclamată de Partid era o veritabilă închidere culturală, care a nu a fost sesizată de o parte a generaţei intelectuale, care s-a lăsat atrasă în jocurile abile ale Partidului. Acordarea acestei pseudo-libertăţi în plan spiritual şi cultural a fost o imensă capcană pentru intelectuali, care au confundat aparenta deschidere culturală cu posibilitate libertăţii de creaţie.

La Plenara Comitetului Central din noiembrie-decembrie 1961 modificarea statutelor Partidului avea să atragă în Partidul comunist noi funcţionari, intelectuali care să servească scopurilor propagandistice. După opinia lui Dej, artiştii şi intelectualii au venit de bună voie în întâmpinarea aşteptărilor culturale ale Partidului. În paginile ziarului *Scânteia* din 16 februarie 1964, se nota entuziasmul lui Dej că "cei mai însemnaţi oameni de ştiinţă, de cultură se numără astăzi în rândurile noastre, iar cei care nu sunt încă membrii de partid ne susţin şi lucrează cu dăruire la construirea economiei şi culturii socialiste." *Realismul socialist* îmbrăca în anii `60 o altă formă, se pretindea că îşi are izvorul în "noua realitate socialistă". Se insinua faptul, că creaţiile, cele mai cerute de public, erau cele pătrunse de "înaltul ideal al construirii socialismului!" Se invoca "asumarea moştenirii culturale", dar nu o "preluare subiectivă şi necritică", cu una care să facă "parte integrantă a luptei ideologice". (*Contemporanul*, iunie 1963). "Sintetizarea" creaţiilor" de valoare din trecutul nostru" însemna o selecţie şi chiar o deturnasre a semnificaţiilor acetora în folosul ideologic comunist. (*Viaţa Românească*, nr. 8, 1959). [22]

[21] Anneli Ute Gabanyi, *op. cit.,* p. 88.
[22] *Ibidem*, p. 90-92, 117.

"Spiritul înnoirii, dorința de a face cât mai mult", însemna în discursul politico-ideologic "conştinciozitate şi pasiune creatoare", iar "participarea masivă în conducerea efectivă" a activităților sociale însemna responsabilizarea tuturor celor care se angajaseră în slujba partidului. (*Buletinul Oficial al Marii Adunări Naționale*, iunie 1962). Instrumentul cenzurii, dar şi exigențele autocenzurii, au fos utilizate simultan, pentru a se combate rapid şi cu fermitate orice abatere de la linia cultural-ideologică a comunismului. În anul 1963, revista *Steaua* lua atitudine în numerele sale față de eventualele "influențe ale literaturii decadente" burgheze sau occidentale", de aceea se aduceau critici acelor scriitori prea liberali de la *Luceafărul* sau *Secolul XX*.[1] Cu ocazia unei conferințe naționale a partidului, care a avut loc la scurt timp după plenara de "destalinizare" a CC din noiembrie-decembrie 1961, chiar scriitorii s-au arătat preocupați de un plan de conformism tactic la ideologia partidului, care să evite atât abuzurile dogmatice, cât şi pe cele de "liberalizare" din anii `50! "Misiunea socială" a oamenilor de cultură rămânea tot cea "dictată de partid". Plenara Comitetului Central al PMR din 1961 marca, după agonia destalinizării formale de după 1953, aşa-zisa moarte a stalinismului în România, prin măsuri care puneau căpăt oricărei influențe sovietice, iar limba rusă şi contribuția armatei sovietice la eliberarea din 1944 nu mai erau recunoscute în 1962, (*Analele Institutului pentru Istoria partidului*, februarie, 1962). În 26 aprilie 1964 a fost emisă în plenul *Comitetului Central*, ca rezoluție istorică, declarația de independență față de Uniunea Sovietică! (*Scânteia*, 16 februarie 1964).[2] "Naționaliştii" nu au invocat explicit emanciparea de tutela rusească, ci o pretinsă investire în interesele şi specificul cultural autohton! Coarda patriotismului şi a naționalismului a avut rolul să mărească numărul susținătorilor, să creeze "baza de masă" a partidului comunist. Dar, abia după 1964, ca orice subiect ce fusese interzis sub amenințarea puşcăriei politice, *patria* şi-a găsit locul în limbajul ideologic comunist.[3]" Reluarea relațiilor politice, economice, culturale cu "lumea capitalistă", fusese anunțată de Dej încă din discursul din august 1960 din fața Marii Adunări Naționale, dar în acelaşi timp, consecvent liniei sale, Partidul comunist denunța "incapacitatea" capitalismului de a rezolva problemele sociale şi morale, o devalorizare care persevera în abordarea critică a orizonturilor occidentale.[4]

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[1] *Ibidem*, p. 95-97, 101-102, 131.

[2] Eugen Negrici, *Literatura romană sub comunism*, Proza, Buc., Editura Fundației PRO, 2003, p. 94-101.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 50. L. Boia, *Mitologia ştiințifică a comunismului*, p. 50. Naționalismul fusese ignorat cândva de Marx, dar reinvestirea unei mitologii a națiunii, însemna legitimarea pe valori şi simboluri ale trecutului autohton şi ancorarea în realitățile prezentului socialist. Nu era vorba de o continuare a vreuneia dintre tradițile naționaliste interbelice, ci de o reinvestire ambiguă a ideii naționale. *Liturghia naționalismului* a trecut pe primul plan în anii `60 deoarece inspira o conştiință comună, o credință colectivă, favorabilă chiar şi Bisericii ortodoxe, orientată spre un naționalism religios. În virtutea bazei teoretice a marxist leninismului s-a păstrat internaționalismul proletar şi solidaritatea privilegiată cu statele comuniste, percepute ca despărțite de un zid imaginar de restul lumii.

[4] *Comunismo e comunismi. Il modello rumeno.* Atti del convegno di Messina, 3-4 maggio 2004, a cura di Gh. Mândrescu, G. Altarozzi, Accent, 2005, p. 47-64.

Din cauza incapacității sau a capacității limitate de a modifica realul după scopurile sale, limbajul comunist a avut rolul de a *evoca*, în sensul magic al termenului, o realitate care nu exista. Discursul de *persuasiune*, bazat pe retorica manipulatorie, progagat în masă prin diferite mijloace literare, jurnalistice, educative a mizat pe efectul "picăturii chinezești"! Ca toate experiențele ideologice comuniste, comunismul românesc apare ca un discurs ideal, mereu amânat, acesta fiind mecanismul magic al neutralizării simbolice, al camuflării eșecurilor politicii comuniste în toate etapele sale.

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SPÓR O WILNO W LATACH 1919-21 A PRÓBA WSKRZESZENIA LITWY HISTORYCZNEJ, JAKO PAŃSTWA TRZECH NARODÓW

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Abstract

The rivalry over Wilno in 1919-1921 and an attempt to recreate historical Lithuania as the state of three nations

During World War I German Army occupied the area of former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which had became a part of Russia Empire after destruction of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. After Germany"s defeat in 1918, aspirations of different nations and political camps clashed there. The Red Army was marching to Wilno with the hope of creating the next soviet republic. The Lithuanians were defending the concept of an ethnic Lithuania with the bigger part of Vilnius province and with Wilno as its historical capital. Poles considered Wilno as Polish city, an important center of polish culture. Byelorussian politicians maintained that a significant portion of the local population spoke Byelorussian; on the other hand, majority of them were people with unclear national identity who usually called themselves "belonging to here". As for Jews, they were particularly prominent in the city of Wilno and they decided support Lithuanians. The pro-Lithuanian stance of Jews in Wilno was related to the concessions made by Lithuania to them in the sphere of national and cultural autonomy

Józef Piłsudski, the Head of Polish state, promoted international cooperation against Russian imperialism. The independent Ukraine together with Romania, Poland and Baltic States were to form an East European entente resisting the spreading of Bolshevik system to the West. Wilno was very important for Piłsudski"s plans as a capital city of so called historical Lithuania which should be constituted by three national cantons and closely connected to Polish state. Piłsudski"s attempt to create a multi ethnical state within the area of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania failed. Lithuanians rejected it, and most of Poles in Wilno demanded the Wilno province to be incorporated into Poland.

Unia Korony Polskiej z Wielkim Księstwem Litewskim miała ogromny wpływ na kształtowanie się stosunków kulturalnych, religijnych i politycznych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej, której znaczną połać zajmowało państwo Jagiellonów. Postępująca w tym czasie unifikacja stanu szlacheckiego – „narodu politycznego" Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów, nakładała się na zjawiska związane z charakterem historycznego państwa litewskiego. Państwo to jeszcze przed unią objęło olbrzymi obszar, nadając nazwę Litwy zdobytym ziemiom ruskim, a zarazem zaadaptowało mowę ruskiej ludności wchłoniętych ziem, jako język kancelarii Księstwa. Postępująca po zawarciu unii kulturalna polonizacja warstw wyższych i polski charakter Kościoła Rzymsko-Katolickiego w Rzeczypospolitej, zaowocowały na tym terenie ukształtowaniem się – przede wszystkim wśród przedstawicieli stanu szlacheckiego - świadomości dwuszczeblowej (gente Lithuani natione Poloni)[5]. Funkcjonowanie demokracji szlacheckiej, a także znaczna rola magnatów litewskich we wspólnym państwie, sprzyjały podtrzymywaniu - wśród polonizujących się kulturowo warstw wyższych - świadomości historycznej tradycji ziem litewskobiałoruskich, przy równoczesnej akceptacji wspólnoty politycznej Rzeczypospolitej. Aż po początki XIX wieku ludność chłopska ziem litewsko-białoruskich utrzymała swoją odrębność językową, choć zarazem trwał w jej łonie proces cofania się języka litewskiego przed językiem białoruskim.

Po rozbiorach Rzeczypospolitej, gdy ziemie b. Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego przypadły Rosji (tzw. „Ziemie Zabrane"), na przestrzeni XIX wieku zaszły na tym terenie istotne przeobrażenia. Pod koniec XIX wieku ludność litewskojęzyczna zamieszkiwała przede wszystkim gubernię kowieńską, ludność białoruska, zazwyczaj identyfikująca się wyznaniowo (katolicy – „polskiej wiary", prawosławni – „ruskiej wiary) i określająca się jako „tutejsi" – stanowiła znaczną część mieszkańców guberni grodzieńskiej. W obu guberniach istniały spore enklawy języka polskiego, obejmujące dwory i okolice szlacheckie, w znacznej części miasta i okolice podmiejskie. Na terenie guberni wileńskiej znajdował się obszar pogranicza językowego polsko-litewsko-białoruskiego, a samo Wilno było ważnym ośrodkiem polskiej kultury, choć pod rządami rosyjskimi, na skutek antypolskich, a zarazem antykatolickich zarządzeń, postępowała zewnętrzna rusyfikacja. Pomimo politycznej dyskryminacji polskości na „Ziemiach Zabranych", po upadku powstania styczniowego (1863-1865) dokonywała się w dalszym ciągu slawizacja ludności litewskojęzycznej, zamieszkującej w okolicach Wilna. Przejmowana przez wioski litewskie „prosta mowa" (którą określić można jako wariant języka białoruskiego, nasycony polonizmami oraz adaptacjami z innych języków używanych w guberniach zachodnich imperium rosyjskiego) służyła jako interdialekt, język porozumienia Litwinów z różnymi nacjami słowiańskimi (Polakami, Białorusinami, Rosjanami). Coraz częściej mowa „po prostu" traktowana była przez katolicką ludność wiejską jako odmiana pospolita, codzienna, mowy polskiej, używanej w kościołach jako język kazań i nabożeństwa dodatkowego oraz język warstw wyższych. Zjawisko to miało związek z rywalizacją katolicyzmu i prawosławia , utożsamianych w pojęciu ludu jako - odpowiednio – „polska" i „ruska" wiara. Szlachta zaściankowa (zwa-

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[5] J. Bardach, *O dawnej i niedawnej Litwie*, Poznań 1988, s. 201-211.

na też zagrodową, szaraczkową, siermiężną), zamieszkująca osady szlacheckie, tzw. zaścianki i okolice, choć w wielu przypadkach równolegle używała „na co dzień" mowy prostej, była – zarówno w oczach władz rosyjskich, jak i licznych pamiętnikarzy - ostoją polskiej tożsamości. Dotyczyło to również szlachty z tradycji, ludzi, „którzy urzędowo już praw szlacheckich nie mają, bo się nie zdołali wylegitymować (...) lecz przechowują tradycje swego szlachectwa z ojca na syna i uważają się za lepszych spośród tłumu włościan" –notował swoje obserwacje Michał Römer. – „Wszystkie te zastępy drobnej szlachty, żyjące śród rdzennie litewskiej ludności włościańskiej i z natury rzeczy obcujące z nią w życiu codziennym, na gruncie bieżących potrzeb i wzajemnej wymiany usług, uważają się wszakże przeważnie za Polaków i używają języka polskiego bądź w życiu domowym, bądź przynajmniej we wzajemnych stosunkach towarzyskich; język polski jest u nich cechą ogłady towarzyskiej, oznaką pewnej arystokracji, pewnej wyższości kultury. (...) Niższe szeregi drobnoszlacheckie (...)– łączą się z włościanami w małżeństwach, obcują z nimi towarzysko"[6]. Codzienne kontakty owocowały rozszerzaniem się wpływów polskich, ciążeniem wielu jednostek spośród chłopów, czasem całych osad, do polskiej kultury i języka. Wobec mocno zakorzenionego związku szlachectwa z polską identyfikacją, a zarazem bliskości kulturowej i braku barier materialnych, dzielących wsie i zaścianki oraz „okolice", szlachta zaściankowa była rozsadnikiem polskości na wielu obszarach Wileńszczyzny. Ślady tych związków są m.in. dostrzegalne w badaniach językowych prowadzonych współcześnie na obszarze Litwy. Wynika z nich na przykład, że część wiosek, gdzie mówi się po polsku, określana jest lokalnie:„przy szlachcie"[7].

Na lata represji po powstaniu styczniowym przypadł okres rodzenia się nowoczesnego narodu litewskiego. Przywódcy litewskiego ruchu odrodzenia narodowego, oparli budowę tożsamości narodowej litewskiej na fundamencie etniczno-językowym i eksponowaniu konfliktu społecznego między litewskim chłopem a panem, czyli zazwyczaj Polakiem. W kształtowaniu nowoczesnej tożsamości narodowej w drugiej połowie XIX i na przełomie XIX/XX wieku najważniejszym warunkiem powodzenia okazywało się wyraźne odgraniczenie społeczności litewskiej od polskiej kultury, języka i tradycji politycznej[8]. Pokonując bariery zakazów administracji rosyjskiej, uderzających w Litwinów, bowiem dyskryminujących Kościół katolicki i kulturę łacińską (dotkliwy był przede wszystkim zakaz druku książek litewskich czcionką łacińską), działacze litewscy zajmowali się szerzeniem oświaty i kultury narodowej. Orężem w tej

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[6] M. Römer, Litwa. *Studium o odrodzeniu narodu litewskiego*, Lwów 1908, s. 22-23.

[7] M. Krupowies, *Repertuar wokalny a identyfikacja etniczna i kulturowa ludności polskojęzycznych terenów Litwy* /w:/ Józef Porayski-Pomsta /red./, *Sytuacja językowa na Wileńszczyźnie*, Warszawa 1999, s. 43-44; por. Z. Sawaniewska- Mochowa, *Socjolekt drobnej szlachty na Litwie* (próba ogólniejszej charakterystyki) /w:/ *Języki mniejszości i języki regionalne*, pod red. E. Wrocławskiej i J. Zieniukowej, Warszawa 2003, s. 275-285.

[8] D. Staliūnas, *Wilno czy Kowno? Problem centrum narodowego Litwinów na początku XX w.* /w:/ *Nacjonalizm a tożsamość narodowa w Europie Środkowo Wschodniej w XIX i XX w.*, pod red. Bernarda Linka i Kaia Struve, Opole, Marburg 2000, s. 259.

walce stało się rozpowszechnianie książek, kalendarzy, czasopism, wydawnictw religijnych, drukowanych poza granicami imperium rosyjskiego, najczęściej na terenie Litwy Pruskiej, które następnie - przemycane przez granicę - były kolportowane wśród ludu. Ofiarność uczestników i zasięg tego, trwającego czterdzieści lat ruchu „nosicieli książek", przesądziły o niepowodzeniu zaplanowanej przez władze akcji rusyfikacyjnej i przyczyniły się do rozwinięcia wśród ludności wiejskiej na Litwie szerokiej akcji samokształcenia w języku rodzimym[9].

Młody ruch litewski uznał ostre oddzielenie się od polskości za zabezpieczenie przed postępującą polonizacją Litwinów. Zagrożenie polonizacją, wobec ugruntowanej przez wspólną tradycję państwowo-kościelną siły i atrakcyjności kultury polskiej, jawiło się jako znacznie bardziej poważne niż ewentualność rusyfikacji. Rozwój ruchu litewskiego i kierunek, jaki przyjął, zaskoczył i oburzył kręgi ziemiańskie, dla których dwuszczeblowa świadomość *gente Lithuani, natione Polonii*" była istotnym komponentem własnej tożsamości. Bezkompromisowe stanowisko przedstawicieli ruchu litewskiego właściwie nie pozostawiało możliwości osiągnięcia konsensusu – kształtowania nowoczesnej tożsamości litewskiej w oparciu o dwie kultury. Jeden z przywódców ruchu litewskiego *Aleksandras Dambrauskas (Adomas Jakštas) w ogłoszonej w 1902 roku broszurze: Głos Litwinów do młodej generacji magnatów, obywateli i szlachty na Litwie*, zażądał od przedstawicieli ziemian litewskich wyrzeczenia się języka polskiego. „Za prawdziwych Litwinów uważamy tylko tych, którzy używają mowy litewskiej"- podkreślał[10]. W innym miejscu autor ten wyrażał pogląd, iż z potomkami rodów litewskich, przyznającymi się do polskiej kultury „należy się obchodzić jak z chorymi. Ich polskość – to ciężka i niebezpieczna choroba umysłowa, bliska mani"[11].

Wielu ziemian na Litwie, początkowo często z sympatią obserwujących pierwszą fazę litewskiego odrodzenia narodowego, poczuło się odepchniętych od zataczającego coraz szersze kręgi ruchu litewskiego[12]. W patriarchalnych stosunkach prowincji litewskiej polski dwór współistniał z ludowym otoczeniem litewskim bądź białoruskim. Niemal do końca XIX wieku między Polakami i Białorusinami nie było poczucia narodowej obcości. Polacy w folklorze białoruskim nie występowali jako obcy[13]. Podobnie, lecz do czasu, rzecz miała się

[9] Szerzej zob. E. Aleksandravičius, A. Kulakauskas, *Pod władzą carów. Litwa w XIX wieku*, Kraków 2003, s.308-315.

[10] [A. Dambrauskas], *Głos Litwinów do młodej generacji magnatów, obywateli i szlachty na Litwie*, bm, bd. [Tylża 1902]; o reakcji strony polskiej zob. Jan Jurkiewicz, *Rozwój polskiej myśli politycznej na Litwie i Białorusi w latach 1905-1922*, Poznań, 1983, s.77-97.

[11] Adomas Jakštas /wł. A. Dambrauskas/, *Faktai ir principai*, „Draugija" 1911, nr 50, s. 165

[12] Charakterystyczna jest anegdota, zapisana przez Stanisława Mackiewicza o swym ojcu, który poczuł się ogromnie urażony, że jego, Litwina, nie chciano w organizacji litewskiej, jako nie znającego języka litewskiego. S. Mackiewicz-Cat, *Kto mnie wołał czego chciał*, Warszawa 1972, s.369-370.

[13] Smalanczuk Aleś, *Biełaruskija Paliaki abo Paliaki u Biełarusi? /w:/ Pogranicza języków – Pogranicza kultur*. Studia ofiarowane E. Smułkowej, pod red. A. Engelking i Romualda Huszczy, Warszawa 2003, s. 329

na terenach etnograficznie litewskich. Jak pisał przedstawiciel jednego z bardziej
znaczących rodów ziemiańskich na Litwie, Michał Römer: „Lud białoruski, jak
litewski, nie uważałem za coś dla mnie obcego; uważałem wszystko krajowe:
Litwinów u nas, Białorusinów na wschodzie Litwy historycznej, Polaków po
dworach i miastach – za jedną całość krajową, jeno różnojęzyczną"[14].

Znaczna część polskiego kulturowo ziemiaństwa na Litwie uczucia zaskocze-
nia i frustracji wyrażała ostro, atakując przywódców ruchu litewskiego, operując
uwłaczającym epitetem „Litwomani" i zarzucając, iż stali się instrumentem in-
trygi rosyjskiej. Jak zauważają socjologowie, nacjonalizm przypomina o etnicz-
nej różnorodności społeczeństwa, domaga się tolerancji i szacunku dla własnej
grupy etnicznej, ale często nie toleruje innych i odbiera jednostce możliwość
samodzielnego decydowania o przynależności do grupy[15]. Tak też Litwini,
uważając Wilno i okolice stolicy za obszar litewski, ludność zamieszkałą na tym
terenie uznawali za Litwinów „spolonizowanych", „zbiałorutenizowanych", zatem
oczywisty materiał, który można litewskości przywrócić[16]. Polacy z kolei niejed-
nokrotnie drwili z „Litwomanów" z powodu wyboru tożsamości litewskiej, widząc
w takim wyborze przede wszystkim dziwactwo, niezrozumiałą fanaberię.

Dalsze dzieje konfliktu, przenoszącego się m.in. do kościołów i przybierającego
charakter obfitującej w gorszące ekscesy rywalizacji o język dodatkowych
nabożeństw i śpiewów zaostrzyły antagonizm[17]. Sprzyjał on umocnieniu się wśród
części społeczności polskiej, głównie w miastach, ideologii nacjonalistycznej,
stanowił też oczywiste podłoże nacjonalizmu litewskiego. Konflikt polsko-litew-
ski cechowała postawa braku akceptacji dotychczasowego układu stosunków
międzyetnicznych[18]. W warunkach przeobrażeń społecznych, następujących po
uwłaszczeniu chłopów, potem w okresie zmian zachodzących w latach rewolucji
1905-1908, zwalczające się nacjonalizmy etniczne pociągały za sobą zaostrzenie
podziałów wcześniej słabo się rysujących.

Z programem utrzymania dotychczasowej jedności występowali na ziemiach
Litwy i Białorusi tzw. krajowcy[19]. „Krajem" rodzinnym były dla nich ziemie dawne-
go Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, w okresie zaborów, nomenklaturze adminis-

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[14] Cyt za: Sawicki Jan, *Od dwuszczeblowości do dwoistości litewsko-polskiej. Świadomość
narodowa Michała Romera* /w:/ *Wilno i Kresy północno-wschodnie*, t.1: *Historia i ludzkie
losy*, pod red. Elżbiety Feliksiak i Antoniego Mironowicza, Białystok 1996, s. 135.

[15] A. Sadowski, *Harmonia i konflikty na pograniczach* /w:/ *Pogranicza etniczne w Europie.
Harmonia i konflikty*, pod red. K. Krzysztofka i A. Sadowskiego, Białystok 2001, s.21-22.

[16] Por np. L. Wasilewski, *Kresy Wschodnie*, Warszawa-Kraków 1917, s. 86; R. Miknys,
*Problem kształtowania się nowoczesnego narodu Polaków litewskich w pierwszej połowie
XX wieku*. „Biuletyn Historii Pogranicza" [Białystok] 2000, nr 1, s. 21-32

[17] P. Łossowski, *Po tej i tamtej stronie Niemna. Stosunki polsko-litewskie 1883-1939*,
Warszawa 1985, s.53-56

[18] Zob. Jolanta Polakowska-Kujawa, *Narodowa, etniczna, postnarodowa identyfikacja a
obywatelstw*o, /w:/ *Nacjonalizm oraz konflikty etniczno-narodowe*, pod red. Jolanty Pola-
kowskiej-Kujawy, Warszawa 1999, s. 9-28

[19] Szerzej zob. J.Jurkiewicz, *Rozwój polskiej myśli politycznej...*; R. Miknys, *Stosunki pol-
sko-litewskie w wizji politycznej Krajowców*, „Zeszyty Historyczne" 1993, z. 104, s. 123-
129; *Krajowość – tradycje zgody narodów w dobie nacjonalizmów*, pod red. J. Jurkiewicza,
Poznań 1999.

tracji carskiej „*Siewiero-Zapadnyj Kraj*". Zgodnie z opinią Juliusza Bardacha: „Krajowcy uznawali prymat interesów całej ludności kraju nad interesami każdej z grup narodowościowych. Jednocześnie jako reprezentanci społeczności polskiej nie godzili się na traktowanie Polaków na Litwie jako mniejszości, lecz jako jednego z trzech elementów historyczno-państwowych i kulturotwórczych kraju. Hasło całości i niepodległości Litwy historycznej łączyli oni z postulatem równouprawnienia wszystkich zamieszkujących kraj narodowości"[20]. Jedna z wybitnych wyrazicielek koncepcji krajowej, Konstancja Skirmunt pisała: „Idea krajowa jest harmonią trzech odwiecznych żywiołów kraju naszego: litewskiego (łącznie z łotewskim), polskiego i rusińskiego, w ich odwiecznej ojczyźnie Litwie i Białorusi; jest zgodą tych żywiołów w pracy publicznej wspólnej, dla dobra wspólnego, przy swobodnym i samodzielnym każdego z nich rozwoju kultural-nym. Ideę tę, a właściwie ideał, podyktowały nam wieki, sięga on korzeniami w głąb naszego zbiorowego jestestwa..."[21]

Tymczasem na scenę polityczną, z dramatycznym w skutkach opóźnieniem, wkraczał ruch białoruski. Na przełomie XIX/XX wieku wraz z procesami modernizacji, z upowszechnieniem druku, umiejętności czytania, z popularyzacją haseł demokratycznych i rozszerzeniem udziału mas w działaniach politycznych, elity białoruskie zyskiwały szansę wzbudzenia szerszego oddźwięku idei narodowych w masach ludności włościańskiej. Białoruski ruch narodowy znalazł się niewątpliwie w trudnej sytuacji wobec konkurencji polskiej, litewskiej, a także rosyjskiej[22]. Trudności wynikały przede wszystkim ze struktury społeczności białoruskiej – niemal wyłącznie reprezentowanej przez warstwy chłopów i robotników rolnych, ze skromnym udziałem przedstawicieli inteligencji i ludności miejskiej, w zasadzie pozbawionej zaplecza materialnego w postaci własnych środowisk ziemiańskich i przemysłowych[23]. Nade wszystko – wobec nielicznej elity wykształconych i świadomych Białorusinów oraz braku oparcia materialnego - zabrakło czasu koniecznego do budowy „infrastruktury kulturalnej", kodyfikacji języka, tworzenia literatury narodowej i systemu edukacji[24]. Procesy narodotwórcze wśród ludności białoruskojęzycznej ujawniły się wyraźnie po 1905 roku, nie obejmując jednak szerokich warstw społeczeństwa. Jednym z najważniejszych ośrodków ruchu białoruskiego było Wilno.

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[20] J. Bardach, *O dawnej i niedawnej Litwie.....*, s. 265.

[21] D. Szpoper, *Sukcesorzy Wielkiego Księstwa. Myśl polityczna i działalność konserwatyat-ów polskich na ziemiach litewsko-białoruskich w latach 1904-1939*, Gdańsk 1999, s. 56

[22] R. Radzik, *Między zbiorowością etniczną a wspólnotą narodową. Białorusini na tle przemian narodowych w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej XIX stulecia*, Lublin 2000; Sadowski Andrzej, *Narody wielkie i małe. Białorusini w Polsce*, Kraków 1991; Wróbel Piotr, *Kształtowanie się białoruskiej świadomości narodowej a Polska*, Warszawa 1990.

[23] Niektórzy spośród ziemian kultury polskiej popierali ruch białoruski. Należeli do nich m.in. Roman Skirmunt i księżna Magdalena Radziwiłłowa. Por. J. Turonek, *Wacław Iwanowski i odrodzenie Białorusi*, Warszawa 1992; Dariusz Tarasiuk, *Polacy białoruscy wobec idei współpracy narodów 1905-1918* /w:/ *Europa unii i federacji*, pod red. K. Ślusarka, Kraków 2004, s. 286-289

[24] Zob. np. H. Głogowska, *Białoruś 1914-1929. Kultura pod presją polityki*, Białystok 1996.

Warto tu przywołać opinię wyrażoną przez Włodzimierza Mędrzeckiego, że na obszarach pogranicza przejściowego, gdzie następują zjawiska przenikania się języków, o kierunku identyfikacji jednostki z szerszą społecznością w stopniu mniejszym, niż na innych terenach, decyduje identyfikacja z ukształtowanym językiem literackim, a w większym - religia; „najczęściej wyznanie decyduje o kierunku integracji ponadlokalnej na Ziemiach Wschodnich, przynajmniej we wczesnych fazach procesu"[25]. Można też sięgnąć po refleksje Franciszka Ryszki, który pisał: „Więzy identyfikacyjne zwane „świadomością narodową" nie były zbyt silnie rozwinięte wśród ludu (...). Prawosławni mówili o sobie, że są „ruscy", katolicy nazywali siebie Polakami, wyrażając jednako zdania o swojej identy-fikacji w gwarze *po prostu*."[26]. Współczesny historyk białoruski mieszkający w Polsce, Eugeniusz Mironowicz konstatował: „W przypadku białoruskojęzycznych społeczności katolickich wyznanie, w warunkach politycznych przełomu XIX i XX wieku, sprzyjało rodzeniu się polskiej świadomości narodowej. Polskość stawała się ideologią broniącą przed antykatolickimi tendencjami, obrońcą wiary ojców i tożsamości na tym zróżnicowanym pod względem wyznaniowym obszarze. Katolicyzm powszechnie zresztą określany był „wiarą polską", w odróżnieniu od prawosławia „wiary ruskiej"[27]. Nieco inaczej wyglądało kształtowanie się tożsamości społeczności prawosławnej. Większość ludności prawosławnej „posiadała jedynie świadomość „ruskości" lub „tutejszości", co wzajemnie się nie wykluczało, lecz nie wiązało się także z żadną ideologią narodową. (...) Cerkiew z liturgią w języku starosłowiańskim i rosyjską oprawą kulturową nie mogła stać się białoruskim czynnikiem narodotwórczym. Kler wychowany w kulturze rosyjskiej nie był zainteresowany zmianą jej oblicza kulturowego."[28]

W przełomowym dla imperium rosyjskiego roku 1905 doszło do zderze-nia programów z jakimi występowały poszczególne narodowości. W kwiet-niu i maju 1905 r. odbyły się zjazdy z udziałem lewicowych działaczy litews-kich, polskich, białoruskich i żydowskich. Poza Litwinami, przedstawiciele tych narodowości ciążyli do koncepcji autonomii Litwy historycznej, ujmując w jedną całość Litwę i Białoruś, tj. gubernie: mohylowską, witebską, mińską, grodzieńską i wileńską[29]. W połowie listopada 1905 roku na ręce prezesa Rady Ministrów hr. Wittego wpłynął memoriał, inspirowany i podpisany m.in. przez jednego z ojców odrodzenia litewskiego, Jana Basanowicza, gdzie uznano za litewskie terytorium etnograficzne gubernie: wileńską, kowieńską grodzieńską, suwalską i część Kurlandii. Autorzy memoriału nie mieli wątpliwości, iż w skład autonomii litewskiej wejść musi historyczna stolica Litwy – Wilno, choć Litwini stanowili około 2% mieszkańców tego miasta. Obszar uznany za „etnograficzną"

[25] W. Mędrzecki, *Liczebność i rozmieszczenie grup narodowościowych w II Rzeczypospolitej w świetle wyników II spisu powszechnego (1931)*, „Dzieje Najnowsze" R. 15:1983, nr 1-2, s. 238.

[26] F. Ryszka, *Pamiętnik inteligenta. Dojrzewanie*, Warszawa 1994, s. 47.

[27] E. Mironowicz, *Świadomość narodowa ludności białoruskiej Białostocczyzny (1944-1948)*, /w:/ *Colloquium narodów, Materiały z sympozjum: Litwini, Białorusini. Ukraińcy, Polacy – przesłanki pojednania,* Łódź 1987, s. 44

[28] Tamże, s. 45

[29] M. Römer, *Litwa...*, s. 349.

Litwę, obejmujący około 125 tys. km2, rozciągający się od Bałtyku na zachodzie i Dźwiny na północy po Bug i Polesie na południu, według spisów rosyjskich zamieszkiwało 1.659 tysięcy Litwinów, co stanowiło poniżej 30% ogółu mieszkańców[30]. Podczas pierwszego zjazdu przedstawicieli narodu litewskiego, 21-22 grudnia 1905 r., określono terytorialny program litewski, żądając autonomii dla Litwy z Sejmem w Wilnie. Autonomiczna Litwa miała się składać z tzn. Litwy etnograficznej „oraz tych przyległości, które ciążą doń ze względów ekonomicznych, kulturalnych, narodowych"[31]. Szermując określeniem Litwa etnograficzna – działacze narodowi nie brali pod uwagę czynnika językowego. Na obszarze Wileńszczyzny, na przykład, język litewski w ostatnim stuleciu cofnął się bardzo na rzecz mowy polskiej i białoruskiej. Sympatyk ruchu odrodzenia litewskiego, Michał Romer podkreślał, że dzielnica wileńska, mniej „wyrazista w zakresie indywidualności etnograficzno-kulturalnej nie zespoliła się ściśle z narodem w procesie odrodzenia"[32]. W argumentacji litewskiej przez kryterium etniczne rozumiano litewskie pochodzenie oraz tradycję historyczną; uważano, że przynależność do narodu ma charakter „obiektywny", w niewielkim stopniu biorąc pod uwagę czynnik subiektywny – świadomość, wolę czy nawet język uznawany za rodzimy.

Miasta d. Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego - przede wszystkim Wilno, ale w znacznym, stopniu także i Kowno, były ośrodkami kultury polskiej, w których język polski występował obok jidysz, używanego przez spory odsetek żydowskich mieszkańców i rosyjskiego, jako języka państwowego. Język litewski był w Wilnie na przełomie XIX i XX wieku prawie nieobecny, choć Litwini starali się uczynić swą historyczną stolicę ośrodkiem skupiającym ważniejsze instytucje polityczne, oświatowe i kulturalne litewskie. Wynikało to z oceny, iż jako jedyne wielkie miasto Litwy Wilno mogłoby stać się centrum ewentualnie nadanej przez Rosjan autonomii, i siedzibą wyższej uczelni. Zarazem dostrzegano oczywiste realia narodowościowe. Aleksandras Dambrauskas pisał: „Wilno zlituanizować można tylko cudem. Ja w ten cud nie wierzę. Daj Boże, aby powstała w Wilnie większa kolonia litewska"[33].

Wilno promieniowało jako ośrodek kultury polskiej na okoliczne tereny. Wileńszczyzna już od połowy XIX wieku językowo stawała się polsko-białoruska. Litwini zdawali sobie z tego sprawę. Antanas Smetona w 1912 roku nawoływał w piśmie „Viltis" do ratowania litewskości na Wileńszczyźnie: „Na wschodzie Litwy droga dla nas każda godzina. Jeśli nie zdążymy na czas, chory może umrzeć. Tak samo i tu: minie kilka, choćby kilkanaście lat i może pozostać tylko ślad, że w Joniszkies, Rodume, Asawia oraz w innych miejscowościach mieszkali Litwini"[34]. Inny działacz narodowy, ks. Tumas również podkreślał, że gubernia

[30] P. Łossowski, *Konflikt polsko-litewski 1918-1920*, Warszawa 1996, s.15.

[31] M. Römer, *Litwa...*, s. 393-394

[32] Tamże, s. 375; por. P. Łossowski, *Konflikt...*, s.15-16.

[33] A. Dambrauskas, *Iš Kauno kronikos*, „Mūsų senovė" 1921, t.1, cz.2, s. 55. Cyt. za: D. Staliūnas, *Wilno czy Kowno?...*, s. 262.

[34] A. Smetona, *Ocalmy wschodnich Litwinów*. Cyt. za: D.Staliūnas, Wilno czy Kowno?..., s. 262

wileńska traciła coraz bardziej litewski charakter, wskazywał, że w wielu miejscach tylko starsi ludzie mówią po litewsku, a dzieci już nie. „Proces polonizacji można w każdej wsi chwycić in acto, na gorącym uczynku."[35]

Przed I wojną światową na ziemiach b. Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego Żydzi stanowili ważną grupę religijno-narodową, szczególnie widoczną wśród mieszkańców miast i miasteczek. Ludność żydowska uważała się za część społeczności „krajowej", grupę zasiedziałą tu od dawna i oczekującą równoprawnego z innymi traktowania. Według spisu ludności imperium rosyjskiego z 1897 r. Żydzi stanowili około 13% ogółu mieszkańców guberni wileńskiej (ponad 205 tysięcy). W mieście Wilnie mieszkało wówczas niemal 64 tysiące osób wyznania mojżeszowego, stanowiąc 41,4% wszystkich mieszkańców[36]. Ogół Żydów zamieszkujących wschodnią część tzw. Ziem Zabranych, nazywano litwakami.

Okres I wojny światowej - klęska militarna Rosji oraz niemiecka polityka wobec ziem tzw. Ober Ostu miały olbrzymie znaczenie dla krystalizowania się programów narodowych na ziemiach b. Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego. Jednym z autorów niemieckich koncepcji był Paul Rohrbach. Uważał on bałtyckie prowincje Rosji za naturalny obszar ekspansji niemieckiej – aneksji a nawet germanizacji[37]. Przygotowując podstawy podejmowanych decyzji, Niemcy dążyli do uzyskania orientacji w stosunkach narodowościowych na ziemiach okupowanych. Przeprowadzili na tym obszarze spisy ludności. Według spisu z 3 marca 1916 r. Wilno zamieszkiwali rzymscy katolicy –w liczbie 76 196 osób (tj. 54,10%) oraz wyznawcy religii mojżeszowej niewiele mniej liczni - 61 233, tj. 43,48%. Na tle tych dwóch wielkich zbiorowości, prawosławni stanowili niewielki odsetek społeczności mieszkańców Wilna -2 049 osób (1,45%), ewangelicy – 1 158 (0,82%), inni – 204 (0,15%). Językiem polskim posługiwało się 70 629 osób, tj. 50,15%, litewskim -– 3 699 (2,6%), rosyjskim - 2 030 (1,4%), białoruskim – 1 917 (1,36%), niemieckim 1000 (0,76%). Liczba ludności narodowości żydowskiej praktycznie pokrywała się z liczbą wyznawców religii mojżeszowej (61 265 osób, tzn. 43,5%). W kategorii „inni" zapisano 300 os. (0,21%). Ogółem Wilno liczyło 140 840 mieszkańców[38]. Pomimo dostrzegalnej dominacji języka polskiego, Niemcy wyraźnie postawili na Litwinów. Jesienią 1917 roku za przyzwoleniem niemieckim powołana została litewska Rada Krajowa (Krašto Taryba) z Antanasem Smetoną na czele. W grudniu tegoż roku Taryba proklamowała zamiar powołania niezależnego państwa litewskiego ze stolicą w Wilnie, wyrażając gotowość przystąpienia do „wiecznego" sojuszu z

[35] Cyt. za: L. Wasilewski, *Kresy Wschodnie…*, s. 86.

[36] Szerzej zob. J. Wołkonowski, *Stosunki polsko-żydowskie w Wilnie i na Wileńszczyźnie 1919-1939*, Białystok 2004, s. 33-35.

[37] Zob. W. Sukiennicki, *East Central Europe during World War I: From Foreign Domination to National Independence*, New York – Boulder 1984, s. 165.

[38] Lietuvos Centrinis Valstybės Archyvas [Cetralne Archiwum Państwowe Litwy, dalej: LCVA] f. 64 ap. 20 b.693, k. 98. Według spisu ludności m. Wilna w dniach 14 grudnia 1916 r. – 10 stycznia 1917 r.: Polaków było w mieście 74 466, Żydów - 57 516, Litwinów - 2 909, Rosjan - 2212, Białorusinów 611, Niemców - 880, innych - 193, razem - 138 787 Zob też: Rocznik statystyczny Wilna 1931, s. 11

Niemcami[39].

Lata I wojny światowej przyniosły pozytywne zmiany w sytuacji prawnej społeczności żydowskiej na obszarze okupacji niemieckiej. Dotyczyło to działalności gmin żydowskich i rozwoju szkolnictwai. Żydzi uznani zostali nie tylko za wspólnotę religijną, ale jedną z narodowości Ober Ostu. W przyszłości społeczność żydowska miała stanowić element struktury tworzonej przez słabe, ale demokratyczne kraje wschodnioeuropejskie, sprzymierzone z Niemcami. Wśród ludności żydowskiej współistniały, a częstokroć ostro ścierały się koncepcje syjonistyczne i autonomiczne. Część Żydów znalazła się pod wpływem haseł radykalnie lewicowych. Zwolennicy asymilacji tracili grunt pod nogami, wobec odsunięcia wpływów rosyjskich. Z kolei wśród elit polskich i litewskich idee nurtujące społeczeństwo żydowskie obserwowane były z pewną podejrzliwością. Aktywny litewski działacz narodowy Petras Klimas oceniał Żydów w taki sposób: „…W duszy pozostali oni Rosjanami. I ten rosyjski duch tęskni do Rosji, jak do ojczyzny swojej kultury. Dlatego obecnie, gdy Litwini szykują się do życia w samodzielnym państwie, żydowscy liderzy niezupełnie wiedzą co począć (…) Wileńscy Żydzi, którzy kierują Żydami Litwy, szukają wyjścia. Nie analizując za wiele otaczającej rzeczywistości, gotowi są oni wciągnąć okolice Wilna nie w zasięg litewski, lecz w obręb etnograficzny białoruski"[40]. Rzeczywiście, z punktu widzenia polityków żydowskich na Litwie z pewnością najkorzystniejszym rozwiązaniem byłoby utworzenie wielonarodowego organizmu państwowego, obejmującego możliwie duże terytorium, na którym masy nie w pełni skrystalizowanej narodowo ludności białoruskiej stanowiłyby przeciwwagę dla silnych ekonomicznie i kulturalnie Polaków, ci zaś hamowaliby młody nacjonalizm litewski. Wobec braku czynnika dominującego narodowo, społeczność żydowska czułaby się zabezpieczona przed nacjonalizmem którejkolwiek narodowości. Pod koniec wojny syjoniści wileńscy zdobyli kontrolę nad najbardziej wpływową gazetą żydowską w Wilnie „Letze Najes". W gazecie propagowano koncepcję tworzenia Wielkiej Litwy z wszystkich ziem b. Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, z jakąś formą autonomii dla poszczególnych części[41].

Postulaty, dotyczące pożądanego kształtu terytorialnego wskrzeszonego państwa, stanowiły w ostatnim roku I wojny światowej przedmiot szerokiego zainteresowania elit społeczeństwa polskiego. Niezależnie od różnic występujących między reprezentantami lewicy niepodległościowej i obozu narodowego, niezależnie od krystalizujących się koncepcji federacyjnych i inkorporacyjnych, w polskich programach terytorialnych nieodmiennie uwzględniano ziemie litewsko-białoruskie. Jak zauważa wybitny badacz tej problematyki, u podstaw kształtujących się koncepcji granic leżało powszechne przekonanie o istnieniu

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[39] 16 lutego 1918 r. Taryba proklamowała niepodległość Litwy i zerwanie związków z innymi państwami, ale w marcu zmuszona została do potwierdzenia koncesji na rzecz Niemiec

[40] Cyt. za: A. Pukszto, *Między stołecznościa a partykularyzmem, Wielonarodowościowe społeczeństwo Wilna w latach 1915-1920*, Toruń 2006, s. 113. [P.Kl., *Lietuvos atstatymas ir żydai (Odbudowa Litwy i Żydzi)*, „Lietuvos Aidas" 15. 12. 1917].

[41] Š. Liekis, *A State within a State*, Vilnius 2003, s. 65-67.

ważnych przesłanek polskich roszczeń, jakimi – w odróżnieniu od Ukrainy - na kresach północno-wschodnich dawnej Rzeczypospolitej były „większa tu siła polskości oraz silniej zaznaczająca się swojskość, wsparta poczuciem wspólnoty cywilizacyjnej"[42]. Szczególne miejsce w polskich programach na wschodzie zajmowało Wilno, jako ważny ośrodek kultury narodowej".

Naczelnik Państwa Polskiego Józef Piłsudski przywiązywał wagę do utrzymania związku z Polską ziem b. Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego przede wszystkim ze względów strategicznych. Kierowała nim obawa przed zaborczością rosyjską. Stwierdzał w końcu 1918 roku: „Polskie wpływy na Litwie są w obecnej chwili jedyną ostoją tego kraju przeciwko bolszewizmowi i jeżeli nie będzie nam danem Litwę jako zaporę budować, niechybny jest wylew bolszewizmu na te kraje"[43]. Odwołując się do tradycji historycznych, Piłsudski przewidywał odbudowę unii polsko-litewskiej, ale zarazem - gdyby Litwa nie została złączona z Polską - za minimalną granicę polskich roszczeń terytorialnych przyjmował „Mińszczyznę białoruską i Wileńszczyznę polską"[44]. Znamienne, że rządów Taryby Naczelnik Państwa Polskiego nie uważał za wyraz autentycznych dążeń Litwinów. W instrukcji dla delegacji na konferencję pokojową stwierdził, iż „koncepcje litwomańskie (Taryba) - jeszcze mniej poważne od Rady Regencyjnej w Polsce – nie dadzą się utrzymać"[45]. Piłsudski zalecał delegacji popieranie w Paryżu „odrębności Litwinów", ale zdaniem polskiego badacza: „...jasne jest, że jej [Litwy] odrębność, o której popieranie upomina się Piłsudski, oznacza w jego oczach odrębność od Rosji, nie od Polski. Chciał Piłsudski znaleźć takich Litwinów, którzy by tego rodzaju interpretację „odrębności" byli gotowi uznać wraz z korzyściami wejścia w obręb „kompleksu polskiego". Jednoznacznie wrogie i lekceważące zarazem słowa o Tarybie, zawarte w instrukcji listopadowej, wskazują, iż nie widział w niej Piłsudski partnera do poważnych rozmów[46].

Wycofanie armii niemieckiej z Mińska i Wilna na przełomie grudnia 1918 i stycznia 1919 roku, otworzyło drogę na zachód Armii Czerwonej. Bolszewicy proklamowali Białoruską Socjalistyczną Republikę Sowiecką. Zaraz potem jej obszar został okrojony na rzecz Rosyjskiej Federacyjnej Republiki i – bez konsultacji zainteresowanych stron - połączony z Republiką Litewską (tzw. *Litbieł*). Rząd litewski w ślad za Niemcami opuścił Wilno. Opór Armii Czerwonej stawiła na przełomie 1918/1919 r. utworzona w Wilnie polska Samoobrona. Panowanie bolszewików zakończyło się w kwietniu 1919 r. zdobyciem Wilna przez Wojsko Polskie[47]. To wydarzenie nie ustabilizowało w pełni nastrojów, wobec zapowiedzi Józefa Piłsudskiego, że o dalszych losach ziem byłego Wielkiego Księstwa Litews-

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[42] R. Wapiński, *Polska i małe ojczyzny Polaków,* Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1994, s. 269.

[43] Cyt za: A. Nowak, *Polska i trzy Rosje. Studium polityki wschodniej Józefa Piłsudskiego (do kwietnia 1920 r.*, Kraków 2001, s. 210

[44] Tamże.

[45] Tamże, s. 211.

[46] Tamże, s. 212.

[47] Szerzej zob. P. Łossowski, *Konflikt...*; W. Niedziałkowska-Dobaczewska, *Wilno i Wileńszczyzna w latach 1914 – 1920*, Wilno 1934.

kiego zadecyduje głos jego mieszkańców. Wrażenie tymczasowości pogłębiało ustanowienie prowizorycznej z założenia władzy – Zarządu Cywilnego Ziem Wschodnich i ostry spór pomiędzy zwolennikami koncepcji federacyjnej i inkorporacyjnej[48]. Na scenie międzynarodowej – obok dążeń i aspiracji polskich, litewskich, białoruskich i żydowskich, ważyły nadto oczekiwania na klęskę bolszewików i powrót na scenę „białej" Rosji, jako członka zwycięskiej Ententy. Szczególne znaczenie miała akceptowana w kręgach kierowniczych partii bolszewickiej opinia, iż rewolucja rosyjska jest językiem spustowym rewolucji światowej.

Środowiska bliskie Piłsudskiemu, wychodząc od pełnej patosu metafory Wodza Naczelnego, pragnącego, by Wilno „stało się jedną z wielkich stolic świata, ogniskiem kultury, nowymi Atenami"[49], wskazywały na jedyną możliwą alternatywę: „Wilno może być albo stolicą wielkiego państwa sfederowanego z Polską, a obejmującego wszystkie narodowości zaludniające historyczną Litwę, albo też musi być miastem polskim"[50]. „Wilno może być polskim miastem prowincjonalnym, wówczas pędzić będzie żywot skromny, zasłużony zapewne, ale nie wybijający się ponad poziom innych miast polskich (...) Ale Wilno może być również stolicą wielkiego kraju, opartego o rozległe morskie wybrzeże, ogarniającego olbrzymie tereny ziemi (...) Może stać się ogniskiem, w którym ześrodkowują się liczne sprawy i interesy, cała administracja cywilna i wojskowa, które stanie się źródłem wiedzy i sztuki dla licznych milionów ludności zaludniającej historyczną Litwę; może stać się miejscem, gdzie pokrewne narodowości w osobach swych mężów zaufania będą rywalizowały ze sobą na gruncie twórczej pracy naukowej, kulturalnej i społecznej – może się stać istotnie nowymi Atenami świata"[51].

Akcja wojskowa Piłsudskiego – zmuszenie Armii Czerwonej do opuszczenia Wilna, a później i Mińska, nie rozwiązywała kwestii statusu wyzwolonych spod panowania bolszewickiego ziem. Wiele wskazuje, iż Piłsudski, jako optymalny wariant swoich planów, przewidywał zbudowanie struktury politycznej, być może opartej na wschodzie o Dźwinę i Berezynę, która imperializmowi rosyjskiemu, przeciwstawiałaby blok państw Międzymorza z Polską na czele. Gra toczyła się więc o odtworzenie dawnego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego z ziem Litwy i Białorusi, sfederowanych z Polską[52]. Osiągnięty wiosną 1919 roku sukces wojskowy szedł w parze z porażką polityczną, jako że fiaskiem zakończyła się misja Michała Römera w Kownie. Römer, czołowy ideolog krajowości, przewidywany przez Naczelnika Państwa Polskiego na premiera rządu Litwy w Wilnie, nie zdołał pozyskać zgody polityków litewskich, którym złożył propozycję wejścia do

[48] Szerzej zob. np. Joanna Gierowska-Kałłaur, *Zarząd Cywilny Ziem Wschodnich (19 lutego 1919 – 9 września 1920)*, Warszawa 2003.

[49] Przemówienie J. Piłsudskiego w Pałacu Tyszkiewicza w Wilnie 25 kwietnia 1919 r., „Nasz Kraj" nr 10 z 3 maja 1919 r

[50] „Nasz Kraj" nr 10 z 3 maja 1919 r. Artykuł redakcyjny: *Litwa i Polska*

[51] „Nasz Kraj" nr 6 z 27 kwietnia 1919

[52] Szerzej zob. K. Grygajtis, *Polskie idee federacyjne i ich realizacja w XIX i XX w.*, Częstochowa, 2001; por. A. Nowak, Polska i trzy Rosje...

wspólnego gabinetu[53]. Odezwa Piłsudskiego, wydana po wyparciu bolszewików z Wilna, zapowiadała swobodne wypowiedzenie się ludności ziem litewsko-białoruskich w sprawie przyszłości swojej ojczyzny. Zarazem sam nagłówek: Do mieszkańców b. Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, sugerował nawiązanie do tradycji unii polsko-litewskiej, ale i do odrębnej państwowości historycznej Litwy. Jak zauważył A. Nowak, konsekwencje odezwy to „deklaracja wojny z każdą Rosją – na tym terenie" i „otwarte postawienie problemu możliwości nawiązania współpracy z narodami dawnego Wielkiego Księstwa (a szerzej – całego bałtycko-czarnomorskiego międzymorza)[54].

Perspektywa odbudowania wielonarodowego państwa, odwołującego się do historycznej tradycji Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, budziła wrogość Litwinów, którzy odrzucali możliwość jakiekolwiek związków z Polską, ale wywoływała też niechęć Polaków na Wileńszczyźnie, dążących do złączenia Wileńszczyzny z Polską. Mimo początkowo optymistycznych zapatrywań na sprawę współpracy polsko-białoruskiej, obie strony były rozczarowane. Politycy polscy - – rozbiciem politycznym niedużego przecież grona działaczy białoruskich (część orientowała się na Moskwę, część na Berlin, inni poparli Tarybę), strona białoruska – realiami na obszarze zajętym przez Wojsko Polskie. Wydawać by się mogło, iż wizja odbudowy wielonarodowego organizmu, odwołującego się do tradycji Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, była bliska idei Wielkiej Litwy, którą propagowały gazety żydowskie w Wilnie pod koniec I wojny światowej. Społeczność żydowska zachowała jednak ogromny dystans wobec koncepcji federalistycznych. Na pewno dużą rolę odegrała atmosfera związana z zajęciem Wilna 19 kwietnia, aresztowanie przez władze wojskowe kilkuset Żydów, a w okresie późniejszym tarcia lokalne, dotyczące m.in. wyborów do Rady Miejskiej. Politycy żydowscy obawiali się także, że związek z Polską - warunek sine qua non polskiego wsparcia dla idei wielonarodowościowej Litwy - oznaczać musiałby zmniejszenie roli społeczności żydowskiej, jako elementu równowagi między narodami d. Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego[55]. Tymczasem politycy litewscy rzucili na szalę ważny argument - zapowiedź wprowadzenia na Litwie autonomii personalno-kulturalnej dla Żydów. W zamian przedstawiciele Żydów wsparli dyplomatów litewskich w Paryżu. (Polityk litewski Petras Klimas nieco złośliwie zasygnalizował w pamiętnikach przyjazd oddzielnej delegacji „naszej Wieży Babel", składającej się z reprezentantów Żydów, Białorusinów i „spolonizowanych"[56]). Wiceminister

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[53] Z.Solak, *Wyprawa kowieńska Michała Römera w 1919 r.* „Niepodległość" t. 47 (27 po wznowieniu), Londyn-Nowy Jork 1995, s. 129-163; J. Ochmański, *Kulisy wyprawy wileńskiej Piłsudskiego 1919 r.*, „Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materiały", t.3, Warszawa 1968, s. 10-76; W. Suleja, *Geneza odezwy Naczelnika Państwa do mieszkańców byłego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego z kwietnia 1919 roku*, „Niepodległość" t.44 (24 po wznowieniu), Nowy Jork-Londyn 1992

[54] A. Nowak, *Polska i trzy Rosje...*,s. 281.

[55] . J. Wołkonowski, *Stosunki polsko-żydowskie...*;J.Januszewska-Jurkiewicz, *W kręgu koncepcji „krajowych". Białorusini i Żydzi na Litwie środkowej wobec konfliktu polsko-litewskiego* /w:/ *Europa unii i federacji...*, s. 308-309.

[56] P. Klimas, *Lietuvos diplomatinėje tarnyboje 1919-1940 m.*, Vilnius 1991, s. 21 - 26. W pamiętnikach dyplomata litewski mógł już sobie pozwolić na pomniejszenie wagi stanow-

spraw zagranicznych Litwy, Szimszon Rozenbaum, jako były lider rosyjskich syjonistów i członek I Dumy, w imieniu litewskich Żydów wystosował na ręce prezydenta Wilsona deklarację, w której nie tylko Wilno, ale i Grodno, Białystok, Bielsk, Brześć uznane zostały za części Litwy. Oświadczenie to miało służyć storpedowaniu ewentualnych zamysłów zorganizowania w Wilnie plebiscytu[57]. W państwie litewskim zajęto się organizacją urzędu ministra bez teki ds. żydowskich. Z rekomendacji Rozenbauma ministrem został Max Sołowiejczyk. Budowa zrębów autonomii żydowskiej na Litwie najwyraźniej zdominowała wyobraźnię żydowskich polityków. Zajęli oni stanowisko zgodne z oczekiwaniami rządu litewskiego, który przecież – inaczej niż elity żydowskie - odżegnywał się od koncepcji wskrzeszenia Litwy historycznej, jako państwa wielu narodów.

Latem 1919 r., kiedy wojsko polskie zajęło Mińsk, a polscy zwolennicy utworzenia państwa nawiązującego do tradycji wielonarodowościowego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego zdawali się być stosunkowo najbliżej wykorzystania historycznej szansy[58], znaczący wydaje się w Wilnie brak współpracy federalistycznych kręgów polskich i żydowskich głosicieli idei Wielkiej Litwy. Tymczasem właśnie wileński organ propagujący koncepcje Józefa Piłsudskiego, „Nasz Kraj" próbował wyciągać rękę do współpracy: „Wilno jest stolicą Litwy, zarazem zaś miastem polskim, leżącym na polskim obszarze językowym, (...) Ale do Wilna, jako stolicy historycznej Litwy całej, mają uzasadnione prawa i Litwini, i Białorusini. Tu bowiem z natury rzeczy ogniskowało się i ogniskować będzie całe życie kraju, a więc ku temu ognisku musi ciążyć cała ludność kraju bez różnicy narodowości. (...) dla Żydów całej Litwy właśnie Wilno jest tym centrum najważniejszym" [podkreślenia – redakcji „NK"]. Krytykując działanie zarówno polskich jak i litewskich nacjonalistów, redakcja konstatowała: „I jedno, i drugie stanowisko najzupełniej ignoruje interesy Białorusinów oraz Żydów oraz ich prawo korzystania z Wilna"[59].

Wojna polsko-bolszewicka została w Kownie odebrana jako możliwość zrównoważenia siły Polski przez zdobycie sowieckiego uznania dla litewskich aspiracji do Wilna. Podczas rokowań z bolszewikami przedstawiciele Żydów (Rozenbaum) i Białorusinów (Dominik Siemaszka) bronili interesów litewskich[60]. Rozenbaum prezentował pogląd, że należy dążyć do uznania przez Rosjan „mak-

iska prezentowanego przez Żydów na płaszczyźnie międzynarodowej, kwitując paryską działalność Rozenbauma, jako z rzadka sięgającą poza kontakty z rosyjskimi Żydami, z powodu nieznajomości jakiegokolwiek języka zachodniego.

[57] Liekis, *A State..*, s. 123.

[58] W tym czasie wychodzący w Wilnie organ federalistów „Nasz Kraj" pisał: „...droga do osiągnięcia wielkiego celu: niepodzielnego b. Księstwa Litewskiego w dobrowolnej federacji z Polską prowadzi właśnie przez porozumienie się i zgodę narodowości tutaj zamieszkałych, które jako autonomiczne, są równouprawnione do decydowania w sprawach przyszłości kraju. Wiadomo, że punktem wyjścia do realizowania tego programu jest wola ludności wyrażana przez plebiscyt, którego przeprowadzenie jest zadaniem administracji cywilnej kraju." „Nasz Kraj" nr 93 z 12 sierpnia 1919. E.S.(Eugeniusz Świerczewski?), *Po zdobyciu Mińska*

[59] „Nasz Kraj" nr 104 z 26 sierpnia 1919 r.

[60] Szerzej zob. E. Gimżauskas, *Baltarusių veiksnys formuojantis Lietuvos Valstybei 1915- 1923* m., Vilnius 2003.

symalnego" programu terytorialnego. W lipcu 1920 r. Wileńszczyzna znalazła się ponownie w rękach sowieckich. W myśl zawartego traktatu litewsko-sowieckiego, wraz z Lidą, Grodnem, Brasławiem, Oszmianą, Wilno uznane zostało za część niepodległego państwa litewskiego. Widoczne były jednak przygotowania bolszewików, by całą Litwę uczynić republiką sowiecką[61]. Gdy pod naporem polskiej ofensywy Armia Czerwona opuściła Wilno, za zgodą Rosjan miasto zajęli Litwini, którzy wkrótce wyparci zostali przez rzekomo zbuntowane oddziały generała Lucjana Żeligowskiego. Wilno stało się stolicą formalnie niezależnego państewka, Litwy Środkowej.

Nazwa państwa utworzonego w wyniku wyprawy gen. Żeligowskiego sugerowała postulat wskrzeszenia historycznej Litwy wraz z ziemiami białoruskimi, ewentualnie stworzenia „kantonalnej" struktury Litwy, w której Wileńszczyzna zajmowała centralne, środkowe miejsce, między obszarem zamieszkiwanym przez ludność języka litewskiego, a białoruskimi ziemiami historycznej Litwy z Mińskiem. Tam zadanie podobne do Żeligowskiego powierzono generałowi Bułak-Bałachowiczowi.

Idee kantonalnej struktury państwa, odwołującego się do tradycji d. Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, z częścią polską (Wilno), Białoruską (Mińsk) mogły – liczono- wpłynąć na Litwinów w Kownie i skłonić ich do wejścia do wspólnego litewskiego państwa[62]. Powodzenie Żeligowskiego rzeczywiście mogło być oceniane jako zapowiedź powrotu do realizacji idei federacyjnej. Wileńska prasa bliska krajowcom z dużym zajęciem i sympatią śledziła w listopadzie próbę podjętą przez gen. Stanisława Bułak-Bałachowicza wyparcia bolszewików z ziem białoruskich[63]. Bałachowicz proklamował 25 października 1920 r. walkę o wyzwolenie Białorusi. Ofensywa podjęta przez 11 tysięczną armię ochotniczą skierowana została na Mozyrz. Stanisław Bałachowicz ogłosił się Naczelnym Wodzem niepodległego państwa białoruskiego, a Białoruski Komitet Polityczny (Wiaczesław Adamowicz, Antoni Lewicki, Paweł Aleksiuk), obejmując wyz-

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[61] P. Łossowski, *Konflikt polsko-litewski...*, s. 129-133.

[62] Jednak „ortodoksyjni" krajowcy, np. Tadeusz Wróblewski, krytycznie ustosunkowywali się do „kantonalnej struktury Litwy... zob. J. Bardach, *O dawnej i niedawnej Litwie....*, s.

[63] Postać generała Stanisława Bałachowicza i dzieje pozostających pod jego dowództwem oddziałów wojskowych doczekały się już dość obfitej literatury. Zob. m.in. P. Simanskij, *Kampania białoruska Rosyjskiej Armii Ludowo-Ochotniczej gen. Bułak-Bałachowicza w r. 1920*, "Bellona", T. 37: 1931, z. 3-4, s. 196-232; M. Cabanowski, *Generał Sanisław Bułak-Bałachowicz*, Warszawa 1993; Z. Karpus, O. Łatyszonek, *Życiorys generała S. Bułak-Bałachowicza złożony w Wojskowym Biurze Historycznym w Warszawie 1 grudnia 1929 r.* „Białoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne" {Białystok} 1995 z. 2(4), s.160-169; K. Gomółka, *Między Polską a Rosją. Białoruś w koncepcjach polskich ugrupowań politycznych 1918-1922*, Warszawa 1994; Z. Karpus, *Wschodni sojusznicy Polski w wojnie 1920 roku. Oddziały wojskowe ukraińskie, rosyjskie, kozackie i białoruskie w Polsce w latach 1919-1920*. Toruń 1999; *Sąsiedzi wobec wojny 1920 roku. Wybór dokumentów*. Opr. J. Cisek, Londyn 1990, s. 121 - 144. Dla poznania białoruskiego kontekstu działań prowadzonych pod przywództwem Bałachowicza szczególne znaczenie ma wyważone, oparte na wykorzystaniu szerokiej bazy źródłowej i literatury przedmiotu opracowanie O. Łatyszonka, *Białoruskie formacje wojskowe 1917-1923*, Białystok 1995

wolone obszary, przekształcił się w rząd Białoruskiej Republiki Ludowej[64]. Mimo początkowych sukcesów, działania Bałachowicza skończyły się niepowodzeniem. Większość jego żołnierzy przekroczyła granicę polską i została w Polsce internowana[65].

Klęska wyprawy gen. Stanisława Bułak-Bałachowicza, nie przesądziła o całkowitym upadku pozycji generała ani w oczach części polityków polskich, ani działaczy białoruskich. Dla Józefa Piłsudskiego i zwolenników jego polityki, Bałachowicz pozostawał cennym sojusznikiem na wypadek wznowienia przez bolszewików działań wojennych, i to sojusznikiem możliwym do wykorzystania zarówno w "wariancie białoruskim", jak i „rosyjskim"[66]. (Wynikały stąd przesłanki do szukania płaszczyzny współpracy z Borysem Sawinkowem, mimo wszelkich trudności pojawiających się wobec sprzeczności aspiracji białoruskich i rosyjskich.) Dla białoruskich działaczy niepodległościowych wrogo odnoszących się do rządów bolszewickich, nazwisko Bałachowicza było cennym atutem dzięki doświadczeniom wojennym, kontaktom z polskimi sferami wojskowymi oraz popularności, jaką cieszył się wśród włościaństwa. Stąd wynikało koncentrowanie się wokół niego antysowieckiej akcji białoruskiej. Już 1 grudnia 1920 r. rtm. Stefan Prądzyński raportował Szefowi Sztabu Generalnego WP, gen. Tadeuszowi Rozwadowskiemu o istnieniu planu „stworzenia na Białorusi organizacji przeciwbolszewickiej zbrojnej, czegoś w rodzaju POW [Polskiej Organizacji Wojskowej]". Z przekonaniem przy tym wskazywał na dużą użyteczność armii gen. Bałachowicza dla przygotowania terenu Białorusi poprzez agitację na wsiach oraz zasilenie i zorganizowanie "zielonych" oddziałów[67]. Podczas narady działaczy politycznych i wojskowych, pod koniec grudnia 1920 r. uznano generała za Naczelnego Wodza, a 1 lutego 1921 r. na tajnym spotkaniu członków Białoruskiego Komitetu Politycznego i przywódców "Zielonego Dębu"[68] podjęto

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64 Zob. O. Łatyszonek, *Białoruskie formacje...*

65 Powstanie to wybuchło zresztą przy współpracy Oddziału II NDWP. Zob. N. Stużinska, *Białoruski ruch antybolszewicki 1917 – 1925* [w:] *Społeczeństwo białoruskie, litewskie i polskie na ziemiach północno-wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1939 – 1941*, pod red. M. Giżejewskiej i T. Strzembosza, Warszawa 1995, s. 360 – 364.

66 Na temat koncepcji Piłsudskiego, zakładających jesienią 1920 r. użycie sił Bałachowicza dla tworzenia niepodległej Białorusi, ale i - w razie powodzenia akcji gen. Wrangla - podjęcie ofensywy w kierunku Moskwy dla osadzenia tam rządu tzw. III Rosji, zob. O. Łatyszonek, *Białoruskie formacje...*, s. 165-166; por. A. Nowak, *Polityka wschodnia Piłsudskiego (1918-1921)* /w:/ A. Koryn /red./, *Rola i miejsce Polski w Europie 1914-1957*, Warszawa 1994.

67 *Sąsiedzi wobec wojny 1920 roku...*, s. 141.

68 Włościańska Partia Zielonego Dębu, polityczna reprezentacja oddziałów "zielonych" - partyzantki antysowieckiej złożonej z chłopów i dezerterów. Jej sztab rezydował w Łunińcu. Założycielem i przewodniczącym był Wiaczesław Adamowicz (starszy). Na czele oddziałów zbrojnych Zielonego Dębu stał ataman Wiaczesław Adamowicz (młodszy), ps. Dziergacz. Organizacja współpracowała z polskim wywiadem wojskowym. Zob. Nina Stużinska, *Białoruski ruch antybolszewicki (1917-1925)...*, s.363-364. Według opinii Olega Łatyszonka, Włościańska Partia Zielonego Dębu została założona przez działaczy Białoruskiego Komitetu Politycznego w okresie przygotowań do wyprawy gen. Bułak-Bałachowicza, dla ideowo-organizacyjnego zespolenia "zielonych" oddziałów, które przyłączyły się do sił Bałachowicza. O. Łatyszonek, *Białoruskie formacje wojskowe...*, s.214.

decyzję o prowadzeniu na obszarze sowieckiej Białorusi wojny partyzanckiej pod przywództwem Bałachowicza[69]. „Ośrodkiem całej projektowanej imprezy ma być baon białoruski konstytuujący się obecnie w Wilnie"[70] – przewidywał referent spraw białoruskich Sekcji Informacyjno-Politycznej Naczelnego Dowództwa Wojsk Litwy Środkowej (NDWLŚr.)

Wilno, jako ważny ośrodek ruchu narodowego, skupiło wielu czynnych działaczy białoruskich. Od początku też dwaj białoruscy politycy - Wacław Iwanowski[71] i Bronisław Taraszkiewicz uczestniczyli w tworzeniu struktur administracji państwowej Litwy Środkowej[72]. Po stronie polskiej naturalnymi sprzymierzeńcami włączenia się Białorusinów do czynnego życia politycznego byli krajowcy[73]. Wobec słabego poparcia w społeczeństwie polskim, współpraca z częścią bodaj społeczności żydowskiej i białoruskiej Wileńszczyzny mogła być szansą krajowców w konfrontacji z polskim nurtem narodowo-demokratycznym. W istniejących warunkach ich koncepcje polityczne były szansą optymalnego rozwiązania dla części przynajmniej ziem zamieszkiwanych przez ludność białoruską.

Politycy związani z osobą Naczelnika Państwa, reprezentujący koncepcję w sposób nieco uproszczony nazywaną federacyjną, znaleźli oparcie dla swej działalności w instytucjach wojskowych, przede wszystkim w ramach II Oddziału Naczelnego Dowództwa Wojsk Litwy Środkowej. Tak zwana „polityka wojskowa", jak krytycy określali ówcześnie aktywność polityczną Oddziału II, w okresie trwania rokowań ryskich nadal jeszcze - niejako na wszelki wypadek - za cel stawiała sobie utrzymywanie antybolszewickiego frontu z udziałem przedstawicielstw narodów graniczących z Rosją. Uznano, że należy wesprzeć środowiska skłonne postawić na współpracę z Polską i umożliwić im wpływanie na opinię społeczności białoruskiej na Litwie Środkowej, poprzez wydawanie organu prasowego, przeciwstawiającego się propagandzie na rzecz Kowna[74]. Ocena realnych szans wpłynięcia na kierunek działań elit białoruskich, zapewne również dotychczasowe kontakty na terenie Ziemi Mińskiej, sugerowały wsparcie takich ludzi jak Wacław Iwanowski czy Bronisław Taraszkiewicz. Zrodziła się zatem inicjatywa powołania organizacji białoruskiej działającej na Wileńszczyźnie w myśl idei „krajowej". Po stronie białoruskiej za twórcę koncepcji, zakładającej powołanie Białoruskiego Związku Krajowego, kierownik Ekspozytury Policji Poli-

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[69] O. Łatyszonek, *Białoruskie formacje wojskowe...*, s.212; LCVA, f. 22 ap.1 b.72, k. 16: *Prikaz zialonodubcam.*

[70] LCVA, f. 22: ap 1 b.44, k. 8-11: *Raport tygodniowy za czas od 27 lutego do dn. 5 marca 1921.*

[71] Zob. J. Turonek, *Wacław Iwanowski i odrodzenie Białorusi* Warszawa 1992, s. 82-85.

[72] Należy pamiętać, iż W. Iwanowski i B. Taraszkiewicz, przyjmując stanowiska w Tymczasowej Komisji Rządzącej uczynili to na własną odpowiedzialność, wobec zdystansowania się od ich decyzji Białoruskiego Komitetu Narodowego /BKN/ w Wilnie.

[73] J. Jurkiewicz, *Rozwój polskiej myśli politycznej...*, s.213-215, 241-242; K. Gomółka, *Polskie ugrupowania polityczne wobec ruchu białoruskiego na Litwie Środkowej*, „Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej" R. 27: 1992, s. 91.

[74] LCVA, Ff. 22: ap 1 b.44, k. 8: *Raport tygodniowy za czas od 27 lutego do dn. 5 marca 1921r.*; *Memoriał* A. Tupalskiego, k.37.

tycznej w Wilnie uważał Aleksandra Własowa[75]. Interesujące jednak, że w tym samym mniej więcej okresie, wiosną 1921 r., powołano na Litwie Środkowej dwa odrębne, tym samym konkurujące ze sobą, ośrodki białoruskie, odwołujące się do idei „krajowości". Jeden z nich - to Związek Krajowy, łączony z osobą Pawła Aleksiuka[76]. Drugi z tych ośrodków stanowiła grupa działaczy związanych z Radą Najwyższą BRL, skupiona formalnie wokół płk. Hapanowicza[77], której sprzyjała działalność II Oddziału NDWLŚr. Referent ds. białoruskich Sekcji Informacyjno-Politycznej NDWLŚr. już na przełomie lutego i marca 1921 r. wiązał osobę Hapanowicza z inicjatywą zorganizowania w tymże roku akcji powstańczej na sowieckiej Białorusi, połączonej z ofensywą pod dowództwem Bałachowicza, zgodnie z planami Komitetu Białoruskiego: „Ośrodkiem całej projektowanej imprezy ma być baon białoruski konstytuujący się obecnie w Wilnie"[78]. W świetle opinii O. Łatyszonka, iż ostatecznie doszło do porozumienia między Radą Najwyższą, a gen. Bułak - Bałachowiczem w sprawie organizacji białoruskich oddziałów wojskowych[79], płk Hapanowicz - można sądzić - odgrywał rolę ogniwa wiążącego plany Komitetu Białoruskiego z działalnością członków i sympatyków Rady Najwyższej.

Postulat powołania pisma białoruskiego, które przeciwstawiłoby się propagandzie na rzecz Kowna został przedstawiony 5 marca przez referenta spraw białoruskich Sekcji Informacyjno-Politycznej wraz z propozycją, by na własny koszt wydawał to pismo O.II. Marian Kościałkowski, szef tegoż Oddziału, w piśmie do Delegata Rządu RP, Władysława Raczkiewicza, stwierdzał iż „Biełaruski Zwon" został założony przez Sekcję Polityczno-Prasową tutejszego Oddziału II i zaczął wychodzić w końcu marca 1921 r., jako tygodnik polityczny i kulturalny, dążący do nawiązania i utrwalenia dobrych stosunków między ludami zamieszkującymi Wileńszczyznę oraz szukający (na razie) dróg porozumienia z Polską. Jako redaktor i wydawca podpisuje pismo p. Alechnowicz.

Po zawarciu traktatu ryskiego faktyczne możliwości samodzielnej „polityki wojskowej" znacznie się zmniejszyły. Coraz większe wątpliwości mogła budzić realność wsparcia przez Polskę próby wyzwolenia ziem białoruskich spod władzy bolszewików. Wzajemna rywalizacja w łonie środowisk białoruskich, gotowych w mniejszym czy większym stopniu kooperować z Polską, osłabiała możliwości działania obu stron. Wydaje się, iż istnienie Białoruskiej Krajowej Grupy Politycznej zakończyło się równolegle z urwaniem się dotacji na „Biełaruski Zwon", a więc najdalej w drugiej połowie maja 1921 r. Iwanowski wyjechał ostatecznie po pewnym czasie do Warszawy, niektórzy członkowie grupy (Taraszkie-

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[75] LCVA, f. 15: Komisarz m. Wilna ap. 2 b. 483, k.9 Tajne pismo kierownika Ekspozytury Policji Politycznej na m. Wilno, S. Olenckiego do Komisarza Rządu z 16 VII 1925.

[76] S. Ełski- Łaniewski, *Sprawa białoruska. Zarys historyczno- polityczny*. Warszawa 1931; *Krótki zarys zagadnienia białoruskiego*. Sztab Generalny Oddział II, Warszawa 1928.

[77] Badacz dziejów białoruskiej wojskowości odnotowuje fakt organizacji na Litwie Środkowej, za zgodą czynników polskich, batalionu białoruskiego, liczącego ok. 500 osób, pod dowództwem płk. Hapanowicza. Zob. O. Łatyszonek, *Białoruskie formacje wojskowe...*, s. 217.

[78] LCVA, F. 22: ap 1 b.44, k. 8-11: *Raport tygodniowy za czas od 27 lutego do dn. 5 marca 1921*.

[79] O. Łatyszonek, *Białoruskie formacje...,* s.217.

wicz, Smolicz, Rak-Michajłowski) na krótki czas weszli w skład Białoruskiego Komitetu Państwowego, związanego z płk. Eugeniuszem Ładnowem[80] część działaczy znalazła się w kręgu oddziaływania Białoruskiego Komitetu Narodowego w Wilnie. Pod jego też auspicjami zaczął się ukazywać „Biełaruski Zwon", tym razem, jak sądzono po stronie polskiej, za pieniądze z Kowna[81].

Paweł Aleksiuk, wiceprezes Białoruskiego Komitetu Politycznego, w styczniu 1921 r. opuścił Warszawę i przeniósł się do Wilna[82]. Wobec braku wspólnej płaszczyzny politycznej, której nie udało się osiągnąć na odbywającym się w Wilnie zjeździe wszystkich organizacji białoruskich[83], celem jego działalności stało się utworzenie ugrupowania o polskiej orientacji, przeciwstawiającego się nurtom prolitewskim. Zapewne znaczną rolę odgrywały też animozje personalne, względy ambicjonalne oraz konflikt postaw politycznych, przeciwstawiające Aleksiuka grupie działaczy Najwyższej Rady BRL. Organizacją, która miała spełnić jego nadzieje stał się Związek Krajowy. Powołanie Związku Krajowego miało ponadto przynieść mu szansę uzyskania mandatu do Sejmu Wileńskiego[84]. Poza działalnością na forum politycznym, przebywając w Wilnie Aleksiuk współpracował także ze Stanisławem i Józefem Bałachowiczami w dziele koordynacji akcji oddziałów partyzanckich na terenie Białorusi sowieckiej. Świadczy o tym raport dowódcy takiego oddziału, atamana Tymoteusza Chwiedoszczeni, adresowany do generała Bałachowicza w Wilnie lub właśnie Aleksiuka, w wypadku gdyby ten pierwszy wycofał się z pracy[85].

W ostatnich dniach kwietnia 1921 r. w Wilnie został zorganizowany Centralny Komitet Związku Krajowego. Odwołując się do odezwy Piłsudskiego z kwietnia 919 r. Związek Krajowy za cel pracy uznał: budzenie świadomości białoruskiej w duchu krajowej łączności z Polską, walkę o prawo narodu wolnego wypowiedzenia się o swojej przyszłości. Odnośnie Rosji – stwierdzono, że jako „źródło

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[80] O. Łatyszonek, *Białoruskie elity polityczne wobec traktatu ryskiego* /w:/ *Traktat ryski 1921 roku po 75 latach.* Studia pod red. M. Wojciechowskiego. Toruń 1998, s. 292.

[81] Z. Ponarski podaje, iż Franciszek Olechnowicz wydawał „Biełaruski Zwon" od 22 marca 1921 r. do 24 lutego 1923 r. z przerwą od 16 maja do 18 sierpnia 1921 r. Jego sugestia (w ślad za artykułem D. Nałęcz), iż tylko „Jedność" Aleksiuka korzystała z subsydiów - w świetle archiwaliów wileńskich - nie jest oczywiście słuszna. Jednak to stwierdzenie nie jest argumentem za interpretowaniem poczynań wydawniczych Olechnowicza w myśl teorii spiskowo-agenturalnej. Niewątpliwie O.II zainicjował i wsparł białoruskie pismo redagowane w duchu „krajowym". Z tego wsparcia, (a potem z dotacji litewskich) korzystał wydawca i autorzy, którzy jednak prezentowali aktualne własne poglądy. Rozczarowanie i polskich, i białoruskich zwolenników krajowości kierunkiem, w jakim toczyły się wypadki, również było oczywiste, tyle, że dla Białorusinów zapewne znacznie boleśniejsze. Spychało to grono autorów „Białoruskiego Zwonu" na pozycje uznawane za antypaństwowe przez znaczną część polskiej administracji i policję. Por. Z. Ponarski, *Franciszek Olechnowicz - wydawca, redaktor, publicysta,* „Białoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne" Białystok 1996, z.6, s. 54-56.

[82] LCVA F.15, ap.2, b.483, k.9: Raport Kierownika Ekspozytury Policji Politycznej na m. Wilno, S. Olenckiego z 16 VII 1925

[83] Zob. O. Łatyszonek, *Białoruskie formacje wojskowe...*, s. 216-217.

[84] LCVA F.15, ap.2, b.483, k.9: *Raport* S. Olenckiego z 16 VII 1925.

[85] J.Januszewska-Jurkiewicz, *Raport atamana T. Chwiedoszczeni.*, „Białoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne" [Białystok] 2000, z. 14, s. 220-230.

imperializmu i wróg wszelkiej odrębności narodowej, musi być wykluczoną ze wszelkich widoków nawiązania z nami związku państwowego"[86].

Najbardziej znanym i mającym odzwierciedlenie w historiografii przejawem działalności Związku Krajowego było doprowadzenie do odbycia w Wilnie, w dniach 11-12 grudnia 1921 r., Zjazdu Włościaństwa Białoruskiego oraz organizacji i partii Zachodniej Białorusi. Zjazd zgromadził kilkuset przedstawicieli społeczeństwa białoruskiego[87]. Wspierając linię polityczną, wytyczoną przez Centralny Komitet Związku Krajowego, podjął uchwały w sprawach: poparcia dążeń do wyzwolenia Białorusi spod władzy sowieckiej, autonomii ziem białoruskich w ramach państwa polskiego, udziału ludności białoruskiej w wyborach do Sejmu Wileńskiego, a także w sprawach szkolnych oraz agrarnych[88].

Wobec podziałów w społeczności białoruskiej i poparcia udzielanego przez czynniki wojskowe konkurentom Aleksiuka, ten skazany był na współpracę z Delegatem Rządu Polskiego w Wilnie, następcą Władysława Raczkiewicza, płk. Andrzejem Tupalskim[89], którego poglądy na ruch białoruski były jednoznaczne: „Ruchu białoruskiego narodowościowego, jako wyrazu nastrojów mas ludowych nie ma i nie było (...). Obecny ruch białoruski jest wytworem sztucznym, wywołanym i podtrzymywanym przez różne polityczne czynniki.(...) Polityka polska dążąca do wytworzenia silnego ruchu białoruskiego, ciążącego ku państwowości polskiej, zbankrutowała i utworzone przez tę politykę placówki białoruskie kulturalno-oświatowe i ekonomiczne zostały obsadzone przez elementy wrogie państwowości polskiej. (...) Dotychczasowa polityka, stosowana względem Białorusinów, powinna być uznana za szkodliwą i stosownie zmienioną. Koniecznym jest spowodowanie faktycznego zaprzestania prowadzenia jakiejkolwiek polityki przez Oddziały II Naczelnego Dowództwa. Jedynym państwowotwórczym elementem na Kresach białoruskich powinna być uznana narodowość polska i dążyć należy do wytworzenia warunków, umożliwiających jej jak najszerszy rozwój, bez ograniczenia jego na rzecz sztucznie wytworzonego ruchu białoruskiego[90].

Takie poglądy nie rokowały szans na realizację oczekiwań Pawła Aleksiuka, który wbrew opiniom przeciwników nie był agentem polskim, natomiast o jego działaniach przesądzało gorące przekonanie o konieczności opierania się ekspansji rosyjskiej wspólnie z Polakami. Jednak 4 listopada 1921 r. na konferencji odbywającej się z udziałem Naczelnika Wydziału Wschodniego MSZ - Michała Kossakowskiego i Delegata Rządu w Wilnie płk Tupalskiego (a także przedstawiciela MSWojsk. mjr Stamirowskiego) przeforsowano zasadę "Białoruś istnieje tylko poza granicami państwa polskiego", co równało się wytycznym, by wyrugować akcję polityczną białoruską na terenie Polski[91].

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[86] J.Januszewska-Jurkiewicz, *Dwie „krajowe" inicjatywy białoruskie na Litwie Środkowej*, „Białoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne" z. 16, [Białystok] 2001, s. 197-218

[87] Zob. np. K. Gomółka, *Między Polską a Rosją...*, 196 - 197

[88] „Ziemia Wileńska" nr 1, 1-3 I 1922 r: *Delegacja białoruska w Warszawie*

[89] Kpt I. Bandrowski do raportował do wiadomości Oddz. II Sztabu Gen. :"P. Aleksiuk pracuje w bezpośrednim kontakcie z płk. Tupalskim. Jest zdekonspirowany i przez swych rodaków uważany za zwykłego płatnego agenta." LCVA f.21 ap.2 b. 12, k. 22- 26.

[90] LCVA,f.22 ap. 1 b.42 k. 42,43: *Memoriał A. Tupalskiego.*

[91] LCVA, 22, ap. 1 b. 54, k. 8-9: *Pro memoria.* Gwoli ścisłości należałoby zaznaczyć, iż M.

Interesującą i mało znaną inicjatywą Oddziału II było powołanie gazety żydowskiej, która prowadziła propagandę federalistyczną i antykowieńską. Redaktorem został Jakub Kronenberg z Kongresówki. Pismo, pod tytułem „Der Najer Morgen" zaczęło wychodzić w pierwszych dniach marca 1920 r. Jego zadaniem było rozbicie jednolitej i nieprzychylnie usposobionej względem Polski opinii społeczeństwa żydowskiego. Administratorem z ramienia O. II był. Henryk Laks[92], a umowę z Kronenbergiem firmował znany wydawca wileński – Ludwik Chomiński.

Na łamach „Der Najer Morgen" szczególną uwagę poświęcano sprawom szkolnictwa żydowskiego i autonomii kulturalno-narodowej. Podkreślano rolę Polski jako najsilniejszego państwa w regionie. „Aby utworzyć mocny mur, który by nas chronił od lwiej paszczy gotowej lada chwila nas pochłonąć, musimy się oprzeć o mocne państwo, które będzie mogło utworzyć właśnie ten mur odporny wobec potęgi rosyjskiej. Jedynym państwem wielkomocarstwowym na kresach Wschodu jest Polska i ona właśnie jest tą podwaliną, na której można zbudować pozycję, gdzie możemy stanąć spokojnie na straży naszych praw, jako obywateli kraju. Litwie nie wolno zdradziecko nas oddać swą polityką w ręce przyszłej Rosji (...) Jedno wyjście ma wobec tego Litwa, którym może nas i siebie uratować od zagłady: utworzenie ścisłego związku z Polską. Gdyby się Kowno temu sprzeniewierzyło, gdyby wobec tego, że zostało ono wychowane na kulturze rosyjskiej chciało nadal pozostać w tej niewoli"[93].

Ogół społeczności żydowskiej w Wilnie pozostawał sceptyczny wobec „państwowości środkowolitewskiej", jak i ewentualności wcielenia Wileńszczyzny do Polski. Zgodnie z oczekiwaniami rządu w Kownie, większość Żydów wileńskich uchyliła się od udziału w wyborach do Sejmu Wileńskiego. Charakterystyczne opinie na temat kwestii wileńskiej prezentował organ demokratów, „Unzer Tog": „Stanowisko Żydów wobec wyborów do Sejmu niektóre organa polskie tłumaczą jako wypowiedzenie wojny polskości (...) Musi być oddzielona „polskość" od „Polski". Polskość jest to wielka literatura polska, kultura polska, język polski, tysiącletnia historia Polski i twórczość narodowa. „Polska" zaś jest to państwo polskie, terytorium polskie, które w ciągu stu dwudziestu lat było rozebrane przez trzy inne państwa i powstało dzięki rozkładowi Austrii i Rosji oraz klęski Niemiec (...). Stojąc na gruncie, że Wilno i cały kraj ma pozostać Litwą, chcemy jednak aby polskość nie została tutaj pokrzywdzona, ale by zajęła ona przynależne jej honorowe miejsce. Będziemy ciągle powtarzali, że Litwa historyczna może zostać demokratyczną rzecząpospolitą czterech równych narodowości, i nie ch-

Kossakowski, otwierając konferencję, odniósł się do istnienia rozbieżności zasadniczych poglądów na politykę białoruską, jako faktu nadal aktualnego. Przeciwstawne poglądy streścił, wskazując na tendencję do ignorowania pierwiastka białoruskiego, jako czynnika politycznego, a więc rugowania akcji politycznej z ruchu białoruskiego w Polsce oraz kierunek pragnący „zachować możność wygrywania pierwiastka białoruskiego, jako czynnika politycznego", co prowadzi do wyznaczenia akcji politycznej białoruskiej małego Piemontu na wschodzie, gdzie ześrodkowaliby się działacze białoruscy, przyjmujący program przychylny państwowości polskiej.

[92] LCVA f. 51, ap.-15, b. 2873, k.26 – 27

[93] *Sprawozdanie z prasy żydowskiej* z 19 lipca 1921 r. LCVA 19 – 1- 16, k. 52.

cemy w żaden sposób, aby tam gdzie Litwini nie są w większości, pozostali oni narodowością panującą, narzucającą innym swój język i kulturę. W Wilnie język polski będzie więcej dźwięczał aniżeli litewski i polskość będzie miała zupełną możność przy wolnych kulturalnych zabiegach panować nad umysłami. (...) konstatujemy, że Sejm obecny jest przedwczesny, muszą nastąpić przedtem ogólne wybory – oczywiście po zjednoczeniu obu części Litwy – do Wszechlitewskiego Sejmu. Potem dopiero mogą nastąpić wybory do sejmików lokalnych, kantonalnych, landtagów – w rodzaju wyborów do Rad Miejskich. Sejm wszechlitewski, suwerenny, określi wszystkie wytyczne państwowe, jak również stosunek do Polski"[94].

Wybory do Sejmu Wileńskiego odbyły się 8 stycznia 1922 r. Pomimo bojkotu wyborów przez Litwinów, większość Żydów (udział w wyborach wzięło zaledwie 15,3% uprawnionych) oraz część Białorusinów (głosowało 41%), frekwencja ogólna wynosiła 64,4%. Wynik wyborów stanowił porażkę „krajowców". Wśród głosującej ludności polskiej i białoruskiej wyraźną przewagę mieli zwolennicy prostej inkorporacji Wileńszczyzny do Polski[95]. Sam fakt zebrania się Sejmu był porażką Litwinów. Nie mogli się oni pogodzić ze stratą Wilna. Konsekwentnie uznawali władzę polską na Wileńszczyźnie za okupację.

Prasa litewska w Wilnie niedwuznacznie wskazywała na perspektywę współdziałania niemiecko-rosyjskiego, skierowanego przeciw Polsce. Widziano w tym współdziałaniu szansę dla Litwy w jej walce o Wilno, a zarazem krótkowzrocznie bagatelizowano groźne dla Litwy implikacje przewagi Rosji sowieckiej w tej części Europy. Pisano na przykład: „Litwa obiecała Rosjanom możność wolnego tranzytu do Niemiec. Jeżeli Wilno będzie pod wpływem i we władaniu polskim, to Niemcy wraz z Rosjanami będą zmierzać do wywrócenia tej polskiej przeszkody, tego klina korytarzowego, a może nawet i całego państwa polskiego. Oprócz tego Polacy mają mnóstwo zagrabionej ziemi, przynależnej Ukraińcom i Białorusinom. Rosjanie, gdy się poczują na siłach, wnet postarają się te obszary od Polski odebrać i może znowu wybuchnąć pożar wojny w Europie[96]. Stawiając na antypolską postawę Rosji sowieckiej i Niemiec, a zarazem licząc na przychylność Anglii i Włoch, Litwini krytycznie postrzegali stanowisko Francji, jako protektorki poczynań polskich. W „*Vilniaus Garsas*" porównywano: „Jak u nas w Wilnie Polacy, tak Francuzi w Nadrenii okupują najbogatsze części państwa niemieckiego i gospodarzą tam w sposób okrutny. (...) Bez pomocy francuskiej zaśpiewają i Polacy inną piosenkę. Jeżeli usunięta zostanie okupacja francuska w Nadrenii, to uczynią to samo z polską okupacją w Wilnie"[97].

Rachuby na pomoc bolszewików w odzyskaniu stolicy zmuszały do postaw-

[94] LCVA 23 – 1 – 182, k.. 125 – 127. *Życie polityczne społeczeństwa żydowskiego w Wilnie*. Sprawozdanie nr 5 /przegląd prasy/

[95] Z. Krajewski, *Geneza i dzieje wewnętrzne Litwy Środkowej (1920-1922)*. Lublin 1996, s. 99-101; A. Srebrakowski, *Sejm Wileński 1922. Idea i jej realizacja*, Wrocław 1995

[96] *Śląsk i Wilno*, „Vilniaus Garsas" nr 21 (52) z 5 czerwca 1921 r.

[97] Artykuł wstępny: *O położeniu politycznym Europy,* „Vilniaus Garsas" nr 4 z 20 stycznia 1922

ienia pytania, czy ten sojusznik nie okaże się zbyt niebezpiecznym remedium. Emocjonalna waga sprawy Wilna była jednak dla działaczy i polityków litewskich zbyt wielka, by oglądać się na konsekwencje pomocy sowieckiej. Na łamach *„Vilniaus Garsas"* spekulowano na przykład: „Gdy Rosjanie przyjmą ponownie udział w polityce europejskiej, podniesiona zostanie kwestia granic z Polską. Wtedy Litwie będzie grozić niebezpieczeństwo ze strony rosyjskiej, gdyż Rosja będzie szukać komunikacji z Niemcami przez Wilno. Politycy nasi nie powinni zagradzać Rosjanom drogi, tylko w miarę możliwości zwrócić ich z Połocka na Grodno i na Grajewo. Wtedy i nasi Polacy przestaną marzyć o Warszawie, a warszawiacy o potężnym państwie, które by miało siłę wyznaczać drogę Rosji"[98]. Enuncjacje *„Vilniaus Garsas"* wskazują, że politycy litewscy uważali sąsiedztwo Rosji sowieckiej za mniej niebezpieczne niż pozostawanie sąsiadami Polski. „Wszystkie pertraktacje Litwinów z Polakami ostatecznie wykazały, że dla Litwinów lepiej i zdrowiej byłoby nie mieć Polaków za sąsiadów. Być może wtedy moglibyśmy z nimi żyć po bratersku i wspólnie pracować[99]. Zamykanie oczu na niebezpieczeństwo sowieckie i przekonanie, iż uda się skierować bolszewików tylko przeciw Polsce, bez obaw o możliwość połknięcia Litwy przy okazji, nie wystawia pochlebnego świadectwa politykom i publicystom litewskim. Jednak w oczach ówczesnych litewskich polityków utrata Wilna, z czym Litwini nie mogli się pogodzić, stanowiła wystarczające usprawiedliwienie zaprezentowanych sądów, a dążenie do odzyskania historycznej stolicy było wytyczną polityki zagranicznej Republiki Litewskiej.

Finał sporu o Wilno w latach 1919-1920 stał się jednym z istotnych dowodów na to, że dziedzictwo Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego nie mogło kształtować stosunków narodowościowych w epoce nacjonalizmów. Dziedzictwo to stało się trwałym mitem współczesnej kultury, mitem, o którym Aleksander Fiut napisał, że nie tyle stanowi wspomnienie „dawnej potęgi i chwały, ile – przywoływany z dumą – projekt cywilizacyjny, który pozwalał przez wieki trwać obok siebie w zgodzie, a przynajmniej bez wzajemnej nienawiści, rozmaitym grupom etnicznym, kręgom kulturowym, religiom, językom i obyczajom. Pojęciem, które się w tym kontekście najczęściej pojawia, jest pozytywnie nacechowana wielokulturowość. Wymierzone nade wszystko we wszelkie przejawy nacjonalizmu i szowinizmu (...). Ale leczące także z poczucia podrzędności, drugorzędności jednej kultury wobec innej"[100].

Recenzent: dr. Tomasz Pawelec
01.12.2007

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[98] Tamże.

[99] Tamże.

[100] A. Fiut, *Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie: między utopią a nostalgią* /w:/ *Ostatni obywatele Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego*, red Tadeusz Bujnicki, Krzysztof Stępnik, Lublin 2005, s. 9-16.

POLITICO-ECONOMICAL MARKERS IN THE PROJECT OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN REGIONAL IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

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Abstract

The Transnistrian region offers an example of a state with serious problems of national and political identity that was able to negotiate provisional solutions. British sociologist Anthony D. Smith presented what he believed to be the five fundamental features of a national identity. They are indeed crucial in the formation of an identity and include a historic homeland, common historical myths and memories, a mass public culture, common legal rights for all members, and a common economy (Smith 1991, p. 20). All these identity indicators underwent change in the Transnistrian region after 1989, when the USSR collapsed and nationalist movements started on the two banks of the Dniester River. From August to December 1989, the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic (MSSR) Parliament passed a series of language laws that made the Moldavian language the official state language and provided the transition from Cyrillic to Latin script. A new tricolor flag was adopted and a national anthem that was the same as that of Romania. Then, in the summer of 1990, the MSSR declared sovereignty, changing its status within the USSR.

A group of Russian speakers led by Igor Smirnov, a factory manager who came to Moldova in November 1987 to become a director of the Електромаш (Elektromash) factory in Tiraspol, expressed concern that the newly sovereign MSSR would soon seek reunification with Romania and take Transnistria along with it. On August 11, 1989, several Transnistrian workers" collectives united under the single banner of the Union of Workers Collectives (OSTK) and pursued a policy of secession from Moldova. Igor Smirnov was the first Chairman of the OSTK. On September 2, 1990, Transnistria declared its separation from Moldova and its existence as a republic within the USSR with "full powers" in the economic sphere.

The research follows the course of Moldova-Transnistria coexistence; examines the influences on identity formation, especially the economical aspects which formed the contours of identity, and attempts to gauge popular responses to the challenges of the postwar partition.

Introduction[1]

The study of the Transnistrian regional identity and its construction consists mostly of political aspects that are based on economical matters. Residents of the so-called "Transnistrian Moldavian Republic" (TMR), with the Russian acronym ПМР (Приднестровская Молдавская Республика)[2], have a keen sense of regional identity and adhere to the Dniester-Soviet values which from their points of view set them apart from the right bank of the population. To answer the question what defines the boundaries of the group, of the oppositional, immigrant and symbolic identities, we must start with the analysis of economical aspects of the TMR which strengthened all institutions of its statehood during 18 years-period of its independent existence.

Traditionally, primary attention is paid to the political aspects of the problem. In the meanwhile, new challenges and events of last years are revealed in the aggravation of economical relations between the Republic of Moldova and the TMR, deterioration of the export-import relations, privatization and investment policy and separation of regional infrastructure autonomy. All these factors show the economical importance of the Transnistria. This economic importance is shaped by political elites as a separate region with a separate regional identity. Thus, we will analyze the options and strategies in the economical activity of the region in the process of regional identity construction and within an effective state apparatus.

The Transnistrian problem has economical dimensions in the policy and economy of the entire Republic of Moldova. The geopolitical and economical position of Transnistrian region (proximity to Balkans, Danube and Odessa, the largest port in the Black Sea) involves interests of many countries in the economy of this region, primarily Russia. The principal communication axes and the major gas and oil line that link Moldova with the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS) pass through this Transnistria region. Almost all of the bridges on the Dniester are also located within this region.

My aim within this paper is an integrated analysis of how the economy influences identity. I seek to explore how this sense of economic importance was formed by the past and how it is reflected in present views on regional identity of Transnistrians. The research starts with an outline of the historical setting that has conditioned the direction of economic reforms after 1989.

First of all, I limit my interest to property relations and industry ownership,

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[2] The so-called *"Transnistrian Moldavian Republic"* (TMR) is a separatist region from the Republic of Moldova. On September 2 1990 the Second Extraordinary Session of the Peoples" Deputies of the Dniester Area took place in the city of Tiraspol and self-proclaimed the Dniester Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (later renamed The Transnistrian Moldavian Republic), as a constituent part of the USSR. Till present, TMR is not recognized by any international organisms.

within the scope and character of transformations in property relations. In the past socialist relationships have conspicuously affected current transformations in the property order and social hierarchy of the Transnistrian region.

Secondly, to analyze how state policy and ideology are reflected in the economy, I look to a state paternalistic policy on the case of *Молдавский Металлургический Завод* (Moldavian Steel Plant) in Rîbniţa. At the same time, I seek to answer the question of how the strong regional consciousness and identity of people strengthen the economic effects of the given territorial identity?

Thirdly, I intend to analyze how Transnistria economy is used by authorities as an instrument of legitimating the Transnistrian model of government, along with the impact of privatization processes at the institutional, political levels and at the level of ordinary people experience. The source material consists of official economic and population data from the TMR and the Republic of Moldova, interviews with ordinary people, residents of Rîbniţa and different sources of Transnistrian mass-media.

I. Economical issues of regional identity and Transnistrian independence

I. 1. Regional Identity in Transnistria: Construction and its Representation

The TMR, the most industrialized zone of the former Soviet Republic of Moldavia and populated by approximately two thirds with Slavs, proclaimed its independence towards Chişinău in September 2, 1990, after the dissolution of the USSR. Transnistria forms, to the East of Moldova, a small territory of 4163 km² (seven times smaller than Belgium, but twice wider than Luxembourg) between the banks of the Dniester River in the west and the Ukrainian border in the east. The Russian name is the official name of the territory: *Приднестровская Молдавская Республика (ПМР)*. For its part, the Council of Europe uses the denomination Transnistrian Moldavian Republic (TMR). The area, a self-proclaimed autonomous republic, accounts six districts (in Russian and Moldavian): Tiraspol, Dubossary (Dubăsari), Rybnitsa (Rîbniţa), Grigoriopol, Kamenka (Camenca) and Slobodzeya (Slobozia). The town of Tiraspol, whose population has a Russo-Ukrainian majority, is the local capital.

Tiraspol refuses to recognize the Moldavian sovereignty on its territory and applies an independent policy, reinforced after the referendum on the independence of September 17 2006. This referendum overwhelmingly supported unification with Russia. Within the framework of this national consultation, the overwhelming majority of the population of this self-proclaimed republic decided for the continuation of the policy of independence of Transnistria and its union with Russia.

The construction of a new identity was at the top of the agenda of the new Transnistrian regime. As Tom Nairn remarked, nationalism is Janus-like in looking back to a historical legacy and forward to a program of continued national construction (Nairn 1977, p. 42). For small groups in multi-ethnic territories, like the Russians in the TMR, the situation requires more sophisticated

and multi-faceted construction of identity. As relative late-comers and as a 29% minority, the Russian elite had to choose perforce a civic, territorial identity as the only option for the construction of the new Transnistrian identity.

The combination of history, demographics, and economy created a regional "imagined community" in Moldova. Anthony Marx offers a helpful framework to understand group formation and mobilization of resource. Marx argued that group formation takes place through mobilization against a common "other" (Marx 1998, p. 3). In Moldavian case, identities fall into four categories. The Moldavian identity was split between those who favored an independent Moldova and those urging reunification with Romania (Pan-Romanists.) Those identified as Russian-speaking were split between ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians (Skvortsova 2002, p. 21). Moldova is a borderland nation, and as a result its ethnic identities were especially fragmented (King 2000; Laitin 1998). Thus, identity question is not a transparent or unproblematic as we think. "Perhaps instead of thinking of identity as an already accomplished fact, with the new cultural practices they represent, we should think instead of identity as "production", which is never complete, always in process" (Hall 1990, p. 222). The question is always where to start "surfing" from. Nation may be formed from one or more ethnicities, claiming the right to political identity with the control of specific territory. Furthermore, the nation-state identifies itself in terms of one specific nation and there is thus an identity of character between state and people. Where do these elaborations lead us? First, it seems that there are at least three basic types of identity: ethnic, national and state identity (including nation-states). Secondly, ethnic/cultural identity is the basic one. The nation, consequently, can consist of one or more ethnicities, and the state can consist of one or more nations. In the TMR over 50% of the population has a mixed ethnic background. Most people simultaneously mix an ethnic identity with another as an inhabitant of the post-Soviet space (i.e. the CIS). Residents of the TMR most often identify with Moldova as a whole, whilst simultaneously considering themselves as (ethnic) Russians, Ukrainians, or Moldovans, as well as inhabitants of Transnistria. The regional component of identity with Transnistria as a state is growing; state authorities of the TMR purposefully develop the identity by cultivating the representation by political and ideological symbols. Such ethnic picture of the region is explained by the history. Transnistria was included in the Russian Empire in 1792 as a result of the Iassy treaty with the Ottoman Empire, whilst the Moldovan territory between the Prut and the Dniester was obtained by Moscow only in 1812. The TMR territory experienced two historical expressions of self-identification and a separate statehood of Transnistria, as the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in Ukraine (1924-1940) and in the current pseudo-state since 1990 (O"Loughin 1998, p. 339).

The idea of regional distinctiveness or the existence of a collective identity, connected to the political expression of regional interests is central to the emergence of a regionalist movement (Schrijver 2004, p. 17). It requires the combination of the construction and maintenance of a regional imagined community and the politicization and mobilization of its members. Being in conscious rela-

tions with each other, people can associate themselves as a small society with separate identity. They have common feelings in the creation of their "imagined community", as Benedict Anderson characterized it in the processes of national identity construction (Anderson 1983, p. 12). In the creation of a community the economical factor is a decisive one.

How is a regional identity in Transnistria constructed and how does the constructed self-image serve to define a regional identity? Who are they in terms of an in-group? These two queries will be addressed from the perspective of the economic wealth of Transnistria.

"The central fact that has really happened in the modern world is that the role of culture in human life was totally transformed by that cluster of economic and scientific changes which have transformed the world since the seventeenth century" (Gellner & Smith 1996, p. 367-368).

In particular, analyzing a case of the USA, Anderson mentioned that initially borders between states were created artificially, and only later received a symbolical value (Anderson, 1983). Thus, borders are constructed on the basis of socially significant representations - such as myths, symbols, etc. They help to achieve the basic purpose of identification processes: to unite the population by common ideals, to form the exclusiveness and uniqueness of the territory and its residents. Vladimir Bodnar, the chair of the Security Committee of the Transnistrian Parliament, defined appropriately the logic driving the separatist states and regional identity construction: "What defines a state? First, institutions. Second, a territory. Third, a population. Fourth, an economy and a financial system. We have all of these! (...) Statehood doesn"t need to be recognized by the international community. It is sufficient if it is declared by the people themselves" (Lynch 2004). It is relevant to recall the argument selected to invoke politically the separate identity in order to determine the in-group affiliation and to draw symbolic boundaries between others. Anthony Cohen writes that "the consciousness of the community is encapsulated in the perception of its boundaries" because the determinant of any community is not the objective structure of the boundary itself but its sense of difference and distinctiveness (Cohen 1995, p. 13).

Institutionalized territorial solidarity (common territory, values, symbols) maintains the image of the region and serves as criteria for constructing national identity and common consciousness. Even more so a regional identity is strengthening in times of economic difficulties (Paasi 1986, p.116). Created by the people"s own free will, our republic is living and developing in defiance of military provocations from our enemies, contrary to all economic, customs, diplomatic, information and other blockades" (Смирнов 2005, p. 4). In the construction of ideal future images by the Transnistrian leadership, the memories of the older generation of Soviet times intensifies the regional identity based on the keeping of last heritage. "During many centuries of life here, in Transnistria, a new generation was created – the transnistrian people - with their own mentality, character and definite features..." (Смирнов 2001, p. 39).

Key issues of the new national consciousness include which group was the

first to settle in which area, the emphasis on long-vanished territorial divisions, the legitimacy of boundary shifts, and the exact delineation of former state boundaries (O"Loughlin 1998, p.339). For separatists, mobilization revolves around the threat to the existence of the cultural or national minority, and the associated risk of its assimilation, dispersion, and oppression. Stuart Kaufman (1996, p. 125) believes that the strikes and other manifestations of opposition to Chisinau were provoked and controlled by a cynical TMR political and economic elite that did not wish to surrender the power to Moldova. In his "ethnic security dilemma model", Kaufman argued that the fear of losing ground to another ethnic group is a powerful motivator for political action and that the TMR leadership played on this fear. "There are two different societies - Moldova and Transnistria. These two societies should live independent, in peace and mutual respect" (*IA Regnum* 2006). Under the rubric of history, we can examine the events which have redrawn the lines of national identity. It is also possible to measure the extent to which identities have changed over the course of time as a result of national experiences. Many residents of the TMR see themselves as constituting a specific and separate entity distinct from their neighbors, and they believe that this identity has been forming for centuries under Russian influence. "Our history and our culture are closely related to the Soviet period. Industrialization in our region was Soviet in its nature. We cannot dissociate ourselves from the Soviet culture... Maybe the Soviet culture is not a good one, but we don"t have another one. We do not think that it is a hundred-percent bad one" (Чубашенко 2007, p. 2).

The regional identity of the population is based on the memories of a prosperous region during the Soviet period and till nowadays they appeal to the Soviet time as a time of peace, harmony, and economic wealth and maintain Soviet symbols and ideology. Economic prosperity means industrial potential. Below the economical policy of the region which will be analyzed.

I. 2. Industrial Potential of the Transnistrian Region and Collectivization Process: Historical Context

At the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries the Bessarabia (a province of Russia) was a typical agrarian remote area of predominant grain specialization. In 1913, most of the labor force was used in agriculture; no more than 10 thousand workers worked in industry. The significant volumes of investments from the central government were directed to the Moldova left-bank economy. As a result, the industrial output of the territory in 1939 in comparison with 1913 increased 33 times, i.e. the rate of growth was four times larger, than the average for the USSR (Gudîm 1967, p. 54). The number of enterprises grew from 19 (without mill enterprises) in 1924 to 235, among them being a group of the largest in the country canning and wine factories.

In the first years after creation of autonomy a cadre policy was pursued by non-residents of Transnistria according to the party control principle. As a result Moldavians occupied the second place in the ethnic structure of MASSR population. It is necessary to point here that the majority of Moldavians lived in

the countryside; therefore they did not have access to vocational education and skilled work. The employment structure among ethnic groups underwent significant transformation. Non-Moldovans played rather essential role in city economy, and Moldovans managed less prestigious and low paid kinds of activity. Such model of development in conditions of regional integration in the Soviet economy system generated a conflict. During the Second World War a wave of deportation against Moldovans began. The economic and political elites were deported after annexation of Bessarabia to the USSR in 1940-1941. In 1946-1947 Moldova suffered a drought. Soviet authorities refused to reduce the mandatory deliveries of grain to the state that has led to famine and death of thousands of people. Right after this disaster a violent collectivization was started (*История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики* – The History of the Moldavian Republic of Pridnestrovie, 2000, p. 101).

Soviet authority scope was to overcome distinctions at the level of economic development of the left and right bank. Building industrial enterprises, alongside with deliveries of the necessary equipment and raw materials was accompanied by the arrival in the MASSR of the factory collectives from other union republics. Such policy essentially influenced the ethno demographic situation of the region. So, in 1930 from 1055 workers of eight largest industrial enterprises, only 98 were Moldavians or 9,3 %. (*История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики*, 2000, p. 129).

Alongside with the industrialization, other direction in the economy was the collectivization of agriculture: in 1940, 98,2 % of peasant farms were collectivized. In conditions of a surplus of labor force and significant investment flows from the central government the processes of industrialization and collectivization brought significant economic gains for the left-bank of Moldova. However these processes were accompanied by an interdiction of the private property, infringement of democratic freedom of the citizens, mass repressions among the most active members of the society and advanced intellectuals (История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики 2000, p. 308). Practically, investments were not directed to the economy of the right-bank of Moldova, which occupied almost the seventh part of the Romania territory and the sixth part of its population.

On the right-bank of Moldova the position of agricultural laborers was very complex. Those workers or their heirs who had "given" land as part of the collectivization process argued most strongly for restitution and the need for historic justice. While this group saw that land reform based on restitution would be the just outcome, this did not translate into a majority wishing to resume individual farming. This was highlighted in a 1997 study of the rural population in Moldova, which indicated that only 16% wanted to become independent farmers (Center for Strategic Studies and Reforms 1997). The main reasons emphasized by those reluctant to become farmers were the absence of the necessary equipment and materials (around 32%), old age and poor health (18%), lack of legal guarantees (16%) and a reluctance to change their lifestyle (15%). There was thus no groundswell of opinion in favor of de-collectivization.

Rather the process of collectivization had left bitter memories amongst some, and a suspicion of the communist elite that managed the collective farms. This did not translate for the majority into a desire to dissolve completely the collectives and begin individual farming. In the Moldovan case, ethnic Slavs were more likely to oppose radical de-collectivization than ethnic Romanians, many of whom saw collectivization as a painful form of russification.

Similar patterns of sentiments have been recorded for the restitution that was not followed for a number of reasons in Moldova. First, *kolkhoz* and *sovkhoz* leaders opposed restitution, as it would mean the loss of their asset base. While opposed to all forms of radical de-collectivization they believed that legislation that focused on the rights of rural workers as a group would lead more likely to a process of reorganization within the existing farm boundaries than restitution (Moraru 1995, p. 299). These collective farm directors were much closer to political power because of the much greater relative importance of agriculture in Moldova, and independence did not lead to the same degree of elite transformation. Secondly, centrist and right-wing political groupings in Moldova did not advocate restitution largely. One former policy advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture explained this as a desire to avoid "ethnic divisions when the Transnistrian conflict was at its height" (Digol 2001, p. 35).

The land and assets of those deported to other parts of the USSR were transferred to *kolkhozi* and local authorities. Restitution thus involves thorny questions about returning land to the families of those that were displaced and also the question of employment for those agricultural workers "imported" or born in the country after 1940. In Moldova ethnic tensions over the secessionist Transnistria republic and the "minor" civil war which ensued led to a more consensual approach that considered the rights of all rural workers (O"Loughlin 1998, p. 341). Transnistria retained Soviet economic structures and its leaders opposed the break-up of the USSR. In asserting its independence, Transnistria refused to take part in the national agricultural programs of the Republic of Moldova.

All these circumstances were a source of the Moldovan national movement, which amplified in the second half of the '80. In 1988, known Moldavian writers participated actively in the organization of the Democratic movement on democratization and reform of language. The major object of criticism became the domination of Russian language in mass media. Thus, in 1988-1991 in a society with a dominant mentality of *Homo Sovieticus*, many cases of street nationalism were registered. Such regrettable incidents took place in all zones of SSRM and did not constitute the monopoly of the right bank. During 1988 – 89 an attempt was made to restore the rights of the majority of the population.

The increased influence of the Popular front caused a negative reaction of minorities, especially Russians. Most Russian-speaking populations supported "*Edinstvo*" ("Unity") - a political movement which has arisen in Transnistria that declared Russian language as a state language. Its leaders accused the Moldovan national leaders in the purposeful unleashing of the interethnic conflict. Then, in 1991 after the break-up of the Soviet Union the government of TMR

declared separation from Moldova consequent to the failed putsch in Moscow in August of the same year. Like any new political regime, the TMR government was faced with the dilemma of creating the state apparatus. Additionally, they had the task of promoting its domestic and international legitimacy by maintaining the separate state as well as engaging in state-making. There is some support for saying that Transnistrians have different political proclivities than "right bank Moldovans." For example, Transnistria had already been collectivized in the '20 and '30 and thus was always more "Soviet" than the Bessarabian part of Moldova (Digol 2001, p. 37).

I. 3. The *OSTK* (the United Council of Labor Collectivities) Role in the State-building Process

While discussions emerged on the Right bank of the Dniester River within which many people pleaded for the unification of the Republic of Moldova with Romania, and the lack of attention and even ignorance of the new leadership from Chisinau towards the specifics and phobias of the Transnistrian population, a new political organization appeared - OSTK (the United Council of Labor Collectivities).

The United Council of Labor Collectivities appeared at the "*Tochlitmash*" factory in Tiraspol. OSTK were created at all plants in the region in 1986 pursuant to the USSR law "Regarding state enterprises" (История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики 2000, p. 402). The important steps in the escalation of the conflict occurred in autumn 1991, when the paramilitary wing of the OSTK transformed itself into the "guardians of the Dniester" and Tiraspol called up the "worker militias". Such paramilitary structures could not coexist peacefully with the security forces of a Moldovan state. The bloodshed began in November 1991, when "worker militias" attempted to take control of police forces in Dubossary (Dubăsari), an event that triggered the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria several weeks later in May 1992. Between 500 – 1000 people were killed and 60 000 to 100 000 refugees are estimated to have fled over the Moldovan frontier into Odessa Oblast of Ukraine following the bloodshed of mid 1992 (International Interim Report 1992, p. 13). The people were openly supported in their struggle by the Russian 14th Army stationed in Transnistria. Russian forces had provided the Transnistrian fighters with artillery as well as tanks and openly took sides after the assumption of the 14th Army leadership by the General Aleksandr Lebed.

In time of political strikes for independence and unity of Transnistrian people, the union of three main industrial centers emerged - Tiraspol, Rybnitsa, and Bendery, which led the struggle for the Transnistrian independent state. OSTK promoted an obvious nationalist policy. Such reaction of the population from the industrial centers of Transnistria was determined by the "socialist internationalism" policy promoted for decades in the USSR and the Russian influence was hiding under the umbrella of "socialist internationalism" (Колосов, Заяц 2001, p. 42). The workers of the large industrial enterprises elected strike committees in August 1989 that, in turn, coalesced under the auspices of the United Coun-

cil of Labor Collectivities to oppose the policies emanating from Chişinău. These strike committees began the movement that eventually led to the TMR independence. In January 1990, a referendum in the region approved the autonomy of Transnistria and on September 2 1990, the OSTK proclaimed the establishment of the TMR. This allowed creating an administrative dictatorship of the Smirnov regime (Рынок Приднестровья 2005, p. 32). For everything that happened and is happening in the republic, Igor Smirnov is responsible as a president and as a permanent chairman of the government. The period of his activity is characterized by self-affirmation, a revolutionary spirit, the desire to maintain the industrial potential of the region (which represents 2/3 from the entire MSSR industry), build own institutes of authority, and a desire to have good relations with Moscow and to keep its support. Despite the confrontation on Dniester and inexperience of the first Transnistrian leaders, this period is considered to be a creative one for state-building and nation construction. The constitution of TMR was adopted and the economic and civil laws along with the Supreme and Arbitration Courts were established. The Supreme Court of TMR was dominated mostly by the representatives of the industrial enterprises. In general, the management leaders of the Transnistrian enterprises in this period of time played a very important role in the political life of the republic. There were many working collectives that gathered at meetings and demonstrations against Romanization of the region and appeal to the right of TMR to realize an independent political and economic activity. Igor Smirnov, a recent arrival to Tiraspol from Russia (he lived in the Far East before being appointed director of a Tiraspol factory), owes his presidency to the "red directors". According to all expert estimations, Grigory Marakutsa who was born in Transnistria and was in good relations with Russia and Moldova had to become a president (Moldova"s Uncertain Future, 2006: p. 9). But directors were afraid that he will not reckon with their interests. Businessmen and the factories staff created the image of Smirnov as a strong-willed, constructive leader, and a patriot of Transnistria, who enjoyed the director"s confidence in all economical questions, including privatization process and property relations.

II. Property transformations and legitimation of Transnistrian economical model

II. 1. Privatization Process and Development of Property Relations

At the beginning of 1990, within the economical complex of Transnistria, state property predominated. But the transition to market economy determined cardinal changes of property relations and organizational-legal forms of ownership. The directions of social and economic development in short-term and long-term perspective by the Government of Transnistrian Moldovan Republic during the '90 have been developing a number of important documents "The Concept and the Program of Social and Economic Development of TMR" (1993), "The Concept of Social and Economic Development of TMR in the Transition Period" (1994), "The Basic Directions of Social and Economic Development of TMR till to 2000" (1996).

In 1991 the Supreme Court of the Transnistrian Moldovan SSR has developed the Law "On De-Governmentalization and privatization of enterprises" as a legal basis of privatization policy. The Fund of State Property of the TMSSR was responsible for the implementation of this decision. The first years of privatization were insufficiently organized with some mistakes caused by both subjective factors and unclear normative-legal base. In 1997 the Supreme Court decided to revise the law "On De-Governmentalization and privatization of enterprises" in order to eliminate the errors made during the privatization. The suspension of the privatization process has aggravated the property relations and made active uncontrolled redistribution of property, lower labor motivation and few opportunities to develop a good market (История Приднестровской Молдавской Республики 2000, p. 411).

In 1999-2000 the Supreme Court and TMR Government started the development of normative acts on the further reformation of property relations. In December 1999, the Supreme Court has accepted the new edition of the law "On De-Governmentalization and privatization of enterprises" which determined the legal and organizational bases of privatization and the privatization of property remaining in state (republican and local) ownership. Among the new organizational-legal forms of ownership that underwent development in the 1990s, it was necessary to allocate joint-stock companies of closed and open type (Joint-Stock Companies and Open Companies) and joint enterprises with the participation of foreign investors, companies with limited liability, financial and industrial groups, co-operatives and farms. In most cases, the new owners of the privatized plants became Russian companies. In the privatization program more than 100 enterprises were included with the price of about 60 mill USD.

In June, 2005, the "Ministry of Economy" of the TMR released data stating that in the year to date the TMR has "privatized" 10 major assets for a price of $4.8 million. This included the Tiraspol bread-making bakery ($1.49 million), Tiraspol bread product integrated works ($1.29 million), and the Odema textile factory ($1.29 million). The bread-making assets were purchased by Sheriff Corporation. Sheriff Company is the TMR"s largest company. It has been and may still be controlled by Smirnov"s son[*] (Infotag July 5 2005). As of June 2005, the highest price paid for a single asset was $29 million for the Moldavskaya Power Plant in 2003 by Saint Guidon Invest of Belgium (Infotag June 7 2005). In 2005 Saint Guidon sold 51% of the shares to RAOO Nordic, a subsidiary of RAO EES, a Russian company -United Electricity Networks of Russia (Infotag July 15 2005). The Transnistrian Supreme Soviet appears to be in a struggle with Smirnov and his supporters over this privatization. Gazprom, the Russian energy company, is seeking to purchase the remaining 49%. The Moldovan Steel Plant in Rîbnița (in the property of an Austro-Ukrainian company - Hares Group) also was privatized (Рынок Приднестровья 2005, p. 23).

Moreover, in June, 2005, the TMR commenced the sale of "the region's light-

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 [*] Current control of Sheriff is somewhat unclear and we have been unable to confirm its current ownership status

industry flagship - the Tirotex textile factory, which ensures jobs to 20% of the working population in Transnistria" a minimum tender has been set at $22.9 million (Infotag June 7 2005).

Besides the conversion of these companies that have been Moldovan state assets, one of the largest properties converted—but not privatized—is the part of the Moldovan railway system that is within Transnistria. In August 2004, "Tiraspol announced the establishment of the independent Transnistrian Railroad Company - through the alienation of the railroad network existing in the Transnistrian region and Bendery and Rybnitsa junction stations with all their property" (Infotag June 13 2005). Sergei Martsinko, the Director of the new Transnistrian Railroad Company explained that the railway in Transnistria became a separate entity so as to avoid taxation from Chisinau. Simultaneously with that, the Moldovan side ceased supplying empty freight cars to the left Dniester bank and began stopping cargoes heading to Transnistria via the Moldovan territory (Infotag June 13 2005).

Nowadays ordinary people are disappointed with the real situation in the economical sector, especially with the privatization policy. My analysis is based on 25 semi-structured interviews* that I conducted in Rîbniţa in 2008, as well as daily ethnographic observations and informal conversations with ordinary people during my fieldwork.

> "Look what happened to our republic! It was a prosperous land, and now it is a backward province. People here were satisfied and merry; now they have to go to other countries to earn their living. Only financial corporations live in freedom because they have privatized everything that provides benefits."

> "We didn"t suppose of such cardinal changes in our economy. We didn"t know laws and how must be organized privatization. Who had money and power privatized state objects very cheap, they became one"s own masters. And what do we observe today? From day to day I see changes for the worse. It is paradoxically we have not job in a town which has a reputation for its industrial complex. A lot of young families are unhappy because of men have to going for work in Russia but women remain and wait for them here".

> "After the privatization of our factories we have lower salaries than it was before the privatization. With such salary it is difficult to support a family, to educate children and people have to immigrate to other countries".

> "Our factories were sold and we remained without work. For instance before Smirnov presidency I was working at knitting factory of Rybnitsa where worked 3000 people. It was a time when we were proud of our work, that we live here. When Smirnov came to power we didn"t produce anything, our factory had to pay heavy taxation, duties were up and soon the factory became bankrupt. It was sold very cheap and we lost our jobs. Now on the grounds of the factory there is an automobile parking, a car wash, storehouse, a firm

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*All respondents refused to present themselves for personal reasons

*on producing of doors and windows, restaurant for festivities and wed-
dings, and only one shop on the producing of seat covers for cars where
100 people are working".*

*"With the privatization process we have only high prices and low salaries,
we have no state enterprises and we don"t produce, we only buy products
from other countries when we can produce and export ourselves. Smirnov
and his son has a monopoly in all sectors of our economical life: banking
system, custom, supermarkets, gas stations, and they put prices how
they want".*

*"Transnistrians start to understand that Smirnov policy lead us into a
dead end. Our enterprises don"t work; people have to leave, "only pen-
sioners and pioneers remain" - it means that here remain not working peo-
ple. We live in expectation of Russia support which adds to our pensions
15$ per month".*

*"I am sure that our leaders became the richest persons in the republic
when a privatization policy was started. They don"t think about future of
our republic but want that we, simple people, will be patriots of our land.
What are we must proud of? We can"t go anywhere because our Transnis-
trian passport isn"t recognized, but without Transnistrian citizenship we
can"t buy or sell house, automobile, and even to get fixed up in a job. I
privatized my apartment but my children without Transnistrian passport
have not the right of succession. They must be citizens of the TMR or to
pay the state 100% due of apartment value and the apartment will be their
property".*

In the EU and the CIS (especially, Russia and Ukraine) foremost attention
is paid to political aspects of the problem, meanwhile new challenges, events
and findings of the last years (2000-2005) are coming out in the aggravation
of the economic relations between Moldova and Transnistria (the so-called
"economic blockade"), complication of export-import procedures for enterpris-
es of the region, implementation of a large-scale (monetary) privatization here
and the entrance of Russian investors. Separation and autonomization of the
region"s infrastructure clearly places the economic component of the "Tran-
snistrian issue" in the forefront.

Transnistrian government considers that Moldova wishes to unite with
the TMR to use the Transnistrian enterprises for paying the debts to the
World Bank (Колосов, Заяц 2001, p. 44). This argument is enough strong
to maintain a regional specificity of Transnistria and the image of an enemy
which is the Republic of Moldova. "Why our citizens which have not received a
cent from foreign loans should pay in the case of unification the Bessarabian
debts?" (Колосов, Заяц 2001, p. 44). 47.4 % of Transnistrians staunchly sup-
port the idea that the situation in TMR is better than in Moldova. Internation-
ally-sponsored surveys among the population of Transnistria confirm that
respondents "have shown higher trust in their state institutions than in their

Moldovan counterparts" and "felt they live better than Moldovans" (Гузенкова 2004, p. 350). In practical terms, this means that most citizens do not want that their state to unite with the Republic of Moldova. This includes an estimated nine out of every ten of even the ethnic Moldovans who live in Transnistria (O"Loughlin 1998, p. 345).

The above-mentioned trends in the Transnistrian economy adjoin a series of restrictions and negative circumstances:

• monopolization of the real sector and services of the regional economy is high; competition capabilities are limited (due to narrowness of the internal market); control and intermediary operations are hypertrophied;

• no less than 20% of the industrial enterprises (food industry mainly, that lost sources of raw materials, which would meet the capacities of its enterprises large as a Soviet heritage) and about 50% – in agriculture – are unprofitable; their share in services is 12-19%;

• the region turned from a net exporter into a net importer of food;

• there is a decrease of the economically active population and a decline of the level of labor motivation determined by inadequate and tardy remuneration for work;

• direct and portfolio foreign investments of Transnistrian residents, according to the official estimates, still "are not of substantial amount";

• deficiency of investments and wear and tear of equipment and infrastructure communications at many enterprises leads to the preservation of underproductive labor;

• there are manifestations of disloyal competition and criminalization of the informal sector of the economy (Conflicting Interests. Moldova and the Impact of Transdnestria, DFID, January, 2003: p. 15).

Along with these processes, "standard" for post-Soviet area, including strengthening of the notorious "vertical line of power", Transnistria, starting from its peculiarities (unrecognized status, uncertainty of legal status) tried non-ordinary actions, including the participation of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, to search for efficient forms of foreign trade and foreign trade partners; started organizational and financial autonomization of the regional infrastructure (railroads, gas and power supply systems, IT and telephony).

II. 2. Privatized Steel Plant in Rîbnița (MMZ): its Role in the Transnistrian Economy and in the Process of Auto-determination

The Steel Plant in Rîbnița (MMZ) steel based plant, was opened in 1985. MMZ refers to a class of mini-factories where 4000 persons are working. The powerful metallurgical plant has formed both the image of Transnistria and of Rîbnița as a modern industrial town. Today it is the largest and most modern in this part of Europe. The main share of republic budget tax revenues is generated mostly by the core sector of the economy - the ferrous metallurgy. This is first of all the result of favorable conditions for the main traded good of the region – rolled metal (JSC Moldovan Metallurgical Plant, Rîbnița – a key "island" in the Transnistrian

economic archipelago – has significantly increased its output and in 2004 has provided over 60% of exports) (Мое Приднестровье 2005, p. 85). "The economical development of our republic depends to a greater extent on the effective work of the metallurgical enterprise", - considers Andrey Yudin, the general director of MMZ (Partner 2006, p. 1).

For the last years MMZ accessed the authority and experience of international markets. The plant quality system is certificated by firm Lloid's Register Quality Assurance on conformity with the requirements of the international standard ISO EN BS DIN 9002:94 and has a quality production certification from the German union of technical control. The Plant has received some prestigious international awards for the good technical and economic parameters: medals "The Diamond Star", the International Silver award for quality. MMZ also renders consulting services to the metallurgical enterprises from Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Uzbekistan, India and other countries.

The geography of the Transnistrian external trade is quite wide – about 90 countries. Nevertheless, Transnistria does not recognize that the production of the plant is successfully exported to many countries, to the CIS as well as to other foreign countries. "The republic is practically recognized, its companies export production to 78 countries of the world", - says Smirnov (Савицкий 2008, p. 5). But the trade and economic relations, as a rule, are unsustainable and depend on the changing conditions both for exports and for imports.

We analyze this plant not only because it is the largest and most profitable factory in Transnistria and its employees receive the highest salaries in the region, but because it lies at the TMR"s social and economic heart, buttressing its ideology of a socialist-like paternalistic state. For MMZ employees, an independent state symbolized the preservation of the Russian language rights and continuity with a Soviet-style life. It is not surprising that the Russian and Ukrainian industrial workers" keenness most frequently refers to "our state and our Transnistrian people". Sizeable hopes to change their own position refer to the support of Russia. In general, people in Transnistria, about 95%, consider that Russia must defend their compatriots in the near foreign countries, and 58% consider that Russia doesn"t support them enough (Шорников 1997, p. 43). For the plant employees, the Transnistrian state is a real, tangible entity embodied in visible roads and welfare checks, as well as a powerful, regulating authority – to which they attribute a better quality of life. However, this seemingly durable, loyal relationship between the state and aristocracy of labor is in fact fickle and fragile. For there is an upshot to MMZ employees imagining their labor as a "statecraft duty," and their factory as upholding a "paternalist state" (Chamberlain-Creanga 2006, p. 7).

The transformations in economy have begun when the leadership and directors received unlimited opportunities on privatization of state enterprises. It is known that a director of MMZ, Belitchenko A. K. is one of the biggest stockholders in the republic. He was and continues to be an irreconcilable fighter for Transnistrian sovereignty and independence, being the active adherent of change of TMR" Constitution in 2000. As the newspaper "Time" from 5/31/2002 wrote,

the administration of the factory regularly lied to workers when confirmed that metal in the USA was sold at 200 dollars per ton, but in a reality it was on sale at 350 - 400 dollars. According to the estimates, the super profits were in amount of 300 million dollars. "There is an opinion that the director starts to dictate to the President his will. It was in 2006 during the economic blockade that TMR had palpable financial losses. In June Belitcenko invited Smirnov at the factory. After the two hour-long conversations with the President he and the director of the plant have solemnly declared that economic blockade is broken. Thus, Belitcenko broke through "the president blockade" for all the companies of Transnistria. It is known that he is the shadow president of the republic" (Марчков 2007, p. 2).

The unusually united political will of the regional elite is supported by the economic potential of the region, by the Russian military presence, as well as the political support of Moscow and the normative force of the Transnistrian factual existence with an impact on the everyday life of its inhabitants. It is important to carry out not only a top-down but also a bottom-up analysis of the construction of Transnistrian regional identity and people attitude towards the economic activity.

In this context we shall analyze the opinions of Rybnitsa dwellers. Interviewed respondents on the question about the Moldovan Steel Plant role for Rybnitsa have noted its definitive role in the economical development of the town and the region as a whole.

> "Our MMZ is a leader of the Transnistrian industry, has a considerable role in the local and republican budget, it makes the payments for the salaries of workers from the budgetary sphere and for the pensions to the older generation".

> "MMZ is the largest enterprise of Rybnitsa, Rybnitsa region and TMR as a whole, and it creates a favorable financial climate in Transnistria and develops the economy of the town and the republic".

> "The factory keeps us afloat in the big ocean of the economy".

Besides the economical role of the factory the dwellers mentioned its political meaning as a symbol of Transnistrian statehood and separate regional identity.

> "The economy of Transnistria and the productive work of our MMZ actively promoted the creation of our Transnistrian Moldovan Republic in the period when the nationalist leadership was in power in Chisinau who supported the idea of union with Romania. The industrial potential that ensured our citizens a better life was kept here. Undoubtedly the factory is a symbol of our statehood".

> "The Transnistrians are an united people, especially in the situation when Moldova treats our companies as poachers and organizes different blockades with the scope to make our life here insufferable".

> "MMZ is a political instrument in the policy with neighboring states. It unites

Transnistria and the Russian Federation by interests, especially when MMZ proprietors became representatives of the Russian Federation".

"MMZ role in the public, economic and political life of Transnistria and Rybnitsa is great. Our production is rated highly in the CIS and other countries. We are proud of such factory".

"Because of the Steel plant we are known abroad, foreigners know about the existence of our republic and about Transnistrian people.

Despite the positive and optimistic attitude of the dwellers regarding the statehood and the development of the regional economical potential, many people are disappointed by the present economic situation and by the privatization policy of the leadership.

"If a plant was not sold, it will be more profitable for Transnistria and the Transnistrians and we will live much better. But nowadays a lot of our people emigrated to work in other countries. So Rivda, a town in Russia is already consisted on 60 % from Rybniciany. Our leadership gets incomes from our industry, and we remain in a position of beggars".

"If at the beginning the factory employees had high salaries, they saw a future in their life, nowadays, after the plant privatization employee layoff has started. It led to emigration because people cannot get a job in this dying place".

"It is a gold vein for our directors and leadership of "our great state". It is one of the best factories in Europe, Transnistria and Rybnitsa, the strategic point of Transnistrian economy bringing 80 % of the income in the state budget and the newest building materials for the construction of a summer residence of our Chairman of the Supreme Court E.V.Shevchyuk. I want that my people will see the sun in this tunnel".

"People are in a stoical survival, we want to trust our government that tells us about our future happy life, but a lot of us already do not trust them and immigrate to Russia and to Ukraine. We could not suppose that Transnistria will be for us as "a reservation" and "a gold vein" for our president. Nobody knew about such corruption of our state or as it will be known as "my father and mine" republic, that means a republic of our president Smirnov and his family".

"Our economy is very unstable. The economy of the republic was brought to ruin, industry and agriculture were destroyed. Enterprises were sold at very low prices. And these enterprises must work for our economy and provide economic security. Our villages are dying. Today the situation in the villages is worse than it was in the period of the II WW".

Thus, in the economical model of TMR it is extremely difficult to separate a state ideology from the reality as the economic populism was practically completely institutionalized. Such policy inevitably creates self-organized economical

groups who use a weak and corrupted authority in their own interests. Creation of a separate identity promotes strengthening and legitimating the government directed "from top to bottom". The regional identity of the population is based on the memories of a prosperous region during the soviet period and nowadays they appeal to Soviet times as a time of peace and harmony that attempts to maintain Soviet symbols and ideology.

III. Political markers of the Transnistrian economy

III. 1. Custom Regime in Moldova-Transnistria Relations

The formation process of the Transnistrian regional identity must be seen in the context of custom relations between the Republic of Moldova and the so-called TMR. The multitude of forms and intensity of impact of the "Transnistrian phenomenon" upon the policies and economy of the Republic of Moldova has been altering during 18 years of their "parallel development": from sudden aggravation and armed conflict in the spring-summer of 1992, through a relative improvement of relations during 1996-1997 and continuing tension between Moldova and Transnistria (economic blockade), which has been affecting the social and economic development of both regions in the most harmful ways.

In 2005 Moldova and Ukraine elaborated agreements which entered in power in March 2006. According to these agreements, Transnistrian products without export documents obtained by registering with the Moldovan government cannot be exported. According to new regulations, Transnistrian companies for export relations must be registered either permanently or temporarily in Chisinau. The process is swift and inexpensive. Permanent registration grants the company the status of a regular Moldovan company, with access to EU trade but also with obligations to the state budget such as VAT and income tax. Temporary registration does not provide access to EU trade preferences, but neither does it require any payments to the state budget. Chişinău promised to reimburse import duties paid by registered Transnistrian companies when they bring goods into Moldova. Over 200 of an estimated 300 companies have registered in Chişinău, of which approximately half have done so permanently.

Moreover, companies that registered temporarily (and so do not pay Moldovan tax) may export to the EU under the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rate. Also, the economic cooperation protocol between Russia and Transnistria signed in May 2006 gives Transnistrian businesses preferential tariffs for exporting to Russia; by registering in Chisinau temporarily, they can ship their goods through Ukraine to the Russian market without difficulty.

The new customs regime is a bitter political pill for the Transnistrian regime but only that; it does little economic if it is used only for imposing new conditions. For example, if Transnistrian companies were asked to allow Moldovan inspectors into their factories on threat of having their registration revoked - it would cause the businesses much distress. The new customs regime is in many ways a tool that can bring about a change in the status quo if it is used only as a stick to force concessions from the Transnistrians. But pressure should be

coupled with greater incentives for compliance (Protsyk 2006, p. 15).

A further weakness in the customs regime is the lack of control over Transnistrian imports. Goods from Ukraine continue to enter Transnistria directly, at checkpoints on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border. Since Moldovan customs officers are not permitted to operate there, they have no way of knowing what is being imported unless Transnistrian companies declare their imports at an inland Moldovan customs office. This means the Transnistrians can still run their illegal re-export schemes. Controlling imports would require Moldovan customs officials at these border points, or an unprecedented level of information exchange between Ukrainian and Moldovan customs officials, neither of which appears likely in the near future.

Regulating the custom regime on the border was widely discussed in the local Transnistrian mass media. We must mention that the left bank population has no opportunity to watch Moldovan TV (the "Sheriff" company has excluded completely all Moldovan programs from their package of services), and population can"t read the Moldavian newspapers. The Moldovan custom regime was characterized as malicious, destructive and incompetent. The Minister of Economy Elena Chernenko said that "if the decision of the Moldovan government will be implemented even up to 50%, our import losses for half a year can amount 20 million dollars" (Нистряну 2007, p. 24).

The experience of the eighteen-year confrontation between Moldova and Transnistria showed that it damages the socio-economic development of both regions, and mutual sanctions applied during the confrontation aggravate the situation even worse, making it practically impossible to find real solutions for the economic reintegration of the country and the country"s adaptation to the conditions of market economy. It is important to point out here the role of external investors, and first of all Russia which supports the separate Transnistrian identity by economical, political, historical and cultural means. For example, Russian economic assistance to the TMR has included below-market energy subsidization even when the rest of Moldova does not have such terms of trade. However, beyond sweetheart energy deals, Russia has been integral in the construction of a Transnistrian economy separate and apart from the Moldovan economy. In 1991, the Soviet *Agroprombank* established the first separate Transnistrian bank; that bank operated as the region"s central bank until early 1992. This was a key step in allowing the Smirnov regime an economic policy that would diverge from that of the rest of Moldova. The Transnistrian economy, such as it is, is completely reliant on Russian munificence.

The TMR"s privatizations which were largely bought by Russian and Ukrainian companies—being unwound or otherwise jeopardized leads to a substantial interest on the part of some of Russia"s business elite. This is redoubled with the substantial interest that *Gazprom* now has in the proper transfer of shares in Moldova-Gas from the TMR to *Gazprom* as a valid means of paying off debt. Most of the TMR"s leadership seems to be Russian nationals. Due to the dual citizenship system, more than 12% of the region"s population (80 thousand people) are citizens of the Russian Federation with the corresponding legal conse-

quences (Herd 2005, p. 12). Russian labor market employs circa 20% of econom-ically active population from Transnistria, whose monetary remittances (about 40 million USD through banking channels) reinforce considerably incomes of the region"s households. And the last aspect that I want to mention (that is not the topic of present research) is the fact that the Transnistrian educational system of all levels (secondary and higher education, training of research staff and officials) is also oriented towards the legal basis of the Russian Federation (standards, curriculum, manuals, etc.). As is clear, economy policy – economy interactions between Moldova-Transnistria-Russia – have a great influence on the identity question that is articulated in narratives through specific us/them comparisons, and generate symbolic boundaries that separate and define social groups on two banks of the Dniester River.

III. 2. Transnistrian Business Elite and Their Effect on the Economy

To understand the effects on the Transnistrian economy, it is necessary to examine how the Transnistrian economy operates. As was mentioned above the Transnistrian economy is valuable because of the Soviet policy in this region and the present support of "a big brother" – the Russian Federation. In the first three months after the implementation of the Ukraine-Moldova customs regime, Russia offered as a help over $50 million in cash and $150 million in credits for the devel-opment of Transnistrian business (Moldova: No Quick Fix 2003, p. 46).

Besides the largest Rîbnița Steel mill other large company is Sheriff that has a network of supermarkets and petrol stations, a football stadium in Ti-raspol known as the biggest in the South-East Europe, textile factory - *Tirotex*, machine-building factory - *Electromash* and cognac and wine factory - Kvint (recently purchased by Sheriff). Thus, the most profitable spheres of trading ac-tivity are under the control of Smirnov and his son, the head of Custom commit-tee. *Sheriff* has a monopoly on tobacco, combustive-lubricating materials, wine industry, import of food stuffs and petrol.

In December 2005, a group of business leaders headed by the chairman of the Supreme Court Evgeny Shevchuk registered the movement, *"Obnovlenye"* ("Renewal"), which formally as a political party in June 2006 gained 23 of 43 seats in the Supreme Court, defeating the pro-Smirnov Republican Party. Analysts believe *"Obnovlenye"*"s victory signifies the growing influence of the business community. Shevchuk is closely linked to a number of Transnistrian companies, including the dominant supermarket network Sheriff. He portrays himself as a young reformer, "a social democratic technocrat with an European outlook" (Conflicting Interests 2003: p. 16). His party calls itself "pro-business and pro-Western". Though it supports Transnistrian independence like Smirnov, it differs on economic issues. Transnistria has "an incomplete market economy", and *"Obnovlenye"*`s goal is to make it "more European" (Савицкий 2005). Shev-chuk speaks the language of the Western-minded businessman. According to him, Transnistria can survive under the current conditions but it cannot de-velop. Investors are frightened away: one day we"re under a customs regime, the

next day we"re not. European companies look a year ahead in determining their contracts and strategy, so with the volatility here, we have no chance of attracting investments. Given that we have not invested much in infrastructure, this is not a good situation ... .if things continue, employees of small and medium business will leave for countries with more stability, and only pensioners and radicals will remain (Савицкий 2005).

In the spring of 2005, the party "*Obnovlenye*" tried to initiate constitutional reforms that would have weakened Smirnov"s powers and strengthened the parliament. A lot of politicians saw it as a division within the regime. Discord between Smirnov and the local business community grew when Ukraine began to enforce the new customs regime in March 2006 and Smirnov ordered Transnistrian businesses to stop trading thus creating the impression of an externally-imposed blockade. "What investor would invest in a Transnistrian enterprise when they see that inventory can sit in the warehouse for three months?" asked Shevchuk (Марчков 2007, p. 2).

The republic has passed from the form of state-monopoly to oligarchic-monopolistic economy. Chairman Shevchuk has acted with criticism to address of president family and asked to return state money from *Gazprombank* controlled by Smirnov to Transnistrian Republican Bank. Such facts about the economic situation in the region and Smirnov"s policy leave people disappointed with his personality and in his policy of nation and state-building.

Conclusions

The economy contributes to a rapid change of the ethno-political situation in the country and influences the politics of the elite and behavior of the population. The economy has a permanent "mobilizing character" of unity among Transnistrian citizens; this was case at the beginning of state-building and it continues today. In Transnistria, the economic issue has played a significant role, with the desire of the pseudo-state leadership to take advantage of the TMR"s relative economic power vis-à-vis the rest of the economy. Political, social, ideological, and economic forces indeed reshaped the lives of the Left and Right banks of the Dniester River in very different ways. Wealth, standards of living, and material well being, all dependent on a national economy, became defining elements in the Transnistrian self-perception. Reinforced connections with the Soviet Union exist without reminding the people of their separate socialist identity. The self-definitions constructed in the postwar era only added a new dimension to the dormant, but still extant, national identity in the Republic of Moldova. The strong "power vertical" created in Transnistria exercised an important influence upon the economic management.

The TMR"s strongest argument for sovereignty is not one stemming from the doctrinal requirements of external self-determination but the argument that it was not part of Moldova historically. While it is true that the east and west banks of the Dniester were often separated by a boundary, the historical fact is that they have existed in a single state, without separation, since 1940. This is longer than most states in existence today. Moreover, there is no linguistic, ethnic, or

religious justifications for separation as the communities on both sides of the Dniester are heterogeneous and multi-ethnic. The TMR tried to answer this by arguing that the majority of the population wants the TMR"s independence and that the TMR has all state attributes and a viable economy. The Steel Mill in Rîbnița has influenced the distinctive regionalism of Transnistria grounded in economic sufficiency and political leadership. Identity is, of course, socially constructed, and the TMR has put significant effort into socializing Transnistrians into having a group identity.

Having analyzed the prerequisites for regional identity construction, some conclusions can be drawn. The decline of the nationalist movement makes us agree with arguments according to which ethnic identity is not fixed but can be easily constructed and deconstructed by elites depending on their changing interests.

The concept of identity expands the economic analysis for a variety of reasons. First of all, identity can explain the behavior that appears detrimental. People behave in ways that would be considered maladaptive or even self-destructive by those with other identities. The reason for this behavior may be to bolster a sense of self or to replenish self-image.. Then, identity underlies a new type of externality. One person's actions can have meaning for and evoke responses in others. Identity also reveals a new way by which preferences can be changed. Notions of identity evolve within a society and some in the society have incentives to manipulate them. As we shall explore, there are many other cases, including public policies, where changing social categories and associated prescriptions affects economic outcomes. And because identity is fundamental to behavior, choice of identity may be the most important "economic" decision people make. Individuals may — more or less consciously — choose who they want to be. Limits on this choice may also be the most important determinant of an individual"s economic well-being.

Accordingly, the combination of these factors and the dominant mentality of *Homo Sovieticus* led to the appearance of a political regime structured in accordance with the classical triad common with totalitarian regimes – a dictator (Igor Smirnov), an idea (independence of a "TMR" state), and a people (the "Transnistrian multinational people"). I consider, the "TMR" is a zone inside which, with the help of violence and manipulation of public opinion, a totalitarian political regime was set up.

It is unsurprising, that in the period of effective control over Transnistria, the TMR leadership has begun "privatizing" or otherwise converting what has been Moldovan state property in the region. Moldova rejects such privatizations, having passed a law stating that any privatization in the territory of Moldova (including Transnistria) must be approved by the Moldovan Parliament.

I analyzed how Russia may use economic ties to put political pressure on Moldova and/or assist the TMR in a manner that goes beyond the norms of non-intervention. Economic pressure is generally not barred; rather such pressure on a state or assistance to separatists must not be used to the extent that Russia has entered the conflict in a manner that would frustrate either Moldova"s sov-

ereign privileges or would breach one of Russia"s pre-existing commitments to Moldova. In considering the present situation, there are four areas of particular interest - the use of energy prices as a carrot or as a stick; the increased use of tariff barriers against Moldovan goods; economic assistance to the TMR; and the shared economic interests of Russian and Transnistrian elites.

All nations have experienced different historical evolutions, created individual cultural vocabularies, struggled with unique internal crises, and at times, considered themselves separate from all others. Each nation has been shaped by the course of its own development, in the process of self-definition and in the creation of identity. People in the present define themselves with knowledge of the past, adding different dimensions: political, economical, social, and cultural. National identity consists of this accumulation. Though it is often debated, national identity is an assemblage of self-assessments and self-definitions commonly held and embraced by the members of a nation.

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THE REPRESENTATION OF HISTORY AND IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION: A TRANSNISTRIAN MUSEUM AS A CASE STUDY

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Abstract

The paper explores how historical knowledge represented in museums constructs an identity. Based on the data obtained during the author"s research trips to Transnistria in November 2006 and June-July 2007, the paper investigates what elements constitute the basis for the Transnistrian identity construction. To explore this issue the author focuses on the museum as the public space for the representation of history and identity construction. The analysis of the Transnistrian identity"s "historical content" suggests that this identity encompasses elements of the following three forms – legitimizing, resistance and project identity (Castells"s classification of identity). Legitimizing identity is constructed by the official discourse, which widely uses the elements of resistance identity. The same elements of resistance identity are sources of forming the project identity, which in the immediate future will be constructed on the basis of the ideas about Transnistrian independence and sovereignty.

For the past few decades perhaps no debate in the social sciences has spurred as much discussion as that about the concept of "identity". According to S. Hall, the concept of identity has been studied within a variety of disciplinary areas and has been subjected to a range of critiques [1, p.1]. The researchers address the issues not so much to record/fix some identities and their manifestations, as to "unravel the tangle of meanings" [2]. As Z. Bauman underlines, identity has become such a salient theme in the social sciences because identity reveals more about contemporary human society than any known conceptual and analytical results of society"s rethinking [3, c. 192].

In this paper I explore how historical knowledge represented in museums constructs an identity. The object of my research is the *Transnistrian identity* – a post-Soviet phenomenon that one cannot easily "insert" into traditional approaches of identity studies. This is determined by the complicity of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (TMR) itself, where the process of identity formation is going on.

The Russian researcher S. Markedonov emphasizes that processes that take place in Eurasian space (NIS-1) are closely tied to the "cunning tricks among the peculiar NIS-2" – the unrecognized states on the territory of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova [4]. These states are not recognized in accordance with the International Laws. Nevertheless, the "virtual character of the existence of these states does not prevent them from being real participants of the "Big Game" in the post-Soviet space [4, c. 118]. Significantly, this process is shaped not only by formal-juridical issues - the appearance of such a phenomenon and the struggle for recognition are outcomes of emotional-symbolic and socio-cultural meanings [4, c. 118]. These *meanings* are reflected by and manifested through the identities that are now being constructed.

The article is structured in three parts. Firstly, I briefly summarize the different approaches to studying Transnistrian identity. Secondly, I highlight the role of museums in the process of identity construction, in order to contextualize my case study. Finally, I present the results of my current research on museums and identity construction in a Transnistrian town.

1.Transnistrian Identity: Research Foci

The literature on Transnistrain identity varies according to the research methodology, which is determined by the researcher"s belonging to a particular scholarship.

Thus, Russian ethno-sociologist M. Guboglo uses questionnaires in his investigation of identity, a traditional research method for Russian ethnology. He employs categories such as "ethnicity", "regional identity", "ethnisim", and "linguisim". M. Guboglo articulates his main research question as tracking the "competing identities of Transnistria" [5, c. 34-35].

The works by the Transnistrian researchers are based on the methodology of Soviet and Russian ethno-sociology and history. Mostly these works have not only "pure" research goals. Above all they aim to ground the Transnistrian politics of identity. Thus "History of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic" de-

clares "the rights for different forms of identity" – national, confessional, linguistic identity and civic identity, and underlines that the principles of the TMR Constitution are conducive for the "symbiosis of civic and regional identities" [6, c. 95].

Analyzing the data of her research, based on qualitative in-depth interviews with students at Tiraspol University, the Moldovan researcher N. Cojocaru concludes that the Transnistrian identity has acquired distinct boundaries vis-à-vis the Moldovan identity, especially among young people, and that this complicates reintegration within a federal model [7].

The American political scientist S. Roper examines how educational, linguistic and citizenship policies have influenced the development of the Moldovan identity and the relations with Transnistria. He concludes that education is not only an important agent of identity formation, but also that such crude political tactics as school closures ultimately affect other education policies, reinforce negative stereotypes and make meaningful dialogue impossible [8].

One of the significant studies on the Transnistrian identity is an investigation by the German researcher S. Troebst. Through this study the author aims at answering whether the conflict-driven state building could lead to nation building [9].

The common features of all these explorations of the Transnistrian identity are that they concern (in different aspects) the issues of the *past*, because investigation of the *present* is indissolubly bounded with the meanings of the past.

In my research[1] I investigate *what are the construction factors that shape Transnistrian identity*. Or in other words, what elements constitute a basis for the Transnistrian identity construction. To explore this issue I propose to focus on the museum, which I regard as the *public space for representation of history and identity construction*.

2. Museums In the Process of Identity Construction: Research Contextualization

The studies that have been done in different societies reveal some common trends: besides their main functions – to represent culture and history – museums play a significant role for the construction, representation and constitution of identities.

H. Riegel has argued that museums have particular "authority" to represent "other" cultures [10]. The historians R. Rosenzweig and D. Thelen underline that the museums "bound" people with the past and by this shape the "existence of the past in the present" [11, p. 32]. These researchers also highlight the links between the museums and the public trust: museums and historic sites are "trusted" by members of the public to convey stories about the past [11]. E. Gable and R. Handler, focusing on specific places like Colonial Williamsburg, explore the ways that visitors from anywhere in the US can experience a personal relationship with their national history and identity through the museum"s use of a dominant historical

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[1] This study is based on the data, obtained during my research trips to Transnistria in November 2006 and June-July 2007

narrative of the past [12]. Other studies, such as the study of Israeli pioneering settlement museums conducted by T. Katriel, examine more explicitly the ways in which the "collective remembering" has been utilized within museums for ideological purposes [13]. Studying museum practices in China, T. Hamlish concludes that museums offer possibilities for the "institutional expression" of the new Chinese nationalism and identity [14]. C. Duncan defined a museum in Europe as a "ritual of citizenship" and also as "the site of a symbolic transaction between the visitor and the state" [15; 22].

These studies all ask questions about the meanings given to history in different societies in recent decades. History and its meanings, perhaps more than "heritage", have become central to public, and often highly political, debates.

The past and its representations acquire a special significance in post-colonial societies. The methods used for the "construction of the past" in the imagination of particular communities raise key questions such as: *what* history means in a post-colonial society, and *how* the past is used for the grounding of actions in the present [17, p. 77]. C. Duncan reminds us that exhibitions in museums do not for themselves change the world, but as a form of public space they constitute an arena in which a community may test, examine, and imaginatively live both its older, time-tested truths and explore the possibilities for new ones [16, p. 133].

"Museum policy" defines *what and how* to exhibit in museums. This policy is formed by the existing political and ideological borders. As Ames argues "Representation is a political act. Sponsorship is a political act. Working in a museum is a political act". [18] The museum practices are just as diverse as the political environments these practices are framed in.

The essence of "identity politics" is encapsulated in its "main question". If politics is about the power to decide *who gets what*, then the "main question" of identity politics is about *who controls the **meaning** of the identity* in the society. Different approaches provide different answers to this question: the individual (liberal theories of politics); the groups with which people associate themselves (sociological and socio-psychological approaches); the society (structuralist and institutionalist approaches); the state (neo/Marxist theorists); the language and discourse that people use every day to communicate their identities (post-structuralist and post-modern political theories).

As they construct and represent identities, museums include all the above-mentioned "agents" of the politics of identity, from the state to everyday discourse. To control a museum means to control *representation of the community and its main significant values and symbols* [19]. Therefore, the degree and scale of the influences of different agents varies depending on the type of society.

3. Case Study: Museum of History and Local Lore as a Space of Construction, Representation and Constitution of the Transnistrian Identity

This paper is built on the data analysis of one of the local museums in Transnistria – a museum of history and local lore of the town Dubossary. This small

town (population 25,000) is an interesting site for research due to the key role it played during the armed conflict in the early 1990s. As it will be showed later, these events have played an important role in the construction of the Transnistrian identity.

As C. Healy emphasizes, the museums of small towns have a special significance for the national and regional history and identity construction: "it has become almost compulsory for history-minded towns to have a museum as evidence of their historic status" [17, p. 77-78]. He suggests that these places are more like "memory places" than the newly-fashioned, technologically sophisticated museums the public has come to experience in metropolitan centers. With the help of such memory places local history is endowed with the meanings that construct the identity of those persons who are bonded with this history.

The collection of the Dubossary museum is mainly replenished by the exhibits donated to the museum by inhabitants of this town. As a rule, museums of small towns, not having a strong sponsorship from the administration, very often involve the grassroots in the formation of the museum"s stocks. The studies by R. Hoskins revealed that this involvement of the grassroots allows the participants to feel they are the custodians and interpreters of the past in their specific contexts [quote from: 20].

Exhibits of the Dubossary museum are presented as "thematically" organized expositions. They represent not so much an integral view of history, but rather demonstrate a particular period of the past through the actualization of particular events and persons. In this way the construction of the Transnistrian identity is built on the constructions of the meanings about the past and present.

The representation of the distant past is connected with its correlation with and insertion into the meta-narrative – the history of the Russian Empire. The exhibits have to demonstrate the town"s attachment to and involvement in the "events of pride" in the history of the Empire: a picture of the "Building, where M. Kutuzov dwelled during the ambassadors" exchange according to the 1791 Yassy Agreement". The same principle is used to "plait" the town into the history of the Soviet period: "In this building in January 1918 G. Kotovskiy delivered his speech for the youth of Dubossary". In these ways the significance and contribution of the local history for the entire meta-narrative – the history of the Russian Empire and later, Soviet history – are stressed.

The Soviet history and its symbols are still an important part of the identity construction in the post-Soviet states. However, one could observe different interpretations of the Soviet heritage. Thus, persons in Georgia and the Baltic States (and similar tendencies recently appeared in Ukraine as well) view this period as a "*Soviet occupation*", and emerging museums today aim to form exactly this point of view and this interpretation of the Soviet past. The unique feature of Transnistria is that the Soviet epoch – especially its early period – is represented in terms of the "honored past", expressed in the Dubossary museum with the help of an exposition under the general title "*Leniniana*" (illustration 1).

Another significant aspect of the Soviet heritage, which is among the "events

of pride", is the history and people who took part in the victory over fascism. In Transnistria, unlike in some other post-Soviet states (and Ukraine is among them), the interpretation of this period does not contradict the public discourse, and the events of the Second World War are evaluated and interpreted through *multiple meanings* as the "Great Patriotic War" (illustration 2). This period is represented through the "personification of the events": the basis of this exhibition consists exclusively of local material about inhabitants of Dubossary, who took part in the war and town"s liberation.

The museum materials also reflect and represent the ethnic diversity of the Transnistrian population. Several exhibitions are devoted to the ethnographic data that expose the cultures of three main ethnic groups – Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian (illustration 3).

> *"The aim of the organization of these exhibitions is to show the multination-ality of our region, "to attach it to the presence of three languages in Tran-snistria, to show interlinks of Russian, Moldovan and Ukrainian cultures /…/ It is quite difficult for us to distinguish or separate these cultures from each other… they are united by Orthodoxy."[2]*

The organization of the ethnographic exhibition reflects the concept of *"Tran-snistrian multiculturalism"*. Issues of ethnic and linguistic policies form the principles for the crystallization and grounding of Transnistrian ideology. The Constitution of TMR declares three "official languages": Russian, Moldovan[3] and Ukrainian. In the official version of the TMR"s history this is discussed in comparison with the principles of the ethno-national policy from Moldova [6, p. 97]. The official discourse highlights that the process of formation of "multinational people" occurring in Transnistria assumes full rights to the "preservation of the ethnicity of all peoples /…/ with the right of every person for free choice of his/her ethnic belonging" [6, p. 96-97].

Three ethnic cultures – Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian – form the core of the concept of "Transnistrian multiculturalism". However, the ethnic structure of the Transnistrian population includes some other ethnic groups. The numbers of these groups have varied during different historical periods. In Dubossary in particular, Jews constituted a quite large ethnic group during the centuries. The number of Jews diminished dramatically during the Second World War, and emigration of the Jewish population after the fall of the Soviet Union, strengthened by the armed conflict in Transnistria, resulted in the disappearance of Jews as a group in the ethnic structure of the town.

At the same time, the Dubossary museum stocks have some materials depicting the "Jews" presence" in the history of the town (specifically, data about Jewish artels in the pre-revolutionary period, and the Jewish genocide). Nevertheless, this is not reflected in the exhibitions. When I queried the museum curators about this lack, they were confused: "*What for? They all are in Israel, and*

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[2] Interview with the museum director, 26.06.2007

[3] Unlike in Moldova, Moldavian language in Transnistria keeps Cyrillic script.

those who stay here received humanitarian aid from Israeli organizations"[4]. Thus, the past of the town is presented through the representation of the "historical actors" that are vital for the present. In other words, the present dictates the strategy of designating what constitutes the "significant past" and "appropriate actors".

The most actualized period of history presented in the museum exhibitions is the "*recent past*" – the years after the referendum on Transnistrian independence. The exhibition "16 years of the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic" opens the representation of this period with materials united under the rubric "*How it was*". There we find documents about the creation of the TMR such as the text of the declaration of independence, the material of the Second Congress of people"s deputies, and the pictures of that time.

The main purpose of exposing these documents is to show the necessity and grandness of the decision-making process regarding the independence, based on opposition to the ideas promoted by the ideologists of the "People"s Front" in Moldova:

> "On 2 September 1990, expressing the will of the *multinational people* of Transnistria… and with the aim to defend it against *Romanization*… the 2nd Congress of people"s deputies of Transnistria… proclaimed the formation of a new sovereign state – Transnistrian Moldovan Republic."[5]

The main parts of these exhibitions are devoted to the participation of the Dubossary inhabitants in the armed conflict between TMR and RM and to the role of the town in the struggle for the independence. These events are interpreted and represented as an "aggression of the Moldovan nationalists against Transnistria" (illustration 4). Moreover, the exhibitions about the armed conflict in the 1990s spatially are placed in the same showroom with the exhibitions about the Great Patriotic War, and these two exhibitions are thematically united under the general idea of the "defense of the Motherland" (illustration 5).

The events connected with the armed conflict are highly significant for Dubossary"s inhabitants: these events are the "core" of the newest history not only of the town, but of Transnistria as a whole. But how much does the official discourse of Transnistrian history reflects these meanings?

> "*Many journalists from different countries came to see these exhibitions. Our museum has one of the only exhibitions about the war events in Transnistria, because the main events were going on here /…/ But Tiraspol* [capital of TMR] *does not value this, does not value the "Dubossarian epic". But if Dubossary would be taken, we would be divided into two parts and Transnistria would not exist.*"

By focusing on the local data about the past, the museum of history and local lore reproduces "local history", which very often could be marginalized in the frame of a meta-narrative (of a state or nation) [20]. When the political construction of the history as a meta-narrative does not take into consideration the

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[4] Interview with the curators of the museum, 27.06.2007.
[5] Indicated in italics by the author.

local histories, a given community might strive to dispute, reject, reinterpret and rewrite this meta-narrative [20].

The role of museums as agents of formation of different attitudes "regarding the future" is highly important in "split" societies and nations. Thus, one study on South Korean museums showed that Korean nationalism "became transformed into a statism that privileged anticommunism over unification" [22, p.23]. As R. Grinker writes, "for Koreans, the past is still happening, and division is not an event that once happened, but is an ongoing and creative process of construction" [21, p. 33].

One can observe the same functions of the museum and the same situation between Transnistria and Moldova. Actualization and grounding of the separation and Transnistrian sovereignty is one of the main principles of the organization of the exhibitions in the Dubossarian museum, and the division between Moldova and Transnistria is an ongoing and creative process of construction. The museum materials demonstrate that anti-Moldovan ideas are privileged over the unification of Transnistria and Moldova.

The existence of the Transnistrian Republic is valued positively not only for Transnistria itself, but also for the independence of Republic of Moldova: *"If not for Transnistria, Moldova would easily be a part of Romania"*.[6] Museums act as places where people define "who they are, and how they have to act" according to this "imagined community" that results from identity politics.

Here Castells"s classification of identity is relevant. This classification was drawn according to the subjects and origins of identity construction. He makes a distinction between legitimizing, resistance and project identities. *Legitimizing identity* concerns dominant institutions and civil society, citizenship and the internalization of domination. *Resistance identity* is an identity of "collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression" resulting in a reversal of the discourse of "the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded." [23, p. 9]. To redefine their position in society social actors build a new *project identity* and transform the entire social structure [23, p. 8].

The analysis of the "historical content" of the Transnistrian identity suggests that this identity consists of the elements of all three mentioned forms. However, the sources for these types of identities go beyond "internal factors," and references used in identity construction include those beyond the borders of Transnistria. Legitimizing identity is constructed by the official discourse, which widely uses the elements of resistance identity (in this case – resistance toward "external factors" – the position of Moldova and all the states that support its politics). The same elements of resistance identity are sources of forming the project identity, which in the immediate future will be constructed on the basis of ideas about Transnistrian independence and sovereignty.

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[6] Interview with a museum curator, 26.06.2007.

Illustration 1

Illustration 2

Illustration 3

Illustration 4

Illustration 5

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Marius Rotar, Corina Rotar (coord.), *Murire şi moarte în România secolelor XIX-XX. Lucrările conferinţei naţionale, Alba Iulia, 11-12 octombrie 2007,* **Cluj-Napoca, Ed. Accent, 2007, 237 p.**

La finele anului 2007, graţie eforturilor comune ale coordonatorilor dr. Marius Rotar şi dr. Corina Rotar, istoriografia românească a fost întregită cu încă un studiu pe marginea atitudinilor şi percepţiilor în faţa moţii. Este vorba de volumul publicat la Editura Accent din Cluj-Napoca cu titlul „Murire şi moarte în România secolelor XIX-XX. Lucrările conferinţei naţionale, Alba Iulia, 11-12 octombrie 2007" şi care înmănunchează selecţia de comunicări ştiinţifice susţinute la Conferinţa Naţională cu acelaşi titlu organizată de către Centrul de Cercetări Istorice şi Politologice „Iuliu Maniu" din cadrul Universităţii „1 Decembrie 1918" din Alba Iulia în contextul proiectului de cercetare „Atitudini în faţa morţii; perspective în faţa vieţii în România secolelor XIX-XXI". Astfel, douăsprezece studii semnate de „istorici, sociologi şi teologi preocupaţi de domeniul muririi şi morţii, provenind din medii universitare româneşti diverse cum ar fi Iaşi, Cluj-Napoca, Sibiu, Craiova, Bucureşti şi Alba Iulia" (p. 9) vin să constituie substanţa narativă a cărţii.

Lucrarea este circumscrisă eforturilor istoriografiei româneşti contemporane de a depăşi „conformismul tematic" şi, concomitent, reiterează noi perspective de afirmare a problematicii muririi şi morţii – temă, de altfel, puţin obişnuită în istoriografia din Republica Moldova, însă cu prezenţe notorii în istoriografia românească de astăzi. După cum menţionează unul din coordonatori în Cuvânt Înainte, „[a]proape inexistente înainte de 1989 şi nu datorită unor comandamente ideologice, ci mai degrabă unui conformism tematic, investigaţiile de acest tip au fost privite ca ,neserioase" după 1989"(p. 7).

Incursiunea multilaterală şi, pe măsură, ambiţioasă în ceea ce priveşte cercetarea fenomenului morţii şi muririi în perioada secolelor XIX-XX debutează cu două studii de fond pe marginea istoriografiei româneşti asupra morţii semnate de Loredana Stepan („Istoriografia morţii în spaţiul românesc") şi respectiv, de Tudor Roşu („Istoriografia românească asupra morţii. Studiu de caz"). Autoarea primului studiu, Loredana Stepan, pornind de la precizarea că „[î]n anii 50-60 ai secolului XX, moartea i-a interesat pe istorici din perspectiva deficitului demografic ... însă marea carieră a morţii în istoriografi a fost cea calitativă, a atitudinilor în faţa morţii, asociată cu istoria atitudinilor în faţa vieţii" îşi propune să ofere cititorului „o trecere în revistă a istoriografiei româneşti asupra morţii, oprindu-se în special asupra productelor istoriografice post-revoluţionare, majoritatea studiilor româneşti de thanatologie istorică, etnografică sau

psihanalitică fiind publicate după 1990, în condiţiile eliminării cenzurii comuniste asupra investigării problematicii spiritualităţii." (p. 11). Acest demers este întregit prin studiul de caz prezentat de Tudor Roşu, „luând în discuţie două volume importante consacrate tematicii morţii, şi anume Reprezentări ale morţii în Transilvania secolelor XVI-XX, coord. Mihaela Grancea, Cluj-Napoca, Casa Cărţii de Ştiinţă, 2005, 346 p. şi, respectiv, Discursul despre moarte în Transilvania secolelor XVI-XX, volum de studii editat de Mihaela Grancea şi Ana Dumitran, Cluj-Napoca, Casa Cărţii de Ştiinţă, 2006, 562 p." (p. 37). În viziunea lui Tudor Roşu, aceste studii vin să confirme afirmarea thanatologiei „ca un nou domeniu al cunoaşterii în perioada post-decembristă", „ca un teren în curs de desţelenire, deloc închis, aşa cum ar putea apărea neiniţiaţilor, ci unul foarte permisiv, utilizând un spectru extrem de larg al surselor, de categorii diverse. (p. 38). Menţionând că „thanatologia oferă posibilitatea unor multiple abordări metodologice, în principal datorită caracteristicii ei de a fi supusă inter- şi transdisciplinarităţii", autorul nu ezită să pună în evidenţă şi eventualele carenţe care apar în procesul studiilor asupra morţii.

Demersul privind „Moartea, ritul şi eroul. Sugestii metodologice", semnat de Andi Mihalachi constituie o contribuţie remarcabilă în domeniu, graţie incursiunilor metodologice pe marginea comemorărilor din epoca modernă încercând să ia în calcul confluenţa mai multor factori care au contribuit la resuscitarea cultului eroilor în perioada respectivă. Reflectând pe marginea felului în care întrebuinţăm ritualul, autorul insistă asupra faptului că „ritualul nu disciplinează, ci participă, în primul rând, la teatralizarea şi estetizarea vieţii. El nu îşi îndeplineşte menirea fără privirea asistenţei, o privire estetizantă, care înlătură, temporar, tot ceea ce nu place ochiului" (p. 59). În căutarea de „noi abordări", cu incursiuni asupra similitudinilor şi deosebirilor în „a ritualiza", „a patrimonializa" şi „a muzeifica", studiul tinde „să iasă din seria nenumăratelor deconstrucţii ale identităţii naţionale, integrându-se, mai curând, într-o istorie a tipurilor de devoţiune, într-o poveste a regimurilor pietăţii" (p. 67) şi ajungând în concluzie la ideea că „între înmormântarea unui erou şi comemorarea lui ulterioară vedem o strânsă complementaritate" (p. 70).

Următorul studiu constituie o investigaţie amplă asupra cazului „tratării" osemintelor lui Nicolae Bălcescu propusă de Mihai Chiper cu titlul „Patria ingrata. În căutarea osemintelor lui Bălcescu". Autorul se opreşte asupra „complexului vinovăţiei, al nerecunoştinţei faţă de jertfa unui martir", considerând că „repetata căutare a osemintelor, sub presiunea resimţită de o vinovăţie colectivă, a devenit ea însăşi o formă de practică memorială" (p. 73).

Studiile semnate de Mihaela Grancea („Epitaful Săpânţean şi celebrarea vieţii"), Maria Janina Şerdean („Dimensiunea monumentală a cimitirelor-necropolă şi a artei funerare în România (1850-1950) constituie contribuţii valoroase privind investigarea spaţiului cimitirului. Cimitirul - „dilemă culturală"?, dimensiunea „pedagogică" a epitafelor, „dimensiunea monumentală a cimitirelor moderne", încercări de „definire a cimitirelor", „cimitirul în universul thana-

tologiei", „tematicile simbolice funebre" – sunt doar o parte din subiectele şi perspectivele de investigare a acestor locuri ale memoriei, în viziunea autoarelor menţionate.

Leonard Arthur Horvath se opreşte asupra temei despre „Moartea şi retorica funerară calvină în Transilvaniaîn secolul al XIX-lea". Analiza retoricii funerare la diferite segmente sociale şi de vârstă din mediul calvinilor transilvăneni („la bătrâni", „la copii mici", „la privilegiaţii societăţii", „la la înmormântarea regelui" etc), în viziunea autorului, „poate prezenta o nouă imagine asupra istoriei din punct de vedere al mentalităţilor colective şi al imaginarului social" (p. 128).

Demersul semnat de Marius Rotar („Eternitate şi cenuşă: preludiu la o cercetare asupra crematoriilor şi incinerărilor umane în România secolelor XIX-XXI (I)") constituie o abordare temerară a problemei crematoriilor şi incinerărilor umane în România secolelor XIX –XX, mai ales în contextul istoriografiei româneşti. După cum afirmă chiar autorul, „[a]naliza istorică a problematicii crematoriilor şi incinerărilor umane pentru spaţiul românesc constituie o cercetare cu potenţial aparte pe viitor datorită multiplelor posibilităţi de anchetă comparativă, temporală şi de contextualizare" (p. 170).

Demersul semnat de Marius Rotar şi Corina Rotar („Asupra morţii suportate în Transilvaniala sfârşitul secolului al XIX-lea şi începutul secolului XX") readuce în atenţia cercetătorilor „realitatea brută a morţii", din perspectiva studiilor de demografie istorică, menţinând-o sistematic prin analiza atitudinilor, sensibilităţilor şi mentalităţilor colective din epoca respectivă.

Volumul este întregit, mai ales în plan transdisciplinar, de originalelele studii elaborate de Csaba Beke („Moartea şi viaţa de dincolo în pilda bogatului nemilostiv şi a săracului Lazăr" şi, respectiv, Tudor Grindean şi Claudiu Ştefani („Determinanţi socio-structurali ai sinuciderii. Studiu în Judeţul Alba, 2000-2005"). În primul caz, autorul Csaba Beke reflectă, în cheia disciplinei teologice pe marginea unei parabole a lui Isus, urmărind să ne introducă astfel „în învăţătura Bisericii referitor la viaţa după moarte" (p. 207). În cazul demersului semnat de Tudor Grindean şi Claudiu Ştefani, investigaţia „îşi propune să retesteze teoriile referitoare la sinucidere, să realizeze o nouă verificare a legilor sale de manifestare şi a regularităţilor sale determinate până acum la nivel naţional", să elucideze „măsura în care intensitatea fenomenului suicidar în Judeţul Alba este influenţată de o serie de variabile sociale structurale şi economice" (p. 221).

Volumul, în esenţă, merită toată atenţia cititorului, instigând cercetătorul la noi perspective de investigaţie a propriilor teme de studiu, la atitudini critice faţă de surse, susţinând astfel efortul autorilor cărţii de a depăşi „conformismul tematic", dominant încă în unele medii istoriografice post-totalitare.

Ludmila Cojocari,
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**Catherine Merridale, Ivan"s War. *Life and death in the Red Army,
1939-1945,* New York, Metropolitan Books, 2006, 462 p.**

In Ivan"s War, Catherine Merridale retells the history of the Red Amy during
the Second World War as seen through the eyes of the ordinary Soviet soldier.
The sources are diverse - letters, diaries and oral accounts (or "true stories"
as Merridale calls them) newspaper articles and archival documents. It is a
complex investigation, which combines in a easy-readable narrative knowledge
of military history, psychology, psychiatry, anthropology and cultural history,
among others. Merridale covers the whole period of the Second World War, from
the first announcements about the German attacks and the confusion which
these announcements created among the soldiers of the Red Army, to the first
disasters suffered by Soviets in the first months of the war and the mass deser-
tions, the everyday life of the war and the strategies of mobilization applied by
the Soviet commanders to reorganize the army, the victory of the 9 May 1945
and its celebrations in the Soviet and post-Soviet period. She also looks at the
role of the veterans in the Soviet society in the post-war period and the impact
which the Second World War and its remembrance had for the establishment of
the Soviet system.

The author is currently a professor at the Queen Mary University of London
and has published previously on culture, trauma and collective memory in Rus-
sia. Ivan"s War is a continuation of Merridale"s interest in the modern Russian
history, which she explored in Night of Stone: Death and Memory in twentieth
century Russia (2000), a well-received book that was awarded the Heinemann
Prize for Literature.

To Catherine Merridale the Second World War defied the human sense of
scale (2), through the number of people engaged in fighting and the rates of
loss which remain beyond imagination. Merridale shows that the Red Army was
destroyed and renewed at least twice in the course of the war, being for the
ordinary soldiers a "meat-grinder". She shows that there is a double standard
in describing the Soviet soldier. On the one side is the "the Soviet Union"s hero
myth", which is found on war memorials, wartime songs and movies, war novels
as the character of Aleksandr Tvardovsky"s fictional soldier Vasily Tyorkin. He is
the ideal everyman "simple, healthy, strong and kind, far-sighted, selfless, and
unafraid of death, oriented towards the future – a bright utopia for which he is
prepared to sacrifice his life. There would be no hint of panic, failure, or doubt to
cloud the story, let alone the suggestion that this might be a man who looted the
cities that his army came to liberate" (6-7). On the other hand, there is the is the
soldier which does not appear in the official documents, but which is associated
with "the culture of vodka, makhorka, the lilting sayings – spontaneous verses
– that they called chastushky, and crude peasant jokes" (191).

Merridale refers to the Red Army as an institution which enforced the at-
tachment to the idea of an almighty Soviet state and to the Soviet citizenship.
She says that besides Russians, who were the majority, the Red Army contained
some other nationalities and ethnic groups and who evaded the traditional cate-

gories in favor of calling themselves "Soviets" (14). This aspect is also linked with the attempts to explain what made the Soviet soldier to fight, and in answering it Merridale refers to the ideology, to the confidence built by training when ideology failed, to terror (17), as well as to the special "Russian soul" or spirit. She refers to Richard Overy who argued that "material explanations of Soviet victory are never quite convincing", "it is difficult to write the history of the war without recognizing that some idea of a Russian "soul" or "spirit" mattered too much to ordinary people to be written off as mere sentimentality" (6). She also agrees that even if it is difficult to understand the loyalty in war, there is a "new kind of consciousness among the young" in relation to the love for motherland which involved preparedness for future wars (37-40). Merridale avoids using "patriotism" as an explanation, instead asking "what is the motivation of the soldiers whose lives had been poisoned by the very state for which they were about to fight. Few wonder, too, what insights future solders might have gleaned from parents or from older comrades who had survived other wars, seen other Russian governments, or learned the way to stay alive by watching just how other died" (6).

An important part of the book deals with the impact of the war, its interpretations and commemorative practices. In Merridale"s view the victory was understood differently by different social groups, which also differently benefited from it. In her words the victory was stolen from the soldiers immediately after the war ended, when "politicians rushed to make the victory their own" with standardized commemorative practices and censorship over the interpretations of the war (188-189). There have been numerous taboos on the real numbers of the war dead and victims and difficulties (or lack of interest) in dealing with the post-war trauma among the demobilized soldiers and their reintegration in the everyday life of the post-war period. With a well documented account she explains that the post-war Soviet system was not prepared to integrate the former soldiers and this provoked a massive crisis, not only in material terms, but also psychologically. Only with the war in Afganistan programs of post-traumatic disorder were implemented in the Soviet Union and only a few number of soldiers and militaries benefited from it. The dissolution of the Soviet Union did not bring much change. Merridale asserts that "the Russian government, too, has an interest in preserving a good memory of the war, for the victory over Fascism remains the greatest achievement that modern Russia can claim" (10).

Ivan"s War is an interesting reading for the academics interested in the Soviet and post-Soviet history, but will as well be attractive to the general audiences, especially now that we are witnessing a new wave of celebrating and remembering the Great Patriotic War in the former Soviet space and the insights which are given by this book could be revealing at such times.

Gabriela Popa,
Florence, Italy

Бреский О., Бреская О., *От транзитологии к теории Пограничья. Очерки деконструкции концепта "Восточная Европа".* **Вильнюс, ЕГУ, 2008, 340 с.**

La mijlocul anului 2008, în cadrul programului *Социальные трансформации в Пограничье (Беларусь, Молдова, Украина)* a văzut lumină un nou studiu consacrat proceselor desfăşurate în ultimele două decenii în estul Europei. Editat de Centrul de Studii Avansate şi Educaţie (CASE)1, monografia se înscrie în perspectiva de cercetare a societăţilor din spaţiul interstiţial care s-a detaşat de paradigma totalitar-imperială, dar rămasă, totuşi, până astăzi, în afara hotarelor Uniunii Europene. Astfel, frecventa sintagmă aplicată societăţilor est-europene - „societăţi aflate în proces de transformare sistemică", a semnalizat o perspectivă de cercetare a acestei regiuni. Tranzitologia în acest context şi-a elaborat propriul instrumentariu teoretic, implementat şi aplicat cu succes până la mijlocul decadei secolului al XXI-lea, atunci când i s-au conturat disfuncţionalităţile şi limitele teoretice. Criticii tranzitologiei, la această etapă, i-au semnalizat incapacitatea de analiză a „zonelor gri" din estul Europei, pasibile să interfereze elemente democratice şi autoritare într-un paradoxal echilibru şi susceptibile să suprime aşteptările transformărilor sociale rapide şi incontestabile. Mai mult decât atât, categoriile fundamentale ale tranzitologiei: „democraţie", „economie de piaţă", „stat de drept", „pluralism", „libertate", „constituţionalism" în societăţile post-sovietice au fost supuse unei ideologizări masive producând devalorizarea limbajului metodologic aplicat. Hotarele, care mai devreme delimitau sistemul socialist de restul lumii, şi-au schimbat trăsăturile, devenind hotare interne ale comunităţilor est-europene, care despart, astăzi, regiuni, elemente, straturi sociale etc. antrenate în procesele de transformare.

Primele două capitole ale studiului readuc în atenţie o istorie a tranzitologiei asociată cercetărilor spaţiilor de frontieră (borderland) şi validitatea acesteia pentru spaţiul Belarusi – Moldova – Ucraina propusă, acum câţiva ani, de un grup de cercetători de la Centrul de Studii Avansate şi Educaţie (CASE) a Universităţii Umanistice Europene (or. Vilnus, Lituania).

Capitolul *Hotarele şi spaţiul de frontieră a Europei de est (Границы и Восточноевропейское Пограничье)* se referă la contururile care localizează subiectul cercetării, în speţă, hotarele geografice şi limitele spaţiului social. Tratate de autori în calitate de „artefacte" ce păstrează „memoria comunităţilor în cele mai diferite timpuri şi stări", hotarele denotă conţinutul unic al culturii, oferă posibilitatea noilor generaţii să revină asupra angajamentelor abandonate în trecut sau să-şi constituie proiectele de prezent sau viitor. De altfel, s-a constatat că hotarele instituite de putere, adesea, nu se suprapun hotarelor culturale. „Harta fizică, la fel, nu indică asupra unor hotare palpabile între Europa de vest şi Europa de est, mai mult decât atât, nu există hotare indiscutabile între Moldova şi România, între Ucraina şi Slovacia, între Ucraina, Belarusi şi Polonia. Nu găsim hotare certe şi la est, acolo unde Moldova – prin Transnistria – se strecoară în Ucraina, unde Belarusi şi Ucraina, pe neobservate, se succed cu Rusia". Din punct de vedere geografic, la fel, nu avem temei să enunţăm acest

teritoriu în calitate de regiune. Doar o ciudată „cortină de fier", ceva ruginită, despică acest spațiu și incorporă comunităților probleme și obiective identice, care pot fi soluționate doar într-o anumită succesiune.

În aceiași dimensiune, următorul capitolul analizează imaginile spațiului est-european existente în mediile intelectuale, identificând oportunitățile descrierii structurale. Autorii susțin că după 1989 în Europa de Est sau declanșat procese de interacțiune a hotarelor și subiectele acestora, implicând "noi forme de comunicare socială", - un proces mult mai vast decât construcția statelor naționale. Acestea presupun implicarea spațiilor și mediilor de reflecție, comunicare și interacțiune, care fortifica propriile hotare circumscrise interstițiului est european. Astfel, Capitolul 5 evidențiază faptul, că în spațiul est-european există trei tipuri de hotare: civilizaționale, culturale și politice, deloc suprapuse, explicându-se și deconstruindu-se fenomenul la scară istorică pe exemplul spațiului care cuprinde actual teritoriul Poloniei și Republicii Belarusi. Autorii susțin, că o istorie separată a popoarelor sau o istorie separată a statelor moderne situate la vest de Oder este imposibilă. Nu există o istorie a națiunii „de la începuturi", deoarece aceasta nu a existat. Prin urmare, trecutul nu poate fi naționalizat, fără să-i recunoaștem apartenența la „un sistem de comunicare mult mai larg în estul Europei".

Cadrul vast de abordare a aspectelor studiate, complexitatea și natura materialului elucidat conferă cărții avantaje evidente sub raportul noutății. Studiul este, fără o îndoială, o realizare de valoare, ce reflectă ultimele realizări în cercetarea problemei spațiilor border în estul Europei.

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